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3    ʻThat seeming disorder which in essence is bourgeois order in the highest degreeʼ. 
    Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Winter Notes on Summer Impressions. (Evanston: Northwestern University 
 Press [1863] 1988, 37). 
  ʻI have come to bring fire on the earth, and how I wish it were already kindled! [...] Do you think I 
  came to bring peace on earth? No, I tell you, but division. From now on there will be five in one 
 family divided against each other, three against two and two against threeʼ 
The Gospel According to Luke (NIV) 12:49, 51-2. 
4Abstract
The last three decades have seen courts and constitutional bodies worldwide expand their activities
beyond the application of individual rights provisions and basic procedural justice norms into what
Ran Hirschl (2008, 98) calls ‘an elusive yet intuitive category of ‘existential’ national issues’. This
study aims to describe,  explain and assess the sub-Saharan African dimensions of this  shift.  Its
focus is on the politics of three high-profile cases from the continent’s Southern region. The first,
Campbell  v  Republic  of  Zimbabwe (2008),  was  brought  by farmers  opposing  Fast-Track  Land
Reform in Zimbabwe. The second, Sesana v The Attorney General (2006), challenged Botswana’s
decision to relocate the inhabitants of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve. The third, The Herero
People’s Reparation Corporation v Deutsche Bank AG, et  al.  (2001), demanded reparations for
colonial atrocity outside of bilateral relations frameworks. All three have had significant political
consequences, and have provoked ‘backlash’ from regional governments. But none have shown any
significant movement towards resolution.
The  first  part  of  this  study  describes  this  phenomenon.  The  second  provides  an  interpretive
explanation for it.  Drawing on the work of Donald Davidson and Mark Bevir, it  highlights the
emergence of new human rights beliefs in the 1970s. These can be explained by dilemmas emerging
from a dual crisis of socialist utopias and modernist administrative orthodoxies. Foucauldian and
constructivist  theories  can  account  neither  for  the  emergence  of  these  new beliefs,  nor  for  the
impossibility of deriving new behavioural norms from them to resolve political disputes. There are
particular  weaknesses  in  constructivist  ‘norm  spiral’  models  of  transnational  mobilisation,
knowledge-gathering, and international institutionalisation. This study’s third part argues that new
rights beliefs have expanded into realms of fundamental political order. Drawing on the work of
Bernard Williams it  provides  an evaluative argument  for  the moral  priority of Hobbesian ‘first
questions’.
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Part I
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1. Prelude
In 1988 game scouts forcibly evicted Maasai pastoralists from the Mkomazi Game Reserve
in northeastern Tanzania. The move was motivated by the government’s desire to improve wildlife
conservation on the reserve (Widner 2001, 372). Tourism, as for many other states in sub-Saharan
Africa, had become a promising means of attracting foreign capital in the wake of the imposed
political and economic liberalisations of that decade (e.g. Derman 1995). The Reserve had become
a significant asset. Maasai petitions to the Office of the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister
of  Home  Affairs,  the  Office  of  the  Attorney  General,  and  the  then  ruling  party  all  proved
unsuccessful (Widner 2001, 372-3).
Five  years  after  the  eviction,  however,  circumstances  appeared  to  shift  in  the  evictees’
favour. The numbers of ‘land-grabs’ - leases negotiated directly with the government by commercial
farming interests, without consultation with those living in the area - had increased significantly
elsewhere in  the intervening period (Shivji  1998).  Northern  Tanzanian  pastoralist  NGOs began
financing attempts to seek legal recognition of common title to land as ‘native communities’, as
defined by Tanzanian Land Law. A series of test-cases was initiated in order to establish customary
rights of occupancy (Tenga 1998).  This was greatly facilitated by the international visibility of
pastoralist  concerns.  In  1989  Moringe  ole  Parkipuny,  a  Tanzanian  MP and  long-time  Maasai
activist, had become the first African to address the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous
Populations (Hodgson 2009, 1). (The word ‘indigenous’ had previously been considered, even by
movement activists, as the reserve of non-European populations in former settler colonies.) The
Cold War’s end greatly hastened this recognition. International donors identified the ‘scaling-up’ of
pastoralist NGOs as key to their support for civil society during the country’s democratic transition,
and the funding of high-profile legal cases was an ideal means to this end (Igoe 2003; 2006, 405). 
The outcome of the Mkomazi Maasai’s case, however, was a considerable disappointment.
Judges were unwilling to take so firm a stand against government policy. One even refused to hear
the case on the grounds that it was ‘too politically difficult’, thus implicitly recognising its legal
merits (Igoe 2003, 879). The High Court Judge Eusebia Masuo recognised that individual plaintiffs
had customary rights, but judged that restitution was no longer practicable, and that compensation
should be paid. She rejected the plaintiffs’ attempt to represent their community as a whole (Widner
2001, 373).  The Court of Appeal  then upheld this  judgement,  despite considerable debate over
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whether observations by nineteenth-century German missionaries established claims to ancestral
title. In an interview with the political scientist Jennifer Widner, the notably independent-minded
Chief Justice Francis Nyalali later admitted he had been impressed by the evidence presented to
him. But he confessed to what Widner describes as ‘private concern about the public policy issues
involved’. A different decision, in his eyes, would have unlocked the ‘Pandora’s box’ of politicised
ethnicity in a country famously free from such tensions. As Nyalali concluded, ‘our national policy
on this subject developed over years of national struggle. The nationalist struggle was a vote against
sectarianism’ (Widner 2001, 374).
2. Introduction
A number of features of this narrative illustrate some new and striking African aspects of a
worldwide  phenomenon.  Courts  and  constitutional  bodies  now  increasingly  rule  on  ‘political’
questions that were previously decided by informal, administrative or legislative means. This is part
of  the  phenomenon which  political  scientists  call  the  ‘judicialisation  of  politics’ (e.g.  Tate  and
Vallinder 1995; Angell, Schjolden and Sieder 2005; Blichner and Molander 2008). Much of it is
familiar  to  Western  social  science.  It  can  be  explained  by later  twentieth-century  fears  of  the
discretionary  power  acquired  by  modern  states  (see  chapters  5  and  6).  Formulae  such  as
‘reasonableness’ and ‘proportionality’ were promoted as tools for courts to use in new areas of
activity. These notions were not intended to involve judges in the detail and policy-making and
administration, but rather to help them promote decision-making based on rational and objective
criteria. In the earlier part of century, as Max Weber described, such principles had been implicit in
administrative practice, but had not yet been formulated as legal rules, 
for the field of administrative activity proper, that is, for all state activities that fall outside the
field of law creation and court procedure, one is accustomed to claiming the freedom and
paramountcy of individual circumstances. General norms are held to play primarily a negative
role  as  barrier’s  to  the  official’s  positive  and  ‘creative’ activity,  which  should  never  be
regulated […] Yet … the rule and the rational estimation of ‘objective purposes’, as well as the
devotion to them, always exist as a norm of conduct (Weber [1922] 1978, 979).
By  the  1970s,  however,  Western  administrative  orthodoxies  no  longer  trusted  ‘creative’
administration.  This  is  well  illustrated  by  experiences  with  constitutionally-protected  socio-
economic rights. These constitutions may grant citizens access to housing and other necessities, but
judges themselves have been unwilling to dictate exactly how resources should be deployed to this
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end (e.g. Langford 2013, 194-7). Instead, they have deployed ‘reasonableness’ and notions of legal
procedure, seeking to ensure that administrative policies are indeed rationally calculated to achieve
constitutional objectives (see generally Eliya-Cohen and Porat 2013).
Such  issues,  however,  differ  clearly  from  those  that  confronted  Francis  Nyalali.  The
Mkomazi Maasai’s case exemplifies what Ran Hirschl (2008, 98) calls ‘the judicialisation of mega-
politics’. These judicialisations involve, broadly, cases which are unlikely to be resolved to legal-
professional satisfaction through procedural technique. They have as their inevitable corollary the
politicisation  of  judiciaries  and  judicial  appointments  (see  Malleson  and  Russell  2006).  As
Raymond Geuss (2008, 93) has argued in a different context, responses to these questions cannot be
derived from abstract principles. This is because ‘power, interests, priorities, values and forms of
legitimation concretely interact’.  In Hirschl’s  words (2008, 99) ‘adjudicating such matters is  an
inherently and substantively political exercise’. There was no specifically legal sense in which the
Tanzanian Chief Justice could justify his ‘private concern’ about the potential political implications
of his judgement. 
Hirschl  (2008,  98)  lists  several  subcategories  of  ‘mega-political’ judicialisations.  These
include the ‘judicial  scrutiny of executive-branch prerogatives in  the realms of macroeconomic
planning or national security … [the] judicialization of electoral processes; judicial corroboration of
regime transformation;  [and]  fundamental  restorative-justice dilemmas’ (for election disputes as
‘pure  politics’ see  R.A.  Miller  2004).  These  topics  have  already  attracted  some  interest  from
Africanist political science (e.g. Steytler 1995; VonDoepp 2009; Ellett 2013). There is, however, an
‘elusive yet intuitive distinction’ between these processes and a final item on Hirschl’s (2008, 98)
list:  ‘the judicialization of formative collective identity,  nation-building processes, and struggles
over the very definition or raison d’etre of the polity as such’. In Tanzania, Francis Nyalali refused
to  open  this  particular  ‘Pandora’s  Box’.  Elsewhere,  however,  courts  have  not  always  been  so
reticent.  Since  the  1980s,  for  example,  the  Israeli  Supreme Court  has  begun to  rule  on  which
Judaism is referred to by the country’s constitutional self-definition as a ‘Jewish and democratic
state’.  (This formulation had previously been the object  of fierce confrontation between liberal
secular and Orthodox political interests.) Meanwhile in Canada, similarly, the Supreme Court ruled
in 1995 that unilateral Quebecois secession would be illegal even following a majority vote, and
that secessionist claims had no basis in international law (for these examples Hirschl 2004).
 In the cases above, rulings over the definition of polities did not directly threaten economic-
structural and distributional change. In Tanzania, by contrast, as Jim Igoe notes, the precedent set by
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satisfaction of the pastoralists’ demands would have triggered a wholesale decentralisation of the
judiciary. All foreign investors and agencies would have been obliged to negotiate contracts directly
with local communities. This would have involved the ‘dismantling of established state and donor
institutions’ and the placing of ‘severe restrictions on foreign investment’. It would have amounted
to ‘nothing less than a radical restructuring of Tanzania’s place in the global economy’ (Igoe 2003,
881). Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, the courts preferred more symbolic acknowledgement of
the  pastoralists’ grievances.  (In  this  respect  their  decision  echoed  the  Australian  High  Court’s
famous  ruling  in  Mabo  v  Queensland  (1992),  which  acknowledged  aboriginal  communities’
ancestral  title,  but without drawing the radical consequence that European settlement was itself
illegal [Reynolds 1996]). 
3. Fundamental political order
To anticipate somewhat, the conclusion to this study will take these arguments a stage further. I will
advance  an  argument  for  the  moral priority  of  fundamental  political  order.  Following Bernard
Williams,  I  see the establishment of this  order,  in Hobbesian terms, as an answer to the ‘first’
political question. This is because ‘solving it is the condition of solving, indeed posing, any others’
(Williams 2005, 3). I take fundamental political order to be established when those conflicts over
the  very  ‘structure  of  authority’,  which  Lund  and  Boone  describe,  have  been  settled.  For
Hobbesians, of course, Leviathan can solve this ‘first’ question through straightforward coercion.
For Williams, by contrast - who follows Weber on this point - polities must legitimate themselves in
some  fashion  that  ‘makes  sense’  to  those  subject  to  their  authority  (Williams  2005,  11).
Considerable ‘consensus building’,  of the kind that  Boone describes,  is  obviously necessary to
achieve this.  Pace Williams’ critics, however, we need not insist that every single member of a
given society accept the legitimation offered them (contrast Freeden 2012). Williams’ (2005, 10)
notion of  fundamental  political  order  is  thus  inevitably ‘scalar’;  or  of  ‘variable  magnitude’,  in
Geuss’ (2008,  22)  terms.  ‘In  some states’,  as  Hall  (2013,  8)  writes,  ‘it  may be  impossible  to
legitimate power to all and we may have to accept that some people are simply being subordinated’.
Nonetheless,
despite the inherently contextualist nature of judgements about who must be satisfied by the
legitimation story, the difference between situations in which a story is offered and generally
accepted, and those in which the powerful either fail to offer a justification at all or offer one
that fails to make sense to their subjects, should in principle be clear.
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In terms of practical politics, my central argument here is that judicialisation can in fact
undermine efforts to answer ‘first questions’, by both Hobbesian  and Weberian means. This first
observation is an obvious one. The justification for many expansions of legal jurisdiction in the
twentieth-century has been to offer some possibility of redress to those confronted with the brute
power of Leviathan. As my case studies emphasise, however, such expansions have also facilitated
challenges  to  the  kinds  of  broad  consensus-building  necessary  for  legitimation.  This  point  is
perhaps  illustrated  most  dramatically  in  chapter  2,  which  describes  how  a  small  number  of
expropriated  farmers  in  Zimbabwe  have  been  able  to  continually  impinge  upon  the  emerging
political settlements brokered by country’s major political forces in Zimbabwe, and which many
have  seen  as  necessary  for  establishing  new  orders  in  land.  This  is  not  to  say  that  conflicts
surrounding fundamental  political  order  need always  be of  so great  a  magnitude.  On occasion
lawsuits may be useful components of broader campaigns to build consensus via socialisation. As
chapter 4 illustrates, there have been times when it appeared as if judicialisation might indeed play
such a role in Botswana; rather as some have hoped  Mabo might catalyse broader reconciliation
processes in Australia (although for sceptical comments see Gunstone 2012). By the very nature of
such conflicts, however, even if courtrooms  are used in this way, they will only ever represent a
small part of the political and institutional landscape that such consensus-builders must mobilise.
Even at this early stage, this argument must now be qualified with some additional caveats.
Even if, firstly, as Lund and Boone demonstrate, the current absence of such orders is a particularly
distinctive feature of politics in  sub-Saharan Africa,  this  is  not  to  say that  it  is  not  also found
elsewhere (for Indonesia, for example, see Lucas and Warren 2003; for Nicaragua Finley-Brook and
Offen 2009; for other African examples Greiner, Bollig and McCabe 2011; Camara 2013). As the
scale of the controversy provoked by Mabo has illustrated, however, it is now highly unusual in the
West.  For Williams (2005, 62), indeed, it  is precisely because these societies are comparatively
‘settled’ in this respect that they have tended to overlook the priority of order over rights. Or as
Geuss (2014, xi) puts it, whilst it is ‘natural for thinking people in the West to start by assuming that
the world is (finally) ‘in order’’, societies lacking ‘generally intact and recognised authorities’ may
have very different political priorities1.
As should be clear from my emphasis on judicialisation’s potential for dysfunction, this is in
no sense a teleological account. Contrary to the assumptions of modernisation theorists, there is no
claim here that fundamental political order will inevitably be established as a by-product of other
long-run processes of social change. And nor, in fact, does establishing it necessarily require the
elimination of all intermediary authorities between the state and the citizen - as such theories also
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once tended to assume (for an overview Klinghoffer 1973, 9-10). As some critics of the World
Bank’s recent proposals have argued, for example, conflicts over the structure of authority in rural
Africa  could,  in  theory,  be  mitigated  by  more,  not  less,  decentralisation  and  complexity  in
institutional design (Nugent 2010, 66). The key point, however, once again, is that for political
order to be established these decentralised institutions must either be enforced by Leviathan, or
have attained legitimacy in the eyes of those subject to them2.
4. Conceptual clarification
 None  of  this  should  be  taken  to  imply,  however,  that  judicialisations  of  fundamental
political order have been immune from political challenge. This is far from the case. To borrow a
term from international relations scholarship, these cases have all in fact triggered ‘backlash’ from
governments jealous of their prerogatives (e.g. Helfer 2002; compare Sikkink 2013, 152). This may
lead some to conclude that the term ‘judicialisation’ is mis-leading when applied to the cases here.
In  Zimbabwe,  for  example,  as  I  will  describe  in  the  next  chapter,  courts  began  to  rule  on
fundamental political questions during the same period that the ruling party elite began limiting the
power of judges (and bureaucrats) to constrain its actions. To be clear, therefore, I am not claiming
that ‘judicialisation’ characterises national politics as a whole in any of the countries studied, nor
that the law has become, or has ever been, free from political influence. In each case, rather, I trace
a  historical  shift  in  the  fora  where  one (albeit  central)  political  dispute  has,  historically,  been
decided.  In  a  number  of  cases,  moreover,  courts  adjudicating  these  disputes  have  in  fact  been
situated outside the relevant country’s borders. 
As  Blichner  and  Molander  (2008)  argue,  therefore,  an  unusual  degree  of  conceptual
precision will be necessary to navigate this terrain. Judicialisation has a variety of meanings, all of
which need to be distinguished (see also Roussel 2003). In this study, as should now be clear, I use
it only to denote ‘increased conflict-solving with reference to law’ (Blichner and Molander 2008,
44).  This  is  an  empirical  process  by which  ‘political’ questions  leave  informal,  legislative  and
bureaucratic arenas, and enter courtrooms. I do not use it to refer to increased judicial power, the
creation of new legal institutions and bureaucracies (sometimes referred to as ‘legalisation’), law’s
expansion  and  differentiation  (sometimes  referred  to  as  ‘juridification’),  or  to  ‘legal  framing’
(sometimes  referred  to  as  ‘juridicalisation’)  (Teubner  1987,  9;  Habermas  1987,  164-179;  M.
Shapiro  1994a;  Russell  1994,  166;  Abbot  et  al.  2000,  402;  Finnemore  and  Toope  2001,  744;
Blichner and Molander 2008, 39-43, 45-7). 
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This latter  process of ‘legal framing’,  as  Blichner and Molander (2008, 48) write, takes
place when ‘society develops a legal culture that extends beyond or even replaces other background
cultures’.  Without  it  ‘disagreement  on  legal  matters  would  tend  towards  disagreement  on  the
standing of the legal order and as such may threaten its stability’. ‘Backlash’ in Southern Africa can
indeed be partially explained by this lack of legal framing3.  But in my conclusion I argue that
scholars have under-estimated the obstacles confronting political attempts to definitively exit  legal
regimes.  The case studies  illustrate  how the  proliferation of  human rights  courts,  and the new
enforcement  possibilities  they offer,  have allowed litigating groups and individuals  to  continue
contesting adverse decisions beyond the borders of their state. In one interviewee’s words, analysed
in the next chapter, ‘as one door closes, another opens’. 
5. Case selection
 The  following three  chapters  thus  describe  an  empirical  process  of  judicialisation,  and
conclude by illustrating constraints on backlash. The truly systematic selection of ‘real-political’
cases  has,  however,  not  been possible.  The ‘intuitive’ quality of  the distinctions  Hirschl  draws
between  his  sub-categories  largely  precludes  their  quantification.  VonDoepp  (2009,  11),  for
instance, has attempted to use Hirschl (2004) to explain judicial autonomy in Southern Africa. He
does this using quantitative methods, and rendering judicialisation as a variable; to the best of my
knowledge the only scholar to do so (VonDoepp 2009, 25-6). Here, however, he is parasitic on the
intuitions of local ‘legal experts’, who classify his sample of cases according to whether they are of
high  or  low  ‘interest’  to  the  government  (see  also  Kapiszewski  2011,  490).  Even  these
approximations, however, are unsuited to this study. As VonDoepp and others have shown, a wide
range of ‘mega-political’ cases may be of high ‘interest’ to the government, perhaps most notably
those  involving  election  outcomes.  But  only  a  very  few  will  strike  at  the  heart  of  formative
collective identity and fundamental political order. Following VonDoepp’s method, therefore, would
have involved an even greater dependence on local experts and their finer-grained perceptions. 
The three cases were initially selected in late 2009. The first pitted a commercial farmer,
Mike Campbell, against the government of Zimbabwe which had expropriated his farm (chapter 2).
The second,  largely decided in  American  courtrooms,  involved demands  by Herero  and Nama
groups from Namibia for reparations from Germany (chapter 3). The third has seen a ‘Bushman’
representative,  Roy  Sesana,  challenge  the  government  of  Botswana’s  decision  to  relocate  the
inhabitants of the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (chapter 4). Another then much talked-about case
-  also  considered  in  2009,  and  which  has  now  been  treated  by  Alter  (2014,  260-267)  -  was
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Hadijatou  Mani Koraou  v  The  Republic  of  Niger  (2008).  Here  the  ECOWAS  (Economic
Community Of West African States) Court of Justice found against the government of Niger, ruling
that the applicant was living illegally as a slave. The political implications of this judgement were
potentially very significant, since tens and possibly hundreds of thousands of Nigériens had similar
statuses (depending on the definitions used). The Court’s decision to order only that the applicant be
liberated, however, limited its scope (a cautious strategy similar to that adopted in my Botswanan
case). More importantly, furthermore, whilst  Hadijatou did represent a profound challenge to an
existing social order, it did not involve the same formidable clutch of issues associated with land
and national identity as those eventually chosen. Concentrating on one  region was not, in short,
integral to the study’s original design. The initial intention was to draw tentative conclusions which
might  be  generalisable,  after  further  research,  to  a  wider  range of  sub-Saharan  situations.  The
Mkomazi Maasai cases, as well as the Enderois v Kenya case recently highlighted by Lynch (2012),
might also have suited.
In the event, nonetheless, a narrower regional focus has brought significant advantages. One
is that it has allowed me to control, to some extent at least, for some common normative biases
induced by the identities of key participants. In Southern African politics it is rare, to say the least,
for  the  Botswanan  and  Zimbabwean  governments  to  be  analysed  as  participants  in  the  same
process. And this is to say nothing of comparing white farmers with the ‘Bushmen’ of the Kalahari.
A second set of advantages is practical.  Financial  constraints  ensured that I  could travel to the
region only twice, for two six-week periods. Good road transport connections, however, allowed me
to conduct  30 interviews - in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa - with an almost
equal number of participants in each case. Interestingly, some interviewees had indirect connections
with,  and opinions about,  the other case studies.  This was a happy consequence of my narrow
regional focus. However, it also pointed towards how South African lawyers’ regional dominance,
and their particular traditions of ‘cause lawyering’, may overdetermine judicialisation in the region.
I  briefly discuss  this  possibility in  chapter  7,  and plan  to  investigate  it  further  in  forthcoming
research.
6. Method and materials
Both the choice of interview method and interviewees were almost entirely dictated by the
study’s design. At the project’s outset, semi-structured interviews were identified as necessary to
supplement the small quantities of material available. Court transcripts, notably, were unavailable.
In  the  Namibian  case  they  were  located  in  the  United  States,  whilst  political  sensitivities
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surrounding the Botswanan case meant they could not be accessed in-country. (Some researchers
believe that Survival International may have copies of these transcripts in London, but my efforts
proved unable to confirm this.) A distinct advantage of supplementing my material this way was
that it removed the need for sampling. All three case studies were naturally bounded, and I could
reasonably hope to contact almost all of those directly involved in them: lawyers, litigants, advisors,
expert witnesses, financial supporters and close observers. Once in-country a number of contact
names and details could be volunteered by other interviewees: the ‘snowballing’ method (famously
Bertaux and  Bertaux-Wiame 1981). (In the event, of course, not all were available for interview,
and  successor  lawsuits  before  and  after  fieldwork  somewhat  expanded  the  pool  of  potential
informants.) 
Predictably, however, the secondary literature on these cases has grown exponentially since
20104.  My  interviews,  whilst  still  extremely  valuable,  have  not  therefore  proved  quite  so
empirically  central  as  first  envisaged.  By  contrast,  they  proved  vital  for  the  explanatory  and
evaluative sections of  this  study (part  II  and conclusion).  As outlined in  chapter  5,  I  adopt  an
interpretive  approach  to  explanation,  focusing  on  the  changing  beliefs  of  actors  and  the
judicialisation strategies. These beliefs and strategies were the focus of my interviews. There is, of
course, no ‘logic of discovery’ which allows us to recover beliefs and strategies in pristine form
(Bevir 1999, 79-86). And lawyers often pose particular problems, since their political beliefs and
strategies must simultaneously be justified as legal ones (cf. M. Shapiro 1994b). But Pierce (2002)
has sought to persuade political scientists that even interviews with senior judges can reveal a great
deal. I was encouraged by his conclusions when designing my study, and my own interviews largely
confirmed them. My cases, however, were both sensitive and in some respects ongoing. A small
number of interviewees preferred, as a result, to talk entirely off the record. Approximately half
(very reasonably) requested to expressly approve any quotations used. Their concerns explain why
reference to interview material is frequently indirect.
7. Structure 
The organisation of the study presented numerous difficulties and is unorthodox as a result.
If gathered together, the empirical material relating to each case study would extend well beyond
the length of two conventional chapters. The theoretical material, meanwhile, would considerably
exceed the length of a conventional introduction. This would be difficult to read, and would most
likely be forgotten before it was illustrated. Part I of this study, therefore, is empirical and mostly
comprised of ‘thick description’ (Geertz 1973, chapter 1). It describes the judicialisation process
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that  will  later  be explained,  and illustrates the constraints  facing backlash against  it.  It  is  only
stylised explicitly to highlight periodisation and, occasionally, to anticipate arguments in part II.
This  second  part’s  theoretical  chapters  supplement  earlier  descriptive  material  with  additional
empirics necessary to explain it. 
8. Summary
The study as a  whole makes three claims. The first  is  descriptive:  the judicialisation of
fundamental political order is now a significant feature of Southern African politics. The second is
explanatory:  this judicialisation can be explained by the emergence of new rights beliefs in the
1970s -  beliefs  from which  determinate  behavioural  norms cannot  be derived,  and with which
governments cannot comply. The third claim is evaluative: these beliefs have obscured the moral
priority of basic political order. 
My descriptive claims are addressed in part I. Chapter 2 illustrates how courts have recently
begun  to  rule  on  the  substance  of  Zimbabwe’s  famous  ‘land  question’.  It  concludes  by
demonstrating the lengths to which the government has had to go to prevent them doing so; a
reflection of a new international order where international courts play greatly expanded roles (see
Alter 2014). Chapter 3 describes the process by which American courts could be asked to rule on
contested  principles  of  chieftaincy  selection  and  rural  authority  in  Namibia.  The  German  and
Namibian governments, as it shows, have been consistently obliged to seek negotiated solutions to
the reparations claim that first gave rise to these cases. In both countries, I argue,  neither human
rights laws nor human rights cultures would have sufficed to resolve disputes (for human rights
cultures see Rorty [1993] 1998, 170). Chapter 4, for its part, tells the story of  Sesana (2006), the
longest and most-expensive court case in Botswana’s history. This saw judges rule on the ‘mega-
political’ question of whether some Botswanans could be more ‘indigenous’ than others. 
Part  II  explains  this  phenomenon.  Chapter  5,  its  theoretical  introduction,  outlines  my
interpretive approach and justifies it against some constructivist and Foucauldian competitors. In
the rest of part II I will argue that these competitors - most particularly the famous ‘norm spiral’
model developed by Thomas Risse, Stephen Ropp and Kathryn Sikkink (1999; 2013) - are unable to
explain why norms, legal or behavioural, cannot be developed to govern cases like mine. To be
clear, I will not claim this model has no value. Indeed, I adopt its basic structure, using chapters 7-9
to track three of the norm spiral’s early stages: the emergence of activist networks, information-
gathering about violations, and the process leading to international norm institutionalisation (Risse
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and Sikkink 1999, 20). I do this, in part, to show how this model can account for normative change
in the domain of individual  subjectivities.  I  also do so,  however,  in order  to  highlight  how its
shortcomings in other domains become visible even at its earliest stages. It fails, most notably, to
explain how institutionalisation has failed to clarify the content of certain norms, most notably those
requiring the definition of groups. This shortcoming I ascribe to its failure to explain (rather than
simply assume) norm emergence; a weakness it shares with other constructivist and Foucauldian
accounts. The ideational context for this emergence, I argue throughout, is crucial for understanding
norms’ later dysfunction and indeterminacy. 
This objection, it should be noted, differs from those which Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (2013)
have sought address in their recent revision of their model. These revisions concede that compliance
with  norms can  be  enforced via  international  coercion,  sanctions,  and a  variety of  other  more
‘realist’ mechanisms (Risse and Ropp 2013, 10-15; compare Simmons 2009). A number of related
scope conditions for compliance have also been added, most notably a new emphasis on states’
capacity to enforce laws, and their ‘material vulnerability’ to external pressures (Risse and Ropp
2013, 15-20). The only modification to the model’s ideational content, however, is its new emphasis
on ‘regime-based counter  discourses  and narratives’ -  such as  East  Asian Values  and the Bush
administration’s ‘War on Terror’ - which some states have been able to use to defuse pressures from
new human rights norms (Risse and Ropp 2013, 15, 21). This revised model thus says nothing
about the ways in which compliance may prove impossible because of the nature of the rights
norms themselves.
Chapter 6 begins to prove this case by explaining the emergence of new beliefs about human
rights; an analytical advance over the norm spiral model, which largely assumes their existence. It
holds that their emergence in particular ideological contests of the 1970s lent them new kinds of
structural  indeterminacy.  Chapter 7 shows how these new beliefs explain the emergence of the
transnational movements with which Risse, Ropp and Sikkink begin their account. And it outlines
how particular  symbolic  technologies,  not abstract  rights  ideals,  have served to  mobilise  wider
constituencies behind these movements’ causes. Chapter 8 finds that these historical dynamics have
also  had  significant  consequences  for  the  knowledge  practices  justifying  rights  claims.  The
historical and anthropological professions, whilst shaped by the same new beliefs explaining the
emergence  of  social  movements,  also  possess  distinctive  disciplinary  histories  rendering  them
unwilling to justify rights-claims in ways that experts usually do. Chapter 9, finally, argues that the
new indeterminacy of  rights  beliefs  explains  why international  institutionalisation  has  failed  to
clarify their content, confounding constructivist expectations. In my conclusion I make my third
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(evaluative) claim: these findings entail modifications to the normative assessment of rights. Pace
sophisticated critical accounts, they do not simply re-shape subjectivities and behavior. They now
regulate domains pertaining to fundamental political  order, where even socialization and ‘rights
culture’ cannot order society in a liberal fashion.
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Chapter 2: Commercial agriculture and indigeneity in Zimbabwe
1. Introduction
In this chapter I tell one part of the turbulent recent history of commercial agriculture in
Zimbabwe. I do this with three objectives in mind. The first is to illustrate the process which the
previous chapter labelled ‘the judicialisation of fundamental political order’. Here I describe how
expropriated  farmers,  or  those  facing  expropriation,  have  been  able  to  make  use  of  new
opportunities  offered  by  laws  and  courts.  These  have  increasingly  allowed  them  not  only  to
challenge the process of  expropriation,  but  the new constitutional  order  such expropriation has
sought to create. My second objective is to show how political elites, of various stripes, have been
relatively  powerless  to  prevent  the  expansion  of  such  opportunities  for  litigation.  In  one
interviewee’s words ‘as one door closes, another one will open’. Finally, I outline the increasingly
stark tensions between the outcomes of this ongoing litigation and current efforts to build political
order  in  Zimbabwe.  My  focus  is  on  the  difficulties  involved  in  adequately  compensating
expropriated farmers faced by a state which lacks the resources to do so. I conclude by highlighting
how these tensions between the demands of law and politics have led global liberal actors to side
against human rights in this case. 
2. Judicialisation
(a) The pre-independence context
In 1978 40 per cent of land in Zimbabwe (then Rhodesia) belonged to white farmers. Whites
as a whole made up less than 4 per cent of the population (Selby 2006, 117). Thanks to the Land
Tenure Act of 1969, intensifying colonial segregation, Africans could not own land privately. They
could only occupy communal land administered by ‘tribal land authorities’ (see Alexander 2006,
chapter 5). The independence of neighbouring Mozambique in 1975, however - among other factors
-  had  already convinced the  white  minority  government  that  political  transition  was  inevitable
(Mtisi, Nyakudya, and Barnes 2009, 144). With insecure borders it could no longer successfully
prosecute the ‘Bush War’ against African nationalist rebel forces. In a belated effort at controlled
liberalisation, the Land Tenure Act was amended to allow African ownership in formerly white
areas (ICG 2004, 25).  
The  influential  Rhodesia  National  Farmers  Union  (RNFU)  supported  this  move,  but
prepared itself for mass sales and/or expropriation (Pilossof 2012, 82). The RNFU’s fears reflected
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more widespread expectations at the time. During independence negotiations at Lancaster House
(from 1960 to 1963), Britain had offered to ‘buy out’ white farmers in Kenya. Strong constitutional
protections of property would be introduced, but the departing colonial power would provide grants
and loans to help transfer one million acres of farmland to 25,000 African families. Most farmers
sold  their  holdings  (Harbeson  1971,  241-2).  Many  of  those  involved  in  Zimbabwe’s  own
independence negotiations at Lancaster House in 1979 believed that Britain would offer a similar
deal (e.g. Palmer 1990, 165; Kitching, 1st January 2009; Media Institute of Southern Africa,  June
24th 2010).  In  the  mid-1970s,  indeed,  Britain  had  pledged  $75  million  to  an  Anglo-American
development fund specifically for this purpose (Palmer 1990, 165-6). And in 1976 Henry Kissinger
had talked of $1 billion (Moyo 1991, 5). 
For reasons are still hotly disputed, however, a Kenya-style deal did not materialise (e.g.
ICG  2004,  28,  n.50;  Selby  2006,  112).  The  new  Thatcher  administration  offered  to  fund
resettlement programmes only (Palmer 1990, 167-8). The content of the new constitution’s ‘land
clause’ was highly contentious, and a priority for Patriotic Front (PF) negotiators representing the
leading nationalist groups - ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) and ZAPU (Zimbabwe
African People’s Union). Negotiations broke-down over both the issue of resettlement financing
and legal protections. Under pressure, notably, from Mozambique, however, which was concerned
about  regional  instability,  the  PF  eventually  accepted  a  deal  considerably  below  its  original
expectations (ICG 2004, 28, n.50; Media Institute of Southern Africa, June 24th 2010; Selby 2006,
111, 153; Mtisi, Nyakudya, and Barnes 2009, 165). Although a number of conference participants
later  reported  that  British  negotiators  promised  various  specific  sums  of  money,  none  was
committed to writing (Selby 2006, 141). The new 1980 constitution authorised expropriation (with
compensation) ‘to promote the public benefit’, but qualified this with provisions protecting property
that  would  be  almost  impossible  to  amend  during  a  ten-year  ‘grace-period’.  This  is  what  has
become  known,  somewhat  simplistically,  as  the  ‘willing-buyer,  willing-seller  clause’.  It  was,
broadly,  the outcome that  the RNFU, now CFU (Commercial  Farmers Union),  had lobbied for
(Selby 2006, 111-112).
(b) 1980-1990: informal negotiation
Despite these legal wranglings, however, in the first decade of Zimbabwean independence
the fate of commercial agriculture was almost entirely determined by informal contacts between the
government  and  the  CFU.  The  question  was  not  handled  by  the  higher  courts  (for  landmark
decisions  Dumbutshena  1998;  De  Bourbon  2003).  The  early  1980s  saw  some  significant
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resettlement, often in land vacated or not cultivated during the Bush War. But a difficult economic
climate, experienced across the continent, soon helped ensure that comparatively little attention was
paid  to  land  reform  and  rural  matters  (Palmer  1990,  169-170;  Selby  2006,  129).  Governing
orthodoxies, moreover, were largely modernist and welfarist (Alexander 2006, chapter 6). Health
and education were central priorities (Muzondidya 2009). As a result ‘recession-inspired cuts in the
resettlement programme were far deeper than those in other redistributive programmes’ (Alexander
1994, 335). The government had identified commercial agriculture as a crucial source of foreign
exchange. Its priorities dovetailed closely with the CFU’s not only on agricultural policy but also on
security, notably the eviction of ‘squatters’ occupying farmland (Herbst 1990, chapter 4; Palmer
1990, 170-171; Alexander 2006, chapter 6, 8; Pilossof  2012, 28-29). In 1989 the CFU President
went so far as declare that the new black nationalist government was the best farmers had ever seen
(Selby 2006, 182). In short,
despite  legal  ways  in  which  land  redistribution  could  have  been  brought  about  without
violating the letter of Lancaster House, it can be informed that a political decision was taken
not to contest the spirit of the agreement, tied in as it was with the whole complex of aid, trade
and investment (Stoneman 1988, 45, in Selby 2006, 140).
(c) 1990-1997: polarisation and the technocratic response
In 1990 the ‘grace-period’ contained in the Lancaster House constitution elapsed. This year
‘proved to be a watershed in government/farmer relations’. The ‘working partnership’ of the 1980s
‘quickly eroded and was replaced by antagonisms on both sides’ (Pilossof 2012, 29). For most of
the decade that followed, however, crucial decisions about land ownership continue to be made
outside the courts. As described below, bureaucrats and ruling-party technocrats largely succeeded
in maintaining overall control of the policy-process, despite a rapidly polarising political climate.  
In addition to new legal freedoms, a variety of new pragmatic considerations help explain
the government’s eagerness to politicise the land question in this period. 1987 saw the signing of the
Unity Accord, which dissolved ZAPU into ZANU to produce ZANU-PF. It put an end, notably, to a
period  of  brutal  ZANU-led  repression  of  ‘dissident’  ZAPU  supporters  in  Matabeleland
(Gukurahundi)  (CCRJ and LRF 1997).  Within three years,  however,  President Mugabe faced a
serious  electoral  threat  from Edgar  ‘2-boy’ Tekere  of  the  Zimbabwe Unity  Movement.  Tekere
denounced  corruption,  opposed  plans  for  a  one-party  state,  and  called  for  land  redistribution
(Sachikonye 1990, 94). This resonated with some rural constituencies (Muzondidya 2009, 190). To
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communal area farmers, in particular, ‘ZANU(PF) appeared increasingly corrupt and out of touch
[…] the  pressures  that  lay  behind  the  various  practices  of  ‘squatting’ …  went  unaddressed’
(Alexander 2006, 182). In response, both the President and Vice-President went on the rhetorical
offensive. Mugabe declared that ‘there shall never be a ‘no’ which we shall accept ever again from
landowners we approach for land’ (Alexander 2006, 181; Selby 2006, 182-3). 
After the 1990 elections the government unveiled a National Land Policy.  Any  land could
now be designated for acquisition, and compensation would no longer have to be paid in foreign
currency (Pilossof 2012, 29). This provoked an immediate reaction from the CFU. A new leadership
worried its predecessors by making land an issue for public debate. The largest ever gathering of
white farmers (more than 4,300) was assembled in central Harare to discuss tactics and express
opposition to designation (Selby 2006, 201-2; Pilossof 2012, 32, 94). This ‘new-found preparedness
to confront  aspects  of government  land policy’ was echoed,  to  some extent,  by the new Chief
Justice (Selby 2006, 203).  In a 1991 speech given to mark the opening of the new legal  year,
Anthony Gubbay outlined a doctrine of ‘essential features’ which would limit parliament’s ability to
amend the Constitution. In response the President asked Gubbay to resign, and Attorney General
Patrick  Chinamasa  criticised  him for  pre-judging  the  validity  of  forthcoming  legislation  (Horn
1994, 144-5).
Even at this time, however, there considerable dispute over whether the government was in
fact  more  than  rhetorically  committed  to  land  reform  (cf.  Moyo  1991,  22).  The  1992  Land
Acquisition Act (LAA), which provided a statutory basis for the National Land Policy, was certainly
poorly drafted,  even according to leading ZANU-PF technocrats  (Selby 2006, 205, n.17; Tendi
2010, 82-3). It created provincial committees to identify land for acquisition, staffed by ZANU-PF,
the  CFU,  and  Agritex  (the  Department  for  Agricultural,  Technical  and  Extension  Services).
Seemingly, however, they could not agree on the criteria for designation (Alexander 2006, 181).
Kumbirai Kangai,  the Minister for Lands,  Agriculture and Resettlement,  generally considered a
technocrat, complained that ‘land designation should be a technical matter and not up to politicians’
(Selby 2006, 222).  The criteria eventually used proved vague and unclear.  To the anger  of the
government,  individual designations were often defeated in court  on procedural grounds (Selby
2006, 222, 238; Pilossof 2012, 95). The CFU President declared it could ‘live with’ the LAA, and
declined to  challenge the substance of  the  policy in  courts.  Throughout  this  period  the  courts,
themselves, furthermore, declined to rule on the central political questions behind the act. Only one
case challenged the constitutionality of designation under the LAA: Davies and Others v Minister
of Lands, Agriculture and Water Development. But both the High Court and the Supreme Court
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dismissed the challenges (Magaisa 2011, 204).
In response to the LAA’s shortcomings, technocrats, notably those on Mandivamba Rukuni’s
Land Tenure Commission, sought to de-politicise the land question. They recommended a range of
market-based interventions,  including subdivisions  and land taxes,  favoured even by the World
Bank (World Bank, 1991; Rukuni Commission 1994; for criticisms Moyo 1995). Their proposals
dovetailed to some extent with ZANU-PF’s new stated intentions to change the racial composition
of the Zimbabwean middle-class,  notably in the commercial  farming sector (Muzondidya 2009,
191-2).  Such  a  move  was  rational  to  some  degree  given  new  budgetary  constraints.  In  1990
Zimbabwe had adopted a ‘home-grown’ Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) that drastically
reduced public expenditure, lowering incentives to invest in more populist land reform measures
(cf. Tshuma 1997). Less charitably, moreover, the new focus on the middle-class may also have
served to justify allocation of land to the politically-connected. In 1994 discontent over such alleged
practices erupted into controversy when a former Agriculture Minister was revealed to have been
awarded a resettlement  farm acquired for 33 families.  Mugabe responded by revoking all  state
leases  and  ‘the  credibility  of  government’s  reform  program  plummeted’  (Selby  2006,  223).
According to broad scholarly consensus, however, land reform in this period had in, in any case,
received nothing like the attention and investment that ZANU-PF rhetoric appeared to demand (e.g.
Muzondidya 2009, 190; Alexander 2006, 181; Miles-Tendi 2010, chapter 4).
(d) 1997-2001: political crisis and domestic judicialisation
By the late 1990s economic difficulties placed severe strain on the modernising orientation
favoured by ZANU-PF technocrats, and land reform returned to the political agenda. Donors failed
to  propose  a  ‘legalistic’  variant  of  such  a  programme  that  was  politically  attractive  to  the
government.  The  CFU,  meanwhile,  continued  legal  challenges  in  response  to  radicalising
government policy. By 2000, however, ZANU-PF publicly disavowed legal routes to land reform in
the face of serious electoral challenge. As we will see, the CFU then brought the substance of the
land question to courts, precipitating a wholesale replacement of the judiciary on political grounds,
and effectively putting an end to domestic judicialisation for the foreseeable future. 
In the later 1990s the government began facing strikes and opposition in urban areas, most
particularly from trade unions, students and other losers from structural adjustment (Raftopoulos
2009, 202-3). Veterans of the bush war, meanwhile, demonstrated violently in 1997 and threatened
ZANU-PF (for both movements see McCandless 2011). This widened divisions between ZANU-PF
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technocrats and those committed to a more populist anti-colonial nationalism (Kriger 2003, 191-
208). In late 1997 Mugabe acceded to their demands for improved pensions linked to ex-combatant
status, ‘thereby ushering in a new period of economic chaos and political re-alignment that heralded
a new politics of land’ (Alexander 2006, 183). On November 14th, ‘Black Friday’, the unbudgeted
Z$4 billion settlement with the war veterans saw the Zimbabwean dollar fall 75% in the space of a
few hours (Ramsamy 2006, 520). Land was now almost the only resource the government could
promise the discontented. Almost immediately 1,471 commercial farms were listed for compulsory
acquisition (Alexander 2006, 183).
Some in the CFU hierarchy were initially reticent about challenging these designations and
remained unwilling to  damage their  working relationship with the government.  ‘In response to
member concerns’, however, a central legal fund was created. This was to be used to challenge
individual designations, and not overall policy (Selby 2006, 239). As Kumbirai Kangai conceded at
the time, the criteria used for designations were largely ‘political’ (Selby 2006, 237). 40 per cent of
farms were de-listed and the ‘vast majority’ of remaining designations were then defeated in the
courts using the new legal fund. Kangai had asked the CFU not to make these challenges, implying
that further politicisation of land might thus be avoided (Pilossof 2012, 34). Earlier in the 1990s he
had accused farmers of ‘token comprises’, implying, in a similar fashion, that voluntary designation
might have pre-empted government action (Selby 2006, 235)5. 
The government, meanwhile - despite the growing popularity within its ranks of ‘political’
approaches  to  land  -  now  turned  to  international  donors  (Alexander  2006,  184).  Technocrats
including  Mandivamba  Rukuni liaised between policy-makers and farmers, producing a detailed
and costed plan for a high-profile conference in 1998 (Selby 2006, 268). This proposed to transfer 5
million hectares of land with due legal process and compensation, and obtained promises of funding
for technical assistance from the United States, Norway, Netherlands and Sweden, and the promise
of a  loan from the World Bank (Cliffe  et  al.  2011,  912).  The UNDP, meanwhile,  co-ordinated
discussions  about  a  new  national  policy.  The  recommendations  of  its  ‘Shivji  report’ included
subdivision,  land  taxes  and  a  number  of  other  technocratic  measures  already mooted  at  other
workshops and by the Rukuni Commission in 1994 (Selby 2006, 274). At a late stage, however,
Britain, which had been heavily involved in technical discussions, decided not participate. (Clare
Short, Secretary for International Development in the new Labour administration, had famously
written  to  Kangai  to  disclaim  any  ‘special  responsibility’ for  land  reform,  claiming  the  new
government was ‘without links to colonial interests’ [Tendi 2010, 87-93].) Almost immediately the
ZANU-PF  conference  listed  841  farms  for  acquisition,  violating  agreements  reached  at  the
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conference.  The  government  justified  this  by  pointing  to  Britain’s  abdication  of  its  historical
responsibilities.  Others,  however,  have  alleged  that  it  was  by  this  stage  no  longer  sincerely
committed to technocratic measures or land reform by legal process (Cliffe et al. 2011, 912; Selby
2006, 270-271; Pilossof 2012, 35, 51).
It was electoral competition, however, which finally precipitated ZANU-PF’s radicalisation
on the land question. 1999 saw the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),
which  emerged  from  the  associational  and  trade  union  opposition  politics  of  the  1990s.  It
participated,  alongside white  farmers,  in  the ‘no’ campaign in  the  constitutional  referendum of
2000,  advocating  the  maintenance  of  checks  on  executive  power  (Dorman  2001).  ZANU-PF’s
defeat in this vote ‘forced an immediate and dramatic shift’ in its tactics and legitimation strategies
(Alexander  2006,  185).  Within  a  matter  of  weeks  there  was  a  wave  of  (sometimes  violent)
‘occupations’ (or  ‘invasions’)  of  commercial  land.  The  number  of  these  had  certainly  been
increasing since 1998. But there is considerable debate, however, over whether this latest round was
co-ordinated by ZANU-PF, or was in fact led by radicalised war veterans and peasants (for an
overview Cliffe et al. 2011, 913). Circumstances certainly varied dramatically in different locales.
War  veterans  rarely  constituted  a  majority  of  ‘occupiers’ (or  ‘invaders’)  (cf.  Marongwe  2008,
chapter 5). Contrary to rumours in some commercial farming circles, moreover, it is clear that the
central government - even if it ‘closely orchestrated’ the ‘remaking of the state’ in this period - had
little input into the detail of occupations (Alexander 2006, 180; Laurie 2012). As illustrated later in
this chapter, attempts to understand and rationalise new patterns of land ownership continue to the
present.
The government, in any event, now refused to evict those it had previously described as
‘squatters’, and began encouraging future occupations. After (disputed) parliamentary elections in
June 2000 it labelled the process ‘Fast-Track Land Reform’ (FTLR), and identified two classes of
beneficiaries: smallholders (on ‘A1’ land), and medium-size farmers (on ‘A2’ land). FTLR became
a  key political  symbol  of  ‘patriotic  history’ (Ranger  2004;  Blessings-Miles  Tendi  2010).  This
narrative, omnipresent in the state-controlled media, portrays the occupations as redress for colonial
injustice  and dispossession.  Those  opposing it,  notably commercial  farmers  and the  MDC, are
labelled as ‘sell-outs’ and puppets of Western imperialism. The side-lining of ZANU-PF technocrats
was now definitive. In the words of one famous slogan, coined by the party’s manifesto for the June
2000 elections, ‘the land is the economy and the economy is the land’. 
Within the CFU there was, unsurprisingly, division and uncertainty over how to proceed. In
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July  a  number  of  occupations  were  challenged  in  the  courts.  The  only  immediate  effect  this
produced, however, was to induce backlash from the government (Pilossof 2012, 52). Mugabe now
announced that 3,000 farms would be acquired. A further set of challenges in September elicited
what would soon become a familiar form of response. (Alexander 2006, 188). The President, like
many party heavyweights, is a trained jurist, and ZANU-PF has rarely sought to disparage the law
per  se6.  As  Kibble  (2013,  93-4)  observes,  ‘there  has  always  been a  tendency in  ZANU-PF to
maintain the semblance of legality (even if post-hoc on occasion) despite its methods’ (see also
Booyson 2003). The party has consistently produced reasons - some taken from public law doctrine
-  why it  should  not  apply to  particular  situations  or  used  by particular  groups.  Now it  urged
Zimbabweans  not  to  let  ‘unrepentant  and  unapologetic  Rhodesians  … use  the  courts  and  the
constitutions against the masses’. Mugabe declared that whites would be tried for crimes in the
liberation war (Alexander 2006, 188).
Reactions such as these triggered a shift in the CFU away from confrontation and towards
compromise  (Selby 2006,  299,  309-310).  The most  notable  of  the  initiatives  to  result  was the
Zimbabwe Joint  Resettlement  Initiative  (ZJRI),  which  offered  one  million  hectares  of  land  in
exchange for orderly settlement. The ZJRI was devised by farmers who were close to ZANU-PF,
and it was backed by a resurgent older generation of CFU leaders who had previously enjoyed such
close relationships. It was even agreed to by Zimbabwe at a Commonwealth meeting in Abuja in
September 2001 (Pilossof 2012, 52, 55; Selby 2012, 310, n.781). Nonetheless, no action whatsoever
was forthcoming. These doomed efforts at negotiation were opposed by more intransigent farmers.
In November 2000, a case funded by the CFU finally challenged the substance of ZANU-PF land
reform. Advocate Adrian de Bourbon argued that the stated objective of acquiring 75 per cent of
Zimbabwe’s white farms could  only be achieved by violating legal process; a direct attack on a
central theme of ‘patriotic history’, and a judicialisation of ‘formative collective identity’ (Blair, 7 th
November 2000; Hirschl 2008, 98)7.  
Like many of those analysed in more detail elsewhere in this study, the CFU case was not
designed, primarily, to obtain a legal judgement that would be effectively enforced. The objective
was, rather, to publicise perceived moral outrages perpetuated by governments. The Supreme Court,
similarly, did not anticipate compliance with its decision. It criticised ZANU-PF’s use of ‘political’
criteria  for  designation,  citing  ‘[racial]  discrimination  in  contravention  of  the  constitution’.  It
directed the government to ‘restore the rule of law in commercial farming areas no later than July 1st
2001’, but there was no prospect that its orders would or could be carried-out (Pilossof 2012, 54).
The government was, predictably, incensed, and it sought to alter the composition of bench in order
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to obtain a more favourable result (see Southall 2013, 149). In a reflection of its legitimation as a
law-respecting regime, ZANU-PF used methods which were, strictly speaking, legal - even if  the
Court was ‘invaded’ by war veterans  on November 24th (Matyszak 2006).  Under severe pressure,
Chief Justice Gubbay was eventually obliged to resign in early 2001. He was replaced by the more
‘executive-minded’ Godfrey Chidyausiku. A new Supreme Court bench he headed ruled that FTLR
was constitutional after all (ICG 2004, 90; Chan 2003, 155, 167). The 4-1 majority included three
judges  appointed  only  two  months  previously,  and  excluded  senior  judges  including  Wilson
Sandura,  Simba  Muchechetere,  and  Nicholas  McNally.  In  the  year  following  Gubbay’s  forced
retirement  seven  Supreme  Court  judges  stepped  down  (Widner  and  Scher  2008,  262-5;  also
Marongwe 2008, 194). In some cases this followed threats from politicians in the media, and in
other  cases  when  rulings  against  the  government  were  overturned  by  Executive  orders  (see
generally Southall 2013, 148-150). Domestic possibilities for legal challenges the new order were
now significantly restricted. And splits within the commercial farming community would soon lead
new litigants to pursue international routes.
(e) New litigants and global judicialisation
By 2002 the CFU had decided to longer  fund legal  challenges  to  FTLR. It  would only
support farmers contesting individual acquisitions. Some of its leaders, meanwhile, continued to
advocate negotiations with ZANU-PF. This became increasingly unpopular with their membership,
the majority of whom had now been evicted from their farms. In mid-2002 a breakaway group was
founded to continue legal action: Justice for Agriculture (JAG) (Selby 2006, 310-311; anonymous
interview, April  2012).  Its  first  mission statement described how it  would continue challenging
FTLR in Zimbabwean courts, but also made reference to the need for ‘unbiased application of just
and  constitutional  laws  that  have  received  international  approval’  (JAG,  3rd August  2002).
Domestically JAG, unlike the CFU, would continue to challenge the constitutionality of the LAA
(Mukaro,  November  12th 2004;  Zimbabwe  Human  Rights  NGO  Forum 2010,  12).  This  was
consistent with its stated belief ‘in fully publicising injustices and bringing the deeds of darkness
into the light’ (JAG, 2nd April 2003). 
By  2003  JAG’s  primary  activity  had  become  the  collection  of  affidavits  and  the
documentation  of  losses  and  human  rights  violations.  The  scope  of  these  was  large  for  many
reasons. Perhaps most importantly, at this stage, JAG sought future compensation for a wide range
of  damages.  It  began  documenting  not  only  losses  to  land  and  improvements,  but  also  those
pertaining  to  (amongst  other  things)  trauma,  relocation,  and  ‘non-trading  consequential  losses’
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(JAG, 2nd April 2003). Furthermore, JAG announced its intention to counter ZANU-PF’s insistence
that its actions had been legalised by its retrospective legislation. If it could ‘convincingly prove
that the rule of law has broken down in Zimbabwe [South African President Thabo] Mbeki and the
rest of this regime’s apologists will then find it a lot more difficult to say, ‘Zimbabwe is complying
with its own laws’’. Perhaps even more ambitiously, finally, ‘if our courts fail us in Zimbabwe’,  it
announced plans for ‘pioneering legal challenges’ at the International Criminal Court and intended
‘international lobbying’ in ‘order to garner support for the cause of justice’ (JAG, 2nd April 2003).
(Neither case would in fact materialise).
These  latter  statements  are  among  the  first  indications  of  commercial  farming  groups
formulating a political programme for life in Zimbabwe after FTLR. The CFU’s legal challenge in
2000 had been primarily intended as symbolic challenge to ZANU-PF’s vision of Zimbabwe, and
not  as  an  intervention  in  political  processes  determining  new  property  rights  regimes.  It  thus
constituted a judicialisation of ‘mega-politics’, but not yet one of fundamental political order (see
chapter 1). JAG however, now began, tentatively, to argue for a new constitutional order:
JAG sees the current situation as an opportunity to create full independence of the individual
by giving him security of tenure, bankable title and full land ownership rights that have always
been denied to the communal and resettlement farmers in the past (JAG, 2nd April 2003). 
Thanks to struggles  internal  to the organisation,  however,  individuals  would do most to
press these demands. A key figure here was English-born farmer Ben Freeth; one of the strongest
critics of the CFU’s ‘appeasement’ of ZANU-PF (see Freeth 2011, chapter 10). In 2011 he recalled
farmers being instructed, at a CFU congress in 2001, to be ‘part of the solution and not part of the
problem’. For Freeth, given the nature of ZANU-PF, this view was ‘naïve’ and his own idealism
practical, ‘if we stood by the law and God’s principles, we would be part of the solution’ (Freeth
2011, 97). The CFU hierarchy had ‘appeased the evil aggressor’ (Freeth 2011, 104). In September
2002 he was controversially suspended as Mashonaland West Chairman for circulating an email
which criticised the government, and told farmers, amongst other things, to ‘use all just means to
attain justice! Do not compromise’ (Selby 2006, 311; Freeth 2011, 188).  
Freeth left the CFU and joined JAG to work on the proposed ‘rule of law’ case (Freeth 2011,
143). At JAG Freeth argued not only for private land rights regimes in a future Zimbabwe, but also,
even more optimistically, for the prior restitution of these rights to evicted farmers. This brought
him and  the  leadership  into  conflict  with  a  new group,  Agric  Africa  (Selby 2006,  312).  This
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commercial  enterprise offered to compensate Zimbabwean nationals for land and improvements
only,  more comprehensive damages claims relating to property covered by bilateral  investment
agreements. Freeth objected, inter alia, that 
a)  Agricafrica  [sic]  is  NOT  planning  to  challenge  in  the  courts  any  of  the
injustices  relating  to  the  expropriation  of  farms  belonging  to  Zimbabwean
citizens  (as  opposed  to  foreign  nationals  protected  by  International
agreements).
b)  Agricafrica  [sic]  is  NOT  planning  to  assist  in  documenting  and  getting
compensation  for  the  vast  area  of  ‘other  losses’  not  included  in  ‘land  and
improvements’.
c)  Agricafrica  [sic]  is  NOT  interested  in  restitution  claims  (through  ‘other
losses’)  to  rebuild  the  commercial  agricultural  sector  in  Zimbabwe  once
good title is recognised again (JAG Open Letter Forum, March 12th 2004). 
It would soon become clear, however, that Freeth’s programme could no longer be pursued
in  Zimbabwe.  In  November  2004  the  Supreme  Court  rejected  JAG’s  challenge  to  the
constitutionality of the LAA, with only one dissenting opinion (JAG Open Letter  Forum,  12th
November 2004). In June 2005 the government finally dispensed with Act, the complex drafting of
which had so often been criticised. The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 17) Act, which
became law three months later, took all lands previously listed for acquisition and vested them in
the state  with full  title.  Section 16B(3) forbade farmers from challenging acquisitions in court,
whilst the regulations that gave effect to the Amendment made it clear that no compensation needed
to  be  paid  for  title  to  be  transferred  (Jones  and  Dunn  2010,  1390;  Dore  2012-3a,  7-8).  This
represented a momentous shift in the constitutional order. Since at least 2002-3 some official voices
had recognised that the need for ‘some form of title’ in resettlement areas was ‘supremely urgent’
(Presidential  Land  Review  Committee,  25th  November  2003,  88)8.  And  the  plan  was  now  to
subdivide and lease commercial  farmland,  vested in  the state,  to  a  variety of  new owners  and
occupiers. In Boone and Lund’s (2013) terms, communal land rights now notionally co-existed with
a new tenure regime, combining private rights - enforced by the market - with user rights - policed
by the state.
Amendment 17 escalated commercial farmers’ campaigns. Action was delayed, however, by
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crippling  ‘internal  battle[s]’  within  JAG  (Freeth  2011,  152).  The  Chairman,  John  Worsley
Worswick, had long been ‘seen by many to be too dominating and confrontational in his leadership
style’ (Selby 2006, 311, n.878).  After more than a year of professional mediation and compulsory
arbitration Freeth and some of his supporters eventually resigned from the organisation (JAG, 28 th
September 2005)9. By this time, moreover, the farm which Freeth managed had itself been listed for
acquisition  (one  of  the  last  in  Mashonaland  West  to  be  so).  This  meant,  crucially,  that  Mike
Campbell, Freeth’s father-in-law and the man who actually owned the farm, now had locus standi to
launch legal challenges in his own name (see Freeth 2011, 147). Freeth severed formal links with
farmers’ groups and now, with the help of David Drury - his family lawyer and an experienced
opponent  of  FTLR acquisitions  -  began  assembling  his  legal  team for  a  more  comprehensive
challenge to ZANU-PF land reform (Ben Freeth, interview, 5th April 2012). He had soon secured the
services of  Jeremy Gauntlett, one of the best-known Advocates in South Africa. Gauntlett was a
some-time chair of the General Council of the Bar in South Africa and vice-president of the Bar for
the International Criminal Court. His willingness to do work even  pro bono was a real coup for
Freeth’s campaign (for this mobilisation see chapter 7).
Both Freeth and Drury have confirmed the outline of their early litigation strategies (David
Drury, interview, 4th April 2012; Ben Freeth, interview, 5th April 2012). Once again, there was no
initial expectation of success, given the probable composition of the bench. But now the objective
was not merely to publicise perceived moral outrages perpetuated by governments; ‘publicity is the
very soul of justice’ as Freeth puts it (Freeth 2011, 165; interview, 5 th April 2012). Freeth’s team
also hoped, in legal terms, to ‘exhaust domestic remedies’ and thus acquire the right to bring their
case to a (as yet unspecified) supranational court. They heard of such an opportunity whilst awaiting
the Supreme Court’s judgement on their challenge to Amendment 17, argued in April 2007. With no
judgement by August, they discovered their case might be admissible before the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) Tribunal  in  Windhoek, due to  open the next  week (see also
Freeth 2011, 154, 163-4; Dube and Midgely 2008, 305). After numerous delays, in July 2008 the
Tribunal eventually held that the ouster clause of Constitutional Amendment number 17 did not
exclude its jurisdiction. It ruled in favour of the applicants on both the issue of compensation and
(more controversially) racial discrimination (for analysis of the judgement Zongwe 2009; Ndlovu
2011). It rejected the government’s assertion that FLTR constituted a legitimate ‘public purpose’ in
a post-colonial state, reasoning (with only one judge dissenting) that, 
We wish to observe here that if: (a) the criteria adopted by the respondent in relation to the land
reform programme had not been arbitrary but reasonable and objective; (b) fair compensation
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was  paid  in  respect  of  the  expropriated  lands,  and  (c)  the  lands  expropriated  were  indeed
distributed to poor, landless and other disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or groups,
rendering the purpose of the programme legitimate, the differential  treatment afforded to the
Applicants would not constitute racial discrimination (Zongwe 2009, 23).
Most immediately, the government was ‘directed to take all necessary measures through its agents
to protect the possession, occupation and ownership of the lands of the Applicants’, and thus to
safeguard what remained of Zimbabwe’s private land rights regime for the 77 farmers now joined to
the case. Whilst even more controversially, as it would prove, the government was directed to pay
‘fair compensation’ to those who had already been expropriated.
3. ‘As one door closes, another one will open’: FTLR and international law
(a) Introduction
The  Government  of  Zimbabwe (GOZ)  did  not  initially  respond to  Campbell by openly
challenging the new liberal order that the Tribunal represented. Instead, it deployed James C. Scott’s
‘weapons  of  the  weak’. Behind  ‘the  façade  of  symbolic  and  ritual  compliance’ it  used  ‘foot
dragging,  dissimulation,  false  compliance,  [and]  feigned  ignorance’ (Scott  1985,  304).  Some
international  relations  constructivists  believe  that  rights-abusing  states  only  make  ‘tactical
concessions’ such as these after first challenging them with  ‘allegedly more valid’ norms such as
national sovereignty (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 24). In chapter 9 I will argue that such theories fail to
understand why such concessions do not lead to compliance. Here, by contrast, I will note only that
concessions  preceded the  invocation  of  allegedly  more  valid  norms.  Faced  with  determined
opposition from Freeth’s litigation team, the GOZ now openly re-asserted national sovereignty. Yet
even  their  boldest  attempts  at  ‘backlash’  have  proved  unable  to  protect  them  from  further
consequences (for backlash Helfer 2002). By persuading other regional governments to suspend the
Tribunal, the GOZ hoped to have isolated itself from international legal interference in its politics; a
road that some other African governments wish to follow to avoid the International Criminal Court
(see Mills 2012). Such hopes, however, are founded upon misunderstandings of new global legal
orders.  Litigants  have  been  able  to  pursue  the  GOZ  in  an  ever  expanding  variety  of
internationalised-domestic,  regional,  sub-regional  and parallel  international  fora  (a  phenomenon
analysed as ‘interlegality’ in  chapter  9).  Even the most determined ‘backlash’ now struggles to
extricate a government from the full range of these entanglements. The situation has been aptly
characterised by Marc Carrie-Wilson, legal advisor to the CFU: ‘rights don’t go away. As one door
closes, another one will open’ (interview, 5th April 2012). 
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(b) ‘Weapons of the weak’
The GOZ’s first reaction to Campbell was to delay proceedings. In late May 2008 it agreed
to take all reasonable and necessary steps to protect the applicants’ property during the case, but
gained a month’s breathing space by failing to file papers on time, reportedly blaming a broken fax
machine in the President’s office (Dube and Midgely 2008, 306; Freeth 2011, 164). Then, in late
June, when accused of not protecting farmers joined to the  Campbell claim, the GOZ lodged a
counter-affidavit  ‘substantially to the effect that there is a state of lawlessness prevailing in the
country  and  that  the  authorities  have  difficulty  in  addressing  the  problem of  intimidation  and
violence committed by certain people’. This counter-affidavit was rejected when the Tribunal heard
the main case in mid-July. This prompted the government’s legal team (led by Minister of Justice
and Legal Affairs Patrick Chinamasa) to ask for a one hour delay to consult ‘their principals’ in
Harare. On their return they GOZ asked for yet another delay, and more time to produce evidence
challenging that used to reject their counter-affidavit  (see Campbell v The Republic of Zimbabwe,
ruling on urgent application, 30th July 2008, paragraphs 2-4). 
At this point Jeremy Gauntlett, exasperated, claimed that his clients ‘were at the end of their
tether’ (Mugabe and the  White  African  2009).  The Tribunal  sympathised.  Dramatically,  and as
shown in a documentary about the trial (Mugabe and the White African), this ruling prompted the
GOZ’s legal team to walk out of court. The applicants’ evidence - which included graphic images of
injuries inflicted in retaliation for their lawsuit - was heard without objection (see chapter 8). It was
only challenged by Gerald Mlotshwa, a lawyer representing farmers resettled on the applicants’
land, who accused Freeth of ‘stage-managing political violence to ratchet up pressure on Harare’;
an absurd accusation in light of subsequent evidence (The Herald, 23rd July 2008) . 
(c) Backlash
The GOZ’s re-assertion of sovereignty began immediately. The  Campbell judgement was
delivered in November 2008. Deputy Chief Justice Malaba used a speech at the 2009 opening of the
legal year to denounce the Tribunal’s jurisdiction (The Herald, 13th January 2009). These arguments
were  developed  later  that  year  as  a  response  to  the  litigation  team’s  unsuccessful  attempts  to
‘register’ the  Campbell judgement  in  Zimbabwe.  The  GOZ now argued that  the  Tribunal  was
illegally constituted because the relevant protocol of the SADC Treaty had not been ratified (see
Hondora 2010, 9). I am in no position to comment on the technicalities of this dispute (for an
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overview  Matyszak 2011, 2-3).  Publicly,  however,  the GOZ’s position appeared to  constitute  a
remarkable  volte  face.  Contrary  to  the  assumptions  of  constructivists  and  other  international
relations scholars, as I will argue in chapter 9, ratification had reflected an almost total lack of long-
term strategic thinking about how to deal with international institutions (cf. Brett and Gissel 2013).
Most remarkably of all, in 2005 the GOZ had even sent a judge (Antonina Guvava) to a Tribunal it
now  claimed  to  be  illegally  constituted  (Hansungule  2013,  137).  During  Campbell  Deputy
Attorney-General Prince Machaya declared that ‘our Minister of Justice concurred in my discussion
with him that Respondent had an obligation to comply at the international level with the orders of
this  Tribunal  and  that  he  was  going  to  inform  his  Cabinet  colleagues  accordingly’  (The
Zimbabwean, 12th July 2009). Yet only a week later, a leaked Cabinet memo, a summary of which
was then itself leaked by Wikileaks, reported that: 
Cabinet dismissed the order and noted that the [interim] injunction, "the effect of which was to
reverse the sacrosanct land reform programme, amounted to blatant negation of the country’s
history  and  it’s  liberation  struggle,"  and  did  not  override  Zimbabwean  law.  The  Cabinet
asserted that  the  country’s  laws relating  to  land "should  remain  in  force"  and left  further
"interface" with the SADC Tribunal to the Minister of Justice [...]  The memo directed the
police to disregard the SADC injunction, based on the Cabinet position that the injunction was
a result of Western interference and [...] grounds a basis for the enemy to fight on because it
has been proven to be worth it by a SADC body (U.S. Embassy, Harare, 28th July 2008).
Time was of the essence if the GOZ was to protect itself from the Tribunal. The success of
Campbell had  led  to  a  flurry  of  applications  from  other  commercial  farmers  being  made  in
Windhoek10.  The CFU itself,  meanwhile, no longer insistent on purely negotiated solutions, had
obtained a case number for an application to obtain more clarity about the ‘fair’ compensation
prescribed in Campbell (Marc Carrie-Wilson and Ben Purcell-Gilpin interview, 5th April 2012)11. In
July  2009  Chinamasa  sought  to  persuade  SADC Ministers  of  Justice  and  Attorneys-General  -
meeting to discuss non-compliance with Campbell - that the Tribunal was illegally constituted (see
Matyszak 2011, 3, n.18; Cowell 2013, 159). The Council of Ministers, responding to Zimbabwe’s
objections,  recommended that  the 2010 Summit  of  SADC Heads of  State  commission a  report
reviewing the  role, functions and terms of reference of the Tribunal. The Summit agreed. During
this review period the Tribunal would take on no new cases for six months and all but one of the
five Campbell judges’ terms of office were not renewed. Despite the Secretariat’s protestations to
the  contrary,  this  amounted  to  a  temporary  suspension  (Gauntlett  2010b;  The  Southern  Africa
Litigation Centre and Ditshwanelo, The Botswana Centre of Human Rights, 4th November 2010,
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paragraphs 3-7). For President Mugabe, meanwhile, backlash was complete,
We [the Summit] are the creators of this monster and we said we thought we had created an
animal which was proper, but no, we had created a monster. We understand that there was
interference or interventions by some countries (such as Britain) that the tribunal would be in
place and the farmers would come to it.  [But] now the house has collapsed and all  those
decisions which it made on Zimbabwe will become invalid (in Nathan 2012, 119).
The  SADC’s  report,  however  -  written  by  Cambridge  University  academic  Dr  Lorand
Bartels  (2011)  -  recommended  that  the  Tribunal’s  powers  be  reinforced.  These  findings  were
discussed at an Extraordinary Summit in Windhoek in May 2011 (Nathan 2013, 878). This, in turn,
decided that the Tribunal now be suspended until August 2012, amid allegations by some NGOs
that Namibian police had turned a blind-eye to harassment by Zimbabwean security officials and
the distribution of anti-MDC propaganda by ZANU-PF youths (The SADC Lawyers’ Association,
23rd May 2011). This final Summit, held in Maputo, Mozambique, was the nail in the Tribunal’s
coffin.  The  assembled  Heads  of  State,  again  to  the  dismay  of  international  observers  and
campaigners including Desmond Tutu, restricted individual access to the Tribunal, stripping it of its
human rights jurisdiction (e.g. SADC Tribunal Rights Watch,14th August 2012; Melber, 17th August
2012; Cowell 2013). 
(d) Other new legal avenues
(i) The legal institutions of the African Union
The litigants’ first response to the Summit’s actions was to bring the first ever legal action by
individuals against more than one head of state. In July 2011 fourteen SADC leaders were accused
of having illegally suspended the Tribunal’s proceedings12. The case, prepared by Jeremy Gauntlett
and Frank Pelser,  was brought  in  the name of  Ben Freeth and Luke Tembani,  one of  the first
(according to his legal team the first) black Zimbabweans to have acquired freehold to agricultural
land after 1980 (SADC Tribunal Rights Watch,  19th May 2011; Gauntlett  2012)13.  Tembani and
Freeth’s lawyers  had wanted to  approach the African Court of Human and People’s Rights;  an
institution established in 2004 as part of the African Union’s symbolic shift away from a continental
order founded purely on state sovereignty (cf. Touray 2005). 
This, however, encountered procedural difficulties. The litigants had hoped to have the case
passed on to the Court by the African Commission on Human People’s Rights (Jeremy Gauntlett,
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personal communication, 7th May 2011). Only 26 states had ratified the Court’s protocol, however,
and Zimbabwe was not among them14. The Commission refused to pass the case on to the court,
preferring to hear the case itself as a quasi-judicial body (Mike Campbell Foundation, February
2013; Gauntlett and Pelser, 17th January 2013). After long deliberations it did ‘not find any Charter
obligation on the respondent states to guarantee the independence,  competence and institutional
integrity of the SADC Tribunal’,  but only one to guarantee such for national courts (Spies and
Freeth, 5th March 2014)15. Freeth and his team are now ‘initiating an application to the UN Human
Rights committee regarding the illegal closure’ (Mike Campbell Foundation, June 2014). None of
this is to say, however, that their case has been without real-world effects. In the words of one NGO
activist engaged with these questions, SADC states have been infuriated by still being ‘faced with
this  mess  from Zimbabwe’ (anonymous  interview,  May 2012).  Tanzania  and Mauritius  -  often
considered liberal states supportive of the international legal order - made technical objections to
the case’s  admissibility. And every state had to go to the effort and expense of responding to the
case (heard in Banjul, Gambia) (see Gauntlett and Pelser, 17th January 2013, paragraph 12). For the
NGOs dedicated to building new Pan-African institutions, moreover, the case was of considerable
significance (Makanatsa Makonese, interview, 30th April 2012). Some of them informed the litigants
at an early stage that the case risked endangering the larger project of socialising African states into
accepting oversight from liberal institutions (Lloyd Kuveya, interview, 3rd May 2012). In November
2012, two months before Gauntlett and Pelser’s submission was heard,  the Pan African Lawyers
Union (PALU) and the Southern African Litigation Centre (SALC), supported by the International
Commission of Jurists and Southern African Lawyers’ Association, approached the Court and asked
for a simple advisory opinion on the matter;  a move clearly devised to minimise confrontation
between member states and new institutions (Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa, 4th August
2011; Pan African Lawyers Union and Southern Africa Litigation Centre, 26th November 2012).
(ii) Crimes against Humanity and the Rome Statute
The efforts of SALC and Freeth’s team have, by contrast, dovetailed neatly in another area:
making use of South Africa’s ‘domestication’ of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC). By passing its 2002 ‘ICC Act’, South Africa had become the first African country to
oblige its courts to prosecute perpetrators of crimes against humanity when such persons ‘after the
commission of the crime ... [are] present in the territory of the Republic’16. And in 2012 SALC
launched the first case testing the scope of these obligations17. Politically, it was designed both to
highlight ZANU-PF repression and to hold South Africa to its proclaimed liberal ideals. It was
argued by Wim Trengrove - who had represented Nelson Mandela, prosecuted Jacob Zuma, and
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successfully argued for the abolition of the death penalty - and Max du Plessis, an academic who
had  written  about  how  the  international  community  should  respond  to  political  transition  in
Zimbabwe (if and when it comes) (see Beresford, 26th November 2006; du Plessis and Ford 2009). 
The case dealt with alleged torture of MDC activists arrested at the party’s headquarters,
Harvest House, in March 2007. In 2008 SALC and the Zimbabwean Exiles Forum (ZEF) passed
evidence to the South African National Prosecuting Authority’s (NPA) Priority Crimes Litigation
Unit. This evidence related to Zimbabwean officials who are regularly ‘present’ in South Africa on
personal and official business. 14 months later the NPA informed SALC and ZEF that they would
not investigate. The subsequent litigation in the North Gauteng High Court challenged their reasons
for refusal. Very broadly speaking, the NPA’s arguments about jurisdiction centred around three
contentions: crimes could only be investigated once perpetrators were present in South Africa, such
investigations violated Zimbabwean sovereignty,  and such investigations would also, on a more
practical level, undermine police co-operation between the two countries and South Africa’s role as
a  ‘mediator’ between  the  MDC  and  ZANU-PF.  The  Court,  however,  refused  to  accept  these
arguments,  and  ruled  that  the  NPA must  investigate  these  crimes  against  humanity  (for  this
paragraph see n.15 above). 
The NPA, in response, continued to cite diplomatic tensions between the two countries as
reasons not to comply (Bell, 3rd December 2013). Patrick Chinamasa, for his part, castigated the
decision, declaring that the ‘same forces who took the government to the so-called Land Tribunal in
Namibia with the aim of reversing the land reform programme are the same forces trying to fulfil
their  agenda through the back door’ (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation,  8th May 2012). This
claim was not wholly correct. The Harvest House case was not jointly devised by SALC and ZEF,
and Ben Freeth and his team. Nevertheless, in November 2013, a week after the Supreme Court of
Appeal had upheld the original ruling on Harvest House, Ben Freeth and Afriforum (see chapter 7)
did indeed submit their own evidence to South African police. This evidence has now been passed
to ‘the Hawks’, South Africa’s  highest investigatory body. It implicates ‘58 named perpetrators’ -
including high-ranking Ministers, officials, and military personnel - in violence against farmers and
farmworkers  amounting  to  crimes  against  humanity  (Bell,  3rd December  2013).  (The  case  is
currently ongoing, and has been appealed by the South African Police Service to the Constitutional
Court [Mabuza, 4th February 2014].)
This  case  had  been  long  in  the  making.  Freeth,  JAG,  and  GAPWUZ  (The  General
Agricultural and Plantation Workers Union of Zimbabwe) had earlier pursued similar data-gathering
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initiatives (see Zimbabwean NGO Forum 2007; JAG and GAPWUZ 2010; Laurie 2012). But in
2008 some of Freeth’s sympathisers began to approach the project with the ICC in mind. (Zimbabwe
had not itself ratified the ICC treaty.) The background to this move was rapid disenchantment with
the MDC in commercial farming circles, following its acceptance of power-sharing following the
2008 elections. One interviewee, who must remain anonymous, described this work in the following
terms ‘We’re trying to cut out [the] MDC … Ben and I are working along same paths … I am doing
human rights … he’s doing land’ (interview, April 2012). This work was encouraged by rulings by
British  immigration  tribunals  that  violence  against  farmworkers  did  indeed  constitute  a  crime
against humanity (JAG, 7th November 2010). According to Freeth, the Supreme Court of Appeal’s
judgement now ‘opens the door’ for perpetrators ‘to be arrested if they come to South Africa’ and
‘for us to put the case into other countries as well’ (Mike Campbell Foundation, 12 th September
2013). The domestication of international criminal law thus multiplies the ways in which it can be
used, and even - in Southern Africa - provides it with some means of enforcement.
(iii) Enforcing Campbell in South African courts
The  Campbell  litigants  have  not  only  sought  to  restrict  the  movement  of  Zimbabwean
officials. Within a month of the High Court’s refusal to register their judgement in Zimbabwe, they
obtained registration in South Africa; the first step towards its domestic enforcement (Jones and
Dunn 2010, de Wet 2011, 591). The application was made to the North Gauteng High Court in the
name of Mike Campbell and two other farmers (Louis Fick, Richard Etheredge) who had joined the
SADC case18.  (It was supported by AfriForum: an Afrikaner minority rights group, whose most
high-profile campaign sought public donations for a hate-speech action against Julius Malema [see
South African Press Association, 10th April 2011].) The organisation was approached by the CFU in
2009, and sought to create a ‘legal framework’ ensuring that property rights would not be ‘left
behind’ by a future government (Willie Spies, interview, 8th August 2011). This team initially sought
only punitive costs of US$5,816.47 which had been imposed by the Tribunal for non-compliance
with its orders (for the rest of this paragraph, unless otherwise indicated, see Media Institute of
Southern Africa,  26th March 2010;  Sokwanele,  21st September  2012;  Zhangazha,  5th July 2013;
Koyana, 12th July 2013; Spies, 12th September 2013; Smith, 17th September 2013). After the ruling
three Cape Town properties belonging to  the GOZ were ‘attached’ (when property is  seized to
ensure  satisfaction  of  a  judgement).  Two  of  these  efforts  failed  when  the  GOZ  occupied  the
buildings  and  claimed  diplomatic  immunity.  A third  property,  however  -  the  now  famous  28
Salisbury Avenue, Kenilworth (worth approximately £300,000) -  was successfully attached, and
permission obtained to auction it off. In 2011 the North Gauteng High Court dismissed objections
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from the GOZ on the grounds that ‘the old doctrine of sovereign immunity has yielded to a more
restrictive doctrine ... in human rights affairs’ (The Republic of Zimbabwe v. Louis Fick et al. 2011).
In September 2013, finally, after two unsuccessful appeals, and just a week before 28 Salisbury
Avenue  was  listed  for  sale,  the  GOZ approached  Spies  with  payment  for  punitive  costs.  This
prevented a sale which, according to Afriforum, would have, for ‘the first time in international legal
history’, allowed individuals to ‘proceed with the legal sale of a property belonging to a state found
guilty of gross human rights violations’. (The Zimbabwean Embassy in South Africa denied all
knowledge of the transaction.)
After this ‘first step’ in its ‘struggle for justice for Zimbabwean farmers’ Afriforum now
hopes to recover farmers’ full  legal costs,  estimated at  £192,344 (Smith,  17 th September 2013).
Other property previously identified for attachment includes the reportedly abandoned Zimbabwean
consulate in Cape Town and, according to Jeremy Gauntlett, a GOZ aircraft ‘pressed into service for
the  indispensible  objective  of  a  state  visit  to  the  Jimmy Choo  shop  in  Sandton [a  famously
expensive residential  and retail  district  of Johannesburg]’ (Gauntlett  2011).  As Willie  Spies has
described, moreover, the potential for this kind of extraterritorial enforcement of rulings in South
Africa is particularly great since ‘South Africa remains Zimbabwe’s most important trading partner
and goods and services flow through this country en route to and from Zimbabwe’ (in Zhangazha,
5th July 2013).  A report in  The Yale Journal of International Law  concurs,  citing South African
economic dominance as a reason to consider the SADC Tribunal ‘a much more powerful force for
human rights in the region than the tribunal’s founders ever foresaw’ (Hemel and Schalkwyk 2010,
517,  522).  (Jurisprudence  discussed  in  the  next  chapter,  similarly,  illustrates  how  the  global
dominance of  the United States can grant  some domestic  courts  unusually effective degrees  of
universal jurisdiction.)
(iv) Expanding the scope of diplomatic protection
‘Realist’ considerations of this sort may help explain why South African courts can play
such ‘activist’ roles. But they cannot account for why and when they actually choose to do so. In
chapter 5 I challenge such explanations, and provide an interpretive political science account of
why courts have become willing to pronounce on ‘mega-political questions’. A particularly striking
example of this was provided by the judgement of the Traansvaal Division of the South African
High Court in the matter of Von Abo v The Government of the Republic of South Africa (2009). The
case was not one in which Freeth’s team were involved, but was one they followed with interest
(Willie Spies, interview, 8th August 2011). The applicant, a South African citizen, had arrived in
48
Southern Rhodesia (as it then was) in 1955. Justice Prinsloo noted how he had then, thanks to
‘substantial personal sacrifice, business acumen, the ability to persist in correct decision taking, and
unmitigated hard work’ been able to assemble a ‘considerable farming empire in Zimbabwe’ (Von
Abo v The Government of the Republic of South Africa 2009, paragraphs 3, 6 and 7). His property
was  then  expropriated  as  part  of  FTLR.  Surprisingly,  Justice  Prinsloo  now  ruled  that  the
Government of South Africa was under a ‘constitutional obligation to provide diplomatic protection
to the applicant’ and had sixty days to ‘take all necessary steps to have the applicant’s violation of
his rights by the Government of Zimbabwe remedied’ (paragraphs 14-16).
A hallmark  of  ‘mega-political  cases’,  and  especially  of  judicialisations  of  fundamental
political order, is that they cannot be resolved by establishing determinate principles with which
governments can comply.  There is simply no means to assess whether the GSA had taken ‘the
necessary steps’ to ensure that the GOZ was no longer ‘violating’ Mr. Von Abo’s rights. In a follow-
up hearing  on this  issue  Justice  Prinsloo  rejected  the  GSA’s  objection  that  it  could  not  ‘have
persuaded the Zimbabwean Government to abandon or reverse their execution of the Land Reform
Program’; finding, inter alia, that they could have ‘relied on the judgement of the [SADC] tribunal
to fortify their efforts to employ effective diplomatic interventions on behalf of the applicant’ (Von
Abo v The Government of the Republic of South Africa 2010, paragraphs 58, 66). This conclusion
was  reached  on  extraordinary  grounds.  ‘The  internationally  recognised  forms  of  diplomatic
intervention’, Justice Prinsloo held, 
have been designed to force offending states to tow the line. There is no room for an argument
that diplomatic intervention becomes toothless, simply because the offending state exhibits no
intention ever to co-operate [...] South Africa is the power house of the region. It is common
knowledge that Zimbabwe is dependent on South Africa for almost every conceivable form of
aid and assistance (paragraph 67).
Even for Willie Spies this judgement constituted ‘quite a drastic intervention by the judiciary’, and
potentially transgressed the principle that there ‘should be a separation between the judiciary and
the executive’ (Willie Spies, interview, 8th August 2011). The Supreme Court of Appeal, for its part,
found  that  ‘compliance  with  this  order  was  impossible  ...  for  any  government  in  the  world’
(Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Von Abo 2011, paragraph 27).  
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(v) International commercial law and privileged litigants
Perhaps the most ambitious of Mr Von Abo’s requests was that South Africa ‘become party
to the ‘International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), in order that the
applicant might pursue a compensation claim against the government of Zimbabwe’ (Von Abo v.
The Government of the Republic of South Africa 2009, paragraph 16). He had hoped, thus, to follow
in the footsteps of German and Dutch nationals. These farmers had exploited provisions in Bilateral
Investment  Promotion  and  Protection  Agreements  (BIPPAs)  signed  by  these  countries  and
Zimbabwe which  allowed  them to  challenge  expropriations  at  the  International  Centre  for  the
Settlement of Investment Disputes in Washington D.C. In November 2009, after long negotiations,
South Africa did finally sign a  BIPPA with Zimbabwe in order to renew investor confidence (see
U.S. Embassy, Harare, 30th November 2009). Despite legal challenges from Louis Fick, however, it
offered no legal redress to 250 South African farmers expropriated by FTLR (see CFU Calling, 12th
February 2010). This was a particular disappointment for them since, as described below, ICSID
cases have elicited more compliance from the GOZ than the judgements of the SADC Tribunal, and
have received more diplomatic support from their embassies in-country. Such support, of course,
has not been available to Zimbabwean nationals. Legal commentators have pointed to the apparent
unfairness of this situation; a departure from the equal treatment for foreign investors that such
agreements were originally devised to promote (e.g. Petersen and Garland 2010, 14-15).
Since the beginning of FTLR the Dutch Embassy in Harare has been the most active on this
issue.  Their  demands for enforcement of ICSID judgements were ongoing in 2012 (Dave Fish,
interview, 19th April 2012). (The British government, notably, still prefers, in post-colonial fashion,
to operate through informal channels.) In November 2000 it received a  Note Verbale  confirming
that Dutch nationals’ farms would be exempt from acquisition. These farms, however, were soon
relisted (Funnekotter v Republic of Zimbabwe 2009, paragraph 31). In 2003 twelve Dutch nationals
requested arbitration of their claims at ICSID in Washington, seeking €36 million in compensation
for  lost  property and interest  (Funnekotter  v  Republic  of  Zimbabwe, paragraph 1)19.  A striking
contrast with Campbell was evident in how the case was eventually decided. The ICSID arbitrators,
presided over by a former President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), chose to pronounce
only on compensation, and carefully avoided ruling on public interest, racial discrimination, and (by
implication) ‘patriotic history’ in Zimbabwe. It awarded the claimants approximately €8 million
(market  value);  not  the  €800,000  suggested  by  the  GOZ  (covering  improvements  only)
(Funnekotter v Republic of Zimbabwe, paragraphs 125-148). 
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Perhaps an even more striking contrast with Campbell was provided by the reaction of the
GOZ.  Although  116  out  of  153  farms  protected  by  bilateral  agreements  have  indeed  been
expropriated, there has been little overt backlash against ICSID judgements, and much more ‘foot
dragging, dissimulation, false compliance, [and] feigned ignorance’ (Scott 1985, 304; Doré 2012-3).
In the Dutch case the government admitted liability from the outset (although it claimed to be in no
position to pay at the time), offered to return the farms, and paid US$ 225,000 to ICSID (its share of
costs)  (U.S.  Embassy,  Harare,  18th October  2007).  In  2013  these  judgements  led  Lands,  Land
Reforms and Resettlement Minister Herbert Murerwa to approve the eviction of 55 resettlement
farmers from Tavlydale Farm in Mashonaland Central (protected by a BIPPA agreed with Belgium)
and to declare that ‘Government will abide by the provision of the agreement and at the same time
we do not want to increase our liability’ (Doré 2012-3, n.51;  The Zimbabwe Mail,  16th January
2013). Correspondingly,  however,  the  GOZ  was  also  swifter  to  pre-empt  extraterritorial
enforcement. In 2007 the U.S. Embassy in Harare identified a $44 million debt to the U.S. Export
Bank as having been paid to prevent attachment of property (U.S. Embassy, Harare, 18th October
2007). And in 2010 the claimants sought to do just this, obtaining a confirmation of the €25million
now owed (thanks to compound interest) in the Southern District Court of New York (C. Dunn
2010).
For  our  purposes,  however,  the  most  dramatic  illustration  of  new political  possibilities
offered by international law was provided by the von Pezold family in 2010. Whilst also Swiss
nationals, the von Pezolds were the largest German investors in Zimbabwe, and even persuaded the
German government to threaten to stop aid to Zimbabwe if those occupying their farms were not
evicted (Bell, 21st December 2010). When this was unsuccessful they filed ICSID claims under the
terms  of  Germany and  Switzerland’s  BIPPAs  (for  the  rest  of  this  paragraph,  unless  otherwise
indicated,  see  Mowatt  and  Mowatt  2013).  In  March  2012  the  Tribunal  was  contacted  by  the
European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), a Berlin-based NGO specialised
in ‘strategic human rights litigation ... setting precedents ... that strengthen the legal framework for
global human rights accountability’. The ECCHR focuses on violations relating to gender, business,
and crimes committed by Western states as part of the ‘war on terror’20. Despite the von Pezolds’
objections, it was allowed to petition the court on behalf of the traditional chiefs of four ‘indigenous
communities’ living on or near the Claimants’ land (the Chikukwa, Ngorima, Chinyai and Nyaruwa
peoples). And it asserted their ‘internationally recognised rights to the land’ as indigenous peoples.
In chapters 8 and 9 I will discuss some of the many controversies surrounding who can be legally
classified as ‘indigenous’ to Africa. Suffice to mention here that very few authors argue that the
national majorities celebrated by FTLR should be counted as such (eg. Chigara 2011, 206-8). The
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Tribunal, certainly, appears to have dismissed the ECCHR’s petition because of evidence that these
‘indigenous communities’ were connected with local ZANU-PF activists. Progressive international
law commentators consider this ruling a setback for longstanding efforts to include ‘human rights
concerns’ in arbitration21.
4. Impossible compliance
Like  ICSID,  the  SADC  Tribunal  could  have  decided  to  rule  only  on  compensation.
However, after discussing the issue right up until the day before the judgement, the majority (Justice
Tshosa dissenting)  also ruled on racial  discrimination (Zongwe 2009, 22).  As Jeremy Gauntlett
(2010b) explained, ‘a striking aspect of the SADC main ruling in Campbell was that it ruled on all
three of the attacks - and sustained each. Often courts will not do that, if one is dispositive’. Some
jurists have criticised them for choosing this politically more contentious option (Zongwe 2009, 25;
Ndlovu 2011, 13).  They allege that whilst new legislation might have been implemented in a way
that discriminated on the basis of race, there was no direct evidence that its  enactment was not
motivated  by  a  desire  to  eliminate  colonial  patterns  of  economic  privilege.  By  ruling  on
discrimination, on their view, the Campbell judges thus risked removing a (desirable) exception to
the international law of expropriations that has always been made for post-colonial land reform.
Nevertheless,  it  is  far  from  clear  whether  and  how  the  GOZ  could  have  paid  this
compensation.  No  commentator  has  demonstrated  convincingly,  in  practical  terms,  what
compliance with such an order would entail. Even this most politically uncontentious of rulings - a
world away from the activism of Justice Prinsloo’s in Von Abo - still constituted a judicialisation of
fundamental political order. There is considerable  disagreement over whether, and by how much,
the general principles of international law allow for compensation to be discounted in the interests
of allowing states policy space or even maintaining public order (e.g. van Harten 2005; Wouters,
Duquet, and Hachez 2012). And indeed, before the SADC Tribunal’s suspension, both David Drury
and the CFU had cases pending in Windhoek asking the Tribunal to clarify the measure and method
of reimbursement  (David Drury,  interview, 4th April 2012; Ben Purcell-Gilpin and Marc Carrie-
Wilson, interview, 5th April 2012). But in the case of Zimbabwe, as illustrated below, it remains
unclear how the GOZ, even if granted the most generous discount permissible, could be held to its
legal obligations.
The parlous state of public finances from 2008 onwards has, in fact, meant that almost any
precise and obligatory ruling on compensation would involve a very significant redistribution of
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resources - towards ex-commercial farmers and away from the basic government functions. The
Tribunal’s ruling represents a legal constraint on the basic political choices at the heart of state
(re-)building in Zimbabwe. From 2006 hyperinflation accelerated in the country, peaking in January
2009 with the issue of a 100 trillion dollar note: the banknote with the most zeros on its face of any
note in history (Pilossof 2009, 295). ‘Dollarisation’ -  the introduction of a multi-currency system
where US dollars and South African Rands became legal tender - soon stabilised this situation. But
it did little to resolve basic economic difficulties. In 2013 Finance Minister Tendai Biti revealed that
the country had an unverified sovereign debt of $10.7 billion (roughly equivalent to GDP), a ratio of
exports to imports of between 1:3 and 1:4, and, famously, on one day had only $217 left in its
public account after paying civil servants (BBC News, 30th January 2013;  The Zimbabwean, 30th
April 2013). In 2010 and 2011 it had current account deficits of $1140 million and $1842 million22.
In  these  two  years  it  could  budget  only  US  $5  million  and  US $2  million  for  compensating
commercial farmers for lost improvements (CFU Legal Department, 28th April 2011). 
Farmers’ groups and their supporters have all condemned these inadequate sums. But very
few of their alternative schemes have reflected political possibilities in Zimbabwe post-FTLR. As
described above, JAG has been most insistent on comprehensive compensation (e.g.  JAG Open
Letter Forum, March 12th 2004). In 2003 its valuators estimated farmers’ losses, including damaged
property,  at  approximately  $50billion;  close  to  nine  times  the  country’s  GDP for that  year23.
Recently the CFU, for its part, has sought similar sums but by other means. It even inquired into the
legal liabilities of Britain: the ex-colonial power which the GOZ itself also holds responsible for
compensation (Ben Purcell-Gilpin and Marc Carrie-Wilson, interview, 5th April 2012)24. By 2010,
however, its draft Agricultural Recovery Proposal conceded that it had become:
very clear to us early on in our deliberations with both the local and international community
that:
a) The government were not in any position to pay and;
b)  The  donor  community  were  not  going  to  come up  with  a  blank  cheque  to  cover  our
damages (CFU Agriculture Recovery and Compensation, 18th June 2010, 1).
The CFU sought to solve this ‘dilemma’ by means of a complicated scheme. The GOZ first had to
acknowledge  its  eventual  liability  for  expropriated  land  values.  This  liability  would  then  be
underwritten by the International Financial Institutions, creating a central ‘investment block’. An
Agricultural Land Bank would then apportion land values to title deeds, creating, in effect, a market
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in interest-bearing bonds that would provide a foundation for a new land market (CFU 2011, 5-6).
The value  to  be  acknowledged by Government  was to  be  calculated  by any ‘legally  endorsed
methodology’ that left farmers ‘no richer or poorer than at the acquisition of the asset’ (CFU 2011,
6). The (anti-)politics of the whole process was neatly captured in the following diagram (figure 1):
Figure 1: ‘A Proposed Solution’ for land compensation (from CFU 2011, 3).
Unlike most other proposals for compensation, this CFU scheme had the obvious merit of at
least  potential economic feasibility.  MDC heavyweight Tendai Biti,  however, dismissed it as an
‘elitist  solution’ beyond  the  bounds  of  political  possibility  (Chivara,  24 th January  2013).  And
supporters of Ben Freeth and his litigation team have accused it of political naïveté. Why, they ask,
would the GOZ now demonstrate good faith in negotiations; good faith that it conspicuously failed
to show at Abuja in 2001 and on other occasions (David Drury, interview, 4th April 2012; Dale Doré,
interview, 13th April 2012)? One of Freeth’s supporter is Dale Doré, an agricultural economist with
a DPhil from Oxford University who provided significant input to the 1994 Land Commission.  He
provides  compelling  reasons  for  why  compliance  with  compensation  orders  is  impossible  in
practical terms:
the Zimbabwe Government has found itself  trapped in a  cul-de-sac of  its  own making. It
cannot afford to keep paying for new farmers’ inputs - but new farmers can only negotiate
loans for inputs if they have secure title to the property. However, they can only secure title
once compensation has been paid. But, compensation can only be paid once valuations for
compensation have been completed and agreed. But, because the government does not have
the funds, qualified staff, or sufficient time, it cannot carry out the valuations. Even if the
government could achieve this Herculean feat, it would still fall far short of just compensation
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under international law. The only veritable conclusion is that the government simply cannot
pay compensation – at least in the short term (Doré 2012-3a).
But he does not see this as an argument for the primacy of a negotiated or democratic basis for a
new political order. Rather, the GOZ should seek to abide to ‘by the rulings of the SADC Tribunal
and the ICSID Tribunal in keeping with its international treaty obligations and international law’,
pragmatic considerations notwithstanding: 
Zimbabweans have been urged to  be  pragmatic  and realistic,  recognising that  it  is  ‘not  a
perfect world’, that ‘politics is the art of the possible’, or that ‘we have no other option’. I have
argued that we should be guided by international law, human rights, and best international
practice.  Unless we adhere firmly to  universal  ethical principles,  there is  the ever  present
danger of first being drawn into negotiations, then into compromises, then into collusion with
those who act in bad faith; and, finally, into accepting the unacceptable (Doré 2012-3a).
Doré is, finally, unapologetic about his refusal to describe how such compliance might actually be
achieved:
even as I stand accused of idealism – for which I bear no shame – I believe the journey home
begins along the narrow, rocky path towards democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It
may be slow and arduous, but by following this road less travelled we will find our way back
home … [to] the international community of nations, holding proudly to our shared ideals of
democracy and human rights under international law (Doré 2012-3a). 
5. The MDC, the 2013 constitution and democratic solutions
Unsurprisingly,  Doré has  been scathingly critical  of  some recent,  often  much-publicised
academic work which has sought  to challenge popular  perceptions of FTLR as an unmitigated
disaster (cf. Scoones et al. 2010; Moyo 2011; Doré, 7th December 2012; Hanlon, Manjengwa and
Smart 2013). One of those he has criticised is Ben Cousins (2010, 21 st May 2010), who has argued
that both land restitution and the restoration of property rights are now politically unrealistic:
suggestions  that  a  new  Zimbabwean  government  should  attempt  to  reconstruct  the  old,
dualistic farming sector dominated by large scale commercial farming will encounter strong
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political  resistance  from the  many ordinary  Zimbabweans  who  have  benefited  from land
reform. In any event, a key component of the Global Political Agreement [GPA] is that land
reform is irreversible (compare Doré 2010).
The GPA to which Cousins refers was the deal that the opposition MDC agreed with ZANU-PF in
2008, and which allowed for the formation of a Government of National Unity (GNU) after violent
and disputed elections (see Chan and Primorac 2013). For Cousins and others this represented an
opportunity for a new political settlement. In 2012, for example, Mandivamba Rukuni, who led the
1994  Land  Commission,  reported  on  the  new  possibility  of  democratic  resolution  to  the  land
question:
back in 2009 there was hardly an aspect of the land issue that the GNU partners agreed on.
Today there is evidence of convergence (not necessarily agreement) on issues such as the need
for  secure  land  rights,  compensation  (at  least  for  improvements),  and  the  need  for  more
intensive land use planning (Rukuni 2012-3b).
For  Doré  and  other  radical  MDC  critics  this  ‘dirty  deal’ triggered  an  almost  instant
disengagement from party politics and a new interest in human rights litigation (JAG Open Letter
Forum,  25th June  2009).  Voice  for  Democracy,  a  group  of  such  critics  with  whom Doré  was
associated,  took both President Mugabe and Morgan Tsvangirai  to court  (see  SW Africa Radio
News,  17th May  2010). By  2009  Ben  Freeth  was  publicly  denouncing  MDC  leader  Morgan
Tsvangirai for refusing to even acknowledge receipt of his letters (Lamb, 11 th October 2009). (Some
equally  scathing  criticisms  of  the  GNU  were  voiced  by senior  party  figures,  but  typically  as
justifications for pressuring the organisation from the outside [e.g. Muzulu, November 27th 2011;
see also Chipangura, 17th July 2012].) Despite consistent criticisms of FTLR, however, even those
MDC  figures  most  sympathetic  to  commercial  farmers  had,  in  truth,  long  been  wary  of  its
international judicialisation. Eddie Cross, for example - the MDC’s former economic secretary and
perhaps leading neo-liberal - was accurately predicting the threat it posed to existing political order
as early as 2006:
thousands of new cases will be forth coming as farmers, now spread across the globe take
legal action to secure compensation in the currencies of their choice, and finally, no assets of
56
the Zimbabwe regime will be safe, aircraft, buildings and even embassy motor vehicles will be
subject to legal attachment. It is a nightmare.
I have no idea how large the total liability will be but I am willing to bet it runs to many
billions of US dollars and certainly exceeds our present  international  debt  that we cannot
service anyway! […] The confirmation of title rights by international courts will complicate
the situation in Southern Africa as a whole (JAG Open Letter Forum, 16th December 2006; for
Cross’  neo-liberalism Bond and Manyanya 2002, 93). 
In 2007, meanwhile, Shadow Justice Minister David Coltart - generally speaking another supporter
of commercial agriculture - commended the Campbell case as it was filed in the Zimbabwean High
Court.  He was careful,  however,  to only criticise the unconstitutionality of the Amendment 17
‘ouster clause’, and made no reference to issues of discrimination, restitution and compensation; a
position  identical  to  that  adopted  by  Zimbabwe  Lawyers  for  Human  Rights  (ZLHR),  by  then
Zimbabwe’s leading NGO (Shadow Justice Minister, January 15th 2007)25.
By 2008  these  pragmatic  concerns  had  started  to  dovetail  with  broader  ideological  re-
orientation within the MDC26.  Blessings-Miles Tendi (2010, 233), for example, has criticised the
party for treating the international community and human rights as a ‘silver bullet’ in the early
2000s. This, he claims, led it to ignore the resonance of ZANU-PF’s ‘patriotic history’ throughout
large swathes of Zimbabwean society. The formation of GNU, by contrast, catalysed some MDC
efforts  to  counter  ZANU-PF’s  ‘patriotic  history’ by  also  legitimating  itself  in  terms  of  anti-
colonialism and the liberation struggle (Tendi 2010, chapter 8; but cf. Zamchiya 2013, 958-9). For a
time Zimbabwe ‘gradually veered towards normalisation and convergence between the opposing
domestic political … gladiators’ (Moyo 2011, 256). Some new MDC stances were on view during
the drafting of a new constitution for Zimbabwe. This would replace that agreed at Lancaster House
in 1979, and update the legally ambiguous GPA (Matyszak and Reeler 2011). A number of the new
provisions were agreed at least as early as 2008. Key questions however, notably those related to
Campbell,  remained controversial into the second half of 2012 (see U.S. Embassy,  Harare,  30th
October 2009; International Bar Association 2011, 23; Chan 2012)27. Despite the CFU’s criticisms,
the final draft reserved compensation for expropriated land owned by ‘indigenous’ Zimbabweans,
or  protected  by  BIPPAs  (‘agreement[s]  concluded  by the  Government  of  Zimbabwe  with  the
government of another country’). Other persons were ‘entitled to compensation from the State only
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for improvements that were on the land when it was acquired’ (Mutenga, 10th August 2012; Magaisa
2012; Government of Zimbabwe, January 2013, section 295).
The  MDC  had  opposed  ZANU-PF  amendments  designed  to  insulate  these  and  other
provisions from challenge in international courts (removing ‘international law’ and ‘the values that
underlie a just,  open and democratic society’ from sources for the interpretation of rights) (see
Amendments 38 and 39 reported in The Herald, 30th August 2012). But it was nevertheless keen to
associate  itself  with  the  document  as  a  whole.  Some  key  figures  who  welcomed  these  new
‘constructive relationships’ with ZANU-PF also used the process to counter ‘patriotic history’. They
distanced themselves from gay rights provisions and narrated liberation ‘struggles’ (not ‘wars’) to
emphasise the contributions of non-ZANU-PF figures from before the nationalist era (see remarks
by  Eric  Matinenga  and  Douglas  Mwonzora  in  International  Bar  Association  2011,  21-22;
Mwonzora’s comments Benjamin Burombo’s legacy in Parliament of Zimbabwe, 6th February 2013,
6;  for  Burombo see  Bhebe 1984).  Crucially,  moreover,  they used  the  constitution  to  signal  an
acceptance, if not an endorsement, of FTLR. As  Douglas Mwonzora, the MDC  Co-Chair of the
Zimbabwe Constitution Select Committee (COPAC) declared, ‘in our view there was not wisdom in
taking  land  from a  deprived  person to  another  deprived  person’ (Parliament  of  Zimbabwe,  6th
February 2013, 39). The key provisions on agricultural land were all agreed to.
Almost  immediately,  unsurprisingly,  Ben  Freeth  and  Dale  Doré  attacked  the  MDC  for
agreeing to discrimination that violated human rights and offended ‘natural justice’ (Bell, August
16th 2012; Doré 2012-3b). Yet Brian Raftopoulos, a keen critic of ‘patriotic nationalism’, saw it as a
‘central part of the mediation process’ and ‘a very good basis for moving forward’ (Raftopoulos
2009, 231;  SW Africa Radio News, February 28th 2013). Ian Scoones, one of Doré’s critics, went
further (see Scoones 2012b). For him, since ‘national political consensus is clearly required on the
land issue’ all argument about ‘the ‘sanctity’ of private property is insufficient’ and all ‘recourse to
an  individualistic  rights  discourse  ...  inadequate’ (Scoones  2012a).  On  Campbell,  he  argued,
‘obsession with this particular ruling forgets that the proposed constitutional provisions are actually
in  line  with  much  international  practice’ (Scoones  2013).  Yet  as  this  chapter  has  sought  to
demonstrate, the reality of international politics is that this is no longer a wholly ‘realistic’ position.
Compromise will indeed be necessary for the building of any kind of political order in Zimbabwe in
the  short-term.  But  Doré  and  Freeth  may nevertheless  be  correct  to  insist  on  the  capacity  of
Campbell, and similar judgements, to impinge on this process.
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6. ‘There’s no right or wrong answer’: liberals against human rights
Throughout this study I highlight two dimensions of global liberal actors’ response to the
judicialisation  of  fundamental  political  order.  Like  ZLHR and  the  MDC they have  been  fully
cognisant  of  the  dangers  it  represents  for  their  projects.  Yet,  like  Scoones,  they  have  also
consistently over-estimated politicians’ capacity to isolate such questions from legal challenge. In
the case of the UN and the international financial institutions, both dimensions became visible as
soon as they accepted FTLR as a fait accompli. These organisations immediately began searching
for new solutions to the land question which would avoid both confrontation with government and
endless legal challenges to emerging forms of political order. One early initiative, in 2003, saw the
IMF, World Bank and UNDP propose commercial farmers financial packages which would allow
them to relocate to neighbouring countries, notably Zambia (Njini, 11th May 2003). Most efforts,
however, centered around re-building technical capacity to enable national solutions. As Gareth
Evans,  President  of  the  International  Crisis  Group,  wrote  in  2004,  a  ‘non-partisan’  Land
Commission would have to,
adjudicate rapidly a myriad of claims and counter-claims that have the potential to tie the legal
system in knots for years.  The international community will  need to support a  process of
binding arbitration that allows reasonable payment to those farmers whose farms have been
illegally seized, while acknowledging that any sensible policy will be a compromise balancing
production, legal concerns, and fair compensation (ICG 2004, vi).
(It is of course precisely such a ‘compromise’ on ‘legal concerns’ that Freeth, Gauntlett, and Doré
have been so desperate to avoid.)
In 2005, meanwhile, that the World Bank published Agriculture Growth and Land Reform in
Zimbabwe: Assessment and Recovery Options (Report No 3199 ZW). JAG (20th June, 2005) accused
this of having ‘all the hallmarks of the social scientists [sic] and technocrats [sic] approach to the
land problem’. It is said to have studiously avoided the question of restoring private land rights
regimes. (Some interviewees believed the author was Sam Moyo, an academic with more sympathy
than most Zimbabwe scholars for ZANU-PF.) Later,  under the GNU, the EU, World Bank and
UNDP jointly  funded  land  audit  and land  policy  work.  This  was  geared  towards  creating  the
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‘national political consensus’ on the land issue that Scoones and others had hoped for (see Rukuni
2012-3b).  Policy papers  built  around the  Campbell  and ICSID judgements  were rejected (Dale
Doré,  interview,  13th April  2012).  Less  legalist  approaches,  by  contrast  -  which  Mandivamba
Rukuni  advocated  during  the  drafting  of  the  World  Bank’s  policy  positions  -  were  embraced.
Rukuni (2012-3b) took a long view:
the land audit should not be an event. It should be the means of creating a system that will
catch the culprits down the road. I know politically you want to catch all your culprits today.
But you need to ask how do you build a system which tenure wise,  administratively,  will
continuously  catch  the  culprits  and  rotate  them  until  you  have  a  brilliant,  productive
agriculture sector which transforms our society to where [sic] want to go.
The EU has funded the valuation of expropriated farms, perhaps reflecting interest from the Dutch
and German embassies (JAG Open Letter Forum, 17th June 2011). And, more recently, after lifting
sanctions on Zimbabwe, it has also donated $6.4 million for capacity-building to the Ministry of
Lands, Land Reforms and Resettlement (Maposa, 28th February 2014). But even it refused to argue
for restitution or comprehensive private rights in land.
Perhaps most interestingly, however, these technocratic approaches have also been endorsed
by Britain, the ex-colonial power. By the late 2000s it was wary of public positions on the land
question. It had drawn lessons from the political uses made of Clare Short’s disastrous letter of 1998
(described earlier). In 2009  an Africa All Party Parliamentary Group report on the land question
aligned itself almost entirely with UNDP prescriptions. Crucially ‘it did not accept that it would be
a good use of government aid to pay millions of dollars to former commercial farmers’. Using a
figure  from a  manifesto  produced  by the  MDC in  2007,  it  then  estimated  ‘that  compensating
Zimbabwean commercial  farmers  could  come to  as  much as  US$8 billion.  Given Zimbabwe’s
current financial crisis it will not be able to meet these costs. The expense is also beyond the means
of the donor community’ (AAPPG 2009, 43). Dave Fish, head of the DFID mission in-country,
echoed these pragmatic assessments. ‘Ideally’, in Fish’s view, the matter would be handled by the
IMF and ‘treated as debt relief, like in the rest of Africa ...  So creditors might get 10% - no hard
figure’. Although he was aware of the ICSID judgements in particular, thanks to conversations with
Dutch counterparts, he himself viewed them as ‘neither here nor there’ in political terms. He did not
even believe they had even been mentioned in the 18 months or so he had spent in-country. There
was, he declared, ‘no right or wrong answer’ to the land question (interview, 19th April 2012). This
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was politics.
7. Conclusion
Again,  however,  as  this  chapter  has  sought  to  show, ‘realist’ perspectives  such as  these
under-estimate the new political possibilities of international law. Whilst litigating FTLR has little
prospect  of  building  political  order  in  any  currently  conceivable  future  Zimbabwe,  it  will
nevertheless continue to provide an avenue by which efforts - by global liberals and others - to build
such orders can be subverted. No simple political decision by lawyers or diplomats can end this
‘nightmare’ (to use Eddie Cross’ term). Contrary to some critical and Foucauldian variants on such
arguments, moreover - introduced in chapter 5 - there is not even a long term prospect that human
rights practices will govern and discipline individuals in ways that ultimately preserve deeper kinds
of liberal order. Some authors, it is true, have made suggestions about how to resolve fundamentally
political questions via socialisation. The editor of one recent volume on land and law in Southern
Africa,  for  example,  has  talked  of  ‘the  need  to  de-school  agents  [from]  …  entrenched
culturalization’ and thus ‘oust the sense of victimization that some white farmers have used to seize
the courts  in opposition to land reform’ (Chigara 2011, 202, 224).  But such suggestions are so
woefully inadequate that they require no further comment. 
After expanding on these theories of resistance in chapter 5, in part II I will argue that new
beliefs about law and politics which emerged in the 1970s explain key three conditions for the
judicialisation of fundamental political order in Zimbabwe. The first is the formation of incipient
social movements such as that which coalesced around Ben Freeth (bringing together a perhaps
unlikely coalition of Jeremy Gauntlett, Afriforum, and Desmond Tutu). The second is the visibility
of the commercial (and especially white) farmers’ plight in British and South African politics. The
third condition is, of course, the very existence of institutions such as the SADC Tribunal; a fact
which I argue is largely explained by the diffusion of European institutional models after 1989.
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Chapter 3: Rural order in Namibia: history, recognition, and traditional authority
1. Prelude
JAG, Ben Freeth and the CFU have not been the only commercial farmers to bring lawsuits
against the Zimbabwean government. In 2002 Maria Stevens, the widow of the first commercial
farmer to be killed during FTLR, sued the President himself. Her co-plaintiffs were MDC politi-
cians and their relatives, including those of MDC National Youth Organiser Tafuma Chiminya Ta-
chiona who had been tortured and killed (Tachiona v Mugabe 2002, background). They filed their
case in the Federal District Court in Manhattan, alleging violations of the Alien Torts Claims Act
(ATCA); a controversial piece of legislation often used to prosecute governments and businesses
with assets in the United States (including the government of South Africa) for crimes committed
abroad (Poullaos 2002, 327-8; Jenkins 2009;  Ku and Yoo 2012, 179-185).  According to David
Drury, who has himself been involved in a separate ATCA case, President Mugabe was served with
court papers en route to the United Nations building (interview, 4 th April 2012). Tachiona v Mugabe
(2002, conclusion) eventually saw the plaintiffs  awarded an unenforceable  $71,250,453.00. The
chapter follows Namibian efforts to make use of ATCA. As with Campbell, this litigation has chal-
lenged fundamental principles of national rural order. And as also with Tachiona, it has failed to eli-
cit compliance. The events it referred to, however, were, unfortunately, among the most grotesque
in the recent history of mankind. 
2. Introduction
In  January  1904  war  broke-out  throughout  the  German  colony  of  South-West  Africa
(Namibia). An uprising in Herero territory had left 123 Germans dead, amid (unfounded) rumours
of  the  mutilation  of  women  and  children.  The  new  governor,  Lother  von  Trotha  opposed
negotiations. He sought to ‘encircle the masses of Hereros at Waterburg, and to annihilate these
masses with a simultaneous blow’ (Gewald 1996, 206). In August Trotha was victorious at the battle
of Hamakari, and surviving Herero - including women, children, and their herds of cattle - were
forced to escape into the surrounding Omahake desert. German soldiers occupied the waterholes
surrounding it and Trotha issued his now notorious proclamation: 
I, the great general of the German soldiers, send this letter to the Herero people. The Herero
are  no  longer  German  subjects  … Within  the  German  frontiers  every  Herero,  armed  or
unarmed, with or without cattle will be shot dead. I shall take no more women or children. I
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shall drive them back to their people or have them fired upon (Gewald 1996, 207).
By the  beginning of  1905 ‘Herero  society,  as  it  had existed before 1904,  had been destroyed’
(Gewald 2000, 211). These acts persuaded Nama leaders to abandon their alliance with Germany
and begin guerilla war. Their resistance thus lasted considerably longer than that of the Herero, but
the  German  military  again  occupied  watering  places  and  commenced  mass  internment.  Many
prisoners were held in concentration camps including women, children and the elderly. On Shark
Island in Lüderitzbucht, most notoriously of all, the skulls of many who died from starvation, over-
work and exposure were sent to Germany as  specimens for scientific analysis (Erichsen 2007).
7,682 prisoners died during the war, somewhere between 30 and 50 per cent of those interned
(Zimmerer  2007,  58).  Many others  throughout  the  colony were  affected  by the  violence,  both
directly and indirectly (Wallace 2011, 165-172). 
3. The judicialisation of recognition
(a) From informal to bureaucratic arenas: the South West-African ‘homelands’
After World War One the Allied powers used these atrocities to help justify the confiscation
of Germany’s colonies (Sylvester and Gewald 2003, xv). The League of Nations handed South-
West Africa to Britain and South Africa to be run as a ‘sacred trust of civilization’.  After 1945,
however, South Africa claimed that the collapse of the League justified the incorporation of its
Namibian ‘mandate’ into its territory. This triggered decades of confrontation at the United Nations
(see Cooper 1991). By the 1960s South Africa was seeking to persuade its international critics that
racial  segregation  was  compatible  with  the  principles  of  self-determination  that  had  driven
decolonisation (Barber and Barratt 1990, 95). The apartheid government designed new ‘homelands’
policies which designated particular rural areas for particular ‘tribes’. The consequences of this for
South-West Africa were set-out in the  Odendaal Commission’s Report of 1964. ‘Native reserve’
policies from the 1950s were to be intensified, and ethnographic ‘science’ was supposed to supplant
administrative  discretion  as  the  basis  for  land  designations  (compare  Posel  2001).  As  the
Commission stated, baldly, ‘separate groups are distinguished from one another by their different
languages, cultures and physical appearance, and to a large extent also according to the areas in
which they … now live’ (Wallace 2011, 262-3).
This  ‘homelandization’ intensified  an  emerging dynamic  in  relationships  between  South
African administrators and Herero traditional authorities. The very concept of paramountcy was
alien to the Otjiherero-speaking societies observed by the first missionaries. The most significant
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vertical distinction they had observed was between the rich, especially in cattle (omuhona, plural:
ovahona) and the poor (omusyona, plural: ovasyona). In the inter-war period, however - as these so-
cieties began to reconstitute themselves in new ways following the genocide -  South Africa largely
followed the British practice of indirect rule (for Herero ‘resurgence’ see Gewald 2000). It preferred
to deal with paramounts and councils of headmen whilst maintaining administrative veto over their
appointments.  The 1960s saw this  formalization of traditional  authority reach its  apex (Bertout
2003, 121-124). 
Simultaneously,  a refusal to recognise the legitimacy of liberation movements led South
Africa to embrace almost any political organisation willing to accept its constitutional politics. Per-
haps the most critical but significant of these organisations was the Herero Chief’s Council (HCC),
which had co-ordinated the first wave of domestic opposition to incorporation at the United Nations
in the 1950s (e.g. Henrichsen, Jacobsen and Marshall 2010, chapter, 1). When the latter became a
modern political party in 1964  (the National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO)) it was re-
garded as a privileged interlocutor. NUDO, however, was dominated by headmen, who in turn dom-
inated homeland administration. Even locally legitimate ovahona leaders, already marginalized in
the pre-war period, were, consequently, ignored by an administration increasingly bent on stabiliz-
ing its authority in rural areas. This exclusion was perhaps especially acute for those representing
the Mbanderu sub-group (sometimes called ‘green flag’ in reference to the colour worn at their par-
ticular annual commemoration (omazemburukiro) of the genocide).  Munjuku Nguvauva, for ex-
ample, son of an Mbanderu omuhona exiled after the genocide, returned to Namibia from Botswana
in the 1950s  but was eventually refused a paramountcy and subordinated to Herero headman within
the administrative structure of the homelands (Bertout 2003, 121-124).
(b) 1990-2000: Independent Namibia and limited judicialisation 
Formally speaking, the ‘homelands’ were swiftly abandoned with the end of apartheid. In
1990, after the country’s negotiated transition to democracy, the South West African People’s Or-
ganisation liberation movement, better-known as SWAPO, formed the first Namibian government.
It proclaimed a commitment to socialism and the undoing of apartheid legacies. International ob-
servers, however, had long doubted its elites’ sincerity  (Melber 2010).  This has been reflected in
the (much-discussed) glacial pace of land reform (e.g. Melber 2005; Shinovene,  27th September
2013). The future of commercial agriculture was not planned for, on the (mistaken) assumption that
white Namibians would leave after independence (Kaapama 2007, 34). One informed observer has
claimed that its policies were drafted, essentially in the interests of expediency, by a ‘small cadre of
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top SWAPO leaders  assisted  by some foreign  academics  … mostly associated  with  the  UNIN
[United Nations Institute for Namibia]’ (Dobell 1995, 175). In 1991 a major Lands Conference in
Windhoek did resolve that ‘there was injustice concerning the acquisition of land in the past and
something practicable must be done to rectify the situation’ (Harring and Odendaal 2002, 31). But it
also adopted a ‘willing-seller-willing-buyer’ (WSWB) principle. SWAPO apparently believed, in-
correctly,  that  this  had  been  constitutionally  mandated  by  the  terms  agreed  during  transition
(Kaapama 2007, 36-8). 
SWAPO has certainly thus far done little to test its powers in this area. 209 farms were pur-
chased in the first 17 years of independence, via market mechanisms but using preferential proced-
ures (Kaapama 2007, 39). Expropriations, thus far limited to a handful of cases, began only in 2005,
under political pressures created by developments in Zimbabwe (Melber 2005)28. And even some of
these, to the considerable embarrassment of the Ministry of Lands and Resettlement (MLR), have
recently been successfully challenged in the Namibian High Court. The Court, typically somewhat
deferential towards the Executive, disagreed with the National Agricultural Union (NAU) that the
transfer  of  functioning farms to untrained farmers  violated  the  ‘public  interest’ (see  VonDoepp
2009, 136). And like the SADC Tribunal in  Campbell, the Court carefully stressed its support for
the ends of land reform. But unlike the Tribunal, however, it refused to place concrete limits on the
means to achieve it (e.g. by prohibiting racial discrimination).  It  ruled expropriations illegal on
purely procedural grounds (Harring and Odendaal 2008, 22). The MLR has, at least formally, ac-
cepted this as requiring significant changes to its land reform programme (U.S. Embassy, 13 th Au-
gust 2008; U.S. Embassy, 8th May 2009; VonDoepp 2009, 136; Hoaës, 15th March 2012.).
The Ministry’s objective, in principle, has been to create user rights regimes in the resettle-
ment areas. As Boone (2007) describes, however, this political choice requires significant bureau-
cratic capacity. Rights have not been clarified in practice (see Kapaama 2007, 41).  SWAPO has
demonstrated neither the willingness nor the capacity to exercise this kind of oversight. Beneficaries
have been poorly informed of their legal status, and there has been criticism of corrupt allocation
practices for over a decade (e.g.  Harring and Odendaal 2002, 100-101). Some more traditionalist
Herero politicians hostile to SWAPO, for example, have alleged that Oshiwambo-speaking Namibi-
ans - who comprise approximately half the national population, and are often identified as a key
SWAPO constituency -  have  benefited  disproportionately in  non-Owambo-speaking rural  areas.
Meanwhile the South West Africa National Union (SWANU) - a former rival liberation movement
now restricted to a largely Otjiherero-speaking support-base - has criticised the government for not
favouring the ‘sons and daughters of the never-to-be-forgotten victims of von Trotha’s Extermina-
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tion Order’ (Gargallo 2010, 161-2, 172). In the face of these attacks, the government has consist-
ently maintained that it rejects the drawing of ethnic divisions between Namibians, and has only the
nation’s interests at heart. 
SWAPO was indeed, initially, sincerely opposed to all assertions of political authority on
ethnic  grounds.  Its  early  decentralisation  initiatives  abolished  the  homelands,  and  redrew  the
boundaries according to geographic and economic, rather than ethnic criteria (Gargallo 2010, 157-
8). Unsurprisingly, such policies were resisted by those Herero leaders who had benefited from the
South African preference for paramount chiefs and headmen at the expense of ovahona. At the 1991
Land  Conference  Herero  paramount  Kuiama  Riruako  disparaged  the  nationalists’ anti-colonial
credentials,  and  claimed a  leading  role  for  the  Herero,  ‘we fought  alone  against  the  forces  of
German colonialism [...] at home we pursued, alone, the political policy of national unity’ . But he
came out especially strongly against the new government’s intentions to re-organise communal land
along non-ethnic lines. Fearing ‘tribal hegemonic deployment’ of Oshiwambo-speakers, he claimed
to be ‘aware of the sinful conduct of some members of the Namibian community who continue to
rejoice in the genocide of my people and who came [sic] up with skilful plans to take away the
remaining land portions of original Hereroland ... a declaration of war against my people (Riruako
1991, 2-5). As Gewald (2003, 298) explains, the genocide now ‘became the preserve of Herero
elites opposed to the new government’. Whilst it is unclear if Riruako was the first of this group to
connect the event with new reparations ideas, he was almost certainly the first do so in such a public
forum29. He informed the Lands Conference that:
we, the Herero, are now left with two options as to the land reform and the land question in
Namibia. They are as follows: 1. The return of our stolen holy land; 2. The just compensation
from the German Government. But, the Herero Royal House and the entire leadership of the
Herero people opted in favour of compensation from the German Government in order to
promote the spirit of peaceful co-existence between the Herero and Germans in Namibia ...
[compensation] will not bring back the lives of those who perished in the genocide, but may
to a certain extend [sic] help heal the wounds of the victims of the Herero holocaust, their
land and their livestock (Riruako 1991, 7-8). 
Riruako thus tacitly endorsed the Conference’s eventual resolution that ‘given the complexities in
redressing ancestral land claims, restitution of such claims in full is impossible’, but nevertheless re-
commended ‘immediate recognition of the right to ownership of communal lands by their commun-
al farmers throughout Namibia, including Reheboth’ (Riruako 1991, 8; Sarkin 2008, 54).
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The 1990s saw a variety of other groups contest the early centralist thrust of SWAPO’s new
rural order. Some Reheboth Baster politicians, to whom Riruako alluded, had supported the brand
of federalism which was proposed by the South-African backed opposition coalition - the Demo-
cratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) - but rejected by the new constitution. Immediately after independ-
ence a former Minister in South Africa’s failed Interim Government of National Unity, Captain Jo-
hannes Diergaardt, led an unsuccessful bid for a separate state in Reheboth. This led to a year-long
occupation of government buildings and failed attempt in 1995 to obtain recognition from the High
Court of communal land rights (Suzman 2002, 19-20). In 1994, meanwhile, DTA parliamentarian
Mishake Muyongo helped form the Caprivian Liberation Army (CLA) in the far North-East of the
country. In 1999 the CLA attacked an army base and police station, and the government responded
by declaring a state of emergency (Melber 2009a). In 1998, finally, as the government began to
make its first substantial concessions to devolved rural governance, Riruako and 100 other tradition-
al leaders marched on Windhoek demanding recognition (Harring 2002, 413). These vigorous asser-
tions of group autonomy may help explain why Sidney Harring (2002, 409) interpreted the early
Herero reparations campaign as similar to Native American land restitution claims; ‘an assertion of
Herero nationhood’ within Namibia.  
Over the course of this decade, after pressure from donors combined with that from some
rural constituencies, SWAPO gradually compromised on its centralism (Bertout 2003, 126; Gargallo
2010, 157; more generally Friedman 2011, 179-235). The Traditional Authorities Act of 1995 al-
lowed nomination of chiefs according to customary law (albeit after confirmation from Windhoek).
This was followed by the National Land Policy of 1998, which permitted chiefs to exclude mem-
bers of other communities from their lands, and the Communal Land Reform Act in 2002, which
gave them limited rights to grant the land itself (Bertout 2003, 125-7; Gargallo 2010, 157-8, 162-3).
These  changes,  unsurprisingly,  have  increased  the  political  significance  of  chieftaincy appoint-
ments. SWAPO has thus recently sought to re-establish the authority of chiefs on a territorial basis,
challenging efforts to build ethnic ‘nations’ (Sasman 2012, 27th February 2012). Earlier it had de-
signed rules governing nominations of chiefs to the advantage of  Ovahona marginalized during
South African rule. Using justifications conceived by the  All-Herero/Mbanderu Traditional Com-
mittee, notably, the government decided that membership of a royal house, rather than election as a
headman, would henceforth constitute the central condition for recognition (Bertout 2003, 125-6).
Traditional authorities, according to this vision, would once again be accorded some legitimacy, but
only in ways increasing central control.  All these developments provide crucial context to under-
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standing the tensions between ‘Mbanderu’ and ‘Ovaherero’ leaders that have dogged the Herero re-
parations claim, and which are described in greater detail below
In response, Riruako and others turned towards the courts. Once again, however, the Court
chose to challenge government policy on procedural grounds. In Kuaima Riruako and 46 others v
Minister of Regional and Local Government and Housing, and The President of Namibia (2001),
Riruako (the NUDO President) and a number of Otjiherero-speaking Koakoland chiefs loyal to the
DTA (with which NUDO was then affiliated) alleged non-recognition by the SWAPO government
for political  reasons.  The Court  ordered reconsideration,  but  not  satisfaction,  of these demands
(Friedman 2011, 215-7).
(c) 2000-: The global judicialisation of struggles for recognition 
As John Friedman (2011, 216) has written, the Namibian High Court case formed part of
‘larger countrywide strategy’ by Riruako ‘to re-unify the Herero nation under the guidance of his
own paramount leadership’. The campaign he has led for reparations has been primarily imagined
alongside these demands for recognition, even if it has formally been accompanied by demands for
a land compensation (e.g. McNeil Jr.,  May 31st 1998; Sarkin 2008, 193). Both the size of early
claims, and the ways in which they were lodged, testify to their intended publicity functions. In
1995 Riruako and three-hundred other Herero marched on the German embassy and presented the
visiting German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, with a demand for $600 million in reparations. Kohl re-
fused to meet, and Riruako threatened to take the matter to the United Nations (Harring 2002, 394-
5). After a similar snub in 1998 from Federal President Roman Herzog - who, like Kohl, had been
addressing German-speaking Namibians at  the time -  the Riruako group escalated its  campaign
(Melber 2007, 266). Two months later a New York Times article alleging Owambo appropriation of
German development aid cited veteran nationalist (but then DTA) politician Mburumba Kerina call-
ing for ‘a mini-Marshall Plan’ for Herero in Namibia (McNeil Jr.,  May 31st 1998). Then, in April
1999, Riruako approached the ICJ on behalf of the ‘Herero nation’. The Court responded, coolly,
that ‘only states may be parties in contentious cases before the ICJ and hence submit cases to it
against other states’ (Gewald 2003, 301). 
Whilst many have viewed this episode as evidence of political naïvety by Riruako, Jeremy
Sarkin, his legal advisor, sees it, plausibly, as proof of savvy (Jeremy Sarkin interview, 12 th August
2011). ‘I look to be simple, but I’m not that simple as you see’, as the Chief would later declare
(Morgan 2010, 87). His claim certainly ‘ruffled a few feathers’ in Namibia and finally got the atten-
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tion of German diplomacy (Gewald 2003, 301). The 2001 Riruako and his circle made a move even
more dramatic in intent, demanding no less than $2 billion from the German government and a
range of  large  multi-national  corporations.  Two legal  cases,  alleging violations  of  ATCA, were
lodged in the District of Columbia in the name of the ‘Herero People’s Reparation Corporation’
(HPRC) (see Cooper 2007). The suits alleged that the Federal Republic of Germany, with the com-
plicity of three German companies (Deutsche Bank AG, Terex Corporation, and Woermann Lines),
was responsible for the ‘genocidal destruction of the Herero tribe in Southwest Africa [now Nami-
bia]’, and should thus pay reparations to the HPRC (The Herero People’s Reparation Corporation
et al. v. Deutsche Bank AG et al. 2001, Complaint at 21). This internationalisation strategy, even if it
is still to produce a final judgement, has fundamentally altered the stakes in domestic struggles for
recognition; a phenomenon social-scientists refer to as ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ (see
Alter 2014, 56). And it has set the stage for more a decade of debate, both in and outside of foreign
courtrooms, over who represents the Herero in Namibia.  
4. Human rights are not rules: ‘compliance’ with new reparations norms
(a) Introduction
The history of the campaign for reparations in Namibia between the early 1990s and 2004
can be understood,  with only some minor modifications,  within the constructivist  ‘norm spiral’
framework established by Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (1999; Risse,  Ropp and Sikkink
2013). Activism originated within the country and then became effective as external actors joined
the social movement to pressure the government:  Risse and Sikkink’s (1999, 18-21) ‘boomerang
effect’. The German government initially reacted by denying the applicability of new and universal
reparations norms to the Namibian context. Both governments, however, subsequently made tactical
concessions in order to stave off further criticism. After 2004, the history of the reparations cam-
paign begins to depart from the norm spiral framework. This model predicts that tactical conces-
sions will  be seized-upon by activists who then socialise states into compliance, precipitating a
‘norm cascade’. States then internalise norms which become part of domestic legal and bureaucratic
routines,  leading  to  ‘rule-consistent  behaviour’ (Risse  and  Ropp  2013,  8-11).  New reparations
norms, however, lack determinacy and cannot be used to socialise governments into new beha-
viours. This helps explains why the German government, for example, has not been keen to create
reparations  precedent  and  initiate  a  ‘norms  cascade’.  The  material  and  structural-political  con-
sequences of such an action are impossible to anticipate. In the short-term, moreover, reputational
concerns provide little incentive to do this, since the opposition would be unlikely to de-mobilise.
Durable political solutions remain elusive.
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(b) Denying the validity of universal norms and ‘tactical concessions’
 The Herero People’s Reparation Corporation’s claim encountered the same jurisprudential
difficulties as those faced by the litigation of apartheid in other U.S. courts (Jenkins 2009). Despite
some adverse decisions about  the timeliness of the action,  courts  have not generally ruled that
groups, in general, are ineligible for reparations from states. Amongst other reasons, the precedent
created by German payments to Jewish groups is much too obvious (Sarkin 2008, 139-144). In-
stead, they have pointed to supposed practical difficulties with documenting the Herero claims, and
have endorsed cautious interpretations of relevant technicalities (Sarkin 2008, 151-154). Contrary
to the expectation of the plaintiffs’ Washington attorney, therefore, judges have not invoked the (in-
creasingly-criticised) ‘political question’ to disbar the claim (Zeller 2003; Hirschl 2008, 98; Cohn
2011, 678-9).30. Furthermore, like the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, SWAPO
initially strongly opposed the lawsuit. Prime Minister Hage Geingob is reported to have declared in
1998 that ‘it was wrong for the Ovaherero to demand reparation for the Ovaherero alone, as they
were not the only one, who were affected by the German atrocities and that all Namibians suffered’
(National Assembly of the Republic of Namibia 19th September 2006, 10-11). Mocks Shivute, the
Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Information and Broadcasting, made identical arguments,
pointing  to  the  fact  that  Germany  remained  Namibia’s  largest  bilateral  donor  (SouthScan,  9th
September 2000). In 2003, finally, Nahas Angula - future Prime Minister but then Minister of Edu-
cation and Culture - advanced the well-known ‘Pandora’s box’ argument:
if you want to return to the past, fine … But we must know about the consequences of that.
You will never stop anywhere. You will have to go all the way from the crimes committed
from the Berlin Conference up to 21 March 1990 [Namibian independence] (in Zuern 2012,
499).
Like the U.S. courts, SWAPO made ‘tactical concessions’. It only denied the validity of the ways in
which universal norms were applied, and did not subordinate them to other ‘allegedly more valid’
norms such as national sovereignty (or the ‘political doctrine’) (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 24).
Perhaps the most obvious of SWAPO’s ‘tactical concessions’ to reparations norms, however,
has been its support for rival organisations commemorating the genocide. Whilst the lawsuits have
certainly raised the profile of Riruako’s campaign for recognition, their assertion of a unified Herero
identity (under his leadership) has not served to build a cohesive nation. They were originally sup-
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ported by the opposition DTA, and by important figures within it such as Mburumba Kerina (a
former Herero petitioner at  the U.N.) (SouthScan,  9th September 2000; Yates and Chester 2006,
193). But from 2003-4 the DTA suffered a number of splits, after a decade in which it had ‘con-
stantly and dramatically lost voter support’, failing to successfully re-articulate its federalist agenda
(Boer 2005, 17). Riruako now decided to pull NUDO out of the DTA (eventually winning 4.2% of
the vote in the 2004 presidential elections, and three seats in the National Assembly). Fractures
within Herero politics were not, however, only visible within federalist parties. Outside SWAPO
strongholds party allegiances are famously fluid in Namibia, and events soon illustrated the numer-
ous ways in which national party-political competition intersects with local cleavages (see Bertout
2006, 74; Hopwood 2008).
At one time it appeared as if the centennial commemorations of the genocide in 2004 might
overcome divisions in Herero politics; an echo of the 1923 burial of Samuel Maharero, which was
instrumental in post-genocide ‘reorganisation of the Herero’ (Gewald 2007). Preparations for these
events had, however, been lengthy and involved elaborate efforts to reconcile a variety of views and
interests. Two national planning committees emerged, each with different links to local churches,
traditional authorities and cultural organisations (some of which had long helped to organise annual
commemorative rituals (omazemburukiro). Delicate compromises had to be reached over the con-
tent of key events.  The Coordinating Committee for the First Commemoration of the Ovaherero
Genocide  (CCFCOG),  most  notably,  commemorated  a  genocide  committed  against  the  Herero
people. Whilst the National Preparatory Committee for the Commemoration of 1904 (NPCC04)
primarily commemorated Namibia’s dead in a war of resistance against German colonialism. These
differing narratives, unsurprisingly, largely corresponded with differing attitudes towards new repar-
ations ideas and the SWAPO government (Morgan 2010, 38-65). 
The precise nature and scope of high-political involvements in these groups is a matter of
controversy. Some CCFCOG activists, for example, but not all, trace its origins directly to the after-
math of the 2001 Durban conference and anger amongst Riruako’s supporters with Germany’s re-
fusal to pay reparations (Morgan 2010, 44-45).  It  has certainly been instrumental  in taking the
concept of genocide from the national political arena and (literally) ‘vernacularising’ it for Otjiher-
ero-speaking  society  (see  generally  Merry  and  Levitt  2009). The  word  was  now translated  as
‘otjitiro otjindjandja tjOvaherero’ or ‘the mass death of Hereros’. At the 2004 Okakarara centenary
celebrations of the Battle of Ohamakari - the pivotal moment in the year - the Committee produced
a dazzling ‘proliferation of depictions of victimhood’. Here ‘Herero-speaking Namibians reappro-
priated the image of their suffering’. Plays were produced illustrating the captivity and execution of
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Herero prisoners, t-shirts were sold printed with an image of emaciated Herero refugees, and a
‘Miss Genocide’ beauty pageant was even organised (Förster 2008, 184-193). While ‘outsiders were
irritated and repelled by this seemingly macabre, tasteless distinction’, Larissa Förster (2008, 187,
190) argues that ‘the live and vivid bodies of the beauty queens were … embodiments of the recov-
ery of the Herero nation and the restoration of Herero culture’.
The NPCC04 was seen by some in CCFCOG as simply a SWAPO device for co-opting the
reparations campaign (Morgan 2010, 46). German-speaking activists involved in the NPCC04’s cre-
ation, by contrast, described the impetus as coming instead from churches in Germany and their loc-
al Lutheran counterparts. On this account, the NPCC04 was originally intended to prevent (fam-
ously-conservative)  German-speaking  Namibians  from  feeling  ‘attacked’ during  the  centennial
commemorations (Morgan 2010, 52; Kössler and Melber 2013). SWAPO thus became involved for
largely contingent reasons. After deciding to try and involve well-known Herero figures in their ef-
forts,  a  natural  point  of  contact  for  these  church  figures  was  Zephania  Kameeta,  an  Otjiher-
ero-speaker and now bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in the Republic of Namibia (Mor-
gan 2010, 52-3). But Kameeta was also a former member of the SWAPO Central Committee (Di-
erks 2004a). When they soon learned of existing divisions between Herero groups planning com-
memorative activities, the churches sided with ‘more or less SWAPO people’, keen to avoid con-
frontation with government over this emotive issue (Morgan 2010, 54). Whatever explanation is
correct, as German-speakers withdrew from the organisation SWAPO sympathisers and members
clearly became pre-dominant in the NPCC04 (see Bertout 2006, 77; more generally Kössler 2008).
It is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that prominent NPCC04 members were initially just as
hostile as German diplomats towards Riruako’s efforts. Their own demands were radical in content,
but traditional in form. At a March 2004 exhibition launch in Cologne, Kameeta called for a Ger-
man ‘Marshall Plan’ to bring lasting material change to Namibia (Kössler 2006, n. 33). A new Ger-
man willingness to make tactical concessions, however - a result of pressures both in Namibia and
at home - soon saw this radicalism downplayed. It also led, temporarily, to something approaching a
united front in Herero politics. In late July the German Embassy announced, crucially, that the Ger-
man Minister for Economic and Technical Co-operation, Heidi Wieczorek-Zeul, would attend the
commemorations at Okakarara (Hintze 2004). This was followed by Ambassador Wolfgang Mass-
ing attending a debate in Windhoek on the 6th of August. Whilst Massing remained forthright in op-
posing action outside bilateral channels - ‘forget about the court case, it will not help anything’ - he
nevertheless declared himself open to an alternative devised by University of Namibia law profess-
or Manfred Hinz (Kuteeue, 6th August 2004). This was intended to deal with reparations claims on
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the ‘political-ethical level’, and to prevent German officials from ‘hiding behind a crumbling legal
façade’ (Hinz 2010, 405, 408)31. Its rationale was that ‘legal obstacles’ would ‘in all probability’
frustrate the legal claim, which was in any case greeted with ‘political unease’ by some in the ‘Ova-
herero community’ (Hinz 2010, 400, 404). Hinz recommended a ‘mediation process’ entrusted to ‘a
bilateral Reconciliation Commission comprising German and Ovaherero/Ovambanderu representat-
ives, established with the blessing and support of the German government’ and eventually accom-
modating other interested parties such as the ‘Nama and Damara nations’ (groups also affected by
the genocide) (Hinz 2010, 408, n. 64). One panellist at the debate, Festus Muinjo, rejected all such
negotiated solutions, claiming that ‘the Herero issue … will continue ad finitum’. And after Mass-
ing endorsed Hinz’s plan both  CCFCOG and NPCC04 announced, forthrightly,  that they would
‘join hands’ and campaign jointly for reparations (Deutsche Welle, 5th August 2004).
It may be, as the constructivist model holds, that the German government’s concessions can
be  understood  in  terms  of  ideas  ‘re-constituting’ interests  (Klotz  1995).  Unlike  in  Britain  and
France,  however,  reparations  also  offered  German  politicians  possibilities  for  legitimation  (see
chapter 5). The history of the 1904-07 genocide had potentially partisan implications. In Britain and
France neither Left nor Right had anything approaching a moral monopoly over the condemnation
of repression in Algeria and Kenya, most notably (e.g. M. Evans 1997; D. Anderson 2005, 326-7).
The German centenary of 1904-07, by contrast, allowed the Left to attack the historical role of the
Right.  In a 2004 Bundestag debate  the ruling coalition of Social  Democrats (SPD) and Greens
(Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) avoided the use of the word genocide and played down the value of repar-
ations - ‘we will not be able to undo what has happened … we are aware of the special significance
of what happened for the history of Germany’ - but still emphasised Namibian national resistance to
colonial  rule  (Kössler  2008,  323;  Hinz  2010,  397).  At  her  speech  in  Okakarara,  moreover,
Wieczorek-Zeul (a member of the SPD Left sometimes dubbed ‘Red Heidi’ in the German media)
stressed how ‘even at that time, back in 1904, there were also Germans who opposed and spoke out
against this war of oppression. One of them, and I’m proud of that, was August Babel, the chairman
of the same political party of which I’m a member’ (G. Jackson 2009, 212; Morgan 2010, 83). (This
referred to debates during the notorious ‘Hottentot election’ of 1907 where the Conservative-liberal
block defeated the SPD and Centre Party by justifying repression in Namibia as necessary for the
muscular ‘world politics’ (Weltpolitick) of a young nation [van der Heyden 2007].)
By  far  the  most  newsworthy  aspect  of  Wieczorek-Zeul’s  speech,  however,  was  her
declaration that ‘we Germans accept our historic and moral responsibility and the guilt incurred by
Germans at that time … the atrocities committed at that time would have been termed genocide …
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everything I have said was an apology from the German government’. She delivered these words
with tears in her eyes, and perhaps even without a script (Kössler 2008, 328; Morgan 2010, 248).
This had a considerable effect on proceedings.  The then Minister of Lands and Resettlement (and
now President)  Hifikepunye Pohamba implored  Namibians  to  accept  Wieczorek-Zeul’s  apology
(Morgan 2010, 86). A ‘calmed down’ Riruako did not even read the speech he had prepared, simply
calling instead for Germans and Hereros to ‘finish the unfinished business’ (Kuteeue,  16th August
2004a;  Morgan  2010,  248).  Herero  political  unity  was  then  underscored  by  statements  from
SWAPO-affiliated  traditional  authorities.  Chief  Munjuku  II,  for  example,  rejected  bilateral
approaches:  ‘we do not  want  a  repetition of  the  chorus  of  the  development  aid to  Namibia,  a
bilateral  arrangement  that  Germany is  enjoying  with  other  governments  worldwide’  (Matundu-
Tjiparuro,  23rd August 2004; Morgan 2010, 81; for Munjuku II  Africa Confidential, 7th February
2003; for his opposition to the HCC in the 1960s see  Tjosongoro et al., letter of 20th September
1961 [Ruth First Papers]). Although Chief Alfons  Kaihepovazandu Maharero, an ovahona Herero
leader from Eastern Namibia, and one of those most opposed to Riruako’s claim to paramountcy,
did come out in favour of bilateral methods, even he qualified this by stating that redress should
nevertheless be targeted towards particular ‘affected communities’ (Matundu-Tjiparuro, 23rd August
2004; for Maharero’s claims Mutjavikua, June 2008). 
(c). ‘You can’t just litigate these things away’: the norm spiral’s final stages
Reparations  advocates  were  soon dissatisfied  with Germany’s  response  to  the  events  of
2004. Apology was clearly not going to lead to payment. Frustrated expectations radicalised de-
mands, but ushered in new divisions. Commemorations continued throughout the year, but were of-
ten only attended by Otjiherero-speakers and the German and international media (e.g. Morgan
2010, 66). At one of these - held at Ozombuzovindimba in early November in order to commemor-
ate the issuing of General von Trotha’s infamous ‘extermination order’ - Riruako condemned Ger-
many’s ‘no-pay attitude’ and SWAPO’s ‘eleventh-hour pretensions … hypocrisy and double stand-
ards’. A declaration was read out vowing to petition the United Nations, the African Union, human
rights organisations and international tribunals for reparations, and reserving ‘a right as a suffering
people to resort to other  legitimate means of struggle against German interests anywhere in  the
world’. Former Attorney General Advocate Vekuii Rukoro,  one of the few figures to collaborate
with Riruako whilst a SWAPO member, cautioned campaigners against groups like the NPCC04
who facilitated German attempts at divide and rule (for Rukoro see Dierks 2004b). Where once
German colonialists had come as saviours but became killers, now ‘they are coming in a different
form through churches and their message is reconciliation’ (Kuteeue, 16th August 2004b). Later that
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month a conference was organised in Bremen by a committee that included Manfred Hinz and Ger-
man development aid officials. It was attended by those whom Riruako and Rukuro attacked, in-
cluding  Heidi  Wieczorek-Zeul,  Zephania  Kameeta  and  Namibia’s  Minister  of  Information  and
Broadcasting, Nangolo Mbumba. Riruako, who was also present, became incensed at the emphasis
placed on  ‘meaningful dialogue’, including the Namibian government. To Wieczorek-Zeul’s con-
siderable distress he described the exercise as ‘a second-round genocide’ (Hälbich, 23rd November
2004).
In order to continue applying pressure on the Namibian government CCFCOG was trans-
formed into a successor body: the Ovaherero Genocide Committee (OGC). In 2005, however, des-
pite organising a march to parliament and protest against Germany’s candidacy for the Security
Council, the group had clearly lost much of its momentum (Dentlinger, 2nd October 2005; Morgan
2010,  59).  The  NPCC04,  meanwhile,  had  transformed  itself  into  the  Ovaherero/Ovambanderu
Council for Dialogue on 1904 Genocide (OCD-1904). This name reflected both its more welcoming
attitude towards Germany’s concessions and its support from SWAPO-affiliated Ovambanderu tra-
ditional authorities in Eastern Namibia (see Kössler 2008, 330). This was perhaps most dramatically
illustrated by its choice of chairman: Chief Alfons  Kaihepovazandu Maharero, one of Rirauko’s
strongest critics (e.g. Maharero 2012; Sasman, 24th August 2012). In May 2005 the first fruits of this
‘dialogue’ were announced: a €20 million German ‘special initiative’ that would implement devel-
opment projects  in areas inhabited by communities who were victims of ‘what today is rightly
termed genocide’ (Kössler 2008, 329). 
Criticisms of the ‘special initiative’ were voiced immediately, from the OGC and others.
Some pointed out that its economic focus and narrow geographical scope meant it could do nothing
to alleviate suffering in the diaspora, or to address the specific needs of women and those undergo-
ing trauma (Johanna Kahatjipara, interview, 30th August 2011). Other disputes emerged between
the affected communities and the Namibian and German governments, with many branding the ini-
tiative as inappropriately top-down and even overly beneficial to consultants and Chinese firms in-
volved in the bidding process (e.g. M. Ngavirue, 11th January 2007; Sasman, 4th September 2012).
For Esther Muinjangue, chairperson of the OGC, it was ‘another nonsense’ (interview, 23rd August
2011). Bilateral solutions, however, clearly threatened the Committee’s reparations campaign. New,
more collaborative strategies were needed. As Riruako explained to me, ‘I found out it’s good for
me to take this case to the government, it’s the time. They benefit from it, and I cannot just keep on
doing things independently’ (interview, 27th August 2011). Most importantly, he tabled a parlia-
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mentary resolution demanding that the government reject the ‘special initiative’ and campaign for
reparations itself:
Namibians through their legitimate government has [sic] the right to decide ... The one sided
special initiative by the self proclaimed ayatollahs who decided to kill us in our country in the
first place, now are deciding for themselves what we are worth of [sic]. Let us support the leg-
al position and demand for reparation as I have spearheaded (National Assembly of the Re-
public of Namibia 2006, 10).
A number of other political actors embraced this opportunity. The most significant of these
was SWAPO Secretary-General Ngarikutuke Tjiriange, who surprised many by calling for ‘repara-
tion for the 1904-1906 Herero Genocide’ (Kössler 2008, 330). Once again, however, these conces-
sions would not fully satisfy Riruako’s demands.  Tjiriange presented a bilateral reparations cam-
paign as a bulwark against the ‘trivial politicization of grief and torment’; an accusation levelled
against the OGC and the (rather ephemeral) ‘Opuwo Genocide Committee’, which he saw as closer
to the DTA than Rirauko’s NUDO. He concluded that ‘although the extermination mentioned only
the Herero, all other ethnic groups were not spared and the debate must be nationally centered’
(Weidlich, 29th September 2006). Leaders of smaller political parties also embraced Riruako’s move
and  sought  inclusion  in  a  reparations  campaign  that  some  felt  excluded  from.  DTA President
Katuutire Kaura supported the motion enthusiastically. Justus //Garoëb, a Damara traditional leader
and President of the small, Damara-dominated United Democratic Front, minimised the importance
of ethnic distinctions during the genocide: ‘there were only two black groups during the war time,
namely the Ovaherero and the Damaras, and the Germans could not differentiate between the two at
a distance’ (Kangueehi, 5th October 2006). Whilst McHenry Venaani, Deputy Chair of the section of
NUDO still affiliated to the DTA, hoped that parliament might oversee bilateral negotiations in a
way that would ensure funds would be used not as hand-outs but to promote commercial agricul-
ture; an issue close to his heart (Kangueehi, 19th October 2006; interview, 2nd September 2011). The
motion was adopted unanimously.
New alliances were also forged internationally, and again reflected a diverse range of political
agendas. The 2005 German federal elections saw the SPD enter a ‘Grand Coalition’ with the Chris-
tian Democratic Union (CDU), preventing a more radical parliamentary grouping entering govern-
ment (Proksch and Slapin 2006, 551). This re-alignment was triggered by the emergence of  Die
Linke (the Left Party), formed by a merger between a Left SPD faction and the former ruling party
of old East Germany. It swiftly positioned itself as the official critic of German colonial amnesia. In
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August 2006, at the annual Heroes Day commemorations in Okahandja, Left Party parliamentarian
Hüseyin Aydin declared that ‘Wieczorek-Zeul’s ‘brave speech’ at Ohamakari had not been followed
up by adequate political action’. He described the reparations campaign as essential for educating
the  German public  about  the  genocide. After  the  Namibian  parliament’s  resolution  Aydin  then
planned a new Bundestag motion on reparations, believing that the (relatively unproblematic) pay-
ment of development funds might now be substituted for cash payments (Kössler 2008, 329).  Un-
surprisingly, however, even this motion was rejected. The Left Party was accused by SPD politi-
cians of trying to ‘instrumentalise’ suffering, and by their CDU counterparts of representing ‘minor-
ity views’ as public opinion (Deutsche Welle,  15th June 2007). (Some Left Party veterans of East
German politics were also uneasy of launching initiatives not supported by SWAPO [Kössler 2008,
330].)
These Bundestag debates obliged SWAPO to articulate its new position. Peter Katjavivi, au-
thor of the classic  A History of Resistance in Namibia  (1988),  and now Namibian ambassador to
Germany, declared that reconciliation should ‘firstly be done within us and our society and secondly
between Namibia and its partners, in this case, Germany’ (Weidlich, 18th June 2007). The Namibian
government thus for the first time conceded at least rhetorical space to the claims of groups. It no
longer sought to subsume them entirely within the (narrow) anti-colonial resistance narrative it still
hoped to impose upon public memory (cf. Melber 2003; Saunders 2007; Zeurn 2012; more gener-
ally Werbner 1998). It suggested, however, that the practical complexities involved could only be
negotiated by the central state. Speeches by leading politicians now illustrated SWAPO’s determina-
tion to make the reparations campaign, and its language, its own. In February 2007, for example,
Prime Minister Nahas Angula gave a speech to the OCD-1904 in which he declared not his only
support for the Special Initiative (restorative campaigns), but for reparations campaigns in general:
those affected by the crime of colonial genocide should define how the restoration programme
should be developed …  If the Germany Special Initiative is well resourced it will go a long
way to bring about restorative justice … Any Namibian who feels wronged has a right to seek
justice ... Reparation demands should form part of a global campaign for reparations against
those who perpetuated slavery; colonial genocide; other forms of colonial abuses and exploit-
ation against the African people [...] restorative justice and reparation demands are not mutu-
ally exclusive. They form a continuum (Office of the Prime Minister, 2007).
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To stress  the  national  character  of  these demands,  Angula  made pointed  reference  to  his
grandfather’s death at the battle of Onamutuni. This took place during the Namibian War of 1904,
and followed from a request for intervention against the German Army from Samuel Maharero to
Ondonga King Nehale lya Mpingana. Nehale was an important ruler in the Oshiwambo-speaking
North who recently has had a gate named after him at Etosha National Park - Namibia’s primary
tourist attraction (for criticism Eino, 25th November 2011). For SWAPO Onamutuni has become a
particularly important piece of ‘usable past’ (Ranger 1976). In 1981 the movement’s official history
had stated clearly that ‘the Germans, preoccupied with their subjugation of the Herero and Nama
and deterred by Owambo numbers and military power, left them [the Owambo] alone’ (in Melber
2014, 159). Historians and OGC activists, indeed, still insist that Oshiwambo-speakers were com-
paratively less affected by the War (Wallace 2011, chapter 6; Esther Muinjangue, interview, 23rd Au-
gust 2011; Miescher 2012, 3)32. But in 2010, in a speech in Kuiama’s Riruako’s political heartland
of Aminius, the First President of Namibia Sam Nujoma pointedly stressed the ‘strong bonds of co-
operation’ between Ondonga King Nehale and Samuel Maharero that were demonstrated at Onamu-
tuni (Sam Nujoma Foundation, 18th July 2010). And the Governor of the Bank of Namibia has re-
cently suggested that the battle might be commemorated on a banknote (Shiimi 2012). Confronted
with attempts to contest its nationalist narrative, SWAPO has thus, on occasion at least, broadened
its canon of anti-colonial resistance heroism; perhaps the reparations campaign’s most significant
achievement33. 
The contrast between SWAPO’s position, and that of OGC, had thus now become a subtle
one.  In  a  reflection  of  new  political  alliances,  reparations  campaigners  close  to  Riruako  also
broadened their historical narrative, placing the Nama alongside the Herero in the ranks of German
colonialism’s victims34. Contra SWAPO, Herero and Nama leaders argued that the complexities of
history should not distract from their stronger legal and empirical claims to compensation. (Whilst
Damara political and cultural leaders had begun to mobilise around the issue in 2005 they have re-
mained outside this developing alliance [Kössler 2008, 331; Erichsen 2008, 11-20].) Esther Muin-
jangue, chairperson of the OGC, provided me with a rationale for this decision: ‘If the Basters also
know that they were targeted, let them come out and prove this to the nation ... because half of the
Namas died … we have joined forces with them’ (Esther Muinjangue, interview, 23rd August 2011).
A 2007 ‘joint position paper from the Nama and Ovaherero people’ pointed out, similarly, that ‘by
1907 approximately sixty (60%) percent of the Namas and eighty (80%) of the Ovaherero were ex-
terminated by the German Imperial war machinery’. It re-stated the claim that parliament should
push for direct redress to affected groups, and not substitute itself for bilateral relations, ‘we do not
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accept that we have initially raised the issue and now it should be about us and yet without us’ [em-
phases in original] (Nama and Ovaherero Traditional Leaders, 14th December 2007, 3, 5). 
This rapprochement, however, did nothing to forge determinate norms that might govern re-
parations payments. Those Herero leaders most opposed to Riruako’s claim to paramountcy contin-
ued to contest the legitimacy of his reparations advocacy explicitly. In late 2007, to Riruako’s fury,
the family of Luther von Trotha - the General who issued the infamous ‘Extermination Order’ -
were invited to Namibia to apologise. The visit was largely organised by Festus Tjikuua, an OCD-
1904 member and Secretary of the Council of the Six Herero Royal Houses (CSHRH): a body of
ovahona  leaders  then led  by  Chief  Alfons  Kaihepovazandu Maharero.  At  a  commemoration in
South Africa Riruako declared that  ‘the person who is  doing these things  is  playing with fire’
(Weidlich, 1st October 2007). In parliament one of his allies in NUDO, Arnold Tjihuiko, made an al-
legation that SWAPO had often levelled at Riruako’s own campaign:  ‘Why do they come here to
apologise to only one language group?’, Tjihuiko asked, ‘what about the Nama, Damara and San,
(who also suffered) - are they going to them as well to apologise … the Von Trothas have just come
here to pursue their strategy of divide and rule’ (Weidlich, 3rd October 2007). The German Embassy,
unsurprisingly, endorsed the CSHRH’s actions, seeing the visit as ‘another step in the right direction
with regard to reconciliation’ (Weidlich, 1st October 2007).
In late 2008 it was Maharero’s turn to express outrage at the actions of his adversary. To the
surprise of many observers, SWAPO finally decided to recognise the Riruako-led Ovaherero Tradi-
tional Authority (OTA)35. (After reaching deadlock in their campaign for recognition in Namibia’s
courts, OTA chiefs had declared they had ‘explored all avenues of Government’ and were ‘now left
with one option only and that is to appeal to the United Nations and international human rights or-
ganisations’ (Weidlich, 12th March 2008.) Outraged, CSHRH leaders wrote to the SWAPO Secret-
ary-General attacking:
the preposterous  proposition for  the  recognition of  the  so-called  46 Ovaherero traditional
chiefs under the leadership of Hon. Riruako, which was part of a grand strategy to undermine
the political legitimacy of the new Namibian Government through provocations (New Era,
11th December 2008).
The Maherero Traditional Authority, for its part, publicly disputed the ‘contentment’ of Herero lead-
ers with Riruako’s 1978 promotion to paramountcy, and attacked the ‘near violent effort to derail
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the programme that was mounted in October 2007, during the occasion of the reconciliatory visit of
the descendants of the German colonial General Lothar Von Trotha’ (Mutjavikua, June 2008).
By this time international advocacy, however, had temporarily shifted towards a ‘new wave
of reparative claims’; focusing around objects of national cultural importance, such as Gandhi’s
glasses (H. Campbell 2009). In Germany similar claims were stimulated by a July 2008 document-
ary describing the use of Herero and Nama prisoners’ skulls in ‘research’ by the racialist scientist,
and future Nazi Dr. Eugen Fischer. Pioneering academic research into his topic was published and
connections between the genocide and National Socialism were publicly debated in Germany (see
chapter 7). The most significant of the documentary’s findings was that 47 of these skulls were still
stored at the Charité hospital in Berlin and at least 12 more at Freiburg University. Peter Katjavivi,
in an interview for the programme, demanded the skulls’ return (Mail and Guardian, 22nd July 2008;
Katjavivi 2012). Once again, however, the German embassy in Windhoek re-iterated its commit-
ment to bilateral relations, stating that a formal request from the Namibian would be required. And
once again the OGC contested this, demanding direct involvement in the process. Speaking on Her-
oes Day, Esther Muinjangue stated that,
we demand these skulls back in order to bury them in dignity … these skulls did not belong to
Germany when they were sent to Germany a century ago. Whom did they ask for permission
then? … We shall continue to demand reparations from Germany even if it should take us an-
other 100 years or more (Weidlich, 25th August 2008). 
Divisions in Herero politics were now increasingly stark. At the same Heroes Day event at
which Muinjangue spoke, Alfons  Kaihepovazandu Maharero called once more for  a negotiated
solution to the question of the skulls, declaring that he would ‘sensitise the Berlin government about
our seriousness for a meaningful dialogue’ (Weidlich, 25th August 2008). Furthermore, whilst the
OGC was eventually bound to negotiate with SWAPO in order to be involved with the skulls’ re-
turn, differences immediately emerged over the historical narrative which this was intended to re-
enforce. Whilst the government wanted the skulls buried at Heroes Acre - a grandiose site dedicated
to placing SWAPO at the centre of Namibian ‘patriotic history’ - Riruako, like SWANU more re-
cently, demanded they be displayed at a ‘genocide museum’ in the capital (Weidlich, 2nd October
2009; Förster 2013). The site he proposed was one which the government had already earmarked
for an Independence Memorial Museum - which,  like Heroes Acre, was to be built by a North
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Korean construction firm (see Zuern 2012, 497, 517, n. 18). (Reparations campaigners now insist
that both Heroes Acre and the Independence Memorial Museum are unsuitable for the skulls of their
dead. They are provisionally stored at the National Museum of Namibia whilst their future is de-
cided (Förster 2013).)
Conflicts, however, had also arisen around the logistical arrangements for the skulls’ return.
Particularly intense debates surrounded the composition and representivity of the delegations bound
for Germany. These discussions were reported to be ‘near completion’ in 2009 but lasted until mid-
2011 (see Luqman, 1st October 2009). The Minister of Youth, National Service, Sport and Culture,
Kazenambo Kazenambo, was the government’s choice to co-ordinate proceedings. Kazenambo was
a potentially satisfying choice for more radical  reparations advocates since he was known as a
‘firebrand’, and his family had fled the genocide for Bechuanaland (Nyaunwa 10th February 2012;
Melber 2014, 171, n. 11)36. (He has also, unusually for a SWAPO politician, apparently criticised
the government for favouring Oshimwambo-speakers at  the expense of Otjiherero-speakers (see
Nunuhe, 2nd November 2011.) In March 2011 he asked Herero and Nama groups to formalise tech-
nical committees to plan the skulls’ return (see Nunuhe, 25 th March 2011). The OGC and Nama
Technical Committee (NTC) asked for the 54 places available for delegates to be split three ways:
between their two groups and that representing OCD-1904: the Ovaherero-Ovambanderu Technical
Committee for the 1904 Genocide (OOTC-1904). To their disappointment, however, the OOTC-
1904 - which, in a further twist, had formed its own agreement with more a politically sympathetic
Nama body: the Nama Traditional Leadership Association (NTLA) - were allocated half the avail-
able places (Nunuhe, 12th April 2011; Namibian Sun, 27th July 2011). Government critics such as
Pauline  Dempers,  meanwhile,  were  removed  from the  list  of  delegates  (interview,  30th August
2011). Despite attempts at arbitration by Prime Minister Nahas Angula, complaints by the OGC and
NTC eventually led the government to postpone the trip indefinitely, with the details only being fi-
nalised four months later (Poolman, 16th May 2011; Nunuhe, 16th May 2011).
In Germany the pressure to return the skulls, and linkage of the issue to reparations, came
primarily from the Left Party and ‘No Amnesty on Genocide’: a coalition of German, diasporic and
Pan-Africanist NGOs (see chapter 7). In May 2011 German Left Party MP Niema Movassat, and
other Left Party politicians, submitted a ‘minor interpellation’ to the Federal Office which cited both
OGC and OCD-1904 statements, and asked, inter alia, why the government continued to refuse the
label ‘genocide’ and make no progress on reparations (German Bundestag language service, 15th
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June 2011, 2-3).  The interpellation,  complete with official  response,  included the following ex-
change, which cuts to the heart of the key issues in reparations politics:
21. In the event that human remains are identified from countries other than Namibia, will
the  Federal  Government  make  contact  with  these  countries  and  offer  to  return  the
remains?
In the event that institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany approach the Federal Gov-
ernment in relation to the return of human remains which are not artefacts, the Federal Gov-
ernment will consider the issue of repatriation in consultation with the institutions’ governing
bodies and, if appropriate, make contact with the relevant country. The appropriate and right-
ful recipients of the remains will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
22. Is the Federal Government working towards the establishment of an international or
European repatriation process for human remains stolen from former colonies? If not, why
not? If so, how does the Federal Government intend to organize the process?
No. An international or European process for the return of human remains would require a
uniform, or at least an agreed, position on issues relating to repatriation of human remains
among the countries concerned. No such position exists, even within Europe, partly due to the
countries’ different approach to their colonial history, varying ethical positions and diverse
legal systems (German Bundestag language service, 15th June 2011, 11). 
In the restitution of cultural property, therefore, as with the compensation of atrocity, accept-
ing  the  judicialisation  of  the  colonial  past  threatens  to  open  ‘Pandora’s  box’.  In  both  cases,
moreover, it is difficult to imagine how determinate norms could produce ‘rules’ to govern the pro-
cess. It might be possible, of course, as some have demanded, to return all objects in European mu-
seums originating from colonial territories to the national museums of states now governing those
spaces (but for critique see Cuno 2001; J. Stuart 2004). Once again, however, as with legitimate re-
cipients of reparations, this depends on either national museums or nationally-designated institu-
tions being accepted as representative sites. The OGC contested such decisions over the skulls, and
have of course challenged bilateral payments of reparations in even stronger terms (Weidlich, 2nd
October 2009)37. 
The German government has sought to avoid all such situations with diplomatic language.
Its apologies for the genocide have been carefully drafted to avoid triggering legal consequences.
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One activist believes that the formula ‘human remains which are not artefacts’ was created by gov-
ernment lawyers to relegate skulls to the category of (natural) ‘objects’, and thus prevent the cre-
ation of a legal precedent for (manufactured) ‘artefacts’; a strategy intended to guarantee at least the
short-term future of objects like the Rosetta Stone in the British Museum and the Queen Nefertiti
bust in the Ägyptisches Museum, Berlin (anonymous interview,  1st September 2011)38. As critics
have pointed out, however, such strategies have been public relations disasters for the German gov-
ernment. And this situation might well have been mitigated by more sincere engagement with ritual
and symbolic initiatives. Melber and Kossler (2012), for example, have pointed to Willy Brandt’s
apparently spontaneous kneeling before the Warsaw War Memorial as a meaningful German histor-
ical precedent for such an action. David Anderson (2005, 336), meanwhile, has recommended the
creation of a Kenyan ‘Heroes’ Acre’ to overcome similar memory conflicts produced by the Mau-
Mau reparations campaign.  However, the expansion of new international legal regimes ensures that
symbolic initiatives can only ever complement, and never definitively replace legal claims. As Esth-
er Muinjangue stressed to me, although some in Germany hope reparations can be dispensed with
politically by a ‘final stroke’, this is ‘wishful thinking’ (interview, August 23rd 2011). In the words
of Chief Riruako’s legal advisor, reparations ‘cannot simply be legislated away’ (Jeremy Sarkin, in-
terview, 12th August 2011). 
As was so often the case over the previous decade, indeed, politics went some way towards
blunting the symbolic impact of the skulls’ return. The Federal Government sent no representative
to meet the delegation that eventually travelled to the Charité University Hospital in September
2011. It also sent no high-ranking officials to a ‘memorial and reconciliation service’ conducted by
Zephania Kameeta, or to a panel debate co-organised by the NGO coalition and attended by the
SPD, the Greens and the Left Party (Hintze, 3rd October 2011; German Bundestag language service,
1st December 2011, 8-9). The Minister of State for the Foreign Office, Cornelia Piper, gave a speech
at the handover ceremony, but did not apologise for the genocide and left soon afterwards by the
back door (Hintze, 3rd October 2011). (The Federal government subsequently explained her actions
by means of the ‘incensed atmosphere and the general confrontational attitude of some participants’
(German Bundestag language service, 1st December 2011, 9).) Whilst agreeing a N$660 (approxim-
ately) £48 million development finance agreement for land reform and infrastructure, the German
Ambassador then accused the delegation of having a ‘hidden agenda’; a thinly-veiled reference to
reparations (Namibian Press Association, 17th November 2011). Minister of State Werner Hoyer,
meanwhile, accused ‘organizations in Germany’ of presenting themselves as ‘joint hosts’ and of
having ‘openly incited’ the delegation demanding reparations. When asked why the government had
refused ‘dialogue’ at the NGO panel debate, Hoyer defended the principles behind bilateral rela-
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tions: ‘international negotiations and discussions on such complex issues simply do not work like
that. Governments do not join independently initiated events to negotiate with foreign partners’
(German Bundestag language service, 30th November 2011, 1-2). 
Almost all of those associated with the delegation criticised the German government. Even
the OCD-1904 spoke scathingly of the ‘intransigence of the German Government to acknowledge
the Genocide committed against the Namibian people and to meet our demand for appropriate res-
torative justice’, and its apparently newfound opposition to ‘Structured Dialogue between the af-
fected communities and the German Government under the facilitation of the Namibian Govern-
ment’ (OCD-1904, 24th November 2011). A spokesman for the NTC went even further and attacked
the German-Namibian development finance agreement reached after the skulls’ return. The state-
ment explicitly connected these demands with those for changes to the rural order. Quoting Presid-
ent Pohamba as having said that ‘communities had no more say over their land’, it prescribed an
end to bilateral relations:
grants from Germany are not expended for the stated purposes, we feel that the bilateral rela-
tions carry no integrity and are in bad faith … it was a significant section of the German
People who organised a fraternal connection between the two nations and who took the Ger-
man State to task for its actions and policies. If the bilateral policy met its deserved fate it was
largely due to the determination of Germans themselves (NTC, 28th November 2011). 
Criticisms of the German government continued into 2012. In March the ‘civil society alli-
ance’ declared that it had forced the Federal administration to adopt a more ‘conciliatary approach’
(AfricAvenir International et al., 7th March 2012). In February Ambassador Walter Lindner, Special
Advisor on African Affairs in the Foreign Ministry, apologised for any insensitivity shown during
the skulls’ handover, and met with a range of Namibian groups including the OGC (Poolman, 2nd
February 2012; Nicolai Röschert, personal communication, 29th July 2014). The Left Party and its
allied NGOs now sought to navigate a new path between bilateral relations and development aid on
one hand, and reparations and  post-national diplomacy on the other. This ‘restorative justice’ ap-
proach prescribed the creation of a reparations fund co-managed by parliament, government and
‘affected groups’ (Sasman, 2nd March 2012). In the Bundestag Niema Mosavvat stated that this
would redress ‘structural inequalities’ suffered by ‘the Herero, Nama, Damara and San people’,
whilst helping to end the ‘disgrace that streets in our towns and cities are still named after perpetrat-
ors of colonial crimes [a campaign pursued by coalition NGOs including Berlin Postkolonial]. (Ap-
plause from The LEFT PARTY, the SPD and ALLIANCE 90/THE GREENS)’ (German Bundestag
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language service, 1st March 2012; 22nd March 2012; Nicolai Röschert, personal communication, 29th
July 2014). An accompanying motion, endorsed by the NGO coalition, asked the government to
help not hinder Namibian unity on the issue, prompting it to ‘enter into a dialogue with the Namibi-
an Government and with the committees representing the descendants of the victims and to come to
agreements on suitable financial and structural acts of compensation’ (AfricaVenir International et
al., 7th  March 2012). These pressures the obliged the SPD and Greens to introduce their own, very
similar motions, only marginally downplaying reparations components (Sasman, 26th March 2012). 
As many commentators have bemoaned, however, the internal settlement upon which this
‘restorative justice’ approach is premised upon has yet to materialise (e.g. Kaure, 24 th August 2012;
Sasman, 28th August 2012; Kazondovi, 6th September 2012). Whilst the government and those asso-
ciated with the OGC have continued to see tactical advantages in limited collaboration, relations
between traditional leaders and politicians affiliated with different committees are yet to improve.
The 2011 Red Flag Heroes’ Day commemorations - parts of which I attended - were the first to be
accompanied by a police presence. Disputes had emerged over the correct location of the Holy Fire:
a site for rituals invoking the healing power of the ancestors, and a key symbolic resource in the
construction of authentic ‘Herero’ tradition (see Wallace 2003). Supporters of Chief Maharero were
told to extinguish a fire they had set-up. They then turned to DTA President Katuutire Kaura for in-
tercession, who re-iterated claims that Riruako’s paramountcy was illegitimate (Kazondovi, 29 th Au-
gust 2011). The next May, a month after Alfons Maherero’s death, those responsible for appointing
his successor were already calling on President Pohamba to intercede on their behalf if similar dis-
putes resurfaced (Namibian Press Association,  14th May 2012). Such disputes did resurface, and
commemorations were even suspended for a week (Sasman, 3rd September 2012). All of these diffi-
culties were compounded by significant challenges to Riruako’s authority from within NUDO, and
even the Ovaherero Traditional Authority structures in his political heartland of Aminius (Sasman,
29th March 2012; Sasman, 16th May 2012).
5. Conclusion
The reparations campaign, in short, had not succeeded in unifying a Herero nation under Ri-
ruako’s paramountcy. One notably critical observer has recently criticised the claims to ‘biological
authenticity’  it has reinforced, and the ‘sort of logic that allowed the paramount Herero leadership
to claim the sole and authentic status of victimhood in relation to the Genocide’ (Melber 2014, 161).
Internal  divisions,  nevertheless,  now seem enduring -  even if  ‘discourse on the genocide’ once
promised to ‘paper over’ them (Gewald 2003, 303). Like those between SWAPO and its opponents,
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these divisions cannot be overcome by legal principle or socialisation processes. The preconditions
for this, as with the Botswanan disputes outlined in the next chapter, are good faith negotiations
leading to political settlement. As  Förster (2013) has written recently, ‘the Namibian government
will have to include and balance different ethnic, political and community identities and interests,
but at the same time counteract exclusionism and claims to sole representation’. The German Spe-
cial Initiative was, of course, criticised as a failed attempt to do just this.
Future proposals must therefore be imaginative ones. Phanuel Kapaama, for instance, an
OCD-1904 member and political scientist at the University of Namibia, has proposed that repara-
tions fund be paid into an international trust, preventing their instrumentalisation by German and
Namibian interests (interview, August 30th 2011). Others have proposed a dedicated national NGO
also including San and Damara groups (Förster 2013). There is as yet no sign, however, that even
such a trust or NGO would be considered representative by enough parties to the dispute. Radical-
ised by recent setbacks and German government statements, reparations campaigners, certainly, re-
main undeterred. They will continue to challenge the principles governing bilateral relations and
political order in rural Namibia. Their efforts represent a new stage in the judicialisation of Namibi-
an politics and national identity, and have seemingly spurred other groups to launch similar initiat-
ives. Even German-speaking conservatives now plan to sue the government, which is intending to
replace an (infamous) monument celebrating German victory in the Namibian War with a statue of
First President Nujoma (Haidula, 24th March 2014; for background Zuern 2012, 506-7; 514). Courts
cannot possibly produce rules or norms to govern or even pacify such disputes. A luta continua.
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Chapter 4: Who is indigenous to Botswana?
1. Introduction
Unlike  Namibian  demands  for  reparations,  Sesana  v  The  Attorney  General  (2006)  was
decided in Botswana itself. The case was the longest and most expensive in the country’s history. It
was also perhaps the most controversial. Survival International, a British indigenous rights NGO,
used the case to condemn the human rights record of the government of Botswana; hitherto seen
internationally  as  a  beacon  of  liberal  democracy  in  Africa.  The  dispute  centered  around  the
relocation of ‘indigenous’ San populations from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR); a
policy pursued as part of an ill-informed  mission civilisatrice  pursued by both colonial and post-
colonial administrations. What was new was the use of courtrooms to challenge such policies. In
subsequent chapters I explain the new indigenous rights beliefs which made this possible. Here I
describe how ‘indigenous’ issues have moved from bureaucratic  to judicial  arenas.  In Hirschl’s
(2008, 99) terms this represents a ‘mega-political ... judicialisation of formative collective identity’.
It publicly exposed challenges to elite self-understandings and national myths in Botswana. Thanks,
partly, to ‘gatekeeping’ by lawyers, however,  the case does not  yet  represent a judicialisation of
fundamental political order (for gatekeeping see Bob 2009, 6-7). Compliance with court rulings is
still  conceivable.  This  presents  revealing  contrasts  with  the  previous  chapters,  revisited  in  my
conclusion. 
2. Terms
The San of Southern Africa are among the most intensely studied peoples in world history.
Debate over nomenclature is ferocious. ‘Bushmen’, commonly used in and outside the West, and
‘Basarwa’, commonly used in Botswana, are often considered pejorative. As Barnard (2007, 5-6)
writes, even ‘San’, which I use, is often rejected as ‘an imposed, ‘politically correct’ term not in use
by any group of Bushmen ]...] there are objectors to nearly every generic term in use’. All such
generic  terms,  furthermore,  conceal  tremendous  cultural,  linguistic  and  social  variation.  As
Saugestad  (2001,  108-9)  notes,  indeed,  ‘the  primary  reference  group  for  self-identification  is
usually a  local  group and/or  speech community’.  But  ultimately,  as she goes onto say,  ‘to ask
whether one should use an inclusive category such as Basarwa, Bushmen or N/oakwe, or specific
terms like Naro, Ju/’hoan, G/wi, G//ana, !Xóo, Kua, etc., is to ask the wrong question; they are
simply different levels of precision’. Whilst I will be discussing events which have only directly
concerned  a  few  hundred  G/wi  and  G//ana  San  -  mostly  living  around  Mothomelo  and
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Metsiamanong (see figure 2) - I generally use generic terms; a reflection of the imprecise political
discourse I am analysing (for CKGR residency Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 309). 
Figure 2: The CKGR today, with the diamond mine at Gope (still under development as of April
2014). Source: Workman (2009).
3. The pre-independence context
(a) Incorporation into Tswanadom
San populations have seemingly been present in the Kalahari as early as 500 AD (Denbow
and Wilmsen 1986). The nature and scope of their interactions with other groups, however, has long
been a  matter  of  debate.  Scholars  disagree,  notably,  over  whether  nineteenth-century travellers’
accounts show these groups to have been so enmeshed in war, trade and diplomacy that they should
be considered to have lost their ‘autonomy’ (cf. Gordon 1984; Solway and Lee 1990; Barnard 2007,
chapter 8; for commentary see chapter 8). Whatever the scale of these pre-existing links, however, it
seems safe to say that political incorporation had begun to reach new levels by the second quarter of
the nineteenth-century. This period saw the expansion and consolidation of highly stratified Tswana
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kingdoms, left almost untouched by the British establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate in
1885 (Englebert 2000, 112-4). In this new order, the nation (morafe) was comprised of loyal subject
peoples and the Tswana nuclear group. For the rest, as Datta and Murray (1989, 63) summarise,
‘whether one became a client or a serf  depended on proximity to the Tswana elite in terms of
culture,  economy and geography’.  In this  hierarchy the San peoples of the Kalahari  were most
distant  of  all.  Today  their  position  is  reflected  in  the  Setswana  term  ‘tengnyanateng’,  which
translates literally as ‘those-who-are-deep-inside-deep’ (Mogwe 1992, 3). By 1890, under Khama
III, cattle-herding and living in villages had become the primary markers of social and economic
status.  ‘Bushmen’, as Wilmsen (2002, 829) writes, were ‘increasingly consigned to a peripheral,
wild, uncontrolled nature in Tswana ideology’.  
(b) Colonial assimilation
Almost  from  its  very  beginnings,  humanitarians  and  missionaries  including  David
Livingstone  had  denounced  these  arrangements  as  equivalent  to  ‘slavery’ and  called  for  their
abolition (Silberbauer and Kuper 1966, 171-2; Solway 2009, 337, n.17). The first official British
policy, by contrast, was ‘to  allow for the civilizing influences of magistrates and missionaries to
bring about a gradual change’ (in Russell 1976, 181). In 1925 the High Commissioner could still
publicly declare that the San were not ‘slaves’ but ‘a backward people who serve the Bamangwato
[one of the principal Tswana tribes] for the food and shelter they receive [...] they are for the most
part contented and they do not wish to change’ (Silberbauer and Kuper 1966, 172). The next decade,
however, saw a ‘burst of agitation’ around the issue, culminating in a 1932 Commission of Enquiry
into the ‘present subject position’ of the San amongst the Bamangwato, led by E.S.B. Tagart, and an
Affirmation of the Abolition of Slavery Proclamation in 1936 (Russell 1976, 178, n.3, 181). Tagart’s
proposals were a gradualist variant on the assimilationist programme which guided liberal states’
attitudes towards their ‘indigenous’ minorities before 1950 (Saugestad 1993, 13, 19; compare Mill
[1861] 1991, chapter 16). He suggested, imperiously,  that whilst the San had ‘so far shown little
aptitude  for  civilization’,  the  difference  ‘between  them  and  the  Bamangwato’ was  in  fact  ‘a
difference in degree not in kind as the Bamangwato would have us believe’ (in Russell 1976, 182). 
(c) Colonial modernist integration and the creation of the CKGR
In chapter 6 I describe the triumph of modernist beliefs in Western public administration
after  1945.  Economistic  modes  of  reasoning  displaced  the  civilisational  ones  implicit  in
assimilationist  thought.  Welfare  and ‘development’ were to  be  delivered  to  an  undifferentiated
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‘people’ on an equal basis. Liberal states began seeking to integrate their ‘indigenous’ populations;
a process which rights-based critics later described as ‘welfare colonialism’ (cf. Paine 1977;  for
Norway  and  New  Zealand,  Saugested  1993,  13,  19).  As  the  Resident  Commissioner  of
Bechuanaland Forbes-Mackenzie declared in 1954, ‘unless the Bushmen were given the opportunity
of developing side by side with the rest of the indigenous inhabitants they could hardly be expected
to survive for any length of time’ (in Wilmsen 2002, 830).  
In chapter 6 I also describe how anthropologists were almost alone in opposing these shifts.
Even they, however, were obliged to legitimate this opposition in terms of prevailing modernist
orthodoxies (for legitimation see chapter 5). This was no less true for anthropologists working in the
Bechuanaland Protectorate (e.g. R. Hitchcock 2002, 804). In this case they could count, however,
on the unusual degree of British political support generated by the extraordinary success of the
films and writings of Sir  Laurens van der Post. As early as the 1930s this Jungian mystic had
become ‘disillusioned with modernists as being out of touch ‘with life and their own nature’’ (in
Wilmsen  1995,  205).  Later,  in  1956,  and  against  a  background  of  almost  total  public  and
professional ignorance of the topic, he produced a six-part series for BBC television on the Lost
World of the Kalahari (cf.  Wilmsen 1995, 203). Its viewing figures were then second only to the
coronation of Elizabeth II three years earlier (Barnard 2007, 59). Van der Post used this film to
lobby, in public and in private, for a ‘Bushman’ Reserve’. A week before its final episode Lord
Ogmore asked Parliament about ‘what arrangements were being made for the proper protection of
the Bushmen in the Kalahari Desert’ (in Wilmsen 1995, 218). And two years later the Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Colonial Relations recorded that: 
as a consequence of the great Parliamentary interest shown in the Bushmen of Bechuanaland,
which in turn was roused by Colonel van der Post’s television programme called ‘The Lost
World of the Kalahari’, the High Commissioner proposed that a survey of the Bushmen in
Bechuanaland should be carried out with the assistance of CD & W [Colonial Development
and Welfare Act 1940] money (in Wilmsen 1995, 219).  
The man who eventually carried out this Survey was young District Commissioner George
Silberbauer; later a prominent anthropologist of the Kalahari and, dramatically, a key witness in
Sesana. Silberbauer recommended the creation of a Reserve because he hoped to create a ‘retreat
for hunters and gatherers’ (Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 293). As he wrote in his final  Bushmen Survey
Report (1965), the reserve was not intended ‘to preserve the Bushmen of the Reserve as museum
curiosities and pristine primitives, but to allow them the right of choice of the life they wish to
90
follow’ (in  Sapignoli  2009,  256). But  as  he  later  explained  on  the  witness  stand,  modernist
orthodoxies meant this could not be made explicit for ‘diplomatic reasons’ (Sapignoli 2009, 264).
‘Already  at  that  time’,  as  Zips-Mairitsch  (2013,  295-6)  notes,  ‘some  administrators  criticised
Silberbauer for creating a ‘human zoo’’. He had therefore stressed the ‘danger of extinction’ and
corresponding need for San involvement in development projects (Sapignoli 2009, 264). Further
legitimation  requirements  were  imposed  by  the  geopolitical  context:  ‘although  it  is  said  that
Silberbauer had South African Bantustan policy in mind, it would have been quite inappropriate for
the British authorities to be instituting a kind of apartheid, particularly in the year in which South
Africa left the Commonwealth and became a republic’ (Barnard 2007, 60). The upshot of this was
the creation, in 1961, of the Central Kalahari  Game Reserve [emphasis added]. Hunting was,  de
jure, illegal. And in 1963 Silberbauer produced a Control of Entry Regulation stipulating that ‘no
person other than a Bushman indigenous to the Central Kalahari Game Reserve shall enter the said
Reserve without having first obtained a permit in writing from the District Commissioner, Ghanzi’
(Zips-Mairitsch (2013, 294, 297). As we shall see, this context was crucial when the case later came
to court. 
4. Judicialisation
(a) 1966-1989: San development in bureaucratic arenas: modernist ‘integration’ in Botswana 
At independence Botswana retained much of the personnel of its colonial predecessor, whilst
deepening its modernist orientation (Charlton 1991, 274-5). Its subsequent developmental record is
famous, and has attracted interest from some of the world’s best-known economists (Acemoglu,
Johnson and Robinson 2003). Some political scientists have explained it by the (in African terms)
unusual continuity between pre- and post-independence elites (e.g. Englebert 2000, 112-4). As Nu-
gent (2010, 41) remarks, however, this does not explain how states based on personal ties become
bureaucratic ones. Here Botswana specialists have provided useful insights. Roberts (1985, 76), for
example, notes how modernist bureaucracy could easily be justified with the prevailing beliefs and
idioms and Tswanadom. In the ‘Tswana polity’, he writes, government was seen ‘quite explicitly as
a managerial task, likening the governing of men to the management of cattle’. (This, of course,
echoes  Foucault’s  (2007,  chapters  8-10)  account  of  how modern  states  drew on Christian  and
Renaissance discourses of pastorship and household management.) Charlton (1991, 277) has char-
acterised the resulting assemblage with the ‘deliberately clumsy’ concept of ‘developmental pater-
nalism’. Ever since the pre-independence years ruling elites have enjoyed close personal and ideolo-
gical ties with modernist bureaucrats (Charlton (1991, 271-6). But these have co-existed alongside a
separate  set  of  patronage ties,  assimilationist  beliefs  and civilizational  modes  of  reasoning (for
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cattle-based patronage generally see Kuper 1982; and for contemporary Botswana specifically see
Pitcher, Moran and Johnston 2009, 146-8). As shown below, however, this assemblage has in fact
proved an unstable one.
No  policy  area  has  illustrated  the  tensions  inherent  in  developmental  paternalism more
vividly than the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP): the primary means for state inter-
vention in San societies. Its first incarnation dates from 1974. At this time Botswana was still, fam-
ously, among the world’s poorest states. For pragmatic reasons, accordingly, despite its modernist
orientation, the state had entrusted San ‘integration’ to a (rather bizarre) variety of Western private
initiatives (see Saugestad 2001, 115-6). (A well-known dispute between two of them - one co-ordin-
ated by H.J. ‘Doc’ Heinz, and another by left-wing anthropologist  Liz Wily - seemed to centre
around ‘whether the !Xoõ might be better regarded as communists or capitalists’ (Barnard 2007,
71). This was characteristic of the ideological pluralism which preceded the triumph of indigenous
rights ideas in the later 1970s, described in chapter 6.) In 1972, however, the official responsible for
‘Bushmen Affairs’ began noting the coordination difficulties these initiatives created. The govern-
ment, he advised, ‘must start a settlement scheme herself’ and ‘keep a very close watch’ on ‘outside
people’ (in Saugestad 2001, 117; see also Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1978, 66). The
RADP was thus created, officially, ‘to foster the self-reliance and development of Bushmen citizens,
and to facilitate thereby their great(er) integration with the wider society of Botswana’. It was en-
trusted to Liz Wily, the first Bushmen Development Officer (in Saugestad 2001, 114).
The RADP’s name from 1974 to 1978 - the Bushmen Development Programme - testifies to
its distinctive character under Wily’s leadership. Like Silberbauer before her, she was obliged to le-
gitimate the programme in terms of the modernist and anti-apartheid beliefs dominating government
(see, for example,  Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1978, 92; 1982, 10, 16). Privately,
however, she hoped to ‘challenge the prevailing conception of how Basarwa/RADs [Remote Area
Dwellers] should be ‘developed’’, and to design interventions catering to the distinctive culture of
the ‘Bushmen’ (Wily 1994, 15-16 in Saugestad 2001, 121). Her second priority was to secure max-
imum ‘access to resources (land and water)’ via the user rights allocated by tribal land boards (Min-
istry of Local Government and Lands 1978,  122; Saugestad 2001, 120-121). At the time, as she
later noted, it would have been simply ‘unthinkable’ to pursue these objectives as part of an ‘expli-
cit land rights programme’, similar to those which later animated  Sesana (Wily 1994, 15-16, in
Saugestad 2001, 121). In the event, however, political pressures proved too intense. Wily thought an
‘emphasis on making the San like the settled (and more civilised) agricultural Tswana’ was ‘seem-
ing to reassert itself’ (Wily 1979, 208 in Saugestad 2001, 122). In 1977 she resigned, arguing for the
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programme to be overhauled lest it be abolished (Saugestad 2001, 123). Government-employed an-
thropologists who argued against ‘villagisation’, such as Robert Hitchcock, became dissident voices
(Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1981, 156).
The Government  of Botswana (GOB) replaced ‘Bushmen’ with ‘Remote Area Dwellers’
(RADs) in the new programme title. This signalled its intention to deliver development on an equal
basis. (Norway, in its modernist phase, had, likewise, referred to Sami minorities as ‘Inhabitants of
Inner Finmark’ [Mathieson 1978].) It took control of partially incorporated private initiatives, and
began displaying a ‘painstaking, almost compulsive concern about appearing to single out, favour
or disfavour one or another of the country’s ethnic groups’ (Ministry of Local Government and
Lands 1979, 129;  Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1981, 11-13; Guenther 1986, 300 in
Saugestad 2001, 125; see also Werbner 2002, 737). RADs were defined as those living:
outside the traditional village structure in a geographic or socio-economic sense … in small
(5-100) communities without leaders, without livestock, far from basic services … without
cash income and generally in dependent relationships […] up to three-quarters of the total
numbers of RADs rely, until this day, on hunting and gathering activity (Ministry of Local
Government and Lands 1978, 4; see also Kann, Hitchcock and Mbere 1990, 14).
This desire to target San for development without calling them by name reflected difficulties
posed by the legitimation requirements integral to ‘developmental paternalism’ (for ‘dilemmas’ see
chapter 5). Various statements by RADP staff have made its paternalist dimensions obvious. Some
have even complained that San cannot be ‘domesticated’ for a ‘civilized life in the villages’ because
‘they remain living among wild animals’ (Gulbrandsen 1991, 130-131, in Saugestad 2001, 103; for
interviews from 1978-1982 see R. Hitchcock 2002, 805). In ‘public debate’, however, ‘the concept
of  ‘domestication’ has  been replaced with  the  more  politically correct  ‘integration’’ (Saugestad
2001, 103). The Ministry of Local Government and Lands has thus addressed the RADP in ul-
tra-modernist terms, telling staff to ‘go into the remote areas, scout around for the Remote Area
Dwellers, settle, develop and finally integrate them into the entire population of the country’ (Min-
istry of Local Government and Lands 1979, unpaginated). And it has informed the Programme that
‘time is past when man can any longer rely on prayer or nature to unfold itself’. RADS should be
taught ‘to bury their ethnic differences and animosity’ and (perhaps most astonishingly) ‘to look at
their life objectively’ (Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1981, 3, 8). The parallels here with
colonial reforming efforts have not gone unnoticed. As early as 1976 Margo Russell criticised an
emerging tendency for GOB officials to deploy the same rhetoric about San ‘slavery’ and ‘feudal-
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ism’ once used by colonial reformers (Russell 1976; for examples  Ministry of Local Government
and Lands 1981, 9; R. Hitchcock 1999, 107). More recently Keitseope Nthomang (2004, 421) has
attacked the RADP for ‘colonial forms of development practice that privilege the world view, in-
terests and needs of the Tswana-dominated government rather than those of the Basarwa’39.
In the years around 1980 bureaucratic and governmental pressures for relocation from the
CKGR combined with calls from conservationists. Most notably the famous lion and hyena re-
searchers Mark and Delia Owens, authors of Cry of the Kalahari (1984), identified San hunting as a
cause of declining wildlife populations (R. Hitchcock 1999, 106-7; 2002, 805; Zips-Mairitsch 2013,
300; for environmentalism’s importance at this time Conklin and Graham 1995, 697-8)40. In 1984
the newly-founded Kalahari Conservation Society also proposed relocation, provoking heated me-
dia debates (Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 300). These demands had been catalysed by the (bureaucratically-
controversial) creation of Special Game Licenses (SGL) in 1979, allowing subsistence hunters to
kill certain amounts of certain kinds of wildlife (R. Hitchcock 2002, 805). In practice, these licenses
were only granted when San used ‘traditional’ methods (such as poisoned arrows) and not hunting
aids (such as horses or vehicles) (Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 298; for critique of such requirements Ul-
bricht 2015, chapter 6).
The government was confronted with considerable San reluctance, and the creation of SGLs
exemplified its slowness to implement villagisation (R. Hitchcock 2002, 805; Zips-Mairitsch 2013,
305). In 1982 it even built a school and health centre inside the Reserve at !Xade, the largest settle-
ment. This followed migration to the area provoked by the availability of year-round clean water,
leading, in turn, to the cultivation of crops and the acquisition of livestock (Saugestad 2005, 2). In
1986 a GOB White Paper used these apparent sedenterising trends, combined with conservationist
concerns, to justify relocations (ignoring its own fact-finding mission which had identified this as
the ‘least preferable’ option) (Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 302-3). Survival International formally protested
against this decision, asking supporters to write to President Masire. This angered senior civil ser-
vants, who associated assertions of San autonomy with the regional ‘destabalisation’ policies of
apartheid  South  Africa  (R.  Hitchcock  2002,  806;  for  reinforced  ‘Bushman’ identities  during
apartheid J. Taylor 2009). Ministers, however, failed to persuade the CKGR’s inhabitants to leave
(R.  Hitchcock 2002,  806). Only a 1989 relocation plan finally ‘confirmed … [their]  ambitions’
(Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 305). By this time, however, geopolitical trends accompanying the end of the
Cold War had opened new political space for the indigenous rights ideas which had emerge in the
1970s (see chapter 9). Survival International, for the first time, issued an Urgent Action Bulletin op-
posing forced relocations (for analysis Resnick 2009, 62). The contest over San development had
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begun to shift from bureaucratic to globalised judicial arenas.
(b) 1989-1996: Indigenous rights and new judicialisation strategies in Botswana
Norwegian aid to Botswana exemplifies similar shifts. In 1988 the country was the largest
recipient of Norwegian aid in per capita terms (Saugestad 2001, 141). Following GOB funding dif-
ficulties the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) agreed to fund an Accel-
erated Remote Area Development Programme (ARADP) [emphasis added] (Kann, Hitchcock and
Mbere 1990, 5). This terminology, however, reflected differences in opinion. NORAD’s name for
the programme - BOT 022: Minoritetsgrupper i utkanstrøk (minority groups in remote areas) - in-
cluded a reference to ethnicity that was anathema to the GOB (Saugestad 2001, 139). By this time
Norway had rejected its earlier modernist commitments to strict equality of treatment, following,
especially, the 1981 Alta-Kautokeino conflict over Sami rights (see Minde 1984; chapter 6). Thanks
to the geopolitical stasis of the Cold War, however, these new beliefs could only be promoted in a
‘very cautious’ manner, showing ‘deference for Botswana’s non-racial policy’ - even if this meant
‘swallowing some camels’ along the way, as one programme officer put it (Saugestad 2001, 146-7).
The definition of RADS in the ARADP agreement illustrated how NORAD sought to combine its
own view with the GOB’s: ‘RADS are under this Agreement understood to be people living per-
manently outside established villages. They will mainly be descendants of ethnic minority groups
living under poor conditions in remote rural areas’ (in Saugestad 2001, 138). Relocations to settle-
ments were the most overtly divisive issue. Whilst NORAD conceded that these would ‘facilitate
the establishment  of  social  services  in  centralised locations’,  they would only agree to  them if
‘people have been properly consulted and agreed to be resettled’ (Kann, Hitchcock and Mbere 1990,
56). 
The very first efforts to exploit geopolitical new freedoms did not, in fact, refer to indigen-
ous rights. These critics sought to promote rights by encouraging culture change. Like some of the
rights theorists discussed in the next chapter they discounted rights’ specifically legal qualities. Let
Them Talk (Kann, Hitchcock and Mbere 1990, 101), for instance - a report on the RADP submitted
to NORAD and the Ministry of Local Government and Lands - concluded that:
it is a challenging and difficult task to change the lifestyle and attitude of a large number of
people from dependency and passivity to creativity and productivity. And, above all, it is a
long term process. There are obstructing attitudes among almost everyone involved in the
RADP, among the RADs themselves as well as among government officers and the general
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public. The lead in changing these attitudes has to be taken by those in high enough position to
do so.
The Botswana Council of Churches (BCC’s), meanwhile - which in 1981 had ‘fully support[ed] the
Government’s philosophy’ that ‘RADs’ be ‘integrated in the Botswana societies [sic]’ - now started
to focus on ‘conscientizing the nation about human rights […] on issues afflicting the Basarwa’
(Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1981, 205; Botswana Christian Council, February 1993).
Litigation, however, was soon identified as the best means of achieving conscientisation.
This shift accompanied the gradual emergence of progressive jurisprudence in the country, and was
greatly facilitated by the new international promotion of, and funding for, indigenous rights causes.
The institutionalisation of indigenous rights also enabled activists to apply norms designed for Latin
America to African situations (all of these developments are discussed in chapter 9). In 1993 Alice
Mogwe founded Ditshwanelo (‘Human Rights’ in  Setswana),  which soon became the country’s
leading NGO41. The previous year she had become the first Motswana to write a report on the San,
commissioned by the BCC (Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 305, n. 96). Mogwe’s 1990 Masters dissertation
had favourably compared Indian-style ‘social action litigation’ with legal aid models. And now she
recommended that challenges to Botswana’s ‘dominant, exclusive [Tswana] culture’ could be ‘facil-
itated by the use of the constitution to support a case in court’ (Mogwe 1992, 10, n.21; 24-5). For
this, she wrote, ‘experiences of indigenous (First Nation) peoples ... could be a useful and relevant
source of inspiration’ (Mogwe 1992, 32).
Such experiences were, indeed, now in no short supply. 1993 was the International Year of
the  World’s  Indigenous  Peoples.  This  was  declared  by the  UN after  indigenous  organisations,
opposed by Spain and the United States, had failed obtain official commemoration of 1992 as the
five-hundredth anniversary of European colonisation and oppression (Saugestad 1993, 11). 1992 in
Botswana had seen the creation of the first San indigenous rights organisation: First People of the
Kalahari  (FPK). In 1993 it  secured funding, via the  Danish International Development Agency,
from the International Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), and it received more funds
from that body than any other indigenous organisation in Africa (Dahl 2009, 133-4). These contacts
were facilitated by a series of dramatic conferences, which brought San spokesmen face-to-face
with government ministers, and helped formulate new demands, notably for land rights (Saugestad
2001, chapter 11; Mazonde 2004, 136-7; M. Taylor 2004, 155). (Regional follow-up events in 1995
led to the creation of the Working Group of Indigenous Minorities in Southern Africa (WIMSA)
[Saugestad 2001, 198-9].) NORAD also supported these new NGOs and activities (Saugestad 2001,
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175). And Sidsel Saugestad (1993, 23) - the ARADP’s Research Facilitator,  seconded from the
University of Tromso - outlined how recent experience from Norway and elsewhere had proved
‘that constructive negotiations must be based on consultations within the legal systems, and the use
of courts […] legal systems have proved to be invaluable mediators between conflicting interests,
taking the heat out of complex political issues by careful consideration of the legal aspects’. 
This  new San assertiveness  undermined ‘developmental  paternalism’ amongst  the  ruling
elite, just as external support for indigenous rights ideas undermined its international legitimation as
a non-racial  democracy.  In constructivist  terminology the government  refused to  make ‘tactical
concessions’ and continued to assert that universal norms were not applicable to Botswana (Risse
and Sikkink 1999, 22-25). (It should be noted that at this time Amnesty International classified
Botswana as a better protector of rights than the United Kingdom [Stedman 1993, 1].) In parliament
MPs attacked Alice Mogwe’s report for the BCC, current Vice-President Ponatshego  Kedikilwe
(‘PTK’) asking what the ‘human rights of the Motswana [has] got to do with who might have got
there first or whatever?’ (Mogwe, February 19th 1993). Officials from the Ministry of Lands, Local
Government, and Housing rejected the International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples on the
grounds that ‘all Batswana are indigenous to the country’ (Botswana Daily News, March 5th 1993).
And they publicly attacked NORAD for promoting apartheid-style ‘separate development’, helping
trigger  the  end  of  Norwegian  support  for  the  ARADP (Botswana  Gazette  20th January  1993;
Saugestad 2001, 240-242).
The Permanent Secretary of Ministry of Local Government Lands and Housing attacked
donors  in  more  overtly  paternalist  terms,  angered  by  their  promotion  of  San  representative
organisations: ‘Botswana owns the Basarwa and it will own Basarwa until it ceases to be a country;
they will never be allowed to walk around in skins again’ (in Hitchcock and Babchuk 2010, 164).
Dr.  Jeff  Ramsay,  for  his  part,  a  professional  historian  and  government  spokesman,  sought  to
substitute anti-colonial resistance for rights and victimhood: 
today many academic historians reject the notion of history as an account of heroes … [but]
instances of violent resistance also occurred among the Naron-Khwe [a San people], whose
land had been alienated by Ghanzi [Afrikaner] settlers. A 1929 colonial report noted that, out
of fear of the Basarwa, ‘no Dutchman in Ghanzi will reside alone at  night’ … It was the
historic institution of bolata [for Ramsay a form of ‘slavery’], not the neo-colonialist concept
of  some  Africans  being  more  indigenous  than  others,  which  divided  Khwe  from  other
‘tribesmen’ in the past, while denying all of us their heroes (Ramsay, 9th July 1993)42.
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(I describe the eclipse of such historiographical trends in chapter 8, focusing on the Namibian War.) 
(c) 1996-2002: Judicialisation in the CKGR or negotiated solutions neglected?
In the aftermath of these confrontations, the GOB continued asking CKGR populations to
relocate, but with only limited success. The situation began to escalate in 1996. In an interview with
the Guardian, soon-to-be-President Festus Mogae even referred to the inhabitants of the reserve as
‘Stone Age creatures who must change, or otherwise, like the dodo, they will perish’ (Good 2003,
16). In March 1997 parliament voted 6,000,000 Pula (approximately $1.4 million) to develop the
New !Xade settlement. And in May-June it moved decisively, resettling three-quarters of the CKGR
there  and  in  Kaudwane  in  north-eastern  Kweneng  District  (see  R.  Hitchcock  1999,  113-6;
Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 63; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 306-7). Almost immediately controversy
erupted over the sufficiency of consultation, information provided, (promised) compensation paid,
and whether threats had been made about the use of force in future (Saugestad 2011, 41; Zips-
Mairitsch 2013, 308-312). FPK now convened a CKGR workshop at  D’kar and a ‘Negotiating
Team’ was formed to engage with government. The Team was comprised of 14 delegates from the
CKGR, 3 from San organisations (FPK, WIMSA and Kuru Development Trust), and (non-voting
representatives) from major NGOs based in Gaborone (Ditshwanelo, the Botswana Council of Non-
Government Organisations, and the BCC) (Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 63; Zips-Mairitsch 2013,
311). Its legal advisor was Glyn Williams from Chennyls Albertyn in Stellenbosch; a firm which
would soon win a famous land rights victory for South Africa’s ?Khomani San in the Kalahari
Gemsbok Park (see Robins 2001; Chennels and du Toit 2004, 104). 
Some of the facts about what followed are relatively uncontested. Initially, the Negotiating
Team struggled to arrange meetings with government officials (Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 64;
Suzman 2002, 4; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 311). Developments in the CKGR, however, helped change
this situation somewhat. Significant compensation packages had been provided to those settled at
New !Xade. New inhabitants were given monthly food rations, and a choice between 5 cattle or 15
goats, and 4.4 million Pula ($900,000) was offered to 730 households to help rebuild houses (M.
Taylor 2004, 154; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 310-311). By 2002 the state had spent an estimated 50,000
Pula ($11,110) on each inhabitant in New !Xade (Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 318). This, however, did not
help beneficiaries as the government intended. Notably, those unused to managing large amounts of
disposable income spent almost all of it on ‘consumer goods (clothes, cassette recorders and simple
status symbols) and alcohol’ (Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 311). With the onset of rains many chose to
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return to the CKGR. By 2000 as many as 650  San and Bakgalagadi were living in the Reserve
(Suzman  2002,  4).  Partly  in  order  to  prove  themselves  as  legitimate  representatives  of  these
populations, the Negotiating Team now began registering those inhabitants who wished to claim
rights of residence in the CKGR, and mapping their ancestral territories (Hitchcock and Vinding
2001, 65; for some results see Albertson 2000). These findings provided the basis for constructive
engagement with the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP). Eventually, the Team
was able to agree a Draft Management Plan (DMP) for the Reserve. This did not guarantee land
rights, but, encouragingly for the Team, it did distinguish zones for tourism and conservation from
those set aside for  Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) (Zips-Mairitsch
2013,  311-2;  see  generally  R.  Hitchcock  2004).  On  the  31st August  South  Africa’s  Mail  and
Guardian described a leaked version of the plan as a ‘stunning success’ (Suzman 2002, 4).
For Stephen Corry, however, the Director-General of Survival International (SI), the failure
to guarantee land rights - as per International Labour Organisation Convention 169 (see chapter 9) -
constituted a ‘slap in the face’ for the San (Corry, 16 th September 2001). SI immediately organised
vigils across Europe, and protests outside the Bostwana High Commission in London and Durban
World  Conference  against  Racism,  Racial  Discrimination,  Xenophobia  and Related  Intolerance
(Suzman 2002, 5). It also began to frame its advocacy in terms of ‘conflict diamonds’; a move
which could hardly have done more to enrage the government (see chapter 7). (Whilst there had
been prospecting in the Reserve since the 1980s, mining had not then begun, and the government
denied that it would in the near future [Good 2003, 18-20, 35-39].)  Negotiations ceased, and in
October the GOB announced that expired Special Game Licenses (SGLs) would not be renewed.
Services, including water, would no longer be provided to the CKGR (Hitchcock and Vinding 2001,
67). In January 2002 (armed) police and DWNP staff removed water storage tanks, closed the last
remaining  borehole  (in  Mothomelo),  separated  some  families,  and  dismantled  (sometimes
bulldozing)  property;  relocating  all  but  a  few  households  to  the  new  resettlement  villages
(Saugestad 2011, 42; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 314). In August the DMP was officially rejected (Solway
2009, 328). The Minister of Local Government, Margaret Nasha, justified this approach in a letter
to Alice Mogwe: ‘all we want to do is treat Basarwa as humans not game, and enable them to
partake of the development cake of the country’ (in Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 67).  The Team
was left with no alternative but to bring the case to court.
It is at this point that participants’ and observers’ accounts begin to diverge. Some maintain
that SI’s dramatic intervention - branded ‘neo-colonialist’ by a government proud of its international
image and anti-apartheid credentials - was responsible for the official volte face. Glyn Williams, for
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example, informed me of documents he believes prove that the DMP had in fact been accepted by
other branches of government (interview, 12th August 2011)43. Manuela Zips-Mairitisch (2013, 318),
in this connection, argues that the ideas underpinning earlier drafts of the Plan had already been
incorporated in hunting regulations - ‘clearly’ proving that the DMP had been accepted before SI’s
intervention. Others, by contrast, believe that central government reacted as it did because it had not
authorised  the  DWNP’s  initiative.  For  Mathambo  Ngakaeaja,  for  example,  a  San  activist  and
representative working with WIMSA, the problem stemmed from ‘a lack of knowledge of what the
right hand was doing from the left hand’. With the DMP’s leak to the South African press, the
central  government  ‘suddenly’  realised  what  DWNP  was  doing  and  began  making  ‘terrible
accusations’ against  it  (interview, 12th September 2011). Nkakaeaja’s view is shared by Stephen
Corry of SI and Gordon Bennett, the British attorney who later took over the case from Williams
and his team on SI’s behalf (for Corry, see Solway 2009, 328, n.9). For Bennett the hierarchical
culture of Tswana government also helps explain the ferocity of government’s reaction towards a
junior  department  (interview,  9th March  2012).  (This  is  not  wholly  implausible,  given  earlier
controversies surrounding the DWNP’s creation of SGLs, and, in particular, the lowly status of the
RADP [Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1978, 92; 1979, 10, 12; R. Hitchcock 2002, 805])
For Corry (2003, 1), meanwhile, the accusation against Survival ‘originates with the local
‘human rights organisation’ [Ditshwanelo]’. Whatever the truth of Corry’s claim, Alice Mogwe, in
particular, has certainly sought to draw very clear lines between her organisation’s tactics and those
of SI. In 2002 she declared a continuing preference for negotiations. Whilst the Batswana ‘cultural
understanding of conflict resolution’ placed ‘an incredible emphasis on talking through problems’,
SI was ‘located in a completely different cultural context and they will, of course utilise approaches
which make sense within their cultural context’ (Ditshwanelo 2002, 34-5). More recently, she has
re-iterated her view that the Negotiating Team as a whole believed in the wisdom of negotiations,
even if ‘the legal route had always been one of the options at [its] inception’ (Mogwe 2011, 169,
173).  ‘The  court’,  she  has  concluded,  ‘is  severely  hampered  in  using  a  purely  Western-based
legalistic tool to unravel [culturally relative] threads of meaning’ (Mogwe 2011, 164). 
This, however, is misleading. By 2002 Ditshwanelo and the Negotiating Team had in fact
spent significant time and energy preparing their now ‘pending’ court case (Saugestad 2011, 42). As
noted above, indeed, in the early 1990s Mogwe had even herself  recommended a shift towards
litigating San issues. At a CKGR workshop in February 1997, moreover, three months before the
first  round of  relocations,  Glyn Williams and Chennels  Albertyn  had been mandated to  pursue
constitutional land rights claims on behalf of  San and Bakgalagadi willing to sign a registration
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form (see figure 3). Seemingly despite the Western biases of courts, ‘participants expressed a wish
for urgent legal representation by lawyers’ (Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 63). Registration and
mapping  initiatives  facilitated  this  exercise,  and  in  April  2000  the  Negotiating  Team  met  at
Ditshwanelo’s offices where ‘the legal strategy was discussed’ again (Hitchcock and Vinding 2001,
66). 
Figure 3:  1997 registration form for CKGR land claim (reproduced in Saugestad 2011, 42).
A further difficulty with Mogwe’s claims is the lack of serious evidence that the GOB had in
fact been willing to negotiate. The three academics who have followed this case most extensively
largely  agree  on  this  point.  Saugestad  (2011,  55)  believes  that  ‘evidence  from  two  rounds  of
relocation (1997 and 2002) ...  can in  no way be said to  reward this position’.  Hitchcock and
Vinding  (2001,  70),  meanwhile,  have  noted  that  by  February  2002  even  the  most  optimistic
members of the Negotiating Team ‘privately … admitted that it was unlikely that the government
would allow people to return to their homes’. The real differences between the organisations were,
therefore, matters of style, audience, and rhetorical framing, rather than fundamental disagreements
over culture and the appropriate role of (international) law in African politics. As Sethunya Tshepho
Mphinyane (2002, 82) points out - in a comment about non-legal matters - even in the late 1990s
Ditshwanelo’s  (highly confrontational)  statements  on the CKGR ‘could as well  have been in a
Survival urgent action bulletin’. Supposed cultural differences were thus discovered late in the day
as  an  exercise  in  ‘gatekeeping’.  ‘The  issue  here’,  Mphinyane (2002,  83)  suggests,  ‘is  one  of
control’. SI, in short, was not solely responsible for the judicialisation of San development in the
CKGR.
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(d) 2002-6: Sesana and the judicialisation of mega-politics in Botswana
The Negotiating Team’s decision to litigate the CKGR relocations thrust the ‘developmental
paternalism’ of the Tswana elite into international spotlight. As illustrated below, in 2006 Judge
Dow sought to rule it incompatible with international legal trends. This constituted a ‘mega-political
... judicialisation of formative collective identity’ (Hirschl 2008, 99). The case also risked, however,
judicialising fundamental political order. The notion of ‘indigenous peoples’, which Dow used to
challenge to  ‘developmental paternalism’, could also have been used to demand new land rights
regimes. As Lund and Boone (2013, 1) anticipate, this would have had significant consequences for
the very ‘scope and structure of authority’ in rural Botswana (see chapter 1). In Saugestad’s words
(2001,  188),  the  CKGR case  had  the  potential  to  combine  ‘interwoven  issues  of  land  rights,
traditional  land-use,  compensation  and  leadership,  and  the  wider  framework  of  international
jurisprudence’.  Lawyers,  however  -  whose  primary  interest  has  been  in  actually  eliciting
compliance from government, unlike the cases examined in previous chapters - have functioned as
gatekeepers,  preventing  such  arguments  from  being  made.  ‘Resistance’ from litigants  (SI  and
CKGR activists) has been contained thus far (see chapter 7). In contrast to Namibia and Zimbabwe,
therefore, liberal actors have been successful in preventing challenges to fundamental order.
One of the most striking aspects of Sesana v The Attorney General was how a relatively con-
servative legal strategy survived a wholesale change in legal team and funding base. Funding was
initially provided via the CKGR ‘Legal Rights Support Coalition’: ‘a loose coalition including in-
ternational human rights NGOs such as International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA),
Norwegian Church Aid, Dutch Global Ministries, the Saami Council (representing the Saami of
Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia), and others, with Ditshwanelo, as its secretariat’ (Saugestad
2011, 42). At its first hearing in the High Court Judge  Dibotelo rejected the case on procedural
grounds. One particular problem, which would become significant again later on, was that Roy Ses-
ana - the lead applicant and First People of the Kalahari activist - only had signatures authorising
him to institute proceedings from 16 of the 241 applicants (Ng’ong’ola 2007, 105). (Gordon Bennett
would later argue that this was because registration took place during relocations [Piet, 11th January
2011].) As on many other occasions, the government’s legal team argued this point in a way that re-
vealed their sensitivities about external interference in San affairs: ‘the contents of Mr. Sesana’s af-
fidavit were too complex to have been within the knowledge of an illiterate person’ (Saugestad
2011, 43). Although the Court of Appeal did refer the case back to the High Court for trial, it failed
to rule on whether Roy Sesana represented the CKGR San as a whole, or merely the named applic-
ants (Ng’ong’ola 2007, 107). These delays, and the immense practical difficulties of working in the
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CKGR, contributed to funding difficulties for  Legal Rights Support Coalition. In July 2004, and
after two weeks of the new proceedings, the legal team asked for more time to raise funds. It was at
this point that SI offered to fund the case alone, on condition that it be argued and led by its own
British barrister, Gordon Bennett. Whilst there is some controversy over whether the applicants as a
whole had in fact asked for such a move, FPK, at the very least - SI’s partner organisation - clearly
supported it (Saugestad 2011, 44; Glyn Williams, interview, 12th August 2011; Gordon Bennett, in-
terview, 9th March 2012).
As in 2002, the applicants asked the Court to rule on four key issues:
(a) whether the termination with effect from 31st  January 2002 by the Government of the pro-
vision of basic and essential services to the Appellants in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve
was unlawful and constitutional [sic].
(b) whether the Government is obliged to restore the  provision of such services to the Appel-
lants in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve;
c) whether subsequent to 31st January 2002 the Appellants were:
(i) in possession of the land which they lawfully occupied in their settlements in the Central
Kalahari Game Reserve;
(ii) deprived of such possession by the Government forcibly or wrongly and without their con-
sent.
(d) whether the Government’s refusal to:
(i) issue special game licences to the Appellants; 
and 
(ii) allow the Appellants to enter into the Central Kalahari Game Reserve unless they are is-
sued with a permit 
is unlawful and constitutional (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dibotelo,
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paragraph 3).
The question of lawful occupation of land was decided in the applicants’ favour - Judges Dow and
Phumaphi ruling with them, and Judge Dibotelo against them. This was the issue with the most ob-
vious potential connections with fundamental political order. SI, indeed, had initially advocated for
the applicants be granted land rights to the CKGR in line with I.L.O. Convention 169 and emerging
trends in the international law governing indigenous peoples. As Suzman (2002, 5) argued, how-
ever, ‘granting Bushmen full ownership of the Central Kalahari would establish a precedent that
would lead to the collapse of Botswana’s communal land tenure system’. (This system most closely
approximated to Boone’s (2007, 559) ‘user-rights’ ideal-type. Land boards, ultimately controlled by
the state, distributed land and grazing rights in response to applications made under customary or
common  law  (see  Adams,  Kalabamu  and  White  2003).  The  widespread  perception  of  San  as
nomads  has  often  worked  against  them in  such  processes  [Nyati-Ramahobo  2009;  Hitchcock,
Sapignoli and Babchuk 2011, 71, 78].) Although the change of legal team created an ‘expectation
that land rights would be introduced into the case as a more explicit claim for ownership, not only
for lawful occupation’, this more radical strategy never actually materialised. As Judge Phumaphi
noted, Bennett even steered away from the less politically-explosive issue of lawful occupation,
despite the fact that:
nearly all the Applicants who gave evidence claimed the CKGR to be their land, from which
they did not want to be moved. Sometimes I wondered during the trial, whether there was a
breakdown in communication between Mr Bennett and his clients (Sesana v The Attorney
General 2006, judgement of Phumaphi, paragraph 60).
In an interview with me Gordon Bennett stressed how he was more interested in obtaining immedi-
ate results for his clients than in any wider political or jurisprudential objectives SI might have had
(interview, 9th March 2012). For Saugestad (2011, 55) he was ‘meticulously loyal’. But Bennett also
insisted that SI had never actually pressured him to change legal strategy (interview, 9th March
2012). Phumaphi, however, decided to investigate lawful occupation nonetheless. He established it
with the aid of the Australian High Court’s famous judgement in Mabo and Others v The State of
Queensland (1992), which held that ‘native title’ had not been extinguished when the British Crown
claimed possession of relevant lands (Sesana v The Attorney General  2006, judgement of Phum-
aphi,  paragraphs  69-79;  Stephenson and  Ratnapala eds. 1993).  In  Clement  Ng’ong’ola’s (2007)
words this was ‘sneaking aboriginal title into Botswana’s legal system through the side door’ (for
this ‘horizontal diffusion’ see chapter 9).
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A second set  of questions  related to  the termination and restoration of services:  weekly
drinking water, borehole water, food rations for orphans and destitutes, and healthcare via ambu-
lances and mobile clinics (Ng’ong’ola 2007, 107). This issue was decided against the applicants,
Judge Dow ruling in their favour, and Judges Phumaphi and Dibotelo ruling against them. Before
the case GOB had argued that it was too expensive to provide services in the CKGR (Hitchcock and
Vinding 2001, 67). Judge Dibotelo highlighted additional difficulties, including an affidavit from
one local government official arguing that ‘it is cheaper for Government to pool its resources in one
village’ (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dibotelo, paragraph 36). And the GOB
did, it is true, eventually incur additional expense by providing services both in  and  outside the
CKGR. These expenditures, however, were not of the same order as those which would have been
involved in compensating expropriated commercial farmers in Zimbabwe, for instance. They would
certainly not have impinged on fundamental state-building processes. Hitchcock and Vinding (2001,
67), indeed, calculated that in 2001 the government was actually spending less on services in the
CKGR that it would had it provided for its inhabitants under its own Destitutes Policy.  Margaret
Nasha, meanwhile, publicly stated that the GOB would refuse international aid money to cover any
shortfall even if offered it (Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 69). 
Judge Phumaphi’s decisive ruling in favour of applicants on this issue was grounded in the
doctrine of legitimate expectations. This doctrine was invented by Lord Denning in 1969, and has
been used extensively by liberal public and administrative lawyers in Britain and South Africa to
combat bureaucratic discretion (Hlophe 1987; Forsyth 1988; Quinot 2004; for critique S. James
1996; for these lawyers and Zimbabwe see chapter 7). Put briefly, it holds governments should not
violate express promises to their citizens or reasonable expectations which their actions create. In
Sesana, however, Judge Dow had sought to expand its usual meaning in an ‘activist’ manner (for
critique Ng’ong’ola 2007, 109-110). She not only ruled that the applicants would have expected to
have been consulted about the termination of services, but would have expected certain specific ser-
vices ‘essential’ for their ‘survival’ to have been continued (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006,
judgement of Dow, paragraph 228). She thus handed down an order for ‘specific performance’, in-
structing the government about exactly which services they should restore (Sesana v The Attorney
General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraphs 236-7). Anticipating such a judgement, based on ‘act-
ivist’ trends elsewhere in the common-law world,  Christopher Forsyth - a leading British/South
African follower of Denning’s - delivered a lecture at the University of Botswana months before the
judgement in Sesana was due (Forsyth 1999; 2006, 5). This was devoted to ‘Some Pitfalls for Bot-
swana to Avoid’ and warned against using the doctrine of legitimate expectations as an ‘inchoate
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substitute for fairness’. Forsyth argued that ‘substantive’ readings such as Dow’s, which mandated
‘specific performances’ by government, risked involving the judiciary in the details of day-to-day
administration. Judge Phumaphi then used Forsyth to argue that ‘the Court should be loathe to enter
the arena of allocation of national resources’ (Sesana v The Attorney General  2006, judgement of
Phumaphi, paragraphs 55-6). Since the applicants produced no evidence of actually having expected
even a consultation, he ruled the termination of services lawful and their restoration unnecessary
(Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Phumaphi, paragraphs 27, 30-31). Once again,
therefore, in this instance, gatekeeping by lawyers helped serve to check judicialisation.
The questions of Special Game Licenses and permits to enter the Reserve clearly had only
minimal wider political implications. Given tourists’ (much-criticised) fascination with ‘authentic’
San, even if hunting did reduce wildlife stocks - as Mark and Delia Owens had claimed - allowing it
would hardly harm the economy (for tourism’s perverse consequences Robins 2001, 839; Guenther
2002; Sylvain 2006). On these issues, as on the others, Judge Dibotelo ruled for the government and
Judge Dow against it. Judge Phumaphi cast his deciding vote in favour of the applicants. Dibotelo
decided, firstly, that the DWNP had complete discretion to issue entry permits. The British decision
to designate the CKGR as a ‘Game Reserve’, secondly - taken for diplomatic reasons described
above - meant there could be no legitimate expectation of being able to hunt inside it. Phumaphi, by
contrast, ruled that the DWNP had not exercised its discretion over permits rationally and in accord-
ance with the evidence before it. Dibotelo’s arguments about the expectations created by the Re-
serve’s designation, meanwhile, were absurd given that such rules had not been applied before 2002
(Ng’ong’ola 2007, 114-120).  As George Silberbauer testified,  the British themselves had turned
‘Nelson’s eye’ to hunting by the San (Sesana v The Attorney General  2006, judgement of Phum-
aphi, paragraph 88).
Inevitably, however, it was not these practical political matters which so fascinated the Bot-
swanan and international media (for an overview Molosiwa 2008). Courtroom drama, as well as
legal argument, revealed how the very notion of a San litigant challenged Bostwanan ‘formative
collective identity’. The centre of attention was lead counsel for the state, Sidney Pilane. He burst
out laughing when one of the applicants declared that she wished to remain near the graves of her
ancestors, explaining that ‘he had not been aware that they buried their dead’; he was enraged by a
foreign lawyer being engaged on their behalf, being instructed by Dow that ‘Mr Bennett ... can fly
from England as often as he wishes’; and, when it became clear the case might be lost, he was even
sent to prison for contempt of court, after refusing to stand up on Dow’s instruction (Chwaane, 2nd
October 2005; U.S. Embassy, Gaborone, 7th September 2005; Pilane v The Attorney-General 2005;
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Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraphs 191, 206). 
Judge Dow was, by a distance, the keenest to rule on the sensitive questions behind such be-
haviour. Most strikingly she ordered, for the first time, that the government should treat different
ethnic groups differently. She noted ‘the Respondent’s position that it does not discriminate on ethic
[sic] lines, but equal treatment of un-equals can amount to discrimination’ (Sesana v The Attorney
General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 210). More substantively, she ruled that proper con-
sultations had not taken place because the ‘relative powerlessness’ of certain groups had not been
taken into account:
the Basarwa [San] and to some extent the Bakgalagadi, belong to an ethnic group that is not
socially and politically organised in the same manner as the majority of other Tswana speaking
ethnic groups and the importance of this is that programmes and projects that have worked
with other groups in the country will not necessarily work when simply cut and pasted to the
Applicants’ situation (Sesana v The Attorney General  2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph
186).   
Emphasising  differential  power  is  central  to  contemporary  ‘relational’ theories  of  indigeneity
(chapter 8). Dow justified her legal challenge to Botswanan modernist equality with other similarly
contemporary notions. She declared, for example, that ‘the current wisdom, which should inform all
policy and direction in dealing with indigenous peoples is the recognition of their special relation-
ship to their land’ (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 117). And as
she summarised, pointedly:
this is a case that questions the meaning of ‘development’ and demands of the respondent to
take a closer look at its definition of that notion. One of colonialism’s greatest failings was to
assume that development was, in the case of Britain, Anglicising, the colonised [...] Botswana
has a unique opportunity to do things differently (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judge-
ment of Dow, paragraph 272; compare Dow 2009).
Unsurprisingly, Sidney Pilane sought to defend Botswana’s modernism against these charges
by highlighting its anti-apartheid non-racialist credentials. In his cross-examination of George Sil-
berbauer, for example, he suggested that the CKGR had been created as a ‘human reserve’, and not
as a ‘haven for the Basarwa [San]’. He alleged that this had been done at the behest of Afrikaner
farmers frustrated with San ‘squatters’ (Tutwane, 14th July 2004). In response, Dow strived hard to
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reconcile her position with these important components of nationalist narrative. ‘The case being
judged’, she explained, ‘is not whether slavery was brutish, which it was, or whether colonialism
was a system fuelled by a racist and arrogant ideology, which it was, or whether apartheid was
diabolical, which it was’ (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 190).
Modernism too, she conceded, even if in some ways responsible for a ‘unique culture’ now being
‘on the verge of extinction’, had also helped the country grow tremendously since independence,
when it had been ‘one of the poorest five in the world and boasted the legendary 12 miles of tar
road, in a country the size of France’ (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow,
paragraph 189).
5. After Sesana: non-compliance as lack of socialisation
Despite  Dow’s censure  of  the Executive,  the  Court’s  ruling  did not  include orders  with
which it had to comply. Her ‘specific performance’ order on services was a non-binding minority
opinion. As Judge Phumaphi concluded ‘this judgment does not finally resolve the dispute between
the parties but merely refers them back to the negotiating table’ (Sesana v The Attorney General
2006, judgement  of  Phumaphi,  paragraph 189).  Some  commentators  on  this  case,  like  the
constructivists  and  legal  theorists  discussed  in  the  next  chapter,  have  therefore  concluded  that
‘compliance’ in this case is more a matter of socialisation than of law. In Saugestad’s (2011, 54)
words,  the  case  ‘does not  contribute  to  any solution  of  the  underlying  problem’,  which  is  the
‘authoritarian and patronising model  for development’ that  Dow attacked.  This view is  broadly
endorsed by Delme Cupido, who has recently become engaged with CKGR matters for the Open
Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA). In his view any successful litigation would have had
to be designed to resonate with and catalyse mobilisation around social questions raised by the case,
as during the Civil-Rights era in the United States (interview, 2nd May 2012; compare Cover 1983,
47-8). Dow’s new Tswana narrative, delivered ex cathedra, would presumably have comprised the
centrepiece of such an effort. In Richard Rorty’s words, ([1993] 1998, 176) human rights would
thus involve getting ‘different kinds sufficiently well-acquainted with one another so that they are
less tempted to think of those different from themselves as only quasi-human’ (see also chapter 5).
As a number of analysts have decried, however, the government has in fact largely suc-
ceeded in using the stridency of SI’s campaign to justify branding Sesana as simply the product of
outside interference. The organisation’s choice of a ‘conflict diamond’ frame, especially, alienated
its campaign from Tswana political culture. According to  Wikileaks Bram Le Roux of the Kuru
Trust complained that ‘SI’s approach was ‘all about marketing’ the plight of the San to potential
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supporters and donors’ and ‘suggested that most of the San and their advocates in Botswana dis-
agreed with the strategy of trying to connect the relocation with diamond mining’ (U.S. Embassy,
Gaborone, 14th July 2005). Dow, Ditswhanelo, and supportive ex-government officials all publicly
distanced themselves from it in an effort to retain credibility (Botswana Press Agency, 19th Novem-
ber 2002; Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 107; Manganu, 3rd
February 2011). FPK, for its part, has been largely ostracised within Botswanan and even interna-
tional civil society, and cannot function when funds from SI are unavailable (Saugestad 2011, 56;
for extraordinary criticisms by the IWGIA see Dahl 2009, 135-8). For critics, the British NGO may
even have ‘eliminated virtually any space for compromise’, and has led ‘those who otherwise could
have been the most likely supporters [to] rally behind the government in an attitude of ‘right or
wrong - my country’’ (Solway 2009, 338; Saugestad 2011, 56). SI, however, has not been interested
in negotiating or eliciting compliance via socialisation. For Stephen Corry Sesana’s greatest legacy
is the legal precedent established by Judge Phumaphi’s recognition of ‘native title’; a development
paving the way for more fundamentally political challenges at a later date (Solway 2009, 339, n.21).
As a whole, the government’s behaviour since 2006 has certainly not reflected the internal-
isation of any new norms. In the immediate aftermath of the case, and whilst still in the glare of the
international media, it announced that it would not be appealing the judgement (see Zips-Mairitsch
2013, 354-5). Since then, however, it has responded with ‘restrictive interpretation[s]’ and ‘consid-
erable ... foot-dragging’ (Saugestad 2011, 50; compare ‘weapons of the weak’ in chapter 2). It an-
nounced that only named applicants could return to the CKGR without permits,  and even they
would need identity documents. Domestic animals and permanent structures were banned. Water
from outside would be allowed if transported at the applicants’ own expense. And applications for
SGLs would have to be sent to the DWNP for individual assessment. As of March 2012 not a single
one had been granted (Saugestad 2006, 2;  Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 354-6; for water Workman 2009,
chapter  15).  For  James Ananya,  UN Special  Rapporteur  and leading indigenous rights  scholar,
whilst the government ‘may or may not have been following the order of the Court in the Sesana
case in a technical sense’, it has violated the ‘spirit and underlying logic of the  decision’ (United
Nations General Assembly, 2nd June 2010, paragraph 73). 
Official pronouncements on the matter, moreover, have revealed a refusal to shift on the fun-
damental issues. President Mogae visited the New !Xade settlement in the month following the
judgement,  and attacked those who wanted to go ‘chasing wild animals barefooted’ (Saugestad
2006, 2). Despite court orders, local government officials continue to plan San relocations at Ran-
yane,  approximately 100km to the West of the CKGR, and have even warned of other relocations
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inside the Reserve itself, because it ‘is a game reserve’ (Sapignoli 2012; Lee, May 22nd 2013; 18th
June 2013; Ghanzi District, July 2013). A number of diamond mining concessions were also granted
in the aftermath the case, infuriating critics who had alleged - probably incorrectly - that mineral ex-
tractions had been behind relocations in the first place (Piet, 21st June 2011; Saugestad 2011, 54;
Sapignoli 2012). A luxurious game lodge, finally, was opened near Roy Sesana’s former home at
Molapo in December 2009 (Hitchcock, Sapignoli and Babchuk 2011, 77).
Supportive NGOs were, however, prepared for a long fight after Sesana. The CKGR support
coalition was re-established in May 2006 with the objective of engaging government (U.S. Em-
bassy, Gaborone, 6th June 2006). Under new President Ian Khama (from 2008) the government has
declared its openness to ‘dialogue’ with this group as long as ‘outsiders’ are not involved (Mot-
laloso, 13th June 2013). The results have, nonetheless, been ‘dismal’ (Saugestad 2011, 52). A ‘Cent-
ral Kalahari Game Reserve Consultation Process’ has comprised annual meetings with little to show
for them (The Government of Botswana et al., June 3rd 2010; Saugestad 2011, 51; Zips-Mairitsch
2013, 357-8). As before, Ditshwanelo, the coalition’s secretariat, remains the most vocal supporter
of these negotiations - which it has co-ordinated alongside community mapping activities and at-
tempts to secure San land rights within the existing land boards system (e.g. Ditshwanelo 2007a;
Mogwe 2011;  Ontebetse, 24th March 2013). The diplomatic community has certainly preferred to
channel any funding in this area through Alice Mogwe and her organisation (Ben Luckock, inter-
view, 29th March 2012; Ontebetse, 24th March 2013). 
Almost immediately SI criticised the support coalition, and chose to remain outside it (Sol-
way 2009, 338, n.20). It has also supported follow-up litigation relating to the High Court’s unfa-
vourable judgement on services. This was precipitated by two developments. Alice Mogwe, after
lobbying Margaret Nasha, had secured the applicants rights to bring water from outside the reserve
for their immediate families’ use; reportedly citing ‘this as a perfect example of how one-on-one
compromise trumped the polarizing Western hard-line confrontational approach’. In 2009, however,
the government revoked this permission, accusing the applicants of transporting water for others too
(Workman 2009, chapter 15). The game lodge near Molapo also promised to undermine any claims
the government might make about the expense and/or difficulty of providing water to the Reserve. 
Survival’s key argument - eventually granted on Appeal - was that the Sesana judgement did
not prevent the applicants from sinking or re-opening boreholes at their own expense. SI was, in
fact, willing to provide funds and engineers to do this. Preventing them from doing so would violate
the right to life and amount to ‘degrading and inhuman treatment’ (Mosetlhanyane v The Attorney
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General 2010, paragraphs 1, 38). Once again, lawyers’ gatekeeping served to check judicialisation.
SI’s team was able to persuade the Court of Appeal that it was not arguing for the right to sink bore-
holes  ‘willy  nilly’,  as  the  government’s  lawyer  had  initially  alleged  (Piet,  19 th January  2011;
Mosetlhanyane v The Attorney General 2011, paragraph 16). Seranne Junner, who had now joined
Bennett in arguing case, told me that Bostwana’s ‘very static and conservative’ bench ensured that
they had very carefully framed the case in terms of existing legislation (the Water Act), and not
around the socio-economic and other rights which Judge Dow had sought to read into it (interview,
26th April  2012;  for  this  judicial  conservatism Dinokopila  2013,  118;  for the  ‘human  right  to
groundwater’ Gavouneli 2011, 312, 318). This would prevent any ‘snowballing effect’. Junner had
sought to persuade the applicants’ to ‘pick their battles’ and not litigate for the return of radio com-
munication equipment lent by SI. Such equipment was not such an ‘easily sympathetic issue’ as wa-
ter, and the public believed that the San ‘just wanted to be left alone’. Bennett, for his part, she re-
ported, had wanted to focus only the re-opening of existing boreholes. He was reticent even about
trying to secure a more progressive interpretation of the Water Act (interview, 26 th April 2012). Al-
though Bennett believed the judgement could probably be enforced from a distance,  both lawyers
agreed that litigation in itself would not resolve the underlying issues (Gordon Bennett, interview,
9th March 2012). 
6. Conclusion: human rights promotion as cultural change
Water rights litigation received support from some U.S Embassy officials (Jacob Johnson,
interview, 24th April 2012; Seranne Junner, interview, 26th April 2012). As a whole, however, and as
with all such representatives of the ‘liberal project’ examined in this study, Western diplomats and
aid officials have been strongly opposed to judicialisation trends. During the Sesana case Wikileaks
records the U.S. Embassy’s frequent criticisms of SI and FPK’s ‘confrontational’ approach in Ses-
ana, which it saw as ‘counter-productive’ in the long run (U.S. Embassy Gaborone, 10th December
2004; 7th January 2005; 14th July 2005). In interviews, meanwhile, diplomats suggested that the case
may  have  led  to  a  disproportionate  focus  on  a  small  segment  of  the  CKGR population  (Ben
Luckock, interview, 29th March 2012; Gilles Roussey, interview, 29th March 2012; Jacob Johnson,
interview, 24th April 2012). As the EU strategy paper for Bostwana (2008-2013) put it, this may
have been ‘to the detriment of wider issues of integration of non-Setswana speaking Batswana’
(Government of Botswana and the European Commission, August 2007, 27). SI has collected a
large number of statements from British ministers and politicians defending the government in let-
ters to its supporters and fellow MPs. In 2002 Glenys Kinnock MEP even made a ‘toe-curling’ visit
by helicopter to New Xade in order to publicise its successes (Glyn Williams, interview, 12th August
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2011; Booker, 26th October 2013). Overall, diplomats, especially, saw the case as unfairly reflecting
on Botswana’s human rights record - a record they still largely defend, overall, against allegations
of new authoritarianism under President Ian Khama (U.S. Embassy, Gaborone, 23rd June 2008; An-
derson, 28th June 2011; Ben Luckock, interview, 29th March 2012; compare Good 2010). 
Unlike in the other cases under examination here, moreover, and thanks to lawyers’ gate-
keeping, the ‘liberal project’ has largely had its wish. Despite having met with President Khama in
2008, Roy Sesana of FPK has occasionally spoken of wanting to take the case to the African Human
Rights Commission and even the ICJ (Setsiba, 24th November 2006; Shore,  1st February 2010).
Jeremy Sarkin - the legal advisor to Kuiama Riruako, who himself used this tactic - argues that even
if the ICJ is formally only allowed to hear complaints from states, such a case would help ‘cast fur-
ther light upon the plight of the San’ (Sarkin and Cook 2010-2011, 30). Given the poverty of the
San, however, the simple truth is that the ‘Government is perfectly right in stating - with growing ir-
ritation  -  that  if  it  had  not  been  for  outside  interference  there  would  not  have  been  a  case’
(Saugestad 2006, 2). Currently nothing can come of these plans for global judicialisation unless
Survival or another organisation is willing to pay for them.
Thus far, therefore, courts have not been forced to rule on the questions of political order
raised by the CKGR controversy. As a result, it is still feasible to imagine it being resolved, some-
how, by socialisation and re-engineering political  culture.  Supporters of negotiated and litigated
solutions, in fact, almost all agree that cultural change is a pre-condition for progress. In Saugestad’-
s (2011, 57) words, a key difficulty with negotiations led by San communities is that ‘the new type
of leadership [necessary] requires an assertive demeanour that conflicts with traditional peer-based
and consensual leadership’. For Mathambo Ngakaeaja ‘the San Community’ are ‘disadvantaged in-
cluding in skills of organisational government’ (interview, 12 th September, 2011). These difficulties
are only intensified when the interlocutors are ‘in suits getting out of helicopters’ (Seranne Junner,
interview,  26th April 2012). Ditshwanelo, for its part, has recently engaged in ‘capacity-building’
work (with some donor support) intended to help ‘leaders to build their understanding and confid-
ence regarding the laws, planning and negotiation skills’ (Ditshwanelo 2007b; Ben Luckock, inter-
view, 29th March 2012). In one diplomat’s words, what is required in someone with ‘a foot in both
worlds’; someone familiar with the languages of (modern) government and (traditional) San culture
(Jacob Johnson, interview, 24th April 2012)44.
These social  prerequisites for negotiations  exacerbate,  however,  what  Robins (2001) de-
scribes as ‘double vision’ towards the San. Liberal support for ‘indigenous’ causes incentivises stra-
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tegic positioning as ‘traditional’, whilst, paradoxically, support for development projects is simul-
taneously intended to ‘socialise’ San ‘into becoming virtuous modern citizens within a global civil
society’ (Robins  2001,  842). Amongst  the  ?Khomani  San in South  Africa,  Robins  (2001,  835)
claims,  such ‘double vision’ has ‘contributed towards intra-community divisions  and leadership
struggles’. In the CKGR, meanwhile, U.S. Embassy officials have identified what they believe to be
a ‘split in the San community created by settlement, where younger members are more accustomed
to a more modern way of living and seem less willing to live in a traditional manner while older
members of the community still embrace the traditional way of life’ (U.S. Embassy, Gaborone, 24th
March 2009; see also U.S. Embassy, Gaborone, 22nd July 2005; compare Survival International,
N.d.c). (‘Industrialization’, one claimed, ambitiously, may be necessary to propel the former out of
poverty [U.S. Embassy, Gaborone, 20th March 2009].) These divisions have certainly not helped to
heal those ‘caused by disputes over the right strategy in the CKGR case’ (Saugestad 2011, 56; for
gender divisions Sylvain 2004).
As in previous chapters, moreover, representative political organisations have failed to over-
come these obstacles. The question of ‘who speaks for the San?’ is not only a topic for fierce schol-
arly debate (e.g. Gagiano 1999; generally Clifford and Marcus eds. 1986). Donors have long been
keen to support umbrella groups, such as the Khwedom Council, intended to represent San interests
(U.S. Embassy, Gaborone, 7th January 2005; 29th July 2005; 30th July 2005; for lawyers’ and NGO
perspectives see Chennells, Haraseb and Ngakaeaja 2009). This, as one British official explained, is
because when you visit the CKGR ‘you can’t phone ahead’. And on arrival they had always been
confronted  with  only  ‘a  series  of  individual  experiences’  -  or  a  ‘diversity  of  individual
perspectives’, in one U.S. official’s words (Ben Luckock, interview, 29th March 2012; Jacob John-
son, interview, 24th April 2012). Unsurprisingly, such problems have also bedevilled the represent-
ativity of Sesana. As legal theorist Owen Fiss (1996, 21) writes, ‘the class action … employs a pe-
culiar concept of representation: self-appointment’. Even if the High Court had ruled that its de-
cisions applied to the San as a whole, and not just to the named applicants, this would not have
overcome internal disagreements (for the Court’s reasoning Ng’ong’ola 2007, 22). As early as 2001,
for example, ‘some of the Bakgalagadi residents who remained in the reserve said that they were
concerned that the focus of attention was on Bushman populations and not on the full range of
people with rights in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve’ (Hitchcock and Vinding 2001, 68). 
None of this, it should be noted, is to say that the Kalahari San lack social organisation. On
the contrary, as George Silberbauer’s testimony made clear, at the level of the individual band these
populations often possess consensus-building capacities that, in theory at least, would be uniquely
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well-suited to this kind of litigation: 
it is not everyone saying that they agree or democracy, but it is a system where everyone con-
sents to go along with the decision. The consent is made in the interest of group solidarity, 
even if necessarily at a cost to me or my interest (in Mogwe 2011, 174)45.
Beyond the face-to-face level of the band, however, indigenous rights activism requires ‘an expan-
ded ‘vocabulary’ with which to speak of oneself internally as well as inter-culturally’; a potential re-
volution in collective selfhood (Eidheim 1992, 3, in Saugestad 2001, 231). Where this is lacking
legal victories by ‘communities’ are likely to have intended consequences. In 2002 a number of ?
Khomani San, for example, asked the High Court to intervene and help them manage land they had
been awarded. The Department of Land Affairs  exercised ‘benign curatorship’ until  ‘good gov-
ernance’ was restored (Chennels and du Toit 2004, 104). This is why Roger Chennels - who repres-
ented the ?Khomani San, and was also involved in Sesana at its early stages - has talked of the need
for capacity-building to accompany litigation. In 2001, for example, he saw the role of the Southern
African San Institute (an NGO he had founded) as: 
very much about culture and development, around the cultural imperative of actually creating
a community. Because there’s a landowner, a legal entity, which has not yet really been filled,
it’s a potential entity at this moment (in Robins 2001, 840; for Chennels’ reflections on Sesana
see Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 345, n.157).
Cases such as this one thus powerfully illustrate how human rights promotion can become more
about socialisation than law; part  of a wider ‘liberal  project’ of far reaching social and cultural
transformation. As argued in the next chapter, however, and as illustrated in the two preceding this
one, when rights are used to challenge fundamental political order, even the most determined of
civilising missions cannot help resolve the conflicts that result. 
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Part II
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Summary
The preceding chapters have illustrated the judicialisation of fundamental political order in
Southern  Africa,  and  have  shown  how  this  has  rendered  compliance  with  some  key  rulings
impossible.  The four chapters that follow this one explain why. They explain the emergence of
beliefs in indigenous rights, group reparations, and supranational courts; show how these beliefs
nevertheless led anthropologists and historians to provide equivocal support to emerging campaigns
via ‘knowledge gathering’; connect these beliefs to more whole-hearted support from transnational
social  movements;  and  explain  how  the  origins  of  these  beliefs  in  1970s  dilemmas  ensured,
simultaneously, that they were fragmented not clarified by their international institutionalisation.
This chapter justifies and outlines the interpretive approach that will guide this analysis, and draws
some  critical  implications  from it  for  Foucauldian  and  constructivist  theories  of  rights.  These
theories,  it  argues,  cannot  account  for  the emergence or  structural  indeterminacy of new rights
norms.
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Chapter 5: Theoretical Introduction
1. Introduction
In liberal  political culture human rights are commonly understood as freedoms from the
power of states and oppressive cultural  traditions. Liberal theorists have typically derived these
freedoms from natural reason, religious inheritances, or abstract principles such as human dignity or
autonomy (e.g. Perry 2000; Griffin 2008; Tasioulas 2013; for an overview Dembour 2010). Such
positions, however, have now come under sustained attack. Both critics and supporters of political
projects couched in the language of rights increasingly stress how, ultimately, power must be used
to effect cultural transformations if free individuals are to be produced. On this new account, human
rights  may  superficially  promise  to  protect  various  domains  of  personal  freedom (conscience,
property, speech and so forth), but in actual fact serve to define and construct new, properly ‘human’
subjectivities. This shift in focus from a ‘liberation narrative’ to a ‘transformation narrative’ may
reflect a ‘fundamental tension’ that characterises liberalism as a whole (Williams and Young 2014,
22). But I will only be concerned here with those authors who claim that this tension does not in
fact  undermine  or  threaten  liberal  political  projects.  Whilst  these  authors  concede  that  the
‘liberatory’ work of human rights may disrupt existing cultural and political orders, they see this
constant disruption as functional to liberal governance.
2. Order in contemporary rights critique
The best-known of such discussions is clearly that of Michel Foucault. Contemporary rights
scepticism owes much to the central thrust of his mid-career thought on law and sovereignty: ‘the
“Enlightenment”  which  discovered  the  liberties  also  invented  the  disciplines’ (Foucault  1977a,
222). Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham (1994, chapter 3) have referred to this as his ‘expulsion of
law’. For Foucault, in this mode, the advent of the modern liberal state and the ‘accompanying age
of  constitutions  and  codes’  saw  subjects  granted  a  wide  range  of  rights  that  purported  to
circumscribe state power (Foucault 1979a, 89). These changes were accompanied, however, by a
dramatic expansion in a ‘continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on)’ that only
served to entrench more insidious and asymmetrical kinds of regulatory ‘micro-power’ in society
(Foucault 1977a, 222; Foucault 1979a, 144). This might appear paradoxical. The juridical state and
its  disciplinary apparatus sought to  ‘free’ the subject with rights,  but  simultaneously used such
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language to justify interventions deploying ever more detailed ‘knowledge’ about true ‘humanity’
(see also Foucault 2003, 38-9).
 
A Foucauldian  corollary of  law’s  penetration  and capture  by discipline  is  its  unavowed
incoherence.  Modern law’s  self-presentation  -  as,  à la Weber  ([1922]  1978,  656),  ‘analytically
derived … logically clear, internally consistent, and, at least in theory, gapless’ - is constantly belied
by its  reality. Foucault  never abandoned this theme. In his later reflections on human rights he
mocked even the aspiration to consistency as an early Enlightenment fantasy.  In answer to the
question, ‘can’t one imagine that every political situation might be subjected to a human rights
screening,  so  that  no  one  could  compromise  these  rights?’,  he  replied  ‘there  you  have  a
wonderfully-eighteenth-century perspective in which the recognition of a certain form of juridical
rationality would make it possible to define good and evil in every possible situation’ (Foucault
[1982] 2000, 471). Despite its jurisprudential pretensions, law has been ‘reduced to the humdrum,
meager, thankless tasks of social control’ (Foucault [1978] 2000, 435). It has become shot through
with discretion in the service of discipline and establishment of social order: ‘it is for the sake of
order that the decision is made to prosecute or not to prosecute; for the sake of order that the police
are given free reign; for the sake of order that those who aren’t perfectly "desirable" are expelled’.
We should in fact say ‘law or order’, just as we ask for lemon or milk with our tea. (Conceptual)
‘disorder’, in this sense, ‘produces [social] ‘order’’ (Foucault [1978] 2000, 437).
Unsurprisingly, a number of even Left and radical critics have attacked this ‘expulsion of
law’. Many have accused Foucault of under-stating law’s constitutive functions and/or its relative
autonomy from the  disciplinary apparatus  (e.g.  Hirst  1986,  49;  Poulantzas  2000,  77;  de  Sousa
Santos 2002, 5; for an overview of this literature Cotterrell 1995, chapter 6; for critique Golder and
Fitzpatrick 2009, chapter 1). Variants of his ideas, nevertheless, can be found in many of today’s
best known rights critiques.  Giorgio Agamben (1998, 9),  perhaps most famously,  has sought to
‘complete’ Foucault’s theory of ‘biopower’ - those disciplinary techniques aimed at ‘the subjugation
of  bodies  and the  control  of  populations’ (Foucault  1979a,  140).  He sees  these  as  inherent  in
Western sovereignty, not merely modern government (Agamben 1998, 181). Until the messianic
arrival  of  a  ‘completely  new  politics’,  man-as-citizen  will  remain  eclipsed  by  political  power
controlling even his ‘bare’ biological life (Agamben 1998, 13). For Agamben even the advent of
human rights  after  1945,  which  Hannah Arendt  and others  had seen as  signalling  the crisis  of
sovereignty, served simply to extend states power over the stateless. For Agamben, like Foucault,
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the putatively legal and metaphysical characteristics of human rights are of no importance: ‘it is
time  to  stop  regarding  declarations  of  rights  as  proclamations  of  eternal,  meta-juridical  values
binding  the  legislator  (in  fact,  without  much  success)  to  respect  eternal  ethical  principles  ...
declarations of rights represent the originary figure of the inscription of natural life in the juridico-
political order of the nation-state’ (Agamben 1998, 75). (With only minor modifications to such
accounts it is, of course, also possible to construe human rights as helping entrench the power of an
international constellation of forces that includes both states and ‘global civil society’ [e.g. Hammer
2007, chapters 5, 7].)
3. Taking rights theorists seriously
Such  critics,  however,  often  understate  the  extent  to  which  liberals  are,  like  them,
increasingly happy to downplay the legal and metaphysical characteristics of human rights. After
1989 international lawyers in the Kantian cosmopolitan tradition certainly did begin to identify
human rights as the future law of world government: Antonio Cassesse’s (1990, part 1) ‘Decalogue
for five billion persons’46. They understood them as peremptory norms from which no derogation
would be allowed, and which would occupy, more generally, the conceptual apex of a hierarchically
organised system of laws regulating a cosmopolitan world community (cf. Tesón 1992). Clearly
they saw nothing wrong with Foucault’s ‘wonderfully-eighteenth-century perspective’. Since then,
however,  wars  in  the name of rights,  combined with ‘backlash’ by more illiberal  elites  -  most
notably against the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) - have persuaded others that the
‘confrontation of deeply entrenched convictions of principle … hinder[s] socialisation processes’
(Krisch 2011, 406). Now, one of the most determined Kantians writes, unlike in ‘happy former
times when law was associated with song and poetry ... an absolute universalism may produce the
risk of unifying and freezing the world order in a hegemonic way’ (Delmas-Marty 2009b, 3, 8).
Durable order is perhaps best protected by political projects. Human rights jurisprudence can aspire
merely to ‘order pluralism’ (see more generally Delmas-Marty 2009a). 
Kantian visions for world government have thus converged with managerialist theories of
global  governance  (for  the  latter  Koskenniemi  2009).  These  theories  have  long  been  centrally
concerned with ‘socialisation’ and other techniques reminiscent of ‘micro-power’ (e.g. Chayes and
Chayes 1995, 228; Koh 2005). They typically treat human rights not as hierarchically-organised
sources  of  law  to  be  ‘discovered’,  but  rather  as  a  language  for  ‘dialogue’ between  judicial
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‘networks’ (Slaughter 2004, 79-81). As at least one Foucauldian critic has pointed out, this more
closely resembles rule ‘through’ law than the ‘rule of law’ (Rajkovic 2010). However, this is hardly
a secret. It is even openly discussed. Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004, 91-104), for instance, recently
Director of Policy Planning at the U.S. State Department, has made human rights ‘dialogue’ among
judicial networks a central component of her ‘new world order’. And she has spoken of how such
an approach can be more effective than designing laws as formal checks on organized power:
legalization  can  blunt  the  power  of  soft  power.  These  networks  do  not  operate  through
coercion, they are horizontal networks, networks of equals from different nations. The power
they exercise  is  in  information  exchange,  persuasion,  deliberation,  and socialization.  It  is
important power, power that neither we nor many political scientists fully recognize (Scott,
Slaughter and Kratochwil 2002, 296; for inequality in judicial networks see Buxbaum 2004).
For managerialists  insisting on rights’ metaphysical character risks the ‘confrontation of deeply
entrenched convictions of principle’ which their approach seeks to avoid. 
Unsurprisingly, some liberal political theorists have been even more forthright in opposing
the claims of human rights to special metaphysical status (recently Raz 2010). Richard Rorty’s ‘an-
ti-foundationalist’ view of rights as sentimentality and anti-cruelty is well-known, as is - to a lesser
extent - his ‘realist’ approach to law (Rorty 1983, 588). For him the key to human rights promotion
was  inclusion (‘sentimental education’); a process that ‘gets people of different kinds sufficiently
well-acquainted with one another so that they are less tempted to think of those different from them-
selves as only quasi-human’ (Rorty [1993] 1998, 176).  Other liberals have gone even further to-
wards critical positions, going beyond mere inclusion, and stressing how human rights institutions
and language can also be used to enable a whole range of political and military interventions. As
Jean Cohen (2008, 578) summarises: 
‘the traditional conception construes human rights as moral rights all people have due to some
basic feature or interests deemed intrinsically valuable. This comported well with the revival
of the discourse of human rights in the wake of atrocities committed during WWII. It served
as a useful referent for local struggles against foreign rule and domestic dictatorship in the
1980s. Since 1989, human rights discourse acquired a new function: the justification of sanc-
tions, military invasions, and transformative occupation administrations by outsiders, framed
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as enforcement of international law against violators. The traditional conception doesn’t fit
this new function’.
This ‘political’ approach is encapsulated by John Charvet and Elisa Kaczynska-Nay’s  (2008, 5) un-
derstanding of human rights as the core value of a ‘liberal project’, which they define as the ‘trans-
formation of the basic structure of the separate modern societies and of the international society
they together constitute, so that they all come to express liberal values’.
Tom Young and David Williams have urged scholars to take this ‘liberal project’ seriously
for many years now. They have shown how much critique of liberal ideology - at any rate that
which seeks to expose the narrow political agendas and interests lurking behind theories of pur-
portedly universal scope - is in fact already explicit within it (cf. T. Young 2002). Cohen’s assertion
that after 1989 ‘human rights discourse acquired a new function’ is here a case in point. The adop-
tion of particular theories and traditions may confine liberal thought to some extent, but liberals’
choices of which theories to espouse are (often unconsciously) shaped by pragmatic assessments of
their political consequences. As Williams and Young have outlined, such a perspective is simultan-
eously wider and narrower than current writing in the Foucauldian tradition. It is narrower because
it focuses on liberal thought and practice, rather than on the more encompassing epistemes signific-
ant in Foucault’s early work. This reflects an ‘understanding of liberalism precisely as a political
project which has as its object the transformation of the social world rather than as simply one set of
ideas that structure the broad possibilities of social life’ (Williams and Young 2011, 3). It is wider,
however, when it claims that liberalism’s ‘kinetic’ aspect, ‘its restless and relentless desire to re-
make the world in its own image … ultimately underpins the liberal project’. Foucauldians have fo-
cused too narrowly on government, and not enough on other avenues by which the transformation
of individuals and societies can be pursued (D. Williams 2009, 10). 
4. How human rights can be dysfunctional for the liberal project
One of the great merits of this view is that it opens many of the explanatory questions some
Foucauldian  accounts  foreclose.  In  his  later  work,  as  he  departed  from ‘archaeology’ and  the
episteme, Foucault stressed how the modern state derives its distinctive character from discourses of
(Renaissance)  sovereignty,  (Enlightenment)  discipline  and  (Christian)  pastorship  (cf.  Foucault
2007).  These  discourses  were,  certainly,  functional  to  long-run  processes  of  ‘human
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individualization  in  the  West’ (Foucault  2007,  184).  But  there  were  no  logical  connections  or
elective affinities  between them. ‘Political  rationality’,  rather,  ‘took its  stand’ on whatever  was
useful in prevailing political cultures; ‘first on the idea of pastoral power, then on that of reason of
state’ (Foucault, 1979b, 256). Young has implicitly extended such arguments. He claims that the
availability  of  useful  discourses  at  critical  junctures  may  even  determine  the  liberal  project’s
survival. The comparatively recent liberal abandonment of nationalism, for example, may fatally
obscure the still urgent political necessity of somehow securing populations’ emotional loyalties to
states under (re)construction (T. Young 1995, 543). On human rights, likewise, the ‘liberal project’
accounts for contingency and explains change better than ahistorical ‘archaeological’ references to
behemoths  such as  ‘(neo)-liberalism’ and ‘market  discipline’ which encompass  such difficulties
seamlessly (e.g. T. Evans 2005; Odysseos 2010). For Young, for example, liberal managers of the
global system after 1989 required a discourse that would legitimate the new range of interventions
which  geopolitical  shifts  had  made  possible:  ‘the  language  of  sovereignty  is  by  no  means
dismantled, but going beyond it requires a new kind of political language with at least as much
emotional  charge  and  at  least  as  much  resonance  with  other  features  of  modernity’.  The  ‘old
nineteenth-century language of more-or-less civilized’, which did similar work during the colonial
period, was clearly unavailable. So ‘the only candidate would seem to be rights’, despite the fact
that ‘they have no coherence as such at all’ (T. Young 1998, 33, 35). 
In this study I make an argument with some echoes of Young’s suggestions for nationalism.
The ‘choice’ of human rights may produce internal inconsistencies fatal for an important aspect of
the liberal project: namely, containing dissent to the establishment of property rights regimes within
durable political  and constitutional orders. Both critics and supporters are therefore mistaken in
describing human rights as seamlessly connected with ever-intensifying transformative (neo-)liberal
projects. Young (1998, 33) himself raises the possibility I wish to explore: ‘the sheer success and
salience of rights discourse meant that it could become the vehicle for other projects ... including
even those that bear no relation to the liberal project or indeed some that are hostile to it’. But he
suggests that subversive appropriations are ultimately likely to be contained. This is because ‘the
staff officers of the liberal project (who do the drafting, man the institutions and so on)’ are not, at
bottom,  constrained  by  any  specific  attachment  to  ideas  of  rights.  Rather  they  deploy  them
strategically in order to further their objectives (even if self-deception will typically ensure that this
strategic background remains unconscious):
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the language of rights is almost infinitely flexible in terms of specifications of claimants, what
is claimed and of whom. But whether claimants are children, women, ‘indigenous’ peoples,
refugees or migrants, the general thrust is the same: first, to delegitimise existing practices
[...] second to sanction new practices that corrode or dissolve obstacles to the liberal project
(T. Young 1998, 36).
The implication here is not that the ‘staff officers’ are insincere in claiming to believe in
human rights, but rather that unavowed deeper political  agendas shape how these beliefs are
formed. This is where I more generally depart from Young and Williams, and more broadly the
genealogical tradition in which Foucauldians write (for this ‘tradition’ MacIntyre 1990, chapter
9). I treat the question of how far liberals’ political agency is constrained by specific rights ideas
as  an open one.  It  is  true that  some liberals  may have (even if  unconsciously)  adopted the
discourse because of its political utility. Other influential actors, however - notably some lawyers
and  human  rights  activists  -  have  taken  the  ideas  so  seriously that  attempts  to  manage  the
discourse for political  ends have been systematically undermined. One implication of this  is
obviously that some liberals must have come to adopt rights language for other reasons than
Young identifies. Focusing on the 1970s, I seek to explain these adoptions as ‘rational’ responses
to dilemmas posed by new circumstances to established webs of belief. I thereby hope to take up
the challenge Graham Harrison (2010, 116) has presented to Williams, to avoid ‘references to
liberals [that]  can tempt analysis  into the abstract:  a referencing of a form of agency that is
deduced rather than identified’.
5. Justifying interpretivism
This use of the term ‘rational’ merits  discussion since it is likely to arouse considerable
suspicion. As David d’Avray (2010, 72) has stated in a work important for this study, it is now a
common belief in social science that ‘the claim to rationality is self-deception’. Nowhere in this
more marked than in the genealogical tradition. Nietzsche, famously, saw man as fundamentally
uninterested  in  establishing  rational  consistency  between  his  beliefs  about  the  world  and  his
experience of it - even if the conclusions he draws from this view changed, however, towards the
end  of  his  life  (B.  Williams  2002,  12-19).  And  Foucault  made  similar  insights  central  to  his
genealogical enquiry into ‘regimes of truth’ (see Foucault 1977b). He understood webs of belief as
inconsistent assemblages imbued with a dangerous aura of self-evidence by ‘the moving substrate
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of force relations’ (Foucault 1979a, 93; for Foucault and ‘assemblages’ see A. Hunt 2013). Here he
linked discursive and non-discursive realms by ‘power/knowledge’, or what he had earlier referred
to in more obviously Nietzschean terms as a generalised ‘will to power’ (Hacking 1986, 34-38).
This  was not  say,  of  course,  that  individual  subjects  are  insincere  in  the  beliefs  they hold  -  a
formulation in any case wholly alien to Foucault’s philosophical project - but rather that power’s
far-reaching consequences entail that self-deception is in effect integral to any claim to rational and
coherent selfhood or identity uncontaminated by it (cf. Foucault [1980] 1984, 59-61).
Once again, my general strategy here will be to open the questions that such perspectives
foreclose. It would be idle to contend that beliefs are always formed in ways uncontaminated by
social  forces.  But  likewise,  as  Mark Bevir  (1999,  170)  contends,  only a  ‘vacuous  ...  nihilistic
relativism’ would  contend  that  ‘all  beliefs,  including  apparently  rational  ones  such  as  those
associated with science, have an irrational origin epitomised above all by the will to power’. This is
not to deny the need for a healthy, critical relativism that ‘queries the strength and nature of our
attachment to our view of the world’, after it has evaluated the origins of that worldview (Bevir
1999, 18; see also Geuss 2002). It is only to stress the variety of psychological processes by which
beliefs are acquired, and to stress the analytical implications of this diversity for social science. In
the chapters that follow I will use this approach to distinguish actors (such as the ‘staff-officers of
the liberal project’) who have acquired beliefs in rights via self-deception, from those who have
acquired them for rational reasons or have deployed them in a consciously strategic fashion. As
outlined  in  the  next  section,  these  distinctions  help  resolve  analytical  puzzles  surrounding  the
adoption of rights discourse by various constituencies. I will argue that the mono-causal theories of
belief formation implicit in existing explanations require that these puzzles remain mysterious.
I borrow these broad notions of rationality from Donald Davidson’s criticisms of the later
Wittgenstein, and the numerous anthropologists, historians, and social theorists who have sought to
explore their implications (Davidson [1963] 2001, 10; [1987] 2004, 101; [1995] 2004, 117; 2001,
xvi; see also Elster 1982, 125; Lukes 1982, 279-282; Bevir 1999, x; Skinner 2002, 31; Ludwig
2003, 6; d’Avray 2010, 17; contrast Winch 1958). For Davidson, famously, reasons can be causes.
They do not  merely redescribe  the  social,  economic,  linguistic,  or  evaluative context  in  which
actions are conducted, as Wittgenstein had argued in the  Philosophical Investigations  (Davidson
[1963] 2001, 10; for a defence of Wittgenstein’s view Tully 1989, 180-182). Reference to context
alone cannot explain why people want to act. Humean efforts to explain action purely in terms of
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desires must also fail. Such theories cannot account for why people prefer rationalizing explanations
to explanations in terms of desire alone (Davidson [1963] 2001, 15-16; also Anscombe 1957, 16;
Hueur 2004). Social-scientific prejudices to the contrary, finally, no ‘covering laws’ can be devised
which would reliably connect particular sets of desires and circumstances with actions (Davidson
[1963] 2001, 15; [1976] 2001; cf. Hempel 1942). Thanks to the ‘nomological irreducibility of the
psychological’, in short, ‘any serious theory for predicting action on the basis of reasons must find a
way  of  evaluating  the  relative  force  of  various  desires  and  beliefs  in  the  matrix  of  decision’
(Davidson [1963] 2001, 16; Davidson [1974] 2001, 230). There is thus no alternative to an open
mind on such matters. 
6. Irrational belief formation in social-science explanation
In  contrast  to  Davidson,  social-scientific  explanations  typically  assume  irrationality.
Contrary  to  Cartesian  prejudices,  however,  this  phenomenon  cannot  be  diagnosed  by  simply
identifying (bodily) desires in the ‘matrix of decision’ (see Davidson [1970] 2001; Rawling 2003,
106).  The key,  rather,  is  whether  the agent  rationalises his  actions in  terms of  the desires that
actually motivated it: ‘in standard reason explanations … the actual states of belief or desire cause
the explained state of belief … In the case of irrationality … there is a mental cause that is not
reason for what it causes’ (Davidson [1982] 2004, 179). d’Avray (2010, 16), approvingly, associates
this view with Jon Elster (1983, 15-6): ‘a belief may be consistent and even true, a desire consistent
and even conformable to morals - and yet we may hesitate to call them rational if they have been
shaped by irrelevant causal factors, by a blind physic causality operating behind the back of the
person’. Quentin Skinner (2002, 31), more famously, has also drawn on Davidson to make a similar
case, ‘a rational belief will thus be one that an agent has attained by some accredited process of
reasoning.  Such  a  process  will  be  one  that,  according  to  the  prevailing  norms  of  epistemic
rationality,  may be  said  to  give  the  agent  good grounds  for  supposing (as  opposed  to  merely
desiring or hoping) that the belief in question is true’. 
For our purposes self-deception is  the most significant source of irrationality.  Thanks to
weakness of the will, our desires will routinely lead us to act contrary to our reasoned beliefs. I
may, for example, believe it immoral to take the last chocolate but secretly take it nonetheless. Self-
deception,  however,  differs from this  in  two important respects.  Firstly,  whilst  ‘the outcome of
weakness of the will is an intention, or an intentional action ... the outcome of self-deception is a
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belief’ (Davidson [1985] 2004, 201; contrast Forrester 2002, 44, n.11; Lear 2014, 88). In contrast to
weakness of the will, secondly, the irrational processes of belief-formation that characterise self-
deception are in some sense  motivated (Davidson 2001, 205; see also Pears 1984). This is what
positivist political scientists describe when that they claim that elites provide new reasons for their
actions merely to conceal new configurations of ‘interests’ (political or economic)47. (Some now
rather antiquated variants on this argument do of course assume that political actors consciously
deceive almost as a matter of course [e.g. I. Hall 2009].) But these are empirical questions, and the
successes of such strategies are in any case parasitic on more general norms of sincerity (Bevir
1999,  28-30;  Meirsheimer  2011,  28-9).  As  two  leading  positivist  scholars  of  judicial  politics
explain: 
we  posit  no  Oliver  Stone-like  conspiracy  in  regards  to  the  legal  profession.....  Legal
socialization, to say nothing of self-preservation, keeps even self-aware judges from admitting
their attitudinal biases (Segal and Spaeth 1994, 10-12).
Young  and  Williams  provide  a  much  more  sophisticated  account  of  irrational  belief
formation  via  self-deception.  This,  however,  is  specific  to  liberals,  and  narrower  than
power/knowledge or a generalised will to power. It is governed by a ‘restless and relentless desire
to remake the world in its own image’ which ‘ultimately underpins the liberal project’ (D. Williams
2009, 12). This ‘kinetic’ quality means that whilst liberal desires thus remain constant liberal beliefs
are endlessly various. There can be, for example, no ‘urge’ to imperialism ‘internal’ to liberalism, as
Uday Singh  Mehta  (1999,  20)  claims.  (And  nor  can  there  be  a  fundamentally  anti-imperialist
‘radical Enlightenment’, as Jonathan Israel (2001, 79-82) has argued.)  If desires to effect ‘social
transformation’ are better served by anti-imperialist beliefs in particular circumstances then liberals
will  sincerely  adopt  such  beliefs48.  Like  traditional  ideology  critique  this  approach  therefore
foregrounds the role of ‘powerful social agencies’ in seeking to change (and distort) wider beliefs,
attitudes and preferences (Geuss 2008,  54-5). Unlike some cruder accounts, however, it  doesn’t
suggest that liberals promote these (typically universalist) beliefs in order to serve their ‘particular
interests’ - or not, at least, when these are narrowly construed as ‘generative of political (and other)
behaviour’ (T. Young 2002, 189, n.28; Geuss 2008, 52). Relentless desires to transform societies
and individuals must, rather, reflect some unavowed ‘preference for greater power’; a preference
which Bevir (1996, 120) proposes as characteristic of ideological belief in general. 
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I disagree only with the scope of these claims. Self-deception may characterise irrational be-
lief formation among some of those promoting liberal ideas. But this need not hold true for liberals
in general. As Bevir points out, ‘although some of those who adhere to an ideology must hold it as a
distorted belief, although their beliefs must be corrupted by a preference for greater power, not all
the adherents need do so’ (Bevir 1996, 121). Not all liberals need conceal from themselves the real
causes of their beliefs (Pears 1984, 15-40; compare Davidson [1985] 2004, 206-210). Their views
need not, moreover, reflect any kind of ‘false consciousness’, even according to minimalist versions
of such theories claiming no privileged access to the truth (contrast Lukács [1923] 1972). Such
people do not, that is, necessarily hold straightforwardly and factually incorrect views which they
have acquired thanks to the ‘manipulative framing of issues by those whose interest, profession, and
mission it is to shape our perceptions’ (Lukes 2011, 27). This diversity of liberal belief formation
processes is, finally, granted some a priori empirical plausibility by the sheer variety of contempor-
ary liberalisms. As Bell (2014, 8) has written: 
most inhabitants of the West are now conscripts of liberalism [...] most who identify them-
selves as socialists, conservatives, social democrats, republicans, greens, feminists, and an-
archists, have been ideologically incorporated, whether they like it or not.
There are, obviously, other possibilities here. The structural sociology of Pierre Bourdieu
and  his  followers,  for  instance,  which  I  largely  neglect  in  these  pages,  typically  explains  the
adoption of new beliefs in terms of unavowed quests for status and struggles for position within
narrow cultural arenas. On this view new ‘fields’ typically emerge thanks to the power of the states
that back them, or the charisma and ‘entrepreneurial’ flair of ‘prophetic figures’ and ‘missionary
idealists’  that  promote  them49.  They  then  spread  thanks  to  desires  for  self-preservation  via
conformity (e.g. Dezelay and Garth 1996, 35, n.6; 45; 71). In Nietzschean ([1873] 1954, 44-5)
terms such ‘herd-like’ people ‘do not flee from being deceived as much as from being damaged by
deception’.  Even  sociologists  can  conceal  from  themselves  that  ‘ressentiment,  envy,  social
concupiscence,  unconscious  aspirations  or  fascinations,  hatred,  a  whole  range  of  unanalyzed
experiences of and feelings about the social world’ can shape their beliefs (Bourdieu 1988, 94-5;
Wacquant 1989, 33). To the extent that quests for status motivate such irrationality, it constitutes
what  Davidson  ([1985]  2004,  205)  analyses  as  ‘wishful  thinking’;  a  species  of  self-deception
distinguished only by its consistently pleasant consequences. 
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7. Rational belief formation
The  process  by which  rational  agents  form their  beliefs  now itself  requires  a  series  of
caveats and clarifications. Perhaps most pressingly, as may be clear by now, ‘rational’ is not here
equated  with  ‘deontological’.  It  differs  from  moral  or  scientific  truth,  and  even  -  as  with
Habermasian concept of ‘communicative rationality’ (Risse 2000) - from forms of reasoning that
are  thought  to  possess  special  truth  or  consensus-establishing  characteristics.  Nor,  avoiding
radically opposed understandings common in disciplines strongly influenced by economics, is it
simply ‘utilitarian’. This purer form of rationality certainly exists - in informed consumers’ choices,
for  example  -  but  differs  from  that  in  domains  more  coloured  by  values.  More  explanatory
significance should therefore be ascribed to beliefs in, say, pacifism, than to mere ‘preferences’ for
various kinds of consumption (d’Avray 2010, 43-4). In Bevir’s (1999, 28) terms, in short, ‘we will
define rational beliefs in terms of consistency, not in terms of objectivity or an appropriate means to
any subjective end’. This reflects what Bevir (1999, 92; 2000, 30) describes as a ‘semantic holist’
brand of interpretive political science; one which I compare favourably to constructivism in the
chapters which follow.
Put  briefly,  such  interpretive  approaches  do  not  try  and  isolate  particular  norms  of
appropriate conduct and then analyse how agents may commend, propagate or otherwise seek to
embed them in social institutions (for this constructivist tendency see Finnemore 2003, 57). They
seek,  instead,  to  show how agents’ beliefs  about  appropriateness  are  always  justified  by other
beliefs,  and  thus  account  for  the  tenacity  with  which  they  are  typically  held  onto  -  evidence
seemingly to the contrary. As Bevir (1999, 95) explains, semantic holism thus ‘starts by rejecting
pure experience and ends by insisting that beliefs confront reality only as interconnected webs’.
This explains the tenacity of belief since ‘observation entails theory, so if an observation disproved
a favourite theory, we could rescue the theory by insisting that the observation rested on a false
theory’. 
Rational  belief  formation  thus  occurs  when  new  understandings  cannot  be  rationally
accounted for using resources contained within existing webs of belief. Key to explaining change,
therefore, is the identification of dilemmas posed to specifiable groups of agents. As Bevir (1999,
29) explains, ‘dilemmas arise for individuals when they accept as authoritative a new understanding
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that, merely by virtue of being new, poses a question for their existing web of beliefs’. They thus
differ from those sources of change identified by positivists who ‘equate dilemmas or pressures
with objective facts about the world rather than the subjective beliefs of actors’. Such scholars often
‘need an analysis of how these pressures lead to people to change their beliefs and actions’ (Bevir
2010b, xxxvii).  This  is  why,  for  example,  I  seek to  distance myself  from analyses  -  positivist,
Marxian and otherwise - that explain new beliefs in human rights in terms of the objective growth
of global culture, capitalism or ‘globalisation’ (e.g. Elliott 2007; Manokha 2009, 445-8).
None of this, of course, should be taken to intellectualist extremes. As d’Avray concedes,
‘emotion, unthinking tradition, and free-wheeling, purely instrumental reasoning no doubt dominate
much of the history of human thought and actions’. But beliefs and deontological convictions can
set ‘the parameters of instrumental rationality’, and our specific investigations can hope to uncover
emotionally-driven and purely habitual kinds of thinking (d’Avray 2010, 62; see also Weber [1925]
1964, II, 2, i). Such an approach does not entail,  furthermore, that agents be conscious of their
beliefs when acting upon them, nor that they constantly seek to establish consistency between them
(see Billig 1991, 147). It merely claims that rational agents typically act in this way when new
circumstances  and/or  determined  interlocutors  force  them  to  become  conscious  of  these
inconsistencies. We should therefore assume rational agency until it is disproved (see Bevir 1999,
128).  Conscious deception is  only effective because it  is  parasitic on sincerity.  The ideological
adoption of beliefs,  likewise,  only furthers political  projects  because of wider assumptions  that
ideologists do not self-deceive.
Importantly, finally, even when we do identify insincerity this does not entitle us to move
directly to an analysis of actors’ self-interests (a point also holding true for irrational belief). As
Quentin Skinner has insisted - in ways Bevir may have been too quick to dismiss - such moves
neglect the inescapable role of legitimation in political discourse (Finlayson 2007, 551-2). Even the
most hard-headed of positivists have, obviously, observed ways in which political actors’ typically
justify their behaviour in ways that diverge from their real ‘interests’. Ran Hirschl (2004, 12, 49;
2009, 830-1) provides a pertinent example for present purposes. He describes elites’ talk of human
rights as simply ‘rhetoric’, used to conceal their real motives for action (‘hegemonic preservation’)
and unworthy of attention from realist scholars. This, however, is to miss two crucial points. The
first is that even the most cynical of politicians cannot choose just  any language with which to
legitimate their actions. They must show that ‘some existing terms can somehow be applied as apt
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descriptions of their behaviour’. Even ‘revolutionaries’, to this extent, are in fact ‘obliged to march
backwards into battle’ (Q. Skinner 2002, 149-150).  Positivists  may not think this a particularly
damaging point. After all, they do not believe the choice of any particular ex-post rationalisation of
conduct to be of special significance. However, if a particular ‘cloak’ is chosen to conceal a hidden
agenda, this will invariably be because it is thought to possess some mobilising and/or legitimating
power in a given context. And the reasons why it might possess that power will only be explicable
via an analysis of broader ideational and cultural trends. (How, for instance, have rights attained the
‘near-sacred status’ that Hirschl (2004, 1) laments?) What is more, as Skinner (2002, 155) points
out, to the extent that critics remember what cynics say, cynics ‘will find themselves committed to
behaving in such a way that their actions  remain compatible  with the claim that their professed
principles genuinely motivated them’. This means that, to the extent that political actors wish to
avoid  accusations  of  insincerity  and/or  hypocrisy,  even  the  most  self-serving  of  post-hoc
rationalisations will have subsequent real-world effects. 
An  important  corollary  of  the  analyses  above  is  that  symbolic  technologies  typically
reinforce existing beliefs, rather than creating new ones (see d’Avray 2010, 71). Rational agents
reason in more-or-less  utilitarian fashion about  how to entrench and mobilise  beliefs  they,  and
others, in fact rarely change. As d’Avray (2010, 8-9) explains (using Weber’s ‘value rationality’ in
place of ‘rational belief’):  ‘value systems are cemented by experience or simulcra thereof … a
recurrent pattern is for value rationality to shape instrumental technique which in turn, among other
things,  reinforces  the  values  through  rituals,  mental  imagery,  mass  meetings,  processions,
education, etc.’ This passage outlines how interpretivist insights can be combined with an attention
to ritual, practice and established social roles. In theory, therefore, a focus on these things - of which
Durkheim and Bourdieu have been the most influential advocates - need not preclude analysis of
the causal role of ideas and beliefs (Bevir 2010a, 22). Practically speaking, however, and despite
some attention to these matters in chapter 7, space will preclude a full account of how rights ‘get
their meaning through practice’ (Hopgood 2006, 215). 
8. Explaining human rights
This focus on the relational dynamics of belief formation comes with an explanatory pay-
off.  Clearly,  Pace  Foucault  and  Agamben,  recent  and  discrete  global  phenomena  cannot  be
explained  by sole  reference  to  the  emergence  of  ‘biopolitical’ practices  in  the  Ancient  World,
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Medieval  Christianity,  the  Renaissance,  or  the  eighteenth-century  West.  The  ‘judicialisation  of
mega-politics’ that Hirschl (2008) describes can be dated with some precision to the later 1970s.
International  relations  constructivists  struggle  with  similar  difficulties.  Like  Rortyean  liberal
theorists, and like Foucauldian critics, these scholars understand rights as social constructions with
no  specifically  legal  or  metaphysical  qualities  (Finnemore  2000).  They  are  created  by  rights
activists via issue framing and other symbolic technologies (Sikkink 2002). Once ‘constructed’ in
this way norms ‘spiral’. After they have been accepted rhetorically activists can use governments’
pronouncements  to  identify  double  standards:  ‘self-entrapment’ (Risse  and  Sikkink  1999,  23).
(Unless, that is, states can deploy ‘regime-based counter discourses and narratives’ which resonate
with the post-9/11 political climate [Risse and Ropp 2013, 15]). ‘Socialisation’ and habit-forming
then begin  to  translate  rights  into  determinate  guides  for  conduct.  This  elicits  compliance  and
eventually ‘rule-governed behaviour’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 898; Risse and Ropp 2013, 8-
10).
Like ‘biopolitics’, however,  such practices clearly significantly pre-date the 1970s. Lynn
Hunt’s (2007) well-known history of human rights locates their origins in the eighteenth-century.
Like Rorty ([1993] 1998) she places great emphasis on how novels and other symbolic technologies
promoted new experiences of ‘empathetic selfhood’ and ‘bodily integrity’ that ultimately created
these beliefs (L. Hunt 2007, 29)50. ‘Equality’, after all, ‘had to be internalised in some fashion’ (L.
Hunt, 2007, 27). Rorteyan inclusion - ‘everyone would have rights only if everyone could be seen
as in some fundamental way alike’ - entailed cultural agency geared towards the production of new
subjectivities (see Rorty ([1993] 1998, 176).
In a recent high-profile work the ‘agentic’ constructivist Kathryn Sikkink (2011; 16, 255-6)
has sought to connect these broad historical trends with a related phenomenon from the 1970s: the
advent  of  fair  criminal  trials  for  violations  of  ‘physical  integrity rights’ -  most  notably torture
committed by state officials51. She proposes five levels of analysis: 1) ‘Deeper ideational instincts in
the human brain’, most abstractly, explain ‘an initial receptivity to demands for justice’ found ‘in a
wide range of cultures and societies’ (Sikkink 2011, 255, 261). 2) At a lower, but still massive level
of generality, Sikkink highlights the global reach of the Enlightenment; ‘liberal ideas about human
rights,  due  process,  and,  in  particular,  individual  responsibility  for  human  rights  violations  …
associated with liberalism and the West, but … not in any way limited to it’ (Sikkink 2011, 255). In
the 1970s, ‘unique background conditions’ then focused these deep instincts into specific cultural
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phenomena (Sikkink 2011, 231). These conditions came in two varieties: 3) the geo-political, such
as end of the Cold War, which allowed for the global diffusion of norms and policies (Sikkink 2011,
21),  and 4) the ideational,  such as the contemporaneous rise  of new human rights  movements;
within which the demands of norm entrepreneurs were ‘nested’, and without which ‘new practices
of  accountability  would  not  have  emerged’ (Sikkink  2011,  20).  5)  Variations  in  local  political
culture, finally, meant that countries with long histories of ‘political trials’ were most likely to adopt
the new, fairer sort as ‘common sense’ responses to the end of dictatorship (Sikkink 2011, 46).
This study questions how the emergence of human rights movements in the 1970s can be
explained by reference to Enlightenment liberal traditions, let alone facts of neurology. As Bevir in-
sists, broad traditions do indeed constitute conditions for the emergence of specific beliefs. By try-
ing to equate traditions with a ‘fixed core’ of ideas, however, such essentialist approaches fail to ex-
plain how there may in fact be ‘no single idea that persists from start to finish’ within them (Bevir
2000, 38)52. Traditions influence individuals ‘only by virtue of being the initial background against
which they set out’. In general terms, therefore, by identifying liberal, Judeo-Christian, or other pre-
cursors to human rights, scholars  explain  later manifestations only to the extent that the former
provided the context in which the latter were actually conceived (contrast Blackburn 2011; Dubow
2012; Cmiel 2012, 29). A number of scholars, for example, have established parallels between mod-
ern subjective rights and Thomist theories of natural law (Tierney 1997, chapter 1; Wolsterstorff
2008, 48-50; contrast Villey 1983, 15-16; Milbank 2012, 225). But if those identifying as natural
law thinkers did anything to shape later twentieth-century traditions they did so against a radically
different ‘personalist’ backdrop from which Thomism was wholly absent (Moyn 2011, 90-91). 
In  Anglophone  liberalism,  meanwhile,  as  Bell  (2014,  11-17)  illustrates,  by  the  nine-
teenth-century the triumph of nationalist, idealist, utilitarian and Darwinian ideas had ensured that
Lockean subjective rights no longer formed part of the liberal inheritance. (In France the notion of
droits de l’homme as a component of (imperial) republican citizenship was increasingly embattled,
but continued to eke out a precarious existence (e.g. Fitmaurice 2012, 125-6).) In Europe, more gen-
erally, where liberal cosmopolitanism survived it was other forms, such as in emerging humanitari-
an efforts to ‘civilise’ war and international relations (Fine 2009, 13-14; Hopgood 2013, chapter
2)53. The Lockean subjective rights ‘tradition’ was, very broadly speaking, only rediscovered by
political theorists and academics in the United States as part of a mid-century effort ‘to define and
defend a holistic ‘Western’ civilization based on ‘liberal’ values, and as such it ‘was of ‘strategic’
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value in fighting totalitarianism (Bell 2014, 23)54. Without this ‘ideological labour’ liberal rights tra-
ditions would not even have provided the conditions for later belief formation (Bell 2014, 18). They
were certainly not extracted from some unchanging ‘fixed core’ of ‘liberal ideas’. 
By contrast, this study does find that the ‘unique background conditions’ Sikkink identifies
in 1970s are significant in explaining new kinds of judicialisation. It too focuses on the diffusion of
new norms and institutions after 1989 (chapter 9), and on the emergence of new human rights
movements and their facilitation by local traditions of political lawyering (chapter 7). But it insists
these new movements were not simply ‘conditions’ for but causes of judicialisation (contrast also
Erdos 2009, 807). They therefore require separate explanation. ‘Altruism’ alone, no less than greed,
can hardly explain activism for indigenous rights and colonial reparations (contrast Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998, 898). In chapter 7 accordingly, the origins of these movements will be explained by
reference to other existing beliefs.
In  the  next  chapter  I  argue  that  the  human  rights  beliefs  of  the  post-war  period  were
transformed significantly in the 1970s. This argument will be made with the aid of Moyn (2010),
who explains the ‘human rights revolution’ in terms of the global de-legitimation of socialist utopias
that followed, notably, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Moyn describes how the failure of
various  utopian  alternatives  in  the  next  decade  (Eurocommunism,  Maoism,  anti-colonial
nationalism etc.) left human rights stranded as the sole survivor of an intense period of ideological
competition. The utopian provenance of these new converts transformed human rights beliefs, and
gradually shifted their focus away from ‘catastrophe prevention’ (Moyn 2010, 226)55. Human rights,
even whilst continuing to ‘draw on the claim that their source of authority transcended politics’,
thus  became a  language  for  ‘maximalist’ demands;  even  becoming  a  ‘dominant  framework  of
government and improvement of human life in far-flung global locales’, and being used to express
such  demands  as  ‘rights’ to  ‘culture,  indigeneity  and  environment’ (Moyn  2010,  223).  Whilst
Sikkink  sees  agents  extracting  human  rights  ideas  from  unchanging  cultural  and  biological
essences, therefore, the next chapter treats them as mutable products of ideological competition56. 
9. Explaining dysfunction
It is ultimately this ‘maximalist’ expansion of rights discourse which explains how human
rights have become dysfunctional for Young and Williams’ ‘liberal project’. The preceding chapters
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had a dual objective. The first was to identify the empirical phenomenon to be explained in the
chapters that follow: ‘the judicialisation of fundamental political order’. The second was to describe
how the expansion of rights into these intrinsically political realms of decision-making has made
compliance impossible.  It  is this  inherent indeterminacy which explains why constructivists are
wrong to understand rights as functioning like (socially constructed)  rules governing behaviour.
Chapter 9 will illustrate these contentions by analysing the international institutionalisation of the
new rights  deployed in  my case studies.  On the  constructivist  account  such institutionalisation
clarifies norms, reduces indeterminacy, and thus helps produce determinate ‘rules’ for behaviour
that elicit compliance. As I show, however, the very opposite has been the case.  Analysts who
wholly discount the ideational content of rights will find these failures of socialisation difficult to
explain.
In the rest of this section I will briefly outline the context in which new beliefs created this
dysfunctional indeterminacy; a context clarified in the next chapter. From our perspective, in short,
the 1970s were in fact characterised by a dual crisis. The collapse of socialist utopias now coincided
with a crisis of liberal modernist beliefs about administration. This period saw the crystallisation of
creeping  disenchantment  amongst  Western  liberal  elites  with  the  productivist  orientation  and
discretionary power of the tutelary state (Jobert 2000, 130-1). This posed dilemmas for adherents of
theories which presented law as a technology of state intervention in economy and society, and it
favoured the rise of new ‘managerialist’ theories which presented law as a steering mechanism for
the co-ordination of largely autonomous social spheres (Nonet and Selznick 1978; Bevir 2010a,
chapter  2).  Great  stress  was  placed  on  the  capacity  of  devices  such  as  ‘reasonableness’ and
‘proportionality’ to  limit  the  excesses  of  regulatory  discretion.  Absolutist  conceptions  of  legal
rights,  already rejected  by modernist  theories  of  the  early twentieth-century,  were  likewise de-
emphasised to prevent dangerous interference with other social domains (see Duguit 1917, 10-26;
Teubner 1983, 255; Cotterrell 1995, 173-4). For managerialists the internal complexity of social
subsystems was such that identifying law with ‘morals’, as human rights ideas often do, would be a
disaster (Teubner 1983,  271-2). 
This was of course a demanding tightrope act. It has not been possible to restrict human
rights discourse to the simply moral sphere. In the 1980s philosophers from a variety of traditions
criticised the tendency for rights-talk to displace ethical decision-making from locales possessing
genuinely ‘thick’ understandings of social practices (MacIntyre 1981, 68-71; Rose 1985; J. Dunn
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[1988] 1990, 50; B. Williams [1989] 2005, 47-50). More recently, meanwhile, some of their liberal
counterparts have sought, vainly, to police and insist upon the distinction between legal and moral
rights (Nagel 1995, 85; Tasioulas 2007; Griffin 2010, 352-5). One of the key explanations for their
difficulties has been the very different sets of dilemmas that the 1970s posed for socialist beliefs.
The collapse of old utopias at the hands of Soviet dissidents, combined with the perceived failures
of other utopian projects that had emerged after 1968, now triggered dramatic transfers of political
energies on the Left (Horvath 2007; Moyn 2010, chapter 4). Ex-socialists thus came to embrace the
absolutist legal notions of individual freedom espoused by early Cold war Christian conservatives,
but  maintain  beliefs  in  the  directive  capacity  of  state  that  liberals  viewed with scepticism and
conservatives with hostility. These persons saw human rights not as a ‘thin’ master frame, but rather
as an indeterminate language through which an almost  limitless  set  of  political  goals could be
pursued. Rights language and concepts have provided managerialists with no resources to prevent
litigants from using these new opportunities to their advantage. Their ideas have served, ultimately,
to dilute legal and political actors’ working distinctions between law, politics and administration.
Chapter 7 locates these dynamics in Southern African traditions of political lawyering crucial to my
case studies.
As anticipated by the ‘liberal project’, and Foucauldian approaches more broadly, in the face
of  such potential  dysfunction some liberal  elites  have  therefore  abandoned absolutist  beliefs  in
human  rights.  Such  actors  have  sought  to  develop  various  ways  of  managing  dangerous
entanglements in inherently political areas. Others, however - lawyers especially - have retained
these more absolutist views; ‘convictions’ in Weber’s sense (see d’Avray 2010, 15-17, 92). This
helps  explain  the  continued  embedding  of  rights  beliefs  in  national  and  international  legal
architectures. Donors, politically-connected NGOs, and other elite figures have not therefore been
able  to  prevent  various  non-elites  from  resisting realistic  efforts  to  address  vital  questions  of
political order in Southern African rural areas. For them, the difficulty has been that deploying the
language  of  human  rights  ultimately  deepens  dependence  on  legal  establishments.  Alasdair
MacIntyre’s  (1988,  344)  ‘clergy  of  liberalism’ thus  replaces  the  ‘staff  officers  of  the  liberal
project’57.  Unlike Lockean theories of subjective rights,  for example,  liberals cannot simply use
these ideas to de-legitimate existing political orders (compare I. Shapiro 1986, 88-89). They must
simultaneously regulate  those currently in  existence.  As illustrated in  chapter  8,  moreover,  this
dependence of lawyers has entailed a concomitant dependence on historical and anthropological
establishments; required as expert witnesses in courtroom battles. These groups, whilst typically
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sympathetic to liberal projects in political  terms, often retain other commitments (explicable by
particular histories of their disciplines) which consistently render them unreliable allies.
There is,  finally,  at  least  one important implication of this  argument,  and one important
qualification to be made to it. Social scientists, firstly, and particularly social movement theorists,
are wrong to describe human rights as simply another ‘frame’ or legitimation device that actors can
use to attract international support (e.g. Keck and Sikkink 1999, 95; generally Benford and Snow
2000; contrast Rao 2010, 172). Frames are not simply interchangeable. Choices between them are
politically significant. Different frames mobilise different international coalitions with distinctive
beliefs  and  ‘repertoires of  action’ (Tilly 1978). Environmentalist  frames,  for example,  typically
appeal to traditions of protest and direct action, on the one hand, and scientific communities with
preferences for informing policy through expertise on the other. Rights frames, meanwhile, via their
appeal  to  lawyers,  possess  a  distinctive  link  to  concrete  legal  orders with  significant  political
ramifications. 
But this should not be taken to imply, secondly, that lawyers’ specifically legal beliefs render
them wholly impervious  to  political  considerations.  They are  political  too.  In  my conclusion  I
discuss new quasi-legal concepts of ‘meaningful engagement’ which have been conceived, in large
part,  as responses to  the trends  I  describe.  This is  just  one of  the many respects  in  which the
judicialisation of politics also entails a politicisation of law more generally (Tamahana 2006). The
vast majority of lawyers remain, nevertheless, profoundly convinced of the normative value of a
law/politics binary; a distinction with profound performative consequences (Zenker 2012, 138-140;
for an extreme formulation Luhmann 1986). As described in the next chapter, furthermore, over the
least  three decades  legal  sociologists  have devoted considerable energy into accounting for  the
significance of these effects. Any plausible theory, they have concluded, must account for lawyers’
political  savvy  whilst  not  reducing  their  specifically  legal  beliefs  to  mere  rhetoric  and
epiphenomena (for overviews Cotterrell 1995, chapter 5; Novkov 2008, 628-9).
10. Resistance beyond transgression
In Southern Africa, therefore, human rights institutions certainly have become ‘vehicles for
other projects’ (T. Young 1998, 33). Liberal actors have not been able to contain or appropriate
them. The strikingly heterodox beliefs of Ben Freeth, Roy Sesana and Kuiama Riruako illustrate
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this well. This conclusion entails modifying the standard normative assessment of resistance found
in critical work on human rights. This scholarship, as we have already seen, increasingly follows
more mainstream accounts in downplaying the specific legal and metaphysical characteristics of
human rights. It tends, however, to see resistant subalterns, and not elite liberals, as those most
likely to use rights to contest existing social orders (see the Gramscian ‘oppositional’ definition in
de Sousa Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito 2005, 14). This ‘bottom-up’ thesis sometimes comes with
a Foucauldian anti-humanist twist. In his later years the great philosopher engaged intensively with
the debates about rights that so divided the Parisian intellectual scene in the late 1970s (Horvath
2007, 895-905). He began to see more political value in them than he had before. A later interview
made it clear that he held to his earlier genealogical critique, ‘through these different practices -
psychological,  medical,  penitential,  educational  -  a  certain  idea  or  model  of  humanity  was
developed, and now this idea of man has become normative, self-evident, and is supposed to be
universal’.  Resistance  on  the  terrain  of  human  rights  thus  still  risked  furthering  hegemonic
processes. This, however, did ‘not mean that we have to get rid of human rights or freedom, but that
we can’t say that freedom or human rights has to be limited at certain frontiers’ (in R. Martin 1988,
15).  Genuinely  emancipatory  human  rights  claims  must  be  ‘unrestricted’ in  order  to  escape
appropriation (Foucault [1979] 2000, 453). This was greatly facilitated by the fact that formal law
by itself had no power to govern society, and was, fortuitously, empty and indeterminate enough to
be permanently open to subversion. Foucault (1977b, 151-2) was explicitly Nietzschean on this
point:
rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to
any purpose. The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules,
to replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their
meaning, and redirect them against those who had initially imposed them.
More  generally,  indeed,  recalcitrant  societies  and  resistant  selves  mean  that  even  the  most
totalitarian of social orders can never hope to contain its ‘outside’ (Foucault 1980a). Even it leaves
silences and gaps to be exploited. In this sense ‘resistance comes first’ (Foucault [1982] 1988, 14, in
Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 75). Crucially, however, in the long run, resistance can be understood
as constitutive of power and integral to the constant re-making of social orders that Young and
Williams associate with the ‘liberal  project’.  Resistance resides at  ‘the very heart  of the power
relationship … constantly provoking it’ (Foucault [1982] 2000, 342, in Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009,
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75). It justifies the perpetual expansion of the disciplinary apparatus (see  Rajagopal 2003, 191).
‘Mobile and transitory points of resistance’ come to ‘inscribe [themselves] in [power relations] as
an irreducible opposite’ (Foucault 1979a, 96, in Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 75).
Human rights critics inspired by Derrida have sought to build an ethos out of this highly am-
biguous celebration of the limits of such processes (cf. Derrida 2001, 11-23). Although wary of the
appropriation of resistance by power, they ultimately value how human rights enable a contentious
politics favouring ‘bottom-up’ pressures towards social inclusion (compare Reus-Smit 2011). For
Costas Douzinas (2007, chapter 9), for instance, human rights laws do not govern the international
order. Instead, they enable imperial projects like the ‘war against terror’ that ceaselessly re-make it
(see also Anghie 2006). But this tendency to justify imperialism, Douzinas (2000, 122, 371) argues,
could be reduced if human rights became simply a name for subaltern resistant aspirations; a messi-
anic, Derridan ‘cosmopolitanism to come’. For him, critics must remain alert to how such strategies
continually risk appropriation, ‘every exercise of right,  every rearrangement of social hierarchy,
opens in turn a new vista, which, if petrified, becomes itself an external limitation that must be
again overcome’ (Douzinas 2007, 13). Other Derridans have seen similar value in ‘Foucault’s law’
(Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009). For Foucault (1977a, 179) it was the inherent indeterminacy of the
norm (‘humanity’) which allows disciplinary agencies to normalise ‘the whole indefinite range of
the non-conforming’; a strong parallel with how activists and bureaucrats use general human rights
to initiate specific ‘norm spirals’58. But this same indeterminacy - which the legal celebration of
‘human’ rights has transformed into the ‘social bond of modernity’ - Derridans see as empowering
in ‘its iterative ability to combine a present determinacy with an incorporative orientation to a bey-
ond’ (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 85).
Human  rights,  however,  do  not  only  re-shape  subjectivities,  but  also  concrete  political
orders. The ‘unrestricted’ human rights Foucault hoped for have now, indeed, expanded beyond the
domains of behaviour, subjectivity,  inclusion, and relations to ‘the Other’. In these areas ‘norm
spirals’ cannot  be derived from rights,  and normalisation processes cannot be derived from the
(indeterminate) norm of humanity. In 1981 Foucault himself co-authored a statement delivered at
the UN in Geneva, and which can be read as making precisely this point. Developments in the
human rights world meant that resistance was no longer limited to prescriptive claims about human
nature, which could be endlessly appropriated by transformative governmental projects. It could
extend into inherently political domains: ‘Amnesty International, Terre des Hommes, and Medecins
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du Monde are initiatives that have created this new right - that of private individuals to effectively
intervene in the sphere of international policy and strategy’ (Foucault et. al [1981] 2000, 475). It is
the consequences of  this new right - more recently extended downwards into national spheres -
which I investigate in this study. As Foucault (1980b, 17, in Ivinson 1998, 142) stated elsewhere, in
a comment on Hobbes, in the context of ‘the permanence of war in society’, the role of a ‘singular
right’ to resistance ‘is not one … above the fray … [or] … to found a reconciliatory order’. As I
shall argue throughout, moreover, constructivism is mistaken in claiming that  these  uses of rights
can  ever  be reconciled with norms for ‘rule-governed behaviour’. Human rights are not always
rules, even in this sense.
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Chapter 6: Explaining New Rights Beliefs
1. Supranational human rights courts
(a) Interpretive explanation
(i) Introduction
In this chapter I explain the transformation of rights beliefs necessary for the creation and
use of new supranational  litigation fora,  such as  that  used to  judicialise  the politics  of  land in
Zimbabwe. The first of these transformations related to beliefs about the appropriate role for human
rights  courts.  The  SADC Tribunal  which  adjudicated  Campbell v.  Republic  of  Zimbabwe  was
created as part of what Karen Alter (2012, 135) has described as a ‘global spread of European-style
international courts’. In these ‘new-style’ fora international courts possess compulsory jurisdiction
and private actors (rather than states, commissions and prosecutors) can initiate litigation (whether
directly or via referral from national courts) (Alter 2014, 84). In 1976 only the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) possessed such features. Today there are at least twenty such courts, half of which are
in  Africa  (Alter  2014,  82-4;  see  also  chapter  9). For  institutionalist  scholars  this  development
represents a new and important feature of global politics: ‘supranational jurisdiction’ (Helfer and
Slaughter 1997, 277). 
This is indeed a surprising and recent development. Before the 1950s, and ‘the creation of
the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, international courts were
primarily designed to adjudicate disputes between states when both parties desired it’. ‘Despite their
revolutionary designs’, moreover, ‘in the 1950s and 1960s both of Europe’s supranational courts
were barely used’ (Alter 2012, 137). The ECtHR only delivered 10 judgements in its first decade of
operation, and ‘for a period in the 1960s’, its part-time judges ‘met about once a year and only
because the rules required them to do so’ (Madsen 2011a, 73).  In this period powerful European
states jealously protected their sovereignty. ECtHR and ECJ judges were prevented from applying,
let alone ‘developing’ the law. Despite its cautious, procedural approach to political disputes, even
the ECJ risked sanction at  various times from member states and their  courts  (e.g.  Alter 2001,
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chapter 5; Rasmussen 2012, 388-394). Stuart Scheingold’s (1965, 284) classic contemporary study
of the Luxembourg Court concluded that  ‘pristine adherence to traditional standards is likely to
thwart the Community’s legal experiment. Only by understanding the forces which buffet the Court,
and by continuing to bend before them at appropriate times, can the judges live a reasonably legal
life in relatively uncongenial surroundings’. The ECtHR, similarly, from 1950 until 1975 - before
its transformation ‘from Cold War instrument to supreme European court’ - consistently ‘deployed a
tacit understanding of the relationship between law and diplomacy, using the latter when confronted
with high-political questions’ (Madsen 2007, 138). 
This would only change dramatically in the later 1970s. The ECJ now became ‘more willing
to make substantive rulings affecting important state interests’ (Alter 2008, 211). By the mid-1970s,
the ECtHR, for its part, had only decided a mere 17 cases. Within a decade, however, as Moyn
(2010, 80) describes, ‘the number of petitions received - and even more startlingly - the number
approved for court consideration skyrocketed’. States now began tolerating drastically increased
levels of ‘interference’ in sovereign policy-making across an almost unlimited range of policy areas.
The paragraphs that follow seek to explain the emergence of this ECtHR; the institution that later
diffused and became recognisable as a template for supranational human rights courts worldwide
(see  chapter  9). Such  dramatic  shifts  require  explanation;  something  interpretive  explanations
maintain can only be provided by reference to the beliefs of actors.
(ii) Positivist and functionalist explanations
Positivist  explanations  for  the  new supranational  courts  forge  ahistorical  generalisations
from observations of powerful states’ ‘control mechanisms’. On this view, for example, the ECJ has
merely functioned as an ‘agent’ of the ‘principals’ (states) who have delegated authority to it, its
decisions catering for their interests (Garrett and Weingast 1993). This conclusion, however, has not
held up to serious scrutiny, and has been moderated by even its adherents (Garrett, Kelemen and
Schultz 1998; Alter 2008, 215). Levels of ‘activism’, moreover, as Madsen (2007, 138) describes,
have varied considerably across time. Moravscik (2000, 244) similarly, has observed how liberal
states in the early Cold War founded the ECtHR as a bulwark against communism, thus ‘‘locking in’
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the domestic political status quo against their nondemocratic opponents’. And from this observation
he draws support for the hypothesis that states are ‘self-interested and rational in their pursuit of
(varying)  underlying national  interests’ (Moravscik 2000,  226).  But  he cannot  account  for  how
states later delegated actual, and not merely formal oversight of their policies to the ECtHR; which
is what he purports to explain. As Ed Bates (2010) has illustrated at length, states had not actually
originally intended that  the Convention would function as  a  text  to  which they would be held
accountable in the court. In 1950, ‘nothing’, in Stephanie Hennette-Vauchez’s words (2013, 118),
‘allowed the thought that the ECtHR’s future would be anything close to the one it has proved to
be’. 
Bourdeiuian scholars provide an alternative explanation for the ECtHR’s ‘autonomy’ that
highlights the pragmatism of its  pioneers (cf.  Madsen 2004; 2007; Vauchez 2013, 7;  Hennette-
Vauchez 2013). This draws on a wider set of theoretical arguments. Law, on this view, only acquires
its autonomy when key actors ‘invest’ in legal fields, using social capital that they have acquired
elsewhere (Dezalay and Garth 1996, chapters 2-3). This dependence on other fields, paradoxically,
later  helps  them appear  self-sufficient  (cf.  Dezalay  and  Garth  eds.  2011;  for  legal  ‘autonomy’
Bourdieu  1986,  823-6,  844-6).  The  key  to  the  ECtHR’s  success,  therefore,  was  the
‘multipositionality’ of the first  generation of ‘entrepreneurial’ figures that ‘populated the ECHR
institutional site’; diplomats, civil servants, legal advisors to governments and so on (Vauchez 2013,
7; Hennette-Vauchez 2013, 121). Their  social  capital  helped in the effort  to promote a view of
human rights  as  ‘scientific’.  This  view perhaps  exaggerates  the  human rights  field’s  claims  to
apoliticism (see  chapter  5).  And like  all  such approaches,  moreover,  it  typically  downplays  or
merely pauses to  register  broad social  and international  shifts;  rendering them (implausibly)  as
simply social  capital  created  by domestic  political  conflicts  (cf.  Bourdieu  and Wacquant,  May
2000). Madsen (2011b, 59, n.58) thus points to the significance of the ‘rights culture developed in
the late 1960s and early 1970s’, but excludes such considerations from his explanatory framework.
Broadly speaking,  therefore,  such approaches  describe  the  consequences  and not  the  causes  of
change.
 Functionalist explanations, finally, explain the spread of ‘adversarial legalism’ in Europe as
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a consequence of functional pressures created by economic liberalisation and the EU’s fragmented
institutional landscape (Kelemen 2011, chapter 2). But as outlined in the previous chapter, and like
positivist political science more generally, such explanations lack a theory of legitimation. They
may note how, from the 1980s, ‘advocates of deeper European integration saw EU rights as a means
to enhance the EU’s legitimacy and to expand its authority to new policy areas’, and even how the
‘legitimating power’ of rights played a ‘crucial role’ in promoting disability rights (Kelemen 2011,
197,  214). But  the sources  of  this  new power  go unexamined.  As the next  three  sections  will
illustrate,  legitimation  imperatives  explain  European  states’  initial  acquiescence  to  the  new
institutions around 1950, and it is the emergence of new rights beliefs in the 1970s that explains
how these legitimation requirements subsequently changed. In the following section this account
will be defended against two possible objections: the first relating to the supposed impermeability
of  legal  families  to  external  influence,  and  the  second  derived  from  ‘realist’  critiques  of
interpretivism.
(iii) Dual crisis
The  primary sources  of  these  new beliefs  were  the  dilemmas  posed by the  collapse  of
socialist utopias outlined in the previous chapter.  For socialists, broadly speaking, human rights
ceased to be associated with Western imperialism. For conservatives, meanwhile, anti-communism -
crucial to the early legitimation of the ECtHR - lost its domestic political salience (see below).
Human  rights  could  now  be  used  to  legitimate  politics  without  significant  accusations  of
partisanship (Moyn 2010, chapter 4). Bill Davies (2012, 420), for instance, notes how the European
Community turned to rights in the late 1970s ‘as part of a broader strategy to address some of the
perceived shortcomings of the integration process’ and ‘win back some much needed legitimacy
among the increasingly sceptical national publics’. But such legitimation strategies, he concedes,
had only become attractive due to the ‘obvious saliency of human rights as an international issue at
the time’. 
As Madsen (2011b,  58)  notes,  however,  ‘these new geopolitics  of  human rights  do  not
completely account for the changes in the course of the ECtHR’. These international legitimation
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strategies must obviously be connected to parallel developments internal to European politics. They
could not have been adopted without new ideas about law and rights which challenged orthodox
beliefs  about  the  importance  of  sovereignty.  I  argue  that  these  developments  have  a  separate
genesis. Madsen identifies this second source of change in ‘new social policy and new citizens’
rights in an increasingly united Europe’. He claims these new social policies ‘legitimized’ the use of
human rights ‘as a tool for social emancipation in a more permissive society’ (Madsen 2011b, 58). I
argue below, by contrast, that a dual crisis of socialist utopias  and modernist government in the
1970s, was of more significance than social liberalisation. In the 1960s new liberal social policies
could  be  achieved  by modernist  means  and  did  not  require  enforcement  by courts.  And when
European courts  did  eventually enter  the  policy process,  the  scope of  their  jurisprudence  soon
expanded far beyond questions of subjectivity, individual freedoms and social change.
(iv) The first crisis: Cold War legitimation and socialist dilemmas
The  creation  of  the  ECHR  (European  Convention  of  Human  Rights)  was  primarily  a
symbolic act. It was not intended to fulfil the role that positivist analyses ascribe to it. Its years of
dormancy thus cease to be a puzzle. European states envisaged it as an anti-communist totem and
‘Cold War weapon’ (Moyn 2010, 78; Hennette-Vauchez 2013, 118). Its precise genesis was in fact
even more conservative. A European human rights court with supranational jurisdiction was first
proposed by La Fédération, a group of French right-wing intellectuals with some links to the Vichy
administration  (Duranti  2013).  They  envisaged  it  as  a  means,  no  less,  of  protecting  Europe’s
medieval  Christian  inheritance  from  parliamentary  democracy;  an  extreme  variant  of  the
‘personalist’ ideas  that  had  become  popular  in  Catholic  political  circles  following  Pius  XI’s
condemnation of totalitarianism in 1937-8 (Moyn 2011, 97-8). 
In 1947-8, after communists came to power in Czechoslovakia, politicians began reaching
for similar ideas to legitimate the new politics of the Cold War. Despite opposition from the Left of
his party, British Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin now declared his support for ‘spiritual
union’ (Duranti 2012). ‘The time’, he told the Commons, was ‘ripe for a consolidation of Western
Europe’ (Simpson 2001,  575;  compare  Mazower  2011,  41).  In  France  and Britain  particularly,
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however, there was almost no sense that any proposed new court would ever be used against the
government (Madsen 2004). It had two champions in British politics. The first was Churchill, who
during  World  War  II  had  already  talked  of  the  need  to  save  ‘ancient  Europe’ from  ‘Russian
barbarism’ (Simpson  2001,  223-6;  Moyn  2010,  78).  The  second  was  David  Maxwell  Fyfe;  a
prominent  member  of  the  conservative  wing of  the  Conservative  party,  a  former  prosecutor  at
Nuremburg, a rapporteur on the committee which drafted the 1950 Convention, and, perhaps most
strikingly, the man who later became famous for declaring that he would not be ‘going down in
history as  the  man who made sodomy legal’ (Kynaston 2010,  370).  (Some of  Maxwell-Fyfe’s
personalist  colleagues  hoped  the  Convention  would  defend  the  ‘autonomy’  of  ‘organic
communities’ [Simpson 2001, 653].)  
At this time, indeed, Maxwell-Fyfe was one of the select few European politicians pressing
for rights  of  individual  petition and real  enforcement  mechanisms.  He was among the eminent
jurists and federalists in the European movement - Madsen’s (2011a, 67) ‘lawyers-statesmen’ - who
skilfully outmanoeuvred attempts led by Britain and Greece to obtain a more toothless, declaratory
regime akin to the Universal Declaration of Human rights (UDHR) (Simpson 2001, chapter 14).
Bevin provided crucial support for the court,  which was strongly opposed in Cabinet (Simpson
2001, 683, 727-730). The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), as a whole, opposed both
individual petition and the institution of a court. A negotiating brief apparently drafted by its legal
advisor, Sir Eric Beckett,  recorded that ‘to set up now a court  to which governments might be
arraigned by individuals […] would be to invite Communists, crooks and cranks of every kind to
bring  actions  which  would  be  at  best  frivolous  and  at  worst  designed  merely  to  embarrass
governments’  (Simpson  2001,  663).  But  as  Quentin  Skinner  and  some  constructivists  have
observed, prior legitimation strategies create ‘self-entrapment’ (see chapter 5). When asked by a
colleague for an argument ‘against the establishment of a Court at any time’ Beckett was unable to
come up with one, constrained as he was by the FCO’s at least rhetorical support for human rights
as a bulwark against encroaching tyranny (Simpson 2001, 666). The FCO’s public opposition was,
crucially,  restricted  to  what  constructivists  label  ‘tactical  concessions’;  highlighting  procedural
difficulties, problems with imprecise drafting, and so forth (Simpson 2001, chapter 14; Risse and
Sikkink 1999, 22-28).  
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Historians  have  ascribed  considerable  significance  to  specific  intellectual  traditions  as
explanations  for  the  positions  adopted  by key players  in  these  negotiations.  Of  those  ‘lawyer-
statesmen’ who pushed for an effective court, they have stressed  the ‘personalism’ and left-wing
Catholicism of  Pierre-Henri  Teitgen  (the  French  Minister  of  Justice  who  chaired  the  Juridical
Committee which produced the first draft of the European Convention), and the legal ‘formalist’
preference  for  individual  rights  of  Hersch  Lauterpracht  (the  British  international  lawyer  who
provided  intellectual  inspiration for  these  efforts)  and René Cassin (a  Nobel  Prize  winner  for
‘fathering’ the UDHR, a founding ECHR judge, and a figure of some limited importance for the
court’s  creation).  Eric  Beckett’s  ‘British  conception  of  human  rights’,  meanwhile,  which  was
derived  from  ‘the  Blackstonian  and  Dicyean’  traditions’  hostility  towards  formal  rights  and
constitutions, has been held to explain his own early opposition (Compte 1998, 93-4; Mazower
2004, 397; Simpson 2001, 43, 46, 215-6, 306, 345, 615, 651-2; Moyn 2011, 101; Sluga 2011, 110-
111; Madsen 2011a, 68-9).
Historians have also, however, noted how these traditions seemingly failed to constrain these
‘lawyers-statesmen’ when they navigated ‘the cross-currents of social and political change’ (Sluga
2011, 109). Beckett,  for example,  soon became the  bête noire  of the Colonial  Office,  when he
supported some of the very same rights of petition in the colonies which he had opposed in Europe
(Simpson 2001,  308-312).  By the late  1960s,  meanwhile,  the supposedly convinced ‘formalist’
René Cassin had embraced the ‘inevitability of national and civilizational differences’ (Sluga 2011,
122). Such apparent contradictions are not simply an ‘irony’ of history or proof of the ‘fluidity’ of
human rights (Sluga 2011, 109, 115). Instead, they illustrate the kinds of irrational belief formation
implicit in ‘the liberal project’ (see chapter 5). In many cases, of course, new legal policies were
adopted for consciously strategic reasons, and not because of irrationally acquired beliefs. In most
liberal diplomatic and legal circles, for instance, the need to replace the League of Nations’ minority
rights regime was not argued on ‘formalist’ legal grounds. These people perceived it, simply, as
having failed to protect minorities (Mazower 2004; Simpson 2001, 210, 212, 326-6)59. Moreover,
such  figures  were  not  always  above  argument  bordering  on  the  straightforwardly  duplicitous
(Madsen  2004, 73,  for example,  describes  Cassin’s  arguments during later  French debates over
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accession as ‘cynical’.) But as Cassin himself described during his 1968 Nobel Prize Speech, if his
beliefs were at times strategically acquired they could nonetheless become sincerely held. ‘After the
turning point of 1948’, Cassin announced, referring to the new strategic environment of the Cold
War, ‘I, a determined universalist, was able to conclude that certain means of implementation are
more  readily  accepted  if  they  are  organized  among  neighbouring  nations  of  similar  culture.
Communities of law and custom are not invented arbitrarily’ (Sluga 2011, 122)60. 
Politically speaking, however, it  was only with the more promising circumstances of the
later 1970s that those working in and around European institutions acquired more room to pursue
such projects. For the most powerful states legitimation in terms of human rights was no longer
restricted  to  mere  anti-Communist  symbolism.  In  1977  the  EU  Parliament,  Council  and
Commission declared they would respect the decisions of the ECtHR, and in 1979 the ECJ decided
to use them as guidelines in its own jurisprudence. Later that same year, in a sign of the times, ‘a
cross-party grouping of Socialists and Liberals within the European Parliament’ sought to persuade
the EU institutions to accede to the Strasbourg Court. This move was most enthusiastically pursued
by EU Commissioner Roy Jenkins: a long-term campaigner for Labour re-alignment with liberalism
in the UK (Davies 2012; 418-420, 433; for Jenkins Bogdanor 2013). As British Home Secretary
from 1974-6 Roy Jenkins had promoted a British Bill of Rights based on the European Convention,
and legislated to ban even indirect discrimination on the grounds of sex and race (Erdos 2009, 807;
Bogdanor 2013). By the 1980s rights and civil liberties had become a central means for the Labour
party to legitimate its opposition to Thatcherite dominance (Madsen 2004, 21-2; Erdos 2009, 805).  
In France the 1974 elections saw the first victory of Giscard d’Estaing’s ‘third force’; a pro-
European liberalism briefly opposed by an unlikely alliance of Gaullists and Communists (Leigh
1977, 74; see generally Nora 1992). These elections were accompanied by a successful campaign
for accession to the ECHR, and a dramatic set of new political orientations towards rights. The
opposition  Socialists  decided  that  the  new  international  salience  of  human  rights  and  anti-
totalitarianism presented them with an opportunity to distinguish themselves from the perceived
totalitarianism of the Communist Party, on the one hand, and the ascendant liberalism of  Giscard
d’Estaing  on  the  other.  The  Communists  responded  by  proclaiming  similarly  redoubled
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commitments  (Agrikoliansky  2005,  329-331)61.  Once  again,  in  short,  as  Moyn  (2010,  80)
summarises, the ‘Cold War ‘genesis’ of the European Convention explains little about its eventual
uses. It was to be far more a cultural and ideological victory in a later era that determined their legal
availability and plausibility even in the European zone’. 
(v) The Second Crisis: Government to Governance
Socialist dilemmas, and the reduced salience of anti-communism associated with them, thus
explain the attractiveness of new legitimation strategies. They cannot, however, account for why
powerful states accepted the obvious and dramatic implications of these strategies for their hitherto
jealously  guarded  legal  sovereignty.  To  do  so  we  must  attend  to  the  dilemmas  posed  by  the
modernist crisis already outlined in the previous chapter. These ultimately saw theories of law as a
technology  for  sovereign  state  intervention  eclipsed  by  new  ‘managerialist’ alternatives.  Such
developments had a long genesis. World War One greatly undermined the developmental-historicist
beliefs  of European elites in the idea of a  unique  national  genius,  whilst  World War Two was
ultimately  decisive  for  notions  of  Western cultural  superiority  (Fussell  1975;  Mazower  2006;
Manela 2007, chapter 9). The modernist ideas which largely replaced them deployed economistic
rather than civilizational concepts of rationality, complemented with new emphases on modernist
modes of government; French technocracy, Scandinavian welfarism, German corporatism and its
Dutch  consociational  variant,  and so  on  (Bevir  2010a,  19;  Kelemen 2011,  15).  By 1945 these
modernist beliefs had begun to penetrate even French and British colonial administrations (e.g. F.
Cooper 2005, 37, 187; Alexander 2006, chapter 2; Mann 2009, 349-352).
On these views forward-looking ‘development’ was to be delivered to an undifferentiated
‘people’,  on  an  equal  basis,  and  under  the  guidance  of  tutelary  authorities.  Although  some
influential  thinkers  used  concepts  of  ‘social  rights’ to  formulate  this  new egalitarianism,  these
‘rights’ were  intended as legislative and regulatory objectives rather than judicially-enforceable
entitlements, and were targeted at individuals rather than groups (Whelan and Donnelly 2007, 923-
7; 932-6; Moyn 2010, 73). In T.H. Marshall’s ([1950] 1964, 72) famous phrase, they bestowed ‘the
right to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in the society’.  This
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shift  was  reflected  across  a  whole  range of  policy arenas.  States  now sought,  for  instance,  to
eliminate  the  ‘deserving’ recipient  from  welfare  provision,  complete  the  long  replacement  of
industrial paternalism with national schemes, and centralise service delivery to unprecedented levels
(Briggs [1961] 2011, 15, 17; Hatzfeld 1971; Debouzy Ed. 1988; Conrad 1991, 177)62. 
Modernist  legal  elites  criticised  orthodoxies  that  posed obstacles  to  these  new kinds  of
interventions. In post-war France a rejection of the institutional models of the Third Republic, now
referred disparagingly as the ‘Republic of Jurists’, was symbolised by the establishment in 1946 of
the Ecole Normale d’Aministration to train elite civil servants (Madsen 2004, 7). The new field of
political science - or science de l’état - was established by a post-war generation of constitutionalist
thinkers eager to dispense with antiquated legal  ‘metaphysics’ (Vauchez 2006, 500).  In Britain,
meanwhile,  modernist  theories  challenged  constitutional  beliefs  that  had  shaped  administration
since A.V. Dicey in the 1880s: the ‘Westminster Model’ (see Griffith 1950; Ewing 2004, 735-740;
Bevir  2008;  566-7).  Most  vulnerable  of  all  were  traditional  notions  of  fundamental  freedoms
guaranteed by common law, and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Both of these struggled
to account for how, under modernist government, the bulk of law was produced by bureaucratic and
administrative  agencies,  and  not  derived  from primary  legalisation  or  hallowed  precedent  (for
famous judicial critique of these developments Hewart 1929; Denning 1949, chapters 3-4)63.
 
Throughout almost all of Europe’s ‘thirty glorious years’ (1945-75) the growth-model on
which this modernist programme depended proved remarkably durable, insulating it from attack.
The success of modernist  productivism pushed even the ‘social-democratic’ parties of Europe’s
centre-Left  in  a  socially  conservative  direction,  leading  them  to  abandon  ‘traditional  socialist
commitments’ to reforming the state and the family. Their ‘attention was entirely concentrated on
the  main  short-term aims:  full  employment  for  all  male  workers  and  the  provision  of  welfare
services to meet needs not provided for through the market’ (Sassoon 1995, 197). In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, furthermore, when these parties finally reacted to socially liberalising trends, they
legislated  without  providing  judicially  enforceable  rights.  In  his  first  spell  as  Home  Secretary
(1965-7),  for  example,  and  in  contrast  to  the  rights-based  strategies  anti-racist  and  anti-sexist
strategies he would deploy a decade later, Roy Jenkins legislated to legalise abortion, de-criminalise
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homosexuality,  relax divorce laws and abolish theatre censorship (Bogdanador 2013). In France
Giscard d’Estaing’s own liberalisation programme - conceived as early as 1967 - was implemented
by similar  means  (Leigh  1977,  74).  This  programme  dominated  politics  in  1975-6,  led  to  the
legalisation  of  abortion  and  divorce  by  mutual  consent  (e.g.  Shenton  1976).  (The  architect  of
divorce reforms, Jean Carbonnier - the first and only legal sociologist to exert significant influence
on the French legal profession - was a staunch critic of the ECHR and the proliferation of subjective
rights [Glendon 1976, 202; Carbonnier 1996, 55-6; de Béchillon 2007].) In short, Madsen’s (2011b,
59)  ‘social  emancipation  in  a  more  permissive  society’  did  not  therefore  require  judicial
enforcement of human rights. 
The financial and energy crises of the 1970s soon, however, posed significant dilemmas to
modernist orthodoxies. Confidence in the productivist orientation and discretionary power of the
tutelary state was drastically undermined by the global recession of the decade. In constitutional
thought the over-burdened formal legal system began to be seen as unfitted for governing economy
and society (see Zumbansen 2008, 787). Advocates of development law started to radically doubt its
efficacy (Trubek and Galanter 1974; Burg 1977). One influential ‘neo-liberal’ argument had long
seen purposive legislation in general as an illegitimate intrusion into spontaneous, self-regulating
social orders (Hayek 1960, chapters 11-13; Hayek 1973, chapters 5-6). And a much larger number
of neo-liberals now compared ‘informal justice’ favourably with imposed bureaucracy (for a critical
overview Abel  ed.  1982)64.  Early  experiments  with  marketisation  that  followed  attacks  on  the
tutelary  state  soon,  however,  generated  new  pragmatic  concerns  about  how  to  co-ordinate
fragmented (even globalised) policy-making processes (Bevir 2010a, 75-81). Theories inspired by
New Public Management were now produced in response to these difficulties (see comments on
‘from marketisation to governance’ in Rhodes 2002). These began to identify law as a ‘thin’ frame
for co-ordinating dialogue between increasingly autonomous social spheres that produced their own
norms,  regulations  and  codes  of  conduct  (cf.  Teubner  1983).  Whilst  courts’  policy-making
competence expanded dramatically, their involvement in day-to-day administration reduced by the
same measure (for criminal law Farrall 2002; for critique Merry and Milner eds. 1993; for South
Africa compare Zenker 2013). These new theories, therefore, saw law not as ‘autonomous’ from
politics, but rather as ‘responsive’ to it: ‘the logic of legal judgement becomes closely congruent
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with the logic of moral and practical judgement’ (Nonet and Selznick 1978, 89; see also Atiyah
1978).
These  theories,  and the  reforms they inspired,  thus  identified  courts  as  mechanisms for
policing complex contractual relationships with significant distributional components;  a task for
which bureaucracies were now believed unfitted. From a functionalist perspective this process has
been  labelled  as  ‘deregulation  and  judicial  reregulation’ (Kelemen  2011,  8).  The  functional
pressures caused by marketisation are not, however, themselves sufficient to explain the new scope
of legal oversight. The creation of the Single Market created a number of pressures on the EU to
find  ways  to  replace  national  regulatory  systems  with  alternatives  that  did  not  require  the
bureaucratic  capacity it  lacked (Kelemen 2011).  Decentralised enforcement by private actors in
courts was thought functional to this need (but cf. van Harten 2005). As the functionalist Kelemen
(2011, 12, 197, 212-4) himself concedes, however, functional requirements to replace regulatory
regimes cannot account for the expansion of court activity into those new constitutional areas, most
notably human rights, that are often studied by scholars of judicialisation. 
This  new  managerialist  orthodoxy,  which  Bevir  (2008,  573) thus  ‘encourages  the
government to treat judges and the courts as part of the policy-making process’. Modernist crises
also,  moreover,  albeit  in  distinctive  ways,  explain  mobilisation  around  the  new  opportunity
structures  which  these  courts  created. The  ‘erosion  of  the  religion  of  progress  and  of  tutelary
doctrines of public action’, led to the ‘entry on stage of social groups competing for new stakes,
detached  from  productivist  religion’  (Jobert  2010,  131  (author’s  translation)).  These  groups
increasingly  regarded  bureaucratic  agencies  and  corporatist  bodies  -  trade  unions,  professional
associations and so forth - as no longer sufficiently representative to mediate social and political
conflict. On the New Left, notably, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a number of environmentalist,
feminist  and  gay  liberation  movements  aimed  at  thorough-going  social  transformation,  via
revolution, self-organisation, mass conscientisation or (on occasion) state intervention. The crises of
these ideas and the ‘victory’ of rights-based alternatives bequeathed these new rights ‘maximalist’
scope (Moyn 2010, chapter 4, 223-6). Many such groups now began to constitute themselves as
NGOs, and, especially in Britain, to use European as well as national legal fora to advance their
151
claims (Dolidze 2011). 
European institutions, in turn, sought to encourage these emerging trends.  By ‘giving civil
society a voice and place in international human rights regimes’ the ECtHR has helped, since the
early 1980s, to ‘expand the boundaries of human rights’ (Cichowski 2011, 79). The ECtHR and EU
have sought to encourage ‘bottom-up’ pressures of this sort, ‘pressur[ing] laggards to strengthen
their legal aid systems’, and, in 1979, requiring governments to provide legal aid in civil cases when
necessary for  effective access to  justice (Kelemen 2011,  65). New beliefs thus account  for the
creation  of  those  ‘support  structures’ -  donors,  public  interest  groups  and  parts  of  the  legal
profession  -  which  some  political  scientists  have  identified  as  the  keys  to  sustaining  legal
mobilisation (Kessler 1990; Lawrence 1990; Epp 1998, 197). 
These beliefs’ utopian origins, finally, help account for the expansion of rights jurisprudence
into the new arenas described in the first part of this study. Their popularity amongst the judiciary
reflects what Hirschl (2008, 98) has described as ‘the demise of what constitutional theorists call the
‘political question’ doctrine’. Even sensitive policy areas such as national security are no longer
constitutionally allocated solely to governmental discretion. As Christoffersen and Madsen (2011,
3)  describe,  the  ECtHR,  ‘in  its  second  phase,  beginning  in  the  mid  to  late  1970s  against  the
backdrop of a series of geopolitical and social changes ... embarked on the development of a more
progressive jurisprudence, evoking notions such as ‘living instrument’, ‘margin of appreciation’,
and ‘practical and effective’. This shift was brought into dramatic relief by a number of dissenting
judgements handed down by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (an ECtHR judge during the crucial 1974 to
1980 phase).   At  the British Foreign Office in  the 1950s he had been one of  the few lawyers
determined  to  extend  individual  rights  to  colonial  subjects  (Simpson  2001,  308-312).  Now,
however, he turned his face against their ‘maximalist’ incarnation, maintaining, in the words of one
commentator,  that  they  should  be  restricted  to  ‘those  basic  issues  with  which  the  natural  law
tradition behind the Convention has always been concerned’, and thus excluded from ‘transient
questions of social and political policy’ (Merrills 1982, 161)65. The ‘natural law tradition’, however,
provided  no  means  to  effect  any  such  restriction.  The  transformation  of  rights  could  not  be
prevented from judicialising politics. 
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(b) Anticipating objections: the permeability of legal families and priority of ‘interests’
These  analyses  gloss  over  some  important  methodological  challenges  that  positivists
generally occlude. These scholars resist any emphasis on rights ‘ideology’. Ginsburg (2008, 90), for
example, alleges that such approaches are unable to account for the precise timing and variation of
reforms. He contrasts them in this respect with those pioneered by himself and Hirschl (2004; see
also  Ramseyer  1994;  Ginsburg  2003;  Helmke  2005).  Whilst  this  study has  endorsed  Hirschl’s
primary descriptive contention,  it  rejects  the mode of explanation that he and Ginsburg favour.
Constructivists like Sikkink ascribe importance to the bearers of rights ideology, even if they do not
explain their emergence. Positivists do not even do this. They simply assume the role of NGOs and
others groups to be insignificant, and therefore ignore them. The beliefs of judges, meanwhile, are
also largely neglected. They are either assumed to act as ‘principals’ of powerful ‘agents’, or to be,
in  all  places  and  at  all  times,  naturally  conservative  and  likely  to rule  in  accordance  with
‘hegemonic ideological and cultural propensities’ (Hirschl 2000, 138). In all these accounts by far
the most attention is paid to political elites. It is their changing configurations of self-interest which
are  held  to  explain  the  timing  of,  and  variation  in,  reforms. In  Bevir’s  (2010,  xxxvii)  words,
however, such analyses lack any theory of how ‘pressures lead people to change their beliefs and
actions’.  Ginsburg  and  Hirschl  do  not  provide  empirical  illustrations  of  specific  instances  of
insincerity and self-deception (compare Spaeth and Segal 1994, 10-12).  Nor do they outline any
more general theory of false-consciousness to compensate for this shortcoming (see chapter 5). As a
result,  their  notions  of  relevant  interests  are  so  under-specified  that  they  cannot  be  plausibly
understood as generative of political behaviour and new rhetorical commitments. They are able only
to identify double standards. 
There are of course some good reasons to be sceptical of claims that particular beliefs have
specific legal qualities. The modern legal profession has almost always justified its activity as the
development of an autonomous and self-standing body of knowledge free from social and political
influence (Cotterrell 1995, 54-5). And accepting this self-presentation certainly blinds the analyst to
the multiple ways in which law integrates external ideological concerns (Silverstein 1996; Novkov
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2008). Yet this is not sufficient to establish systematic self-deception or insincerity. For decades
sociologists  of  law have  sought  a  via  media  between the  wholesale  acceptance  and  wholesale
rejection  of  law’s  claim  to  self-sufficiency.  At  the  very  least,  these  discussions  have  largely
established, specifically legal beliefs and legal traditions will  typically determine the depth and
speed with which law is penetrated by external influences (e.g.  Dezalay and Garth 1996, 98; for
overviews Cotterrell 1995, chapter 5; Novkov 2008, 628-9). Over the short term, at least, they may
exercise significant influence.
The reactions of European legal elites to the ECtHR’s transformation illustrate these asser-
tions. Unlike their British counterparts, for example, in the early 1970s West German judges and
politicians believed that the EU’s basic rights protections were too weak (Stone Sweet 2000, 170-
178; Kelemen 2011, 214; Davies 2012). They were less enthusiastic, however, about the ECtHR’s
gradual mutation into a policy-making organ. A ‘central pillar’ of civil-law traditions is the (Kan-
tian) notion of ‘subjective rights’. On this view legal ‘science’ distributes individual rights and re-
sponsibilities which can then be asserted in court. Group rights and group interests (as in class ac-
tion lawsuits) cannot be so neatly distributed (Gidi 2003, 344-347). To redress collective injuries,
therefore, ‘a civil-law system would more likely turn to legislative and governmental administrative
actions’ (Brake and Katzenstein 2013, 739). In 1983, after pressure in particular from British law-
yerly NGOs, the ECtHR modified Rules of Procedure to allow  amicus curiae  submissions from
‘public interest’ groups. Such notions of group representation were initially anathema to civil-law-
yers, whatever their political sympathies. For the first decade of the new Rules the majority of sub-
missions came from organisations based in Britain, who drew on common-law familiarity with such
practices (Dolidze 2011). The civil law, however, could not long remain immune to the post-mod-
ernist de-legitimisation of legislative and administrative discretion. Despite widespread expectations
that it would remain impermeable to class-action lawsuits, these have now become a common fea-
ture of civil law systems across the globe (Brake and Katzenstein 2013, 739-740). The specificities
of Europe’s legal systems have not served to ‘block’ the development of U.S.-style ‘adversarial leg-
alism’. At the most they have served to ‘channel’ and ‘moderate’ them (Kelemen 2011, 9). 
Hirschl’s analysis of British attitudes towards human rights in the 1950s provides a further
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case in point. During decolonisation British elites began to promote the inclusion of ECHR-style
human rights standards in post-independence constitutions. As Hirschl (2004, 97) points out, this
had more than a whiff of hypocrisy about it (but see Smith 1961b, 217-220). The Colonial Office
was simultaneously arguing that colonial subjects should continue to be deprived of Convention
rights in order to prevent ‘subversives’ from using legal technicalities to further decolonisation.
Moyn (2010, 78) is not entirely correct, therefore, when he states that rights were ‘domestically
uncontroversial’ by the post-war period. He is also perhaps misleading, although not inaccurate,
when  arguing  that  anti-colonialism constitutes  a  ‘distinctive  tradition’ within  the  human  rights
canon; one which placed ‘collective liberation’ before human rights (Moyn 2010, 86; Moyn 2012).
Anti-colonialists did in fact, despite his claims, frequently argue for ‘individual rights canonized in
international law’ (Moyn 2010, 85). But as Christian Reus-Smit (2013a, 175-7) argues, this was
more a tactical move than a matter of sincere conviction - designed to de-legitimate imperial rule by
exposing its claims to (universal) ‘civilization’ as hypocritical (for Southern African specificities
Irwin 2012, chapter 4). 
Such double standards, however, taken by themselves, prove neither pure insincerity nor
self-interest. Hirschl (2004, 45-8, 215-221) does not even consider the possibility that sincere anti-
communism,  rather  than  covert  elite  desires  to  protect  property,  explain  the  ECtHR’s  creation.
There are numerous difficulties, meanwhile, with his claim that post-colonial property rights were
‘constitutionalised’  as  part  of  colonialists’  efforts  to  ‘protect  the  interests  of  their  principal
constituencies - white settlers, urban intelligentsia, and foreign investors’ (Hirschl 2004, 97). It is
very unclear, firstly, why this (already highly disparate) set of groups should naturally constitute
post-colonial  ‘constituencies’.  This  cannot  account,  for  example,  for  the  well-known contrast
between the keenness with which Britain and France sought to maintain such links, particularity
with political elites (e.g. Golan 1981; Keese 2007; Chafer and Cumming 2010, 55). It can also not
explain,  secondly,  why formal constitutional means were chosen to protect these ‘interests’ - as
opposed to, say, the more informal relationships which have characterised Françafrique (Ginsburg
2008,  92-3  implicitly  concedes  this  point).  Post-colonial  constitutionalisation  is  much  more
plausibly understood, in fact, as an attempt to resolve dilemmas produced by partition in India, and
the failure of ‘unwritten constitutions’ to promote the kind of social order Britain wished to promote
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in post-independence countries (for insider perspectives Smith 1961a, 93, 98; 1961b, 215; OSPA
Research Project 2011; contrast Jennings 1961, 12)
None of this, of course, is to deny the importance of pragmatic calculations in politics. A
range of these will typically supervene on deliberations motivated by even the most sincerely-held
beliefs or consistent legitimations. The British state,  for example, continued to derogate from a
number of ECtHR provisions relevant to its conduct in Northern Ireland until the early 2000s, and
has since found fresh justification for these derogations in the so-called ‘War on Terror’ (Campbell
2005, 335). This does not mean, however, that it has refused to legitimate its activities in terms of
the new beliefs which had emerged in the 1970s. In Ireland v United Kingdom (1978), for example -
one of the series of ‘remarkable’ cases from the late 1970s during which ‘the course of European
human rights took a new direction’ - the British government accepted a ruling that neither a ‘margin
of appreciation’ nor derogations on the ground of national emergencies could justify inhuman or
degrading  treatment  (Madsen  2011b,  53-4)66.  In  Madsen’s  (2011b,  54)  words,  the  1957-1961
Lawless  case, where Ireland had been allowed to detain Irish Republican Army members without
trial,  now ‘suddenly seemed to belong to a distant past’.  For states pragmatic calculations now
supervened on new beliefs about law and politics.  
2. Universal civil jurisdiction and the litigation of historical injustices by groups
(a) Explaining reparations litigation
 In this section I argue that the emergence of new reparations practices can be explained by
the same 1970s transformation of human rights ideas that explains the new uses of the ECtHR on
the other side of the Atlantic. In 2001, as we saw in chapter 4, the Herero People’s Reparation
Corporation brought their lawsuit against the German government and German business in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, seeking to use the provisions of the Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA). This rather
extraordinary piece of legislation dates back to a statute contained within the Judiciary Act of 1789
which allowed courts in the United States to hear civil cases brought against foreign national for
breaches of treaties and the law of ‘nations’ (see Burley 1989, 465-488). In 1978 two Paraguayans,
Joel and Dolly Filártiga, accused General Peña Americo Norberto Peña-Irala of kidnapping, tortur-
156
ing, and killing their seventeen-year-old son as punishment for opposing Paraguay’s President Gen-
eral Alfredo Stroessner.  Two years later an Amnesty International (AI) staff member learnt that
Peña-Irala was facing deportation proceedings in New York. Amnesty International contacted the
Center for Constitutional Rights, whose lawyers discovered the two-hundred year old ATCA, and
argued that it granted the federal courts jurisdiction over the Filártigas’ claims (Davis 2006, 62). 
1978, the year of the Filártigas’ accusations, also saw the launch of a campaign for redress
for Japanese Americans interned during World War II (Torpey 2006, chapter 3). This signalled the
emergence  of  new reparation  litigation  practices  such as  that  later  used by the  Herero.  It  also
represented the first of a series of claims in Western jurisdictions for compensation for atrocities
committed during World War II. As Torpey (2001, 335-6) enumerates, these included:
claims arising from state-sponsored mass killing, forced labor, and sexual exploitation on the
part of the Axis powers (Germany and Japan, but also Austria), as well as from the unjust
wartime incarceration of those of Japanese descent in Allied countries (the United States and
Canada) and from economic or other kinds of collaboration in Nazi crimes by putatively
neutral countries (Switzerland, France, the Netherlands).
Unlike claims made against West Germany in the 1950s and 1960s, these claims involved payments
to groups,  and not  to  states  or  representative organisations attached to  them. This was a  novel
feature  of  reparations  practice.  Both ‘corporate’ groups (such as  indigenous peoples)  and mere
‘collectives’ (with no ‘legal personality’ beyond the issue in question, like plaintiffs in class-action
lawsuits) now became eligible to receive payments (see P. Jones 1999). 
In  its  explanations  of  such phenomena  this  study rejects  the  episteme,  and  makes  only
cautious  use of such amorphous entities as  ‘Western’ and ‘liberal’ traditions,  which it  treats  as
conditions not as causes of change. It thus rejects accounts of reparations, such as Elazar Barkan’s
The Guilt  of  Nations  (2000), which see reparations as in some sense inherent to the West.  For
Barkan ‘extending sympathy to the weak and feeling guilty for not doing enough is a fundamental
Judeo-Christian principle that was formulated in part by Aristotle, adopted by religion, secularized
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by the Enlightenment, celebrated by Smith, and decried by Nietzsche’, which has been subsequently
focused  by  a  ‘Neo-Enlightenment  turn  in  the  postmodern  and  post-Cold  War  world’ which
supplemented ‘classical liberal notions of the individual’ with ‘sociological insights about the place
of the community and specific identity in the life of people’ (Barkan 2000, 308, 315-6). Unlike
Barkan, John Torpey (2009) seeks to explain these new ‘sociological insights’. Theorists (historians,
theologians, legal academics, therapists and ‘educators’), he claims, have lent scientific credentials
to the new beliefs promoted by rights activists and members of ethnic organisations: 
human rights activists concerned with building a better future … theologians who see history
in redemptory terms … therapists who specialize in dealing with the ‘traumas’ of the past …
attorneys …who see the past as a series of potentially justiciable events … historians who
have frequently come to play an important role as consultants and expert witnesses in political
and legal events to come to terms with the past … educators … who see history as redolent
with ‘lessons’ for the present … [and those] associated with ethnic organizations and who
seek to gain recognition or compensation for those of their kind who have suffered injustices
in the past (Torpey 2009, 31-2).
Like Moyn (2010), Torpey explains the emergence in these beliefs in terms of ‘the collapse
of  the  future’ associated  with  the  bankruptcy  of  socialist  utopias.  But  he  also  highlights  the
(normative and empirical) modernist crisis I outlined earlier:
the spread of reparations politics is [...] a response to a post-utopian context that differs from
the period that preceded it […] the idea of well-being for the undifferentiated ‘masses’ has
been replaced by the goal of satisfying the wants, often defined in cultural terms, of minutely
nuanced population segments. Mass utopia, whether capitalist of socialist in coloration, is
thus out; group self-expression and group self-esteem is in […] in the process, ‘one-nation’
ideologies and the corresponding idea of assimilation have become increasingly suspected of
being a form only of ‘ethnic cleansing’, not of potential inclusion (Torpey 2006, 7, 28, 71). 
As described in the previous chapter, new human rights ideas also emerged from this ‘post-
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utopian context’. These ideas transformed previous existing practices, just as they had transformed
feminism, environmentalism, and other alternatives to productivist  and socialist  orthodoxies. As
Torpey (2006, 43) notes,  the most  visible  consequence of this  was that  ‘reparations’ no longer
generally referred to those sums of money paid by defeated parties  to war victors,  or to those
payable  for  seizures  of  property  (for  Eastern  European  ‘restitution’ Herman  1951;  Kozminski
1997). Even the most recognisably contemporary reparations claims in this previous period, as with
demands for human rights more generally, were made on behalf of ‘peoples’ and not groups or
specific individuals. In 1952, for instance, West Germany agreed a (controversial)  $845 million
compensation package with Israel, payable over a 14-year period. The bulk of this money was used
for the purchase of crude oil and industrial products needed for modernisation (Honig 1954, 569-
571; Lewan 1975, 42-3, 48, 55-6). Only just over $100 million was earmarked for distribution to
individuals by the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany: an organisation based
in New York representing the Jewish diaspora, but founded at Israel’s instigation (for details Zweig
1987).
Between 1959-1961 a number of other formerly-occupied European countries concluded
‘global agreements’ with the Federal Republic of Germany. These allowed governments to receive
funds intended for distribution to individual claimants; a very similar arrangement to that which the
government of Namibia has more recently tried and failed to obtain (Schwerin 1972, 510-1; chapter
3). Under Willy Brandt’s chancellorship (1969-1974), meanwhile, West Germany ‘avoided formal
recognition’ of  claims  from Eastern  Europe.  It  provided ‘indirect  restitution’ to  the  Polish  and
Yugoslavian states in  the form of economic aid and low-interest  credits.  Public  opinion, which
became favourable to more direct forms of compensation in the late 1970s, only ‘became truly
marked in the course of the 1980s’ (Goschler 2009, 104). Like Allied and neutral countries, West
Germany now began to  contemplate  compensating  groups for  harms suffered.  The decade saw
fierce public debate over the proposed amendment of legislation to allow for legal claims to be
launched by groups representing ‘forgotten victims’: ‘forced labourers, Sinti and Roma (Gypsies),
victims of forced sterilization, communists, homosexuals, draft resisters, and deserters’ (Pross 1998,
vii)67.  Goschler  (2009,  105)  explains  these  German  developments  in  terms  of  ‘the  shift  from
universalistic  ideologies  -  embodied  in  the  role  of  the  ‘fighter’ -  to  the discourse of  identity -
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embodied in the role of the ‘victim’’; thus highlighting Torpey’s ‘collapse of the future’.
(b) Modernist crisis and new views of colonialism
Human rights ideas have thus transformed the practice of paying reparations after war. They
have also significantly transformed African advocacy for ‘reparations’ from former colonial powers.
The developments which Torpey uses to explain the crisis of modernist ideas in the mid-1970s - the
oil crisis of 1973 and the collapse of the Bretton Woods monetary system - were significant once
again. These economic shocks, famously, hit African states particularly hard (e.g. Ravenhill 1986;
Callaghy  1987).  Domestically,  although  with  some  exceptions,  where  modernist-bureaucratic
orthodoxies  had  retained  their  influence  they  were  abandoned  (contrast  Allen  1995,  305-7).  A
number of African rulers began to experiment with new (more or less formalised) legitimation
strategies, including personalist ‘African’ alternatives to modernism, such as Mobutu Sese Seko’s
authenticité in Zaïre (Jackson and Rosburg 1982; C. Young 2004, 33-35). 
Internationally,  meanwhile,  African  states  did  not  yet  respond  to  these  dilemmas  with
legitimation  through  the  still  marginal  ideology of  human  rights.  They turned  instead  to  Pan-
Africanist  intellectuals, highlighting once again how new beliefs  emerge from wider  worlds  of
ideas, and not merely from ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (contrast Sikkink 2011, 11). These intellectuals
sought  to  replace  confident  modernist  ideas  with  Marxian  ‘dependency’ critiques  of  Africa’s
vulnerability in the global economy (e.g. Arrighi 1970; Amin 1972; Rodney 1973). Re-distributive
demands were now justified by persistent reference to  ‘past  exploitation under colonialism and
neocolonialism’ (Looney 1999). This marked a new phase in the rhetorical treatment of the colonial
past by African states, which had previously, by and large, emphasised long ‘traditions’ of virile
statehood and anti-colonialism (see chapter 9).
Ideas associated with these theories informed the turn by a number of African states towards
the international system (for this  paragraph Arnold 1980; 297-300; Looney 1999; see generally
Bhagwati ed. 1977). From 1973 they became important actors in UN advocacy by the Non-Aligned
Movement for a ‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO). This was intended to replace the
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Bretton Woods monetary system that had underpinned modernist development over the last three
decades,  and was inspired by the now evident international economic influence attained by the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. In 1974 the UN General Assembly adopted a
Declaration  and Program of  Action  of  the  New International  Economic  Order  and approved a
complimentary  Charter  of  Economic  Rights  and  Duties  of  States  (for  associated  controversies
Weston 1981). These documents made various demands for changes to the international system,
including ‘indexation’ of raw material prices, targets for development aid, and improved technology
transfer.  Between 1975 and 1976,  diplomatic  action  along these  lines  obtained minor,  but  still
substantive changes to the international aid regime. 
Like other political programmes, however, the NIEO soon began to be legitimated through
the new medium of human rights. Unlike the other case studies presented here, therefore, and in a
departure  from the  norm spiral  model,  incipient  transnational  movements  were  not the  first  to
propagate new beliefs. Instead, as illustrated in the next chapter, an important political response by
African states to the emergence of the human rights revolution was to re-cast demands to combat
‘underdevelopment’ as a ‘right to development’. The Senegalese ‘lawyer-statesman’ Keba M’Baye
had been using this phrase since 1972, but it was only debated at the United Nations for the first
time in 1977 (Bunn 1999-2000, 1426, n.2; Normand and Zaidi 2008, 437, n.1). In 1978 M’Baye
‘formally launched the idea’ with a paper to the UNESCO Meeting of Experts of Human Rights
entitled  ‘Emergence  of  the ‘Right  to  Development’ as  a  human right  in  the  context  of  a  New
International Economic Order’ (Normand and Zaidi 2008, 437, n.1). He was himself clear that some
notion of rights was required to resolve the dilemmas posed by modernist crisis. He expressed this,
as Rubner (2011, 249) puts it, ‘in most apt Robespierrian terms’:
within the framework of development law, the traditional balance “freedom-social order” is
upset  because  the  need  for  order  overrides  the  need  to  grant  liberties.  This  is  where…
government [sic]…invoke …: “you can’t make an omelette without breaking a few eggs”.
Unfortunately,  it  often  happens  that  eggs  are  broken  without  producing  an  omelette  at
all….The idea would be to discover what is the required correlation between development and
respect for human rights.
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But M’Baye also carefully legitimated these new ideas in terms of African states’ new political
ambitions  (see  Rubner  2011,  176-8,  249).  The  new  right,  like  many  other  such  rights,  was
controversial with liberal theorists who hoped that to maintain conceptual order in the face of new
‘maximalist’ tendencies.  They pointed  out,  for  instance,  that  the  precise nature of  the  duties  it
created were incapable of specification (see Donnelly 1985). But here, as elsewhere in this study,
there was no conceivable conceptual resolution to the question of how and whether the validity of
new rights should be adjudicated. They could only be opposed through bureaucratic ‘gatekeeping’
(Bob 2009).
In political terms, however, at least the kind of legal duties that African states sought to
create were clear enough: obligation for payments from Western states. New reparations beliefs
emerging elsewhere were identified as a means of expressing these demands in their new form. But
African states especially sought to apply these beliefs to situations they had not previously been
designed for (see Q. Skinner 2002, chapter 8; for how institutionalisation enables ‘resistance’ see
chapter  9).  Payments  would  be  made  from (ex-colonial)  states  to  (Third  World  and especially
African) states, as Germany had in the 1950s and 1960s. They would not be made to groups. This
strategy, along with its shortcomings, is neatly illustrated by a 1979 UN Secretary General’s report
on the international dimensions of the right to development (United Nations Secretary General, 2nd
January 1979, paragraphs 52-54). This summarises debates in the UN Human Rights Commission.
During  these  debates  the  view  was  apparently  expressed  ‘by  a  number  of  speakers  that
underdevelopment was basically the sequel of colonial domination and that, even after political
independence, developing countries too often remained subjected to neo-colonialist exploitation of
their  natural  resources’,  and  ‘a moral  duty of  reparation  has  been  inferred  from these  views’.
Cautiously, however, the report then went on to note that acceptance of this duty ‘to make up for
past exploitation by the colonial powers’ is ‘by no means universal’ and would therefore not be
pursed in earnest. 
The looming debt crisis soon radically reduced African states’ leverage in the international
economic arena (Looney 1999). Their attention therefore shifted to other areas, such as UNESCO’s
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regulation of communications (for political controversies this provoked Sussman 1982, 177). Soon
even African leaders who had been genuinely influenced by new dependency and Marxian ideas -
such as Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso - began to draw new implications from it (see Otayek
1989, 19-20).  If  an unequal  economic world system could not be profoundly reformed African
states would have to practice ‘self-reliance’. As the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) declared
in 1979, ‘the time has come when close attention should be paid to the problems of socio-economic
transformation of Member States … in the present circumstances of world economic system [sic]’
(Organisation of African Unity, 17th-20th July 1979). The NIEO’s ‘old’ reparations ideas, which still
emphasised  transfers  between  states  representing  ‘peoples’,  thus  temporarily  faded  from  the
international  stage.  As described in chapters  7  and 9,  however,  they would  soon return  in  the
changed circumstances of the post-1989 world.
(c) Explaining litigation fora
The early 1990s, finally, would also see new life breathed into the ATCA. After Republican
attacks on the Act from the late 1980s, the Clinton administration reclaimed it, to use Anne-Marie
Slaughter’s term, as a ‘badge of honour’ to legitimate its new foreign policy orientations (Burley
1989; Slaughter and Bosco 2000). Such bipartisan struggles have been a recurring pattern in United
States politics (even if the Obama administration has recently helped restrict its scope Ku and Yoo
2012, 179-185)68. Foreign policy legitimation also helps explain the Act’s initial re-discovery, and
the availability of new fora for reparations claims. As Moyn (2010, 151-160) has described, Jimmy
Carter’s  1977 Presidential  election  victory was  instrumental  in  moving  human  rights  from the
margins to the centre-stage of Democratic Party politics. It certainly appeared to have some short-
term political advantages. The Republican Gerald Ford had famously struggled to articulate a clear
line on détente and new levels of superpower parity in the Cold War (Mieczkowski 2005, 275, 280-
3). But, as with the European Union (described above), this legitimation strategy was only attractive
because of the new international salience of these ideas.
The  immediately preceding  period  had  seen  the  formation  of  a  number  of  new groups
mobilised around the issue. Among the most significant of these, in an American context, were
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Amnesty International and the Ford Foundation. As a number of analysts have described, in the
1970s these organisations turned to Latin America. They capitalised on new beliefs emerging in the
region after the crisis of ‘revisionist’ socialism - triggered by the overthrow of Salvador Allende in
Chile in 1973 (Y. Dezalay and Garth 2006, 237-242; Moyn 2010, 140-141; S. Dezalay 2011, 11; for
the Latin American Left in this period Carr and Ellner eds. 1993). In Chile, notably, a number of ex-
members  of,  and former sympathisers with,  the Allende administration became influential  local
partners in the forging of a new, rights-based opposition to the regime of General Pinochet. These
‘networks’ then played an important role in persuading the new Carter government to integrate
human rights into its foreign policy (Sikkink 2004).  By now a number of other lawyerly NGOs -
such as the Lawyers’ Committee for International Human Rights in New York and the International
Human Rights Law Group in Washington D.C - had also committed themselves to holding the
Carter administration to  its new rhetorical commitments. They instigated test cases and produced
amicus curiae  to  achieve this  objective (Lillich 1980,  21).  Pressure groups such as these have
represented ATCA plaintiffs in 42 percent of cases since 1980, whilst defendants have not had such
representation (Davis 2006, 67). And it was they, in partnership with Amnesty International USA,
who ultimately rediscovered the 1789 Act. As elsewhere, in short, new legitimation strategies were
parasitic on the emergence of new beliefs. The mobilisation of actors constituted by these new
beliefs could then help trigger ‘self-entrapment’ and political change.
(3) Indigenous rights advocacy
(a) Intepretive explanation and ‘framing’
As Moyn (2010, 223) argues, ‘rights’ to ‘culture, indigeneity and environment’ are prime
examples of the triumph of human rights over other alternatives to modernism which emerged in
the late 1960s. One recent symptom of this, described in chapter 4, was Judge Unity Dow’s ruling in
Sesana that ‘the Applicants belong to a class of peoples that have now come to be recognized as
‘indigenous  peoples’.  This  recognition  is  a  recent  event.  Until  recently,  as  Torpey  (2006,  71)
describes, the dominance of ‘‘one-nation’ ideologies and the corresponding idea of assimilation’
would have prevented it. Constructivists, however, do not even seek to explain the emergence of
these new beliefs. They are content to simply note that the indigenous rights movement has been
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‘growing’ over the ‘past two decades’, or, even more vaguely, that ‘indigenous resistance to the
threats of states, markets and modernity that shaped the movement’s trio of core demands: self-
determination, land rights and cultural survival’ (Brysk 2000, 59; Sarfaty 2005, 1811, n.85). Some
more  sophisticated  analyses  do  point  out  these  demands  cannot  easily  be  fitted  within  those
traditions  ‘associated  with  liberalism and  the  West’ that  Sikkink  (2011,  255)  claims  constitute
conditions for rights. As Niezen (2010, 222) puts it, ‘international agencies are responsible for a
multiplication of laws, but also for a hankering for a world without them, in which the spiritual
knowledge of enlightened ancestors has been restored’ (contrast Thomas et al. 1987; Elliott 2007).
Indeed, when it comes to indigeneity, at least, even Sikkink and Keck (1999, 100) are willing to
allow that rights are ‘constantly changing’ and ‘renegotiated’ for strategic reasons (contrast Brysk
2000, 29-32; 35). They do not simply ‘resonate across cultures and societies’ (Sikkink 2011, 255). 
Once  again,  however,  this  adoption  was  not  ‘strategic’ in  the  narrow  sense  of  being
functional to ‘interests’.  Activists’ core concern was with the local effects of development projects.
Indigenous rights provided an effective legitimating ‘frame’ for this advocacy in the early 1980s.
After  an  ‘explosion  of  environmentalist  attention  to  the  Amazon’,  however,  rights  were  soon
jettisoned in favour of environmentalist language and symbolism that ‘resonated’ more effectively
with global networks (Sikkink and Keck 1999, 95; Hochstetler and Keck 2007, 162). Analyses such
as  these,  however,  cannot  account  for  why particular  languages  come  to  ‘resonate’ or  bestow
legitimacy on political action. These points are helpfully clarified by Fiona Adamson’s concept of
discursive  ‘opportunity  structures’  (2005,  554-6).  For  her,  the  myriad  ‘contradictions  and
inconsistencies’ of international discourse offer a ‘normative toolbox’ to be exploited strategically,
just like international institutions. She argues that Marxism-Leninism’s collapse has recently left
liberalism  as  the  dominant  international  discourse,  triggering  the  re-framing  of  local  political
demands. In the nineteenth-century, by contrast, other ‘‘structures of meaning’ such as nationalism,
anarchism, and socialism competed with liberal internationalism as tenable political world views’.
To this I would add only that an analysis of ideological competition between these views, such as
that  attempted  by Moyn  (2010),  can  help  explain  which  ‘frames’ become rational  to  adopt  as
legitimation strategies at particular times. 
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(b) The revolt against productivist civilization
It  is  probably  true,  as  Mbembe  (2001,  4)  argues,  that  Africa  in  general  has  long  been
understood in Western culture as an ‘empty continent’; easily imaginable as the pristine Lost Eden
which Isaiah Berlin (2003, 24) saw as ‘a central strand in the whole of Western thought’ (both in
Gallagher  2009a,  439).  But  is  nevertheless  also  the  case  that,  before  1945  at  least,  European
colonial  powers  routinely  distinguished  between  different  levels  of  ‘primitivity’ amongst  their
subject  populations.  Pygmies,  ‘Bushmen’,  and  Karamoja  pastoralists,  for  instance  -  like  some
defeated  Amerindian  populations,  were  allocated  ‘reserves’ on  the  grounds  that  they  needed
protection from ‘civilization’ (for the Karamojong Barber 1962, 111, 118-9; for Botswana Ramsay
1998, 76; for pygmies Ballard 2006). After 1945, however, in the  Bechuanaland Protectorate and
elsewhere, official attitudes shifted (see chapter 4). The spread of modernist ideas amongst even
colonial administrations ensured that all colonial subjects were now at least rhetorically identified
as  potential  targets  for  ‘development’ (see  above).  And  these  ideas  were  almost  universally
endorsed, again if sometimes only rhetorically, by new Third World elites (see T. Young 2003, 1;
Young and Williams 2008; compare R. Jackson 1990, 91-94). 
Reus-Smit  (2013a,  166-177)  faults  Moyn  (2010)  for  implying  that  human  rights  only
become politically significant  with  the  emergence  of  social  movements  sincerely committed to
them; the classic historians’ error of over-estimating the significance of source material. He points
out that human rights, although rarely endorsed with any sincerity between 1950 and 1970, were
nevertheless  important  tools  in  the  struggles  for  decolonisation  that  dominated  international
institutions during this period. Unlike these individual rights, however, indigenous rights did not
even  have  an  institutional  presence  in  international  politics.  The  only  relevant  international
instrument of the time, for instance - the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention of
1957, C107 - identified modernist problems in its preamble: ‘there exist in various independent
countries indigenous and other tribal and semi-tribal populations which are not yet integrated into
the  national  community  and  whose  social,  economic  or  cultural  situation  hinders  them  from
benefiting  fully  from the  rights  and  advantages  enjoyed  by other  elements  of  the  population’
(International Labour Organisation, 26th June 1957; see also Minde 1996, 231). Other important
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instruments from the 1960s -  the UN Convention on the granting of Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples (1965), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and
International  Covenant  on  Economic  Social  and Cultural  Rights  (1966)  -  mention  the  right  of
‘peoples’ to  self-determination  in  their  first  paragraph or  article,  but  were never  interpreted  as
applying to entities other than states. The 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial  Discrimination,  for  its  part,  did  allow  for  group  rights  at  sub-state  level,  but  only  as
temporary measures for promoting individual equality (for these instruments Havemann 2009, 267).
The later 1960s,  finally,  saw some attention paid towards indigenous issues by Latin American
members of the UN Sub-Commission for Human Rights. This was initiated by the Secretariat but
carried-out in the name Special Rapporteurs; an effort to avoid hostility from states. But even the
culmination of this work - a few paragraphs in Hernán Santa Cruz’s Study on Racial Discrimination
in  the  Political,  Economic  Social  and  Cultural  Spheres  (1970)  -  remained  focused  around
‘individual and equal rights’, ‘populations’ not ‘peoples’, and continued to recommend integration
(Minde 2008, 53-4).
In this period anthropologists were, indeed, almost alone in endorsing limited versions of
what would now be recognisable indigenous rights beliefs. The profession had, of course, long been
a lone voice of Western opposition to post-war modernism; an attitude famously encapsulated by
the  American  Anthropological  Association’s  (now  renounced)  opposition  to  the  1948  UN
Declaration of Human Rights (see Goodale 2006).  Yet even their criticisms had to be carefully
measured (see Tilley 2007). The imperatives of legitimating anthropological work in the eyes of
modernist  (post-)colonial  governments  ensured  that  research  -  especially  in  the  ‘applied
anthropology’ tradition -  focused around easing brutal  ‘transitions’ to  modern ways of  life  and
recording ‘data’ from ‘disappearing’ tribal societies (Wright 1988, 371). The collapse of modernist
orthodoxies, however, radicalised anti-modernist beliefs and greatly eased legitimation demands.
‘The new indigenous movement’ in the Americas, like the International Work Group for Indigenous
Affairs (IWGIA), were born out of ‘trends within anthropology that started in 1968’ (Brysk 2000,
64; Dahl 2009, 20). Cultural Survival (CS), today the most prominent organisation of this kind in
the  United  States,  was  founded  at  exactly  the  same  time  by  the  distinguished  Harvard
anthropologist  David  Maybury-Lewis  (L.K.  Hart  2009).  Even Survival  International  (SI)  itself,
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founded in 1969, initially sought out links with anthropologists, and had such eminent names as
Claude Lévi-Strauss and Edmund Leach as sponsors and on its board (Houtman 1985, 4).
In retrospect, there are at least three distinctive features of indigenous rights advocacy in the
late 1960s and early 1970s. The first was its narrow geographic focus: on the planned destruction of
indigenous societies in Latin America, and in Amazonia most particularly. In Western culture this
part of the world was the most potent symbol of modernist crisis and the worst effects of post-1945
industrial growth - although not yet understood as a specifically environmentalist issue (Chernela
2005). The second distinctive feature was the narrow scope of its advocacy. This centred around
genocide as defined by the UN Declaration of 1948, rather than any specific notion of indigenous
rights (for the IWGIA Dahl 2009, 10, 25; for CS Maybury-Lewis 1997, 1-6; for SI Houtman 1985,
3; Survival International, 25th April 2013). The third distinctive feature of this period, finally, was
the relative distance of these groups from the (still small) broader human rights movement. The IW-
GIA produced publications only for a ‘politically aware public’, whilst SI’s distance was signalled
by its original name: the Primitive People’s Fund (1969-1971). Whilst SI’s old name was chosen
‘on the analogy of the World Wildlife Fund’, its new name consciously echoed Amnesty Interna-
tional; by far the most significant human rights organisation of the 1960s, deeply rooted in British
Quaker and Northern European liberal Protestant circles  (Dahl 2009, 26, 29; Houtman 1985, 3;
Hopgood 2006, 52-72). 
(c) Indigenous movements and new legitimation strategies
An indigenous rights movement was also slow to emerge in the wider world of politics. For
most of the 1970s the idea of a specific class of human rights for indigenous peoples existed as only
a comparatively minor player in the intense ideological competition opened-up by modernist and
socialist collapse. In Latin America the popularity of ‘conscientisation’ had inspired a turn by some
anthropologists towards indigenous intellectuals and ‘Indianness’ - paralleling the Black Conscious-
ness ideas that thrived in South Africa in the same period (Wright 1988, 373-4; Magaziner 2010,
125-137). In Northern America, by contrast, indigenous groups sought instead, typically, to appro-
priate the self-determination ideals which the international system applied only to states (Cornell
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1986; for Australia Foley, Schaap and Howell 2014; for an overview of this ‘era’ McHugh 2005,
chapter 6). Such strategies could hope to attract significant international sympathy until Western be-
liefs in self-determination largely collapsed under pressure from human rights in the late 1970s
(Moyn 2012). (In the social sciences these developments were reflected by the eclipse of ‘internal
colonialism’ theories, which began to be abandoned on the grounds that they neglected various
forms of intra-group discrimination [Hind 1984, 553; Chavez 2011, 786].)
 Perhaps the most internationally significant of the groups active this period, the American
Indian Movement (AIM), exemplifies these shifts (unless otherwise indicated see Cornell 1986,
113-4, 126-8; Minde 1996, 232-3). It was founded in 1968, inspired by the black nationalist out-
growth of the civil rights movement. It argued against the extension of civil liberties to tribal courts
and for Indian sovereignty; a return to relationships with federal government governed on the basis
of treaty. Over the next five years it occupied strategic locales including Alcatraz Island and the
Bureau of Indian Affairs headquarters in Washington, D.C. In 1973, however, after a 71-day stand-
off with federal forces, it had to call-off an occupation of the historically-significant South Dakota
town of Wounded Knee. This failure precipitated a new more transnational strategy (see also the
conclusion to Hau de no sau nee (Iroquois Confederacy), 1978). But the new International Indian
Treaty Council (IITC), set-up by the AIM, mobilised with Marxist not rights-based ‘frames’ (see
also Wright 1988, 377). As late as 1977 it continued to take a ‘class-based approach to indigenous
issues’,  and seek political  support from Non-Aligned states  (then advocating New International
Economic Order) (Dahl 2009, 42). Unlike the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP), which
represented the new indigenous rights movement, it rejected government funding and any represent-
ative structure within the UN, installing itself, symbolically, in the World Council Churches (WCC)
building opposite the UN headquarters (Minde 2008, 61-2). 
The names given to the first indigenous rights-holders bore the traces of these conflicts. In
1974 the Canadian Indian leader George Manuel wrote a manifesto for an international politics of
the ‘Fourth World’, a concept more recently de-emphasised because of its ostensibly socialist over-
tones (Minde 2008, 81).  Distancing itself from demands for self-determination, such as those en-
dorsed by the IITC, Manuel’s manifesto for this movement declared that ‘the Aboriginal world is al-
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most wholly dependent upon the good faith and morality of the nations of East and West’ (Manuel
and Posluns 1974, 6, in Minde 2008, 59). This represented a new legitimation strategy appealing to
transformations in human rights ideas, or, in Minde’s (2008, 55) words, ‘the winds of favourable
change that indigenous questions were experiencing in Western countries’ (see also  Minde 1996,
242). It led directly to the formation of the WCIP in the following year, and immediately attracted
support from the Human Rights group in the Norwegian Foreign Ministry (Dahl 2009, 28; Minde
1996, 240; Minde 2008, 66). Norwegian advocacy, in turn, soon helped displace a diversity of ap-
proaches with which Western countries had previously adopted vis-à-vis their ‘Fourth World’ popu-
lations. In post-war Scandinavia, for example, welfarist ideas had mitigated strongly against group
rights, whilst the civil right movement’s push for legal equality had similar effects in North America
(Minde 1984; C. Taylor 1992, 56-61). Sami groups, however, now seized successfully upon Scand-
inavian international advocacy to demand special rights in the domestic sphere. And in Canada the
crises of Pierre Trudeau’s civil rights liberalism - which had proved catastrophic in the late 1960s
and early 1970s - led to the development of multiculturalist orthodoxies far more favourable to
emerging notions of indigenous rights (Cairns 2000, chapter 2; Kymlicka 2007, 16-18)69. 
The institutional consequences of these normative shifts were immediate. The 1977 Interna-
tional NGO Conference on Discrimination against Indigenous Populations in the Americas, suppor-
ted by the Carter Administration as part of its new human rights policy, was followed by a range of
similar events over the years that followed (Minde 2008, 69-74; Dahl 2009, 46). Representative or-
ganisations proliferated, and in 1982  the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP)
was established to revise ILO Convention 109 and establish a post-modernist consensus on the rela-
tionship between indigenous peoples and nation-states (Saugestad 2001, 47; Dahl 2009, 33). Indi-
genous rights had defeated their competitors to become the most attractive frame with which social
movement demands could be legitimated.
4. Conclusion
This chapter has described how a dual crisis of modernism and socialist utopia transformed
rights beliefs in the 1970s, explaining both new kinds of legal mobilisation and the availability of
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new litigation fora. In Western Europe crises of socialist utopias meant that powerful states could no
longer use the ECHR simply as a symbolic justification of anti-communism, whilst modernist crisis
and new mangerialist ideas led administrative elites to welcome courts into the policy process. By
1980 advocacy for judicially-enforced rights was no longer limited to a small group of liberal law-
yer-statesmen focused on individuals, but had become the preserve of a wide range of organisations
with ‘maximalist’ demands including group rights. In sub-Saharan Africa, meanwhile, modernist
crisis after 1973 led states to downplay virile statehood and demand redress for colonial exploita-
tion. The human rights revolution that followed the crisis of socialist utopias then led these states to
re-frame these demands in terms of legal rights for reparation. In the United States new legal fora
were  becoming  available  to  litigate  such  demands.  This  was  largely  a  consequence  of  Jimmy
Carter’s famous decision to legitimate his foreign policy in terms of human rights. In Latin Amer-
ica, finally, the new legitimating power of rights saw indigenous groups re-frame their opposition to
modernisation. They could now count on support from new Western NGOs. These organisations
were typically created by anthropologists and were created following broader crises of the modern-
ist ideas that they had long opposed.
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Chapter 7: Transnational networks.
1. Introduction
This chapter has three objectives. The first is to explain the formation and transformation of
social networks in terms of the new beliefs analysed in the previous chapter. This represents an ana-
lytical advance over constructivist approaches, which view networks as simply conditions for norm
emergence  (e.g.  Sikkink  2011,  231).  Its  second  objective  is  to  give  symbols,  culture  and
‘Durkheimian’ insights their proper due (see chapter 5). New beliefs are not by themselves adequate
for explaining how and why transnational networks acquire mass appeal. Nor are appeals to broad
Western or universal ideals of bodily integrity sufficient (compare L. Hunt 2007, 27-29; Sikkink
2011, 255, 261). Theorists of collective action framing have long stressed the ‘cultural resonance’ of
campaign symbolism (see the overview in Benford and Snow 2000, 622). I use this approach to
identify three moments in which actors holding new beliefs successfully tailored communications
for culturally-specific, local audiences, in ways that generated increased support for litigants. Thus,
in Germany the 2004 centenary of the Herero and Nama genocide saw the issue effectively linked
with ongoing political debates about how to deal with the Holocaust and its legacies. In Britain and
America, after 2001, indigenous rights in Botswana were effectively linked with the question of
‘conflict  diamonds’.  Whilst  in  Britain,  finally,  violence  towards  white  farmers  after  2000  was
framed as a rights issue for the first time. And this was done in ways that resonated with Western
cultural habits of identifying more closely with white than black Africans (for ‘habits’ Weber [1925]
1964, II, 2, i). 
This attention to specific aspects of Western cultures is, of course, not meant to deny the ex-
istence of a broader, more universal global human rights symbolism. For the anthropologist Sally
Falk Moore (2006, 284) the manipulation of such ‘common, diffuse, value-laden symbolic content’
is in fact key to ‘political struggles in legal arenas’. Whilst for John Torpey (2006, 8-9), more spe-
cifically - whose work was discussed in the previous chapter - the Holocaust has become the ‘cent-
ral metaphor’ of ‘our contemporary historical context’. This fact is certainly reflected in the mobil-
isation strategies of all three social movements examined here. Such comparisons are, of course,
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hardly surprising in the case of the Herero and Nama genocide. The possibility of genuine connec-
tions between the two episodes is now a matter of serious scholarly debate (see below). More in-
triguing are the numerous parallels that Ben Freeth and his legal team have sought to establish
between Nazi Germany and the racial discrimination of FTLR - suggesting, notably, that President
Mugabe  has  behaved  like  Adolf  Hitler  (e.g.  Gauntlett  2009,  13;  remarks  by  Jeffrey Jowell  in
Mugabe and the White African, 2009; JAG Open Letter Forum, 27th April 2009; Munyoro, 5th Feb-
ruary 2010; Freeth 2011, 126; 2013, 47). It is especially striking that Survival International - despite
criticism reported by the BBC - has attempted to describe CKGR relocations as ‘cultural genocide’,
even if no deaths have been directly linked to the government’s decision (Levene, 10 th October
2002; Kenyon, 6th November 2005). In an African context, of course, apartheid frequently occupies
a similar position to the Holocaust. It symbolises a great evil in relation to which all political move-
ments must signal their ‘‘post’-ness’, in Torpey’s (2006, 8) terms. Here it is notable that Archbishop
Desmond Tutu -  the symbol of anti-apartheid human rights, alongside Nelson Mandela - has pro-
duced written and video messages in support of both Ben Freeth and the CKGR litigants (Mmegi,
7th November 2006; Setsiba, 8th November 2006; Freeth 2011, foreword; SADC Tribunal Rights
Watch, 14th August 2012). 
This omnipresence of Hitler and Tutu in human-rights framing also illustrates the import-
ance of what Willems (2005, 100) refers to as ‘personalisation’. As she writes, citing Galtung and
Ruge (1965, 65), ‘the more the event can be seen in personal terms, as due to the action of specific
individuals, the more probable that it will become a news item’. (Anthropologists have often noted
how David and Goliath tales - illustrated below - resonate particularly strongly with broad Western
publics [e.g. Jeffrey 2006, 235; Allen 2009, 165].) Just as  ‘the imagined community of millions
seems more real as a team of eleven named people’ - to borrow Eric Hobsbawm’s (1990, 143) com-
ment on football and nationalism - identifying constituencies with particular faces thus intensifies
the mobilising power of their cause. 
Thirdly,  and finally,  this  chapter  will  situate  its  analysis  between two explanatory poles
found in the literature dealing with the emergence of African social movements and NGOs. Whilst
the norm spiral model posits that ‘norm entrepreneurs’ are initially motivated by ‘empathy’ and ‘al-
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truism’, others have suggested that in Africa, especially, NGOs are typically founded in order to ‘es-
tablish an instrumentally profitable position’ for accumulating patronage resources (compare Fin-
nemore and Sikkink 1998, 898, with Chabal and Daloz 1999, 22; see also Bayart 2000; Hearn
2007). This chapter does not deny that insincerity and even cynicism may exist. But it maintains
that many components of its Zimbabwean and Namibian case studies are much better understood as
falling into a third category. Here international languages are ‘read’ and ‘appropriated’ according to
African  actors’ local  political  needs;  a  neither  purely  cynical  nor  purely  altruistic  endeavour
(Dorman 2001; Pommerolle 2005, 12-13; 2006; contrast Hearn 2006, 653). 
One corollary of the litigant with convictions is that strategic framing becomes a contentious
process. Lawyers and activists have sometimes had to work to prevent some more idiosyncratic be-
liefs from being voiced publicly. Conflicts have emerged over the use of frames clashing with either
global human rights symbolisms, or more local cultural content that movements seek to mobilise
(for how ‘inconsistent’ framing can disable mobilisation compare Zuo and Benford 1995 with John-
son 1997). Where contentious framing has been successful it has allowed rights claims to become
‘vehicles for other projects’, and enabled litigants to ‘resist, transform and thwart elite agendas’ (T.
Young 1998, 33; Bevir 2010, xli; chapter 5). 
2. Commercial farmers and indigeneity
In the case of the commercial farmers’ campaign issue framing was not the only means of at-
tracting transnational support. Even the choice of litigation team was designed to maximise symbol-
ic impact. The first man approached was Sir Sydney Kentridge, who had defended Nelson Mandela
and Stephen Biko in perhaps the most famous cases in apartheid South Africa’s history. He had also
led the appeal to the Privy Council in Stella Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke, the most famous case
in Rhodesian history, which saw the new rebel state’s constitution ruled illegal (H. H. Marshall
1968; Freeth 2011, 152). Kentridge, now aged 83, was no longer taking on cases abroad, but passed
on relevant case law (Ben Freeth, interview, 5th April 2012). In a potentially explosive move, Freeth
then approached Cherie Booth QC; a human rights lawyer but, most importantly, wife of British
Prime Minister Tony Blair  - the man whom President Mugabe famously detested like no other
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(Chan 2003; 2012, 124; Freeth 2011, 152). Booth, however, would have asked £5,000 for a legal
opinion (anonymous interview, April 2012; Ben Freeth, interview, 5th April 2012). Next on the list
was Johann Kriegler, an ‘old friend’ of Mike Campbell’s and a retired judge on post-apartheid South
Africa’s Constitutional Court (Freeth 2011, 152-3; Ben Freeth, interview, 5th April 2012). Kriegler
put them in touch with Jeremy Gauntlett, one of the best-known Advocates in South Africa, who
has chaired the General Council of the Bar in South Africa as acted as the Vice-President of the Bar
for the International Criminal Court (Freeth 2011, 152-3). 
Gauntlett’s case was not, however, his alone (see Freeth 2011, 154-8). In his own words, ‘I
wouldn’t want you to think I’m Florence Nightingale alone in an unlit ward’ (in Pampalone, 23 rd
December 2009). The argument against the Government of Zimbabwe’s ouster clause was produced
with the assistance of Professor Sir Jeffrey Jowell QC, one of Britain’s leading public lawyers and
the son-in-law of Helen Suzman, long South Africa’s sole anti-apartheid parliamentarian (Freeth
2011, 151; for Suzman see  Strangwayes-Booth 1976). Given his lawyers’ credentials Freeth was
concerned about funds. As in the other cases analysed in this study, donors and politically well-con-
nected NGOs - agents of the ‘liberal project’ in Africa - were unwilling to assist in such a funda-
mental challenge to the new order. Money was therefore found from other sources (Freeth, 2011;
153). Crucially, the legal team was often content to work for free. Since 2011 they have been work-
ing entirely pro bono (Ben Freeth, interview, 5th April 2012). The first part of this section seeks to
explain how Freeth’s case came to acquire such importance for these legal constituencies. In some
respects the account parallels explanations for new beliefs about law and politics presented in the
previous chapter, but it highlights particularities peculiar to apartheid South Africa and Britain’s
‘Westminster Model’ of government. 
(a) The transformation of a transnational movement
Apartheid was ushered in by the National Party’s electoral victory in 1948. This victory co-
incided with ‘mounting support within a range of bureaucratic circles’ for ‘the growing global en-
thusiasm for a more centrally unified and assertively interventionist state’ (Posel 2001, 99). In the
1950s liberal judges were steadily replaced with the ‘executive-minded’. New ‘purist’ theories of
175
law became dominant, popularised notably by Lucas Steyn (Chief Justice from 1959 until 1971, and
author of the first legal textbook in Afrikaans). These theories attempted to cleanse South African
law of corrupting British influence. They were intended to justify new levels of discretion for the
racialist  and modernist  state,  and sought to discover legislative intentions, freeing the executive
from the constraints of common law precedent (Cameron 1982, 40, 59; Dugard 1979, 37-42)70. Per-
haps  the  most  notorious  application  of  these  doctrines  was  Lockhat v Minister  of  the  Interior
(1960). Here an Indian resident of Durban charged that the planned division of the city into ‘group
areas’ would have an unreasonably discriminatory effect not justified by the terms of the Group
Areas Act 77 of 1957. The Court held, however, that whilst such discrimination was indeed not per-
mitted by the Act, it was ‘clearly implied’ by the fact that ‘the Group Areas Act represents a colossal
social experiment and a long-term social policy’ (Dyzenhaus 2010, 71)71.
Liberal jurists sought to oppose these developments by holding to the tenets of the British
‘Westminster Model’. This had been classically formulated by Albert Venn Dicey’s Introduction to
the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885).  As Bevir (2008, 563-4) argues, until the 1970s it
formed the broad template for how British liberal legal and political elites thought about constitu-
tional affairs. And as Chanock (2001, chapter 18) describes, the Model had also dominated constitu-
tional thought in South Africa until 1945. For South African purposes, the Model was comprised of
two core beliefs72. Parliamentary sovereignty, firstly, allowed parliament to make or unmake any
law it chose. The rule of law, secondly, countered any despotic temptations thus produced by em-
phasising the importance of ‘known rules, equality,  and respect for precedent’ (see Bevir 2008,
562).  The upshot of this was that jurists knew that ‘in the Diceyan world they did not settle sub-
stantive political issues, and that the judges’ role was only to keep the executive within the powers
defined by the legislature’ (Chanock 2001, 517). By focusing on ‘known rules, equality, and respect
for precedent’,  and focusing on apartheid’s violations  of its  own precepts,  liberal  opponents of
‘grand apartheid’ in the 1960s and 1970s sought to avoid the damaging charge of political partisan-
ship often levelled at human rights in this period73. In the words of the ‘leading (and representative)
text of the period’, by Tony Mathews:
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the identification of the human rights or of a particular philosophy … with the Rule of Law is
here  rejected  as  unscientific  […] theories  are  inevitably contentious  and unstable;  and to
identify the Rule of Law with any one of them is to make it … a weapon in the war of politic-
al and moral ideas (Mathews 1971, 1-2, in Chanock 1999, 378).  
The most-discussed liberal critique of the Model in this period - John Dugard’s 1971 inaugural lec-
ture at the University of the Witwatersrand - was grounded in natural law, not human rights. Reveal-
ingly, it garnered few adherents (see Sachs 1973, 260; Albertyn and Dennis 2010). 
The human rights revolution of the late 1970s saw increased international funding for human
rights causes. Dugard, notably, became Director of the Centre for Applied Legal Studies at the Uni-
versity of the Witwatersrand: a new academic home for human rights founded in 1978 with grants
from the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller Fund and Carnegie Foundation (S. Dezalay 2011, 16-17)74.
In the 1980s Western funds for legal advice centres, education projects, and defence funds ‘grew ex-
ponentially’ (Abel 1995, 20-1; Broun 2000, 99, 101). The time was now ‘ripe’, Dugard (1978, 47)
declared, ‘for South African civil libertarians positively to assert their demands for a Bill of Rights
and, negatively to measure their losses by the new standards of liberty of the world community,
rather than by the limited, largely procedural standards of Dicey’. From the very outset of his career,
however,  Jeremy Gauntlett  defended South Africa’s  older  ‘Cape liberal’ legal  traditions  against
these new ideas. A much-discussed (and very impressive) student essay of his - deploying Mathews
against Dugard - defended ‘the firm empirical tradition in the sphere of the law’ against more free-
wheeling ‘higher law’ arguments (Gauntlett 1972, 213-7). And he continued to occupy such posi-
tions until the last days of apartheid. This was illustrated in 1988 by his fulsome praise for the ‘bal-
ance  between  detachment  and  commitment  to  liberal  values’ struck  by James  Rose-Innes,  the
greatest Chief Justice in the ‘Cape liberal’ tradition (1914-1927) (Gauntlett 1988, 13).
In the post-apartheid era, however, Gauntlett has found new opponents. His brand of legal
liberalism now identifies itself as defending the Rule of Law, not against ‘purism’ and Afrikaner
statism, but against ‘transformative jurisprudence’ (see Klare 1998). Very broadly speaking, this
new philosophy has two dimensions. The first is a claim that the ‘activist’ nature of South Africa’s
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new constitution entails a style of judicial interpretation more focused on just outcomes than on
‘formalistic’ technicalities and the letter of the law (compare Moseneke 2002 with Lewis 2009, 441-
4). Gauntlett (2011) has publicly criticised exponents of this, like Albie Sachs, who would like ‘ju-
dicial reasoning to embrace fluid concepts of hybridity and permeability’ claiming that ‘language
like that ... is inexact because the reasoning is not rigorous’. (For a response attacking Gauntlett’s
own ‘exceedingly formalistic’ approach see de Vos 3rd February 2011.)
A second dimension of transformative jurisprudence Gauntlett has opposed is affirmative ac-
tion in the legal profession, and specifically the ‘transformation of the judiciary’ (e.g. Gauntlett
2010a, 13; Rabkin 12th November 2012)75. The Judicial Services Commission (JSC) has, controver-
sially,  rejected his applications for both the Constitutional Court (CC) and Western Cape bench
(where he was one of four candidates for three vacancies) (Buthelezi, 14th November 2012; Consti-
tutional Crossroads, November 21st 2012; Tolsi, 12th April 2013). The immediate background to the
latter is most relevant for our purposes. In 2008-9 the JSC dismissed allegations that John Hlophe,
the Judge President of the Western Cape High Court, had attempted to improperly influence two CC
judges sitting on a case involving corruption allegations against Presidential hopeful Jacob Zuma. A
newly-founded NGO, Freedom Under Law (FUL), then decided to take the JSC itself to the CC
(Malan 2012, 280-288). FUL was chaired by Johann Kriegler (an outspoken critic of Hlope and ju-
dicial transformation) (Kriegler, 7th October 2007; 6th September 2009). Its Board of Directors in-
cludes Gauntlett, the Namibian advocate Elize Angula (who helped argue Campbell), and the Bot-
swanan attorney and ex-Chief Magistrate Abdul Rahim Khan (part  of the original  Sesana legal
team). Its International Advisory Board includes Desmond Tutu and Jeffrey Jowell76.
Jowell and Gauntlett not only have similar political projects but promote similar jurispruden-
tial beliefs. In debates surrounding Campbell, as well as in their academic work, both have become
advocates of a shift from a governmental ‘culture of authority’ to ‘culture of justification’ (Jowell
2009; Rabkin, 19th May 2011). They borrow this phrase from Etienne Mureinik (1994, 32) - a South
African liberal jurist (sadly) famous for committing suicide whilst controversially opposing the se-
lection of William Malegapuru Makgoba as the University of Witwatersrand’s first black Deputy
Vice-Chancellor (compare Trewhela, 23rd July 1996 with Mamdani 1997). Mureinik’s formulation
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was intended, partially, to preserve constitutional respect for parliamentary sovereignty after the col-
lapse of the Westminster Model (see Mureinik 1988, 63-4; Haysom and Plasket 1988; Corder and
Davis 1988). It relates closely to the ‘managerialist’ theories of administration whose genesis is de-
scribed in the previous chapter. The judiciary, on this view, should not interfere in the details of ad-
ministration, but should nonetheless demand that government justify its decisions as reasonable and
proportionate. In post-apartheid South Africa it has proved particularly attractive to legal liberals,
like Gauntlett, who fear excessive governmental discretion but have been constrained in arguing for
legal ‘formalism’ because of dilemmas posed by the advent of a new ‘activist’ constitution (see
Lewis 2009, 442-3; for this constitution’s genesis Brett 2014).
In British public law circles, meanwhile, the culture of justification has thrived as Dicey’s
influence has waned. In post-war Britain the very notion of ‘administrative law’ was a heterodox
one. Lord Alfred Denning, who became Master of the Rolls in 1962, was almost a lone advocate for
this cause. He became known as the closest British equivalent to the American ‘crusading judge’
(see Jowell and McAuslan eds. 1984). As he explained in his 1949 Hamlyn lectures Freedom Under
Law - from which FUL took its name - ‘the Jack-in-office never realises that he is being a little tyr-
ant’.  Parliamentary sovereignty alone was an insufficient  remedy against  this  tyranny,  so when
power is ‘exercised in a way that is plainly unreasonable, then the court will infer that it was not a
genuine exercise of that power’ (Denning 1949, 110, 127). In the 1970s the Westminster Model col-
lapsed, unable to cope with dilemmas posed by the simultaneous crises of its core beliefs (for simul-
taneous crises d’Avray 2010, 13, 77). Accession to the European Union challenged parliamentary
sovereignty, new ‘horizontal’ regulatory regimes challenged old rule of law ideas, and new behavi-
ourist orthodoxies undermined ‘constitutional morality’ (Bevir 2008, 564). These changes disabled
Dicyean and modernist opposition to Denning’s project77. As explained by Jowell (2006), moreover,
new managerialist orthodoxies have allowed some judges to further the simultaneous growth and
expansion of human rights. After reviewing, and welcoming, ‘the rapidly expanding standards es-
tablished through the process of judicial review of administration over the past 40 years’, he con-
cluded that:
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although the courts based many of those standards upon such broad notions as “fairness” or
“reasonableness”, the result has been, in fact, that the courts were … consciously or uncon-
sciously .. chipping away at the rock of parliamentary supremacy by making it increasingly
difficult for Parliament to authorise the infringement of the rule of law and ... fundamental
rights (Jowell 2006, 575).
A key agent in this process has been Lord Tom Bingham, who recently occupied Britain’s
most senior judicial roles in succession: as Master of the Rolls (1992-1996), Lord Chief Justice
(1996-2000), and Senior Law Lord (2000-2008). He argued, amongst other things, for the incorpor-
ation into British law of the European Convention of Human Rights, (via the Human Rights Act of
1998),  and for  the stronger  institutional  and symbolic  separation of  the  judicial  and legislative
branches of government (via the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005); the two key milestones in
Bevir’s (2008, 570-2) ‘juridification’ of the British constitution (Beloff 2007, 311-3; Clayton and
Tomlinson 2009, 61-2). For Bingham’s admirers this was ‘the transformation of the law’ (Andenas
and Fairgrieve eds. 2009). Ben Freeth, Jeremy Gauntlett and their supporters have certainly been
keen to associate their movement with Bingham’s name - commending his Orwell Prize-winning
book on the  Rule of Law  (2010) to various audiences, including myself (Gauntlett 2010a, 9-10;
2011; Ben Freeth, interview; 5th April 2012; see also Dale Doré, interview,  13th April 2012; Doré
2012-3a; Sentamu 2012).
This enthusiasm for British models reflects, in part, conscious efforts by Jowell and others to
build a transnational network dedicated to promoting these ideas in Southern Africa. Jowell’s own
activities in this area - now pursued as inaugural Director of the Bingham Centre on the Rule of
Law - significantly pre-date Judge Hlophe and FTLR. He assisted with the post-apartheid’s constitu-
tion’s administrative law statute and organised workshops on the topic for the South African Law
Commission  in  the  following  years  (South  African  Law Commission,  August  1999,  paragraph
5.4)78. He was recently praised by the Constitutional Court’s first Chief Justice for his advocacy of
the right to lawful administrative action; a right he has advocated for other jurisdictions (Chaskalson
2012; Jowell, 19th November 2012). In Zimbabwe he has not only argued against the ouster clause
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of Amendment 17 - the antithesis of a ‘culture of justification’ - but has also helped in drafting the
Law Society’s model constitution (Law Society of Zimbabwe, October 2010, foreword). 
This  Zimbabwean work,  especially,  excited  the  interest  of  his  colleagues  in  the  Middle
Temple (an Inn of Court, one of Britain’s elite institutions for training barristers). In 2011 Jeremy
Gauntlett was admitted to the institution as a ‘bencher’, and began publicising the SADC Tribunal
case (Burnton 2010, 5; Jowell and Gauntlett 2011, 7-8). In 2010, meanwhile, the Temple organised
a conference in Cape Town on The Rule of Law. An all-star cast of speakers included Gauntlett,
Jowell, South Africa’s Deputy Chief Justice, one current and two former judges of the Constitution-
al Court, one current and two former judges from the UK Supreme Court, one judge from the Irish
Supreme Court, and Britain’s Director of Public Prosecutions (for an overview Meiring and Pelser
2010; for a contribution discussing  Campbell Cameron 2010, 27-8). In a section of an article for
The Middle Templar entitled ‘Why South Africa?’, The Rt Hon Lord Justice Stanley Burnton - the
institution’s senior figure (or ‘Master Treasurer’) - explained why it had decided to invest in the
campaign: 
my belief that South Africa is at a cross-roads. [...]  My impression was that the Rule of Law
is not entirely secure in South Africa. Her northern neighbour, Zimbabwe, is a terrible ex-
ample of what may happen to a once-prosperous country when the Rule of Law is abolished. I
felt that sending a strong delegation of judges and lawyers from Middle Temple to a confer-
ence on the Rule of Law would be a demonstration of support for the independent judiciary
and legal profession there (Burnton 2010, 5).
The aim of this section has been to show how new (post-Dicyean) beliefs help explain the creation
and transformation of (liberal legal) transnational networks. We do not have to refer simply to ‘al -
truism’ or ‘unique background conditions’ to account for their emergence. The goal of the next is to
explain the new mobilising power of Burton’s allusions to FTLR. 
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(b) Framing
There can be no doubt that ZANU-PF rule in Zimbabwe has been frequently coercive and
often brutal.  This has been highlighted by scholarly work on, amongst other topics, the  Gukur-
ahundi massacres, military control of prisons, torture and imprisonment of political opponents, co-
ercive control of informal diamond mines, the intimidation and eventual displacement of around
100,000 farm workers, and Operation Murambatsvina - the demolition of hundreds of thousands of
homes as part of politically-motivated ‘slum clearances’ (e.g. Alexander, McGregor; and Ranger
2000, part II; Sachikonye 2003; 2011, 89-93; Vambe Ed. 2008; Nyamunda and Mukwambo 2012;
Alexander 2013). The British media, however, has focused almost entirely on violence directed to-
wards white commercial farmers during FTLR, as well as on how, in Burton’s words, the latter’s
threat to the ‘Rule of Law’ has ruined a ‘once-prosperous country’. This is not to deny that real bru-
tality was involved. Eleven farmers were killed between 2000 and 2004, and a much larger number
suffered threats, intimidation and assault (Pilossof 2012, 227, 229-236). But in the wider landscape
of repressive politics in Zimbabwe the (British) media focus on these events was wildly dispropor-
tionate. For Rory Pilossof (2012, 147, n.78), who helped document violence against farmers, this
group ‘received an embarrassing avalanche of attention’79. 
Wendy Willems (2005) has recorded the background to this avalanche. In 2001 Liz  Mc-
Gregor, The Guardian’s Deputy Comment Editor, noted how:
with countries with a large white population like Zimbabwe and South Africa there is a lot
more interest and I think this is largely because the [British] newspapers are white-run and
owned and they are trying to identify with people who look like them [...] one of the reasons
why there is not a lot of interest in the DRC is that there is not a big white party involved (in
Willems 2005, 93).
Other (anonymous) Guardian and Daily Telegraph journalists who Willems interviewed noted that
‘if one white farmer was killed, that created far more news input than if thirty blacks were killed’,
and how one editor said ‘look, put white and black in your lead paper, and you know, you are on the
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wire’. As another concluded, ‘people like to read about themselves’ (Willems 2005, 95-6).
At one level, of course, this collective self about which people like to read about is simply
comprised of racial prejudice. As correctly observed by Gérard Prunier, a prominent observer of
conflict in the Great Lakes, ‘white corpses are heavier than black corpses’ (in Keane, 13th January
2005;  compare  Achebe  2012,  218-220). As  theorists  of  ‘communitarian  international  relations’
insist,  however, a whole range of other domestic political identities are also (often implausibly)
projected into the international sphere (Walker 1993, chapter 3; Adler 2005; compare ‘projection’ in
Gallagher 2009b). In short, the self and its others - ‘us’ and ‘them’ - are subjects of heightened
international moral concern. In the previous chapter, for example, I outlined the genesis of the new
human  rights  ideas  in  the  1970s.  Unsurprisingly,  however,  these  were  not  uniformly  applied.
Durkheimian and communitarian concerns supervened on ideational dynamics. As Jack Donnelly
(1988) described in detail, the human rights records of Chile, Israel and apartheid South Africa were
subject to a level of concern and scrutiny at the United Nations that the objective brutality of these
regimes cannot plausibly account for.  
In part, as also described in the previous chapter, this ‘bias’ resulted from attempts by the
Third World bloc to use international law and regimes to discredit their ideological opponents (cf.
Irwin 2012, chapter 4). These attempts could only attract Western sympathy, however, because of
the ways these regimes symbolised what Western states identified against: colonialism, racism, and
fascist dictatorship. As Young (1987, 425) outlined at the time, apparently far worse atrocities in
Burundi,  East Timor,  and Northern Nigeria went simultaneously  unnoticed because Westerners
could not understand them in such terms. ‘By what strange calculus’, he asked: 
are the lives of Burundians or Timorese worth less, or at least less attention, than those of
black South Africans? […]  What  is  special  about  South Africa is  that  it  is  whites  killing
blacks, or at least whites ordering the killing of blacks. […] For the white people of the world,
or at least its thinking part, South Africa represents a peculiarly painful guilt, a reminder of
their historical awfulness, of slavery and racism, of the failure of Western civilisation to live
up to the ideals of freedom and liberty in its relations with non-European peoples. […] The
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parents see in their offspring the image of their own inadequacies (T. Young 1987, 425-6). 
In Britain, today, conversely, as Paul Gilroy (2005, 105) has written, such feelings of pain and guilt
mean that images of white Zimbabweans are not only ‘deployed to contest and seize the position of
victim’,  but  also  to  symbolise  ‘the  severe  problems  that  arise  once  colonial  order  has  been
withdrawn or sacrificed’ (for more on British-Zimbabwean relations Gallagher 2011). When these
framings are successful they enable white farmers, like supporters of apartheid, to become subject
to heightened levels of Western moral concern - even if this concern is of a diametrically opposed
kind. The key point here,  pace the ‘norm spiral’ model, is that political culture ensures that some
transnational movements are more likely to get off the ground than others.
An important feature of attempts to build such familial and communitarian identification is
‘personalisation’ (see  above). In  2000  the  death  of  David  Stevens  attracted  significant  media
attention. Hello! magazine even devoted five-pages to an interview with his wife Maria (Hello!, 23rd
May 2000, in Willems 2005, 95). More recently, however, Ben Freeth himself has become the face
of commercial farming. He has been featured on the BBC News website 14 times, with a photo of
his  face  accompanying  the  headline  on  7  occasions80.  This  identification  was  promoted,  most
significantly,  by  an  award-winning  documentary  entitled,  revealingly,  Mugabe  and  the  White
African (2009)81. Focusing almost entirely on Freeth, Mike Campbell and their family, the film, in
Desmond Tutu’s words, narrates the SADC Tribunal case as a ‘David and Goliath’ battle between
Freeth and President Mugabe (Freeth 2011, foreword). A subsequent book by Ben Freeth, with the
same  title,  goes  even  further  down  this  path.  According  to  Mike  Thomson,  the  BBC  Today
programme’s  foreign  affairs  correspondent,  it  ‘lays  bare  … ‘a  Clockwork Orange’ state  where
racism, greed and violence are ultimately humbled by almost unimaginable courage’ (Freeth 2011,
cover). It opens with an account (excerpted on the back-cover) of a (an otherwise) unremarkable
meeting  between  Freeth  and  Mugabe  in  the  1990s.  Freeth  describes  a  ‘clammy  …  lifeless’
handshake with the President, whom he characterises as ‘a reptile and not a warm-blooded human
being’ (Freeth 2011, 16-7).
Framing FTLR in these terms mobilised effectively in Britain,  and helped, indirectly,  to
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generate support for liberal jurists’ campaigns to save the SADC Tribunal. In 2010 Freeth received
an MBE, curiously, ‘for services to the farming community in Zimbabwe’ (Daily Telegraph  12th
June  2010).  His  2011 book came with  forewords  from Desmond Tutu  and  John Sentamu,  the
Archbishop  of  York  who  famously  destroyed  his  dog  collar  on  BBC  television  to  protest  at
Mugabe’s actions (BBC News, 9th December 2007; Freeth 2011, foreword). Freeth’s charity, the
Mike Campbell  Foundation,  has held events at  the Royal Geographical Society hosted by Kate
Hoey, MP, Chair of the all-Parliamentary Committee on Zimbabwe. Hoey (5th November 2013) has
encouraged Peter Hain - a former Labour minister and anti-apartheid campaigner - to meet with
Freeth,  ‘a brave Zimbabwean standing up for the rule of law’.  As revealed during a House of
Commons debate replete with (somewhat nostalgic) references to Zimbabwe’s former status as the
‘bread basket of Africa’ - her Committee had even arranged for a special screening of Mugabe and
the White African  at Westminster in 2009. Paying ‘special tribute’ to Freeth and his (undeniable)
courage,  Hoey  concluded  -  mistakenly,  as  it  turned  out  -  that ‘ZANU-PF’s  intransigent  and
dishonest response to the tribunal [sic] helped leaders of SADC Governments to recognise the true
nature of what they are up against with the old guard in Zimbabwe’ (Commons Hansard, 27th April
2011, column 73WH). 
(c) Resistance
Writing in The Guardian Blessings-Miles Tendi (5th February, 2010) criticised Mugabe and
the White African.  He pointed out that Zimbabwe’s history of land alienation,  and colonial and
white minority rule was simply absent from the film. Farm-workers, for their part, were literally
consigned to the background (for farmers’ story-telling more generally see Pilossof 2012, chapter
5). In his conclusion, meanwhile, Tendi noted how, in 
a  separate  documentary  by  Hopewell  Chinono  called  ‘A Violent  Response’ ...  Michael
Campbell comments on the Mount Carmel Farm violence by saying ... [‘]I do not believe that
any of them are capable of ruling themselves. Democracy is a joke’ […] Were [the directors
Lucy] Bailey and [Andrew] Thompson so gullible to fall for Michael’s ‘I am a white African’
pretensions  or  did  they  conveniently  choose  to  omit  the  unpalatable  reality  that  colonial
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attitudes endured in independent Zimbabwe?
If Bailey and Thompson framed their material by screening-out ‘unpalatable’ and illiberal
beliefs, Ben Freeth himself has been consistently up-front about them. As Freeth informed me, his
legal  team have  often  been  ‘a  hard  task-master’,  telling  him ‘down-boy’ when he  risks  going
overboard (interview, 5th April 2012). As one of them informed me, for example, contacting Cherie
Booth was like releasing ‘a bull in a china shop’ (anonymous interview, April 2012). In his solely
authored publications, however, Freeth has been free from such constraints. He expresses views
clearly  at  odds  with  the  contemporary  liberal  ones  some  theorists  equate  with  human  rights.
Capitalism,  Freeth  maintains,  is  a  product  of  a  unique  Anglo-Saxon  and  Protestant  genius.
‘America’,  notably,  ‘was  good  because  it  understood  the  truth’;  a  truth  revealed  by  the  Old
Testament,  the  prosperity  of  Sumeria,  Magna Carta,  John  Wyclif’s  vernacular  bibles,  and  ‘the
Christian-inspired enlightenment that drove the Glorious Revolution’ (Freeth 2013, 55, 121-2, 130,
157, 164; 7th  March 2013). Now this legacy is threatened by a ‘Marxist totalitarian’ and ‘godless’
ideology of Communism in Southern Africa (Freeth 2013, 55, 101). The ‘genocides’ inflicted by
Lenin, Stalin and Mao will inevitably result (Freeth 2002). Authors cited to prove this point include
Ayn Rand and Rousas Rushdoony (who elsewhere advocated the death penalty for homosexuality,
apostasy, sabbath-breaking, failing to restore bail and other crimes) (Freeth 2013, 51-2; Longman
III 1998, 115). Africa, meanwhile, has only been exposed to these truths by Anglo-Saxon settlement
and colonisation. Prior to this it had no wheels, no calendars, no civilization without slavery, and
‘each day simply merged into the next’ (Freeth 2013, 139). On a trek in northern Kenya he had
observed how ‘enveloped by a universe of tyranny, the Omotic tribes were suspended in a world of
their own’ (Freeth 2011, 38). Rhodesia in the 1970s may therefore have appeared ‘idyllic’, but ‘like
a crocodile lurking below the water, conflict was close at hand’ (Freeth 2011, 22). The crocodile -
‘often used as a picture of evil’ in the Bible, and which has ‘remained virtually unchanged since the
age of the dinosaurs’ - is the ‘clan totem’ of President Mugabe (Freeth 2011, 89-90).
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3. Reparations for Africa
(a) The transformation of transnational movement
As described in the previous chapter, the same 1970s dilemmas which helped displace the
Westminster Model generated new beliefs and legitimation strategies for African states. While these
states  had  begun  arguing  for  reparations  during  the  Cold  War,  the  impetus  for  a  genuinely
transnational movement only  came from Nigeria in 1990. The politically-influential businessman
and philanthropist M.K.O. Abiola had become well-acquainted with the latest developments in this
area thanks to contacts with Congressional Black Caucus and Jewish groups in the United States.
He now organised a series of high-profile conferences on the subject,  receiving support from a
number of states. In 1992, the OAU swore-in a twelve-member Group of Eminent Persons (GEP)
charged with information gathering in pursuit of reparations for slavery and possibly other historical
wrongs done to Africa (for this paragraph Howard-Hassmann 2008, 26-7; Gifford 2012, 77-82).
The GEP clearly represented an effort to re-legitimate the international politics of the 1970s
and 1980s.  It  included key African advocates for the NIEO, notably Samir Amin (a prominent
dependency  theorist),  Amadou-Mahtar  M’Bow  (UNESCO  Director  during  its  controversial
advocacy for a New World Information and Communication Order), and East African intellectual
Ali  Mazrui  (Howard-Hassmann  2008,  32,  72)82.  None  of  its  members,  however,  despite
disagreements over specific issues, ever departed from the position that states not groups should
receive reparations. Nor did they jettison ‘dependency’ theorists’ arguments about the debilitating
effects of Africa’s enmeshment in the global economy (see chapter 6; see also Howard 1978).  
As Rhoda Howard-Hassmann (2008,  48-9)  has  argued,  however,  drawing on Snow and
Benford (1988), these framings were not conducive to mobilisation. Unlike Holocaust reparations
campaigns, the GEP’s ‘symbolic politics’ failed to ‘personalise’ the issue (see above). And it could
not identify with precision ‘who is the perpetrator of a wrong, who is the victim, what exactly is to
be compensated,  and what  are  the desired reparations’ (Howard-Hassmann 2008, 48).  Practical
problems emerged immediately, and included the notorious difficulties involved in tracing victims
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of slavery, disputes with Black Caucus members and others over whether African-Americans and/or
Africans should receive reparations, and opposition to efforts at symbolically excluding perpetrators
amongst African comprador elites (Makanjuola, February 4-10th 1991). The campaign established
no convincing ‘causal chain between initial actions and later damage’ (Howard-Hassmann 2008,
49). 
As a result, the social movement that coalesced around the GEP was limited to two small
activist networks. Transafrica Forum, based in Washington DC, published some material on the
movement alongside much more significant engagement in demands for reparations for African-
Americans  (Torpey  2004,  176-8;  Howard-Hassmann  2008,  54).  The  London-based  African
Reparations Movement (ARM) drew on older Anglo-Caribbean political networks created in the
late 1970s and early 1980s (Howard-Hassmann 2008, 29, 54; Gifford 2012, 77-82). This advocacy
reflected a multiculturalist turn on the metropolitan British Left that was provoked by socialist and
anti-racist dilemmas (cf. Bernie Grant, the ARM’s founder, in Gilroy 1990; Shukra 1998, 68; C.
Jones  2014).  More  recently,  following  the  failure  of  African  states’ campaigns,  these  Anglo-
Caribbean networks have embraced similar reparations (for slavery) by Caribbean states83. These
states are being advised on this by the same specialist law firm (Leigh Day) that is responsible,
inter alia,  for the Mau-Mau veterans lawsuit  (for details  R. Sanders 2013; Associated Press in
Miami, 26th July 2013). Thanks to new histories, moreover, they have been able to draw much more
plausible causal connections between ‘initial actions and later damage’. Most notably, careful work
by a group of historians working with Catherine Hall - a London-based historian of the Caribbean
on the new Left in the 1970s - has been instrumental in identifying past and present beneficiaries of
£20 million (an enormous £11.6 billion in today’s money) paid in 1833 by the British government to
slave-owners in compensation for abolition (Draper 2009; C. Hall 2013; Matthews 2013, 22). This
work has formed a central plank in the Caribbean states’ case (R. Sanders 2013; C. Jones 2014)84. 
The difficulties encountered by African reparations contrast starkly with the more successful
mobilisation around ‘limited claims’ by Mau-Mau veterans and descendants of survivors of the
Herero and Nama genocide (for limited claims Howard-Hassmann 2008, 56-9). Despite complica-
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tions often associated with the contemporary representation of victims, in such cases wrongs and
their perpetrators can typically be identified with precision. Not only to do states have legal person-
alities - a significant practical advantage over claims for the slave trade - but atrocities can be more
easily personalised. British and German Documentaries, exhibitions and press articles in the press
have all focused significantly on Terence Gavaghan, the Officer-in-Charge of Rehabilitation in the
Mwea Camps for Mau-Mau detainees, and, of course, Lothar von Trotha - the general who issued
the infamous extermination order of 1994 (e.g. Kenya: White Terror 2002; BBC News, 14th August
2004; Namibia Genocide and the Second Reich 2005; McGreal, 13th October 2006; Sears, 10th April
2011). 
The  groups  mobilised  around  the  Herero  and  Nama  genocide  reflect  these  global
transformations. A key factor in mobilising German support for reparations claims has been framing
in terms of Holocaust legacies. Such practices have a pre-history, beginning with the controversies
surrounding ‘incorporation’ of South-West Africa after 1945 (see chapter 3). Using the languages
and  ideas  of  the  Nuremburg  trials,  activists  sought  to  connect  earlier  German  ‘crimes  against
humanity’ with  South  African  failures  to  honour its  mandate. The key figure  then  was  radical
Anglican priest Michael Scott, around whom the most important figures in the small world of post-
1945 human rights activism coalesced. (Scott received assistance from the Indian UN delegation,
Natal’s Council for Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt, the International League for the Rights of
Man, MPs Frank Byers and Tom Driburg, and the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society
(which had previously represented Namibian groups at the League of Nations, and now represented
the pre-history of the rights movement) [for these organisations’ support and (unusual) activities
Yates  and  Chester  2006,  83,  90,  103-5;  Dedering  2009;  Moyn  2010,  125;  Irwin  2011,  15-18;
McMahon 2013, 186-7].) In a groundbreaking institutional development, Scott was granted special
permission to petition the United Nations in 1949. He summarised his demands in an article of the
same year, focusing directly on the figure of von Trotha and continuities with the Holocaust:
then came the German colonists, hungry for land; and finally von Trotha, a general whom
Hitler would have been delighted to honour … the Germans had not gas chambers then, but
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killed babies with their own hands, or burned sick old women in their huts (in Gewald 2004,
68).
Cold War politics, however, soon checked the emergence of international criminal law, and
put an end to such forms of mobilisation. Genocide in South-West Africa became associated with
South Africa not Germany, and was publicised by African and Namibian anti-colonial nationalists,
not human rights activists (see Irwin 2012, chapter 4; compare Moyn 2010, chapter 3). This became
especially pronounced after the Sharpeville massacre, when international attention began to focus
on South Africa’s human rights record (Klotz 1995, 463; Black 1999, 82-6). SWAPO and SWANU
made allegations of genocide in South-West Africa at the UN. A 1962 fact-finding mission sent by
the Special  Committee for the country,  however, rejected the allegations, and its (controversial)
‘Carpio-Verwoerd’ communiqué found no breach of the mandate (du Pisani 1986, 138-9). Even
radical international sympathisers such as Michael Scott and Ruth First sought to frame advocacy in
more moderate terms, and accused nationalists of over-politicising the genocide concept (Yates and
Chester 2006, 193, 239). As First wrote to SWANU President Jariretundu Kozonguizi: 
do you not feel this is hard to substantiate in the light of the definition of genocide in the 1948
convention?  The  result  of  land  and  labour  policies  and  neglect  of  the  social  and  health
conditions of the people is  undoubtedly great ...  but is  this  genocide? ...  Perhaps I’m too
sensitive to a certain proneness to exaggerate a very good case and, by slightly over-doing it,
to render it shaky (Ruth First, letter of July 14th 1962 [Ruth First Papers]).
West German groups mobilised around Southern Africa in this period were, however, largely
unconcerned with such niceties - or even rights issues more generally. Unlike in Britain and the
United States for instance, where anti-apartheid was influenced by liberal and religious ideas and
enjoyed broad generational appeal, here ‘solidarity’ with Southern Africa was firmly nested within
radical student movements activism (compare Skinner 2010, chapter 7 with Schilling 2014, 135-
142).  During  the  1960s  West  Germany  had  only  recently  emerged  from  Allied  tutelage.  The
generational shift of this period led to widespread critique of the complicity of state elites in Nazi,
rather than colonial crimes. In 1967, most famously, radical students at the University of Hamburg
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attacked statues of former German colonial ‘heroes’ in the belief that:
by attacking this ‘embodiment of the Aryan master race’ in direct action, they could unmask
the  West  German  establishment  as  heirs  to  Nazism  and  contribute  to  a  ‘change  in
consciousness’ that would lead to solidarity with the struggle of liberation movements in the
Third World and a revolution against a perceived deeply ingrained deference to authority at
home (Cornils 2011, 197).
After 1968 the new popularity of Maoist and Third-Worldist ideas saw a number of student groups
raise funds for the revolutionary and guerilla activities of political organisations identifying with
their brand of socialist thought (Kössler and Melber 2002, 110, 114).
After  the human rights  revolution,  by contrast,  Daniel  Cohn-Bendit,  the Franco-German
student leader of 1968, would ask whether West German solidarity should have been shown towards
the (Vietnamese) victims of imperialist genocide, instead of towards the anti-imperialist resistance
which  claimed to  represent  them (Melber  and Kössler  2002,  118).  In  the  1980s  West  German
solidarity movements joined the international human-rights-against-apartheid mainstream (Kössler
and Melber 2002, 122; Köhler 2002, 150-151). Only in the early to mid-2000s - after years of
public disinterest in African affairs, and in a parallel with Britain’s Mau-Mau Justice Network -
would members of the old anti-imperialist West German Left throw themselves behind the Herero
and  Nama  reparations  campaign  (for  previous  disinterest  Hofmeier  2002)85.  In  what  follows  I
describe how this accompanied framings in terms of Holocaust legacies. 
(b) Framing
The emergence of new beliefs animating those mobilised around these issues is well ex-
plained by Torpey (2001, 334). He describes 
the emergence of a broader "consciousness of catastrophe" that is rooted in but goes well bey-
ond Holocaust awareness. This novel sensibility derives fundamentally from the dominant in-
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terpretations  of  the history of  the twentieth century,  which stress its  catastrophic qualities
rather than the humanitarian possibilities to which its disasters have given momentum. 
These ‘catastrophic’ interpretations are, of course, themselves to be understood as reactions to the
crises of socialist utopias (for critique Badiou 2005). As many commentators pointed out, for ex-
ample, debates about German colonialism in 2004 strongly paralleled the famous ‘historians wars’
of the 1980s (Fitzpatrick 2008; Gerwarth and Malinowski 2009). These ‘wars’ were primarily about
whether Soviet atrocities should be commemorated like Nazi ones (see Eley 1988). Whilst it is true
that some scholars, ever since Hannah Arendt (1951, part II), have postulated discursive and struc-
tural similarities between colonial atrocity and the Holocaust, these ideas had only become objects
of widespread academic discussion with the beginnings of organised comparative research into gen-
ocide in the 1990s. Paralleling wider efforts to de-link the study of human rights from an exclusive
grounding in the history of the West, scholars such as those associated with the Journal of Genocide
Research (founded 1999) have attempted to challenge the ‘trope of uniqueness’ that has surrounded
the Holocaust  (Moses  2002; Fitzpatrick 2008, 483;  Stone Ed.  2008;  Gerwarth and Malinowski
2009, 280). These efforts dramatically altered the scholarly consensus among historians of German
colonialism in the 10 years after 1995 (Lennox 2010, lvi-lvii). 
Nevertheless, despite these shifts Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer could still  declare in
2003 that the Herero lawsuit precluded official apology. Germans, he announced, were not ‘host-
ages to their history’; an allusion to longstanding debates over whether a ‘final stroke’ was required
to finally reconcile the country with its traumatic past (Diebold, Engelhardt and Iskenius 2004, 55;
Kössler 2006, 58). Throughout the 2004 centenary of the genocide a small number of activists or-
ganised events designed to contest this perspective, comprised largely of ‘scholarly conferences,
adult education initiatives and information venues, television features and exhibitions of various
shapes and sizes’ (Kössler 2006, 58). Zeller (2005, in Melber 2014, 163) enumerates six distinct ex-
hibitions and more than twenty seminars, panel debates, public lecture series and conferences from
mid-2003 to mid-2005; many more than were held in Namibia. Contemporary Pan-Africanist NGOs
in the ‘No Amnesty for Genocide’ alliance now obtained significant exposure for the first time (for
contemporary Pan-Africanism see H. Campbell 2009; contrast Cheikh Anta Diop in Mazrui 2005,
192
58). AfricAvenir - one of the most important of these, founded in Berlin in 2000 before the Durban
conference - has since 2005 organised more events (mostly in Germany) every year than in the
whole of its previous existence86. But all of these events have remained ‘directed mainly towards a
limited and committed audience’ (Kössler 2006, 58). 
Of perhaps wider import, however, was Herero, a highly-publicised 2003 novel by anarchist
and 1968 student activist Gerhard Seyfried87. This revived Arendt’s thesis but was sometimes criti-
cised by academic experts (e.g. Eckert 2007, 276). Largely told from the point of view of German
protagonists - who act as ‘focalizers representing colonial thinking’ - Herero places key dates, par-
ticular perpetrators, and guilty institutions in the spotlight (Göttsche 2013, 90). Also significant was
a prime time television series and accompanying 2005 book produced by Horst Gründer, ‘one of the
grand old men of German colonial historiography’ (Kössler 2008, 326). Gründer had long opposed
expanding the scope of the genocide concept, and in a 2005 public debate about the Maji Maji war
claimed it was time to shed ‘whininess, larmoyency and the penitential robe’, since all modernisa-
tion had proved socially destructive (Steinmetz and Hell 2006, 157; Kössler 2008, 326). Neverthe-
less, even critics that praised his book asserted that ‘continuities between colonialism and Nazism
… seem too comfortably resolved’ (Eley 2010, 65). Comparative scholars of genocide were more
openly critical. Jürgen Zimmerer, perhaps the leading proponent of these new perspectives in the
Namibian debate, and then editor of the Journal of Genocide Research, was rebuked by Gründer for
alleging that he had ‘reintegrate[d] colonialism as a positively valued epoch of national history’
(Kössler 2008, 326; see also Zimmerer 2005). 
(c) Resistance
Despite their comparatively limited impact, the new reparations advocacy of Pan-Africanist
organisations nevertheless helps showcase the ‘appropriation’ of rights for local political struggles.
AfricAvenir, for example, was founded in Douala in the 1980s by the Cameroonian intellectual and
Germanist Prince Kum’a Ndumbe III88. Ndumbe’s father was a member of the Union des Popula-
tions du Cameroun (UPC): the country’s largest anti-colonial rebel movement which was excluded
from power at decolonisation thanks to a compromise between the French government and less rad-
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ical political forces (Ndumbe III, April-May 2010; Joseph 1977 remains the classic account of the
UPC). For the last thirty years Ndumbe, like other UPC sympathisers, has turned towards human
rights activism as a means of internationalising domestic struggles for recognition. Like the group
associated with Kuaima Riruako, contemporary UPC activists have sought to receive justice for co-
lonial repression by directly addressing the former colonial power, bypassing inhospitable bilateral
relations  (Libération,  17th September  2008;  for  the  internationalisation  of  current  UPC  rights
strategies Pommerolle 2005, 72-3, 241-2; 2006, 79-81).
Kuaima Riruako’s own ‘sustained campaigning, including court action in the USA’ has been
central  to ‘the dynamism which the whole issue … [has] gained since the mid-1990s’ (Kössler
2008, 326). And he too has also been willing to frame his cause in terms of pan-Africanism and new
reparations beliefs. In 2006, for example, in a speech delivered at the Global Pan Afrikan Repara-
tions and Repatriation Conference in Accra, he described how:
the world is full of victims: victims of war and genocide for land, oil, gold, diamonds and
people to enslave […] It  is  instructive to hear  African people,  Continental  and Diaspora,
whose growth and development have been interrupted by colonialism, slavery, and genocide,
tell their story. Each thinks that their experience was the worst, that their colonizer or slaver
was the most brutal, most evil, and that their experience was the longest and most devastating.
I would say that each of us speaks our truth. It was the worst, for us (Riruako 2012, 119-120).
Elsewhere, meanwhile, he has sought to frame his demands in terms of the more specific Holocaust
parallels which have recently given the campaign momentum in Germany: ‘the Herero Genocide in
1904 was the inaugural holocaust, succeeded by the Jewish Holocaust in the 1940s and enacted by
the same sovereign power’ (Sarkin 2010, vi).
To perhaps an even greater extent than Kum’a Ndumbe III, however, Riruako - who himself
has a degree in political science - has appropriated reparations ideas within a web of internationally
unorthodox beliefs. In the 1980s, after his (contested) selection as Herero Paramount, he particip-
ated in South Africa’s controversial efforts at internal settlement (see du Pisani 1986, 416; Soggot
194
1986, 271-3). Genocide commemorations became symbols of ‘peace between black and white’ and
‘South African-sponsored Opposition to SWAPO’ (Gewald 2004, 296; Förster 2007, 253-5). Riru-
ako began also blending neo-traditionalist ideas with a Cold War brand of Christian conservatism
(compare Gatsha Buthelezi in Southall 1981). These ideas identified the apartheid government as a
bulwark against ‘materialistic communism […] the most dangerous ideology ever known to man’.
Communism’s ‘diabolical anti-Christ plan’ violated ‘the belief in a Supreme Being (Mukuru, Mod-
imo) by the African’. And it also undermined ‘the communal system’ of ‘African society’. In this
system, although ‘land really belongs to the people, including the chief … no man can take or na-
tionalise another man’s property’ and ‘tribal society is composed of the rich, the middle class and
the poor’ (see Riruako 1984, 9-10). These statements were not, however, purely for external con-
sumption. Riruako openly encouraged the death penalty in tribal courts, for example - not a position
destined to secure international legitimacy (Riruako 1984, 22; see also Soggot 1986, 278). More
strikingly for our purposes, furthermore, he continues to espouse similar positions today - well after
they have lost their political utility. As he explained to me, the campaign was launched on behalf of
‘my tribe or nation whom I love’, and was inspired by Biblical models of leadership including Jesus
Christ and John the Baptist. Unlike some of his more radical supporters he hoped that reparations
payments would not be used for land reform until it was possible to ‘educate people of this country
until land becomes one of those things’ (interview, 27th August 2011).
As with Ben Freeth in Zimbabwe, internationally unorthodox beliefs such as these have thus
required strategic framing to mobilise most widely. Riruako’s attempts to do so have dovetailed
with the more orthodox objectives of his advisors and legal team. Esther Muinjangue, for example -
the Ovaherero Genocide Committee Chair - would prefer that the campaign be understood as ‘com-
munity mobilisation’ rather than simply about Riruako’s leadership, even if ‘we give him the ac-
knowledgement that he started the whole issue and so on and so on’ (interview, 23 rd  August 2011).
Jeremy Sarkin, similarly, who has volunteered his services pro bono as legal advisor, has certainly
not hoped solely to promote Riruako’s leadership claims. He has also sought to challenge ‘patriotic
history’ in Namibia and to pluralise its nationalist narrative; ‘the current case for reparations is
about more than restitution; it is about the preservation of ethnic memory and identity for a group
that has been denied official recognition and land by its post-independent [sic] government’ (Sarkin
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2008, 184). He hopes that the case will help publicise the victimhood of not only anti-SWAPO
political forces (such as Riruako and NUDO), but also ex-SWAPO members (such as the dissidents
detained and tortured at Lubango in Angola the 1980s) (interview, 12 th August 2011; for details
Groth 1996; Southall 2013, 62-3). Having worked himself for South Africa’s Truth and Reconcili-
ation Commission, he hopes, like some others in Windhoek civil society, that the reparations cam-
paign will help promote a similar process for Namibia89. 
4. Indigenous rights in Bostwana
(a) The transformation of a transnational movement
The  early  2000s  also  saw new framing  techniques  used  by the  transnational  campaign
opposing  relocations  in  the  CKGR.  As  before,  moreover,  these  techniques  were  deployed  by
activists  holding new beliefs  which  had emerged in the  1970s.  Western interest  in  the CKGR,
however,  long predated this period.  As described in the previous chapter,  Western publics have
traditionally displayed ‘double vision’ towards modernisation projects in Africa (see Robins 2001).
In Botswana this was evident as early as the inter-war period. As outlined in chapter 4, nineteenth-
century  missionaries  had  pressured  the  government  to  abolish  San  ‘slavery’.  As  the  colonial
administration  began  to  move  in  this  direction,  however,  the  most  vocal  British  critics  of
Tswanadom suddenly became  its  staunchest defenders. In 1930  Tshekedi Khama, the Regent of
Bangwato, had travelled to the country to raise support for his campaign against unprecedented
levels  of  metropolitan  interference  in the  judicial  and constitutional  affairs  of  the  Protectorate.
Khama succeeded in rallying a number of key constituencies to his cause ‘the missionaries, the
humanitarians,  liberal  politicians  or  those  who  just  needed  a  stick  with  which  to  beat  the
government  of  the  day,  and  finally,  most  important  of  all,  the  press’ (Crowder  1985,  212).
(Intriguingly, given Survival International’s later tactics, Khama had done so by framing his cause
in terms of the damaging consequences of plans for mining; ‘if towns such as Johannesburg spring
up we have lost the whole of the country’, he told Sidney Webb (by then Lord Passfield) (Crowder
1985, 204).  In 1935 he and others  were able  to mobilise these same constituencies against  the
colonial government’s new abolitionism (compare Solway 2009, 337, n.17). He wrote the first part
of a London Missionary Society (1935) report on the issue. ‘African tribal life’, this concluded, ‘is a
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complicated and intimate social structure which it is most undesirable to break down forcibly or
hastily without fully understanding the system and its  sanctions and having a well  thought out
policy of reconstruction ready to apply’. San interests would be best protected by maintaining their
incorporation under improved conditions, and not by ‘turn[ing] them back to the desert where they
would revert to the hunting stage of life’ (in Russell 1976, 184).
The depth of the post-war modernist shift, however, provoked a traditionalist reaction eager
to defend ‘reversions’ to the ‘hunting stage of life’. In North America and Britain, especially, this
traditionalism was catalysed by the extraordinary success of Laurens van der Post, whose films
helped pressure the British government to create the CKGR (see chapter 4; Wilmsen 1995). As
analysed in the previous chapter, however, efforts to effect such changes via litigation would only
come later,  with the emergence of indigenous rights NGOs such as Survival  International.  The
organisation’s activities in Botswana provide some evidence for this shift. These began in 1975-6,
and focused around health and education (Resnick 2009, 62; Survival International, N.d.a, 3). As
Barbara Bentley (1976, 352) wrote, the ‘common thread’ running through all SI’s new projects at
the time was that they were ‘designed to provide specific groups of aboriginal peoples with the
opportunity or  "breathing  space"  in  which  to  gather  themselves  together  to  protect  their  rights
against the encroachment of the modern world’. Focusing on ‘ethnocide’ and conscientisation they
were informed by the narrow rights agenda and post-1968 utopianism typical of the period (see
chapter 6). Although land rights could perhaps be secured by ‘if necessary buying the land and
giving it to the aboriginal peoples concerned’, the ‘problems of aboriginal peoples’ were, ultimately,
‘part  of  a  larger  problem of  global  proportions’ (Bentley 1976,  352).  Fundamentally,  as  Jaulin
(1970,  422)  wrote,  ‘the  solution  of  ethnocide  will  only  be  found  within  the  framework  of  a
modification of the attitude of the West to the universe’ (in Bentley 1976, 352). 
Ultimately,  however,  Africa  would  only  become  a  focus  of  indigenous  rights  activism
following the end of the Cold War (as described in chapter 9). In the 1980s there was little trace of
the explicit land rights programmes that were already being developed for other continents. SI’s
first  Urgent Action Bulletin  on the CKGR dates from 1989, and was issued amid allegations by
government  officials  that  SI  was  assisting  apartheid  ‘destabalisation’ (R.  Hitchcock 1999,  109;
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2002,  806;  see  also  chapter  4).  Such  accusations  worked  powerfully  to  disable  transnational
mobilisation.  They could even claim some  a priori  plausibility,  moreover,  thanks to the (albeit
rather  academic) controversy which had surrounded Jamie Uys’ very successful  1980 film  The
Gods Must be Crazy. This film begins, famously, with a Coca Cola bottle falling out of the sky from
a plane. The arrival of the mysterious object leads the San protagonist to have a series of comedic
encounters with incompetent and malevolent black African politicians and Cuban revolutionaries.
The film, financed by the South African government, was roundly denounced by academics for its
essentialist depictions of San life and ‘thinly disguised … propaganda’ (Lee 1986, 91; see also
Hunter 1985; Volkman 1985; Parsons 2006, 38). For the anthropologist Robert Gordon (1992, 1) it
was  proof  that  ‘some films  can  kill’.  Some anti-apartheid  groups even held  protests  against  it
(Parsons 2006, 38). At the time even Laurens van der Post - who famously visited the Kalahari with
Prince  Charles  in  1987  -  did  not  criticise  planned  relocations90.  A rare  1988  article  in  the
Washington Post criticising relocations, and drawing a hostile response from the government, was
clearly at pains to avoid advocating ‘separate development’ (Harden, 27th March 1988; R. Hitchcock
1999, 108-9). It stressed that life in the CKGR was ‘no longer the stuff of romantic movies’, and
pointedly cited revisionist anthropologists, such as Edwin Wilmsen, who understood San-Batswana
relationships in terms of economic inequalities rather than cultural incompatibilities (Harden, 27 th
March 1988; for ‘revisionism’ see chapter 8).
(b) Framing
As described in chapter 4, a transnational movement centered around indigenous rights and
opposition to the CKGR relocations began to emerge in the early 1990s. Its framing tactics, how-
ever, remained largely similar. Like its predecessors it sought to appeal to the symbolism of Western
anti-modernist nostalgia. The Marshall family, for instance - who made a series of famous ethno-
graphic films about the San in the 1950s - have now been shown to have ‘deliberately excluded any
signs of acculturation amongst the Ju/Wasi, such as the use of modern implements (pots, pans,
Western clothing, tyres, water drums, and so on)’ (van Vuuren 2009, 562, discussing Tomaselli and
Homiak 1999, 160-1). By 1980 John Marshall was seeking to challenge essentialism, and even shot
‘footage of the filming of The Gods Must Be Crazy’ to show ‘the racist and patronising attitudes of
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the South African filmmakers’. But in 1991, post-apartheid, he was once again happy to use his
films from the 1950s to promote San land claims in Namibia (van Vuuren 2009, 567, 572).
First People of the Kalahari (FPK), for its part, was also, initially, keen to mobilise old im-
agery in the new geo-political context of the 1990s. In 1996 van der Post - who described reloca-
tions as ‘unforgiveable’ - arranged for Roy Sesana and John Hardbattle to meet with Prince Charles
at his home in Balmoral (Block, 26th May 1996; R. Hitchcock 1999, 115; Booker, 26 th October
2013). The publicity they helped create generated support, notably, from the House of Lords and the
American Senate (Block, 26th May 1996; R. Hitchcock 1999, 115). But it was also criticised by a
variety of diplomats and human rights organisations. The Swedish ambassador defended the gov-
ernment’s intentions (Block, 26th May 1996). Linda Chalker, the British Minister for Overseas De-
velopment, made similar arguments in response to criticism in the House of Lords (Lords Hansard,
16th May 1996). Whilst for the American ambassador the real question, apparently, was ‘how does a
hunter-gatherer culture fit into modern life in an age of telecommunications and travel to Mars?’
(Matloff,  September 3rd 1997).  San activist  Louis Liebenberg,  finally, claimed that  ‘people like
Laurens van der Post have done much to focus attention on the Bushmen but have also done a lot of
damage by creating a romantic, mythical image of Bushman life’ (Block, 26th May 1996). 
These constituencies, unsurprisingly, are still appealed to. In 2014 FPK activist Jumanda
Kakelebone presented a letter to Prince Charles stating that ‘we know that you walked with Laurens
van der Post and the bushmen a long time ago. You know who we are. We are begging you to talk to
president Khama and ask him to stop persecuting us’ (Vidal, 18th April 2014). Now, however, such
framings co-exist with more contemporary ones. In the early 2000s SI decided, for the first time, to
also frame the issue in terms of ‘conflict diamonds’ - alleging, more specifically, that intentions to
mine in the Reserve had motivated relocations. This new frame had been created for Western pub-
lics by NGOs, notably Global Witness, who had reported on wars in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone
and the DRC in the 1990s (I. Taylor and Mokhawa 2003, 266-8). It was particularly embarrassing
for the Bostwanan government since its own response to these tactics had been to legitimate itself
internationally as the sole example of an African administration not to fall into the ‘conflict dia-
mond’ trap. In 2001, just before SI’s change of tactics, it had launched a ‘Diamonds for Develop-
ment’ campaign to make just this point for the West (cf. I. Taylor and Mokhawa 2003, 271-3). The
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NGO now held protests outside embassies, official occasions, and the opening of flagship De Beers
stores in London and New York (Mail and Guardian, 22nd June 2005; Resnick 2009, 63). (President
Mogae had earlier, unwisely, described this company as Botswana’s ‘Siamese twin’ (Good 2004,
17, n.2).) In 2005 SI protested outside the National Museum of History in London, which had re-
fused to alter an exhibit about diamond mining in Southern Africa in ways highlighting its costs in
the CKGR (U.S. Embassy Gaborone, 14th July 2005). These activities led supermodels Iman, Erin
O’Connor and Lily Cole to distance themselves from De Beers. The actress Julie Christie and fem-
inist icon Gloria Steinem joined protests against it (Ottawa Citizen, 20th September 2006; Survival
International, N.d.a, 4-5). 
Late 2006 and early 2007, meanwhile, saw the release of the film Blood Diamond, featuring
Leonardo DiCaprio. SI tried to use this to attract younger and perhaps less traditionalist supporters
to its campaign. A full-page advertisement in the magazine  Variety, paid for by SI and FPK, in-
formed DiCaprio that ‘we hope you will use your film The Blood Diamond to let people know that
we too are victims of diamonds, and we just want to go home’ (Survival International, N.d.a, 6; see
also Solway 2009, 323). After the film’s release SI and FPK then
appealed to our black brothers and sisters in the hip hop industry - to Russell Simmons,
Snoop Dogg, Ludacris, and all the other musicians that are household names to help us. We
know you love our diamonds. . . .  at least help us pressure our government to let us go
home. Please don’t let us perish for your ‘bling’ (Solway 2009, 323). 
(c) Resistance
These new framings had a considerable impact.  In 2008 De Beers decided to sell its pro-
specting licenses held in the Reserve, citing the campaign and ‘particular sensitivities regarding the
status of communities in the CKGR subsequent to their court victory’ (Reuters, 6th December 2005;
Survival  International,  29th October  2008;  De Beers,  N.d.).  As  Resnick  (2009,  67)  has  shown,
moreover, an explosion of references to the CKGR controversy in the international news media can
clearly be linked to this new choice of frame (see figure 4). 
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Figure 4: References to the CKGR controversy in magazines, newspapers and international press
agency material (via LexisNexis). From Resnick (2009, 67).
SI’s tactics did, however, alienate the litigation campaign from most of its Botswanan support base -
a sad development described in chapter 491. Even Judge Dow, the judge seemingly most sympathet-
ic to its cause, was scathing in her criticism:
while diamond mining as a reason for the CKGR relocations might be an emotive rallying
point, evoking as it does images of big, greedy multinationals snatching land from, and thus
trampling the rights of small indigenous minorities, the case before this Court does not fit that
bill. It would be completely dishonest of anyone to pretend that that is the case before this
court. Those looking for such a case will have to look somewhere else (Sesana v The Attorney
General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 107).
FPK and Roy Sesana were, indeed, almost alone in following SI’s lead. As a consequence,
and as in Zimbabwe, the applicants’ legal team tried to avoid the diamond issue, and frame their
cause in terms more acceptable to the court and wider society. Judge Dibotelo described tensions on
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this point between Sesana and his lawyer, Gordon Bennett: 
the allegation that the First Applicant was running articles in the press during the trial to the
effect that the mining of diamonds in the CKGR was one of the reasons why the government
was relocating the residents of the CKGR is true and was in fact not denied by the First
Applicant, who also strangely even stated that he did not have confidence in the manner the
Court was handling this case, which statement resulted in his apology to the Court through
his Counsel. I must also state that Counsel for the Applicants has told the Court that it is not
part of the Applicants’ case that they were relocated from the CKGR by the Government in
order to give way to the mining of diamonds in the Reserve (Sesana v The Attorney General
2006, judgement of Dibotelo, paragraph 9).
Apparently fearing such confrontations with the court, both legal teams, strikingly, refused to call
Sesana (the lead applicant) to testify. This led Dibotelo to label Sesana’s allegations as ‘disingenu-
ous’ (Sesana v The Attorney General  2006, judgement of Dibotelo, paragraph 11). Dow, for her
part, noted how Gordon Bennett had failed to ‘rein … in’ Sesana after he had made a series of ‘ri -
diculous’ statements to the press. At one point Bennett even promised ‘to file a letter of undertaking
by Mr. Sesana that he would stop the presentation of the distorted version of his case to the public’
(Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 21).
Unlike in the cases of Ben Freeth and Kuiama Riruako, however, these tensions within the
litigation team do not appear to have resulted from human rights ideas being ‘read’ or ‘appropriated’
according to politically unorthodox webs of belief. Roy Sesana’s ‘resistance’ can, instead, be under-
stood according to the most thoroughly ‘strategic’ accounts of collective action framing (cf. Valoc-
chi 1996). Wikileaks records, indeed, that Sesana had even informed the U.S. Embassy that ‘he did
not agree necessarily with … [SI’s] strategies nor with its campaign to boycott Botswana diamonds.
He thought it only hardened attitudes on both sides [...] [T]he alliance was a last resort’ (U.S. Em-
bassy,  Gaborone,  18th March  2005).  Commenting  on  Sesana’s  rhetorical  flexibility,  Saugestad
(2011, 48) has claimed, in culturalist fashion, that ‘in playing out these different roles Sesana took
on a striking resemblance to the classical trickster, one of the heroes in San mythology and belief
[...] The trickster is perfectly at home in this changing world, in tune with its spirits of disorder and
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flux’. Dow concluded, however - in a more rationalist spirit - that ‘the only conclusion one can
reach, and it is an adverse one, is that this was a case of ‘he who pays the piper, calls the tune’, that
is, Mr Sesana chose to sing the tune dictated by those or some of those who paid for his fees. Unfor-
tunate’ (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 21).
5. Conclusion
Human rights resistance, therefore, need not be a matter of expanding liberalism’s disciplin-
ary apparatus by seeking to provoke it and transgress its limits (see chapter 5). In some cases - as in
the case of Roy Sesana - rights may be invoked for straightforwardly tactical reasons. In other cases
- as with Ben Freeth and Kuaima Riruako - they may be ‘read’ according to transgressive, but non-
etheless profoundly political conservative beliefs. In all cases, the expansion of rights into new do-
mains has seen them become vehicles for non-liberal projects. This expansion, itself analysed in the
previous chapter, has here been used to explain the emergence and transformation of the transna-
tional movements which have supported these litigants. (In the next chapter similar historical dy-
namics will be used to explain particular dilemmas confronting historians and anthropologists who
have provided this support.) New beliefs alone, however, cannot explain the mobilisation of politic-
al energies. In this chapter I have sought to correct for the potential rationalist biases of my David-
sonian approach by integrating it with Durkheimian insights about the roles of imagery and symbol-
ism provided by theorists of collective action ‘framing’ (for this theoretical integration see chapter
5; d’Avray 2010, 91). Actors in transnational movements have framed campaigns in terms of potent
local symbolisms; conflict diamonds, Holocaust legacies, and moral concern for the collective (ra-
cial) self.  
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Chapter 8: Information gathering
1. Introduction
The  first  phase  of  the  norm  spiral  model  begins  with  ‘information-gathering’  by
transnational networks (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 20). The last two chapters have illustrated how this
model  assumes  rather  than  explains  the  emergence  of  these  movements.  This  chapter,  like  the
previous one, shows how focusing on the ideational context for this emergence - which is absent
from the model’s early stages - helps us to understand the model’s failure to explain normative
dysfunction  and  indeterminacy.  It  argues  that  those  1970s  dilemmas  which  produced  new
transnational rights networks were responsible for a very different set of beliefs amongst  historians
and anthropologists; the ‘information-gatherers’ in my Namibian and Botswanan case studies. It is
only by understanding the distinctive attempts of these disciplines to resolve these dilemmas that we
can account for their failures to behave as the norm-spiral model anticipates. In short, prevailing
historical  and  anthropological  orthodoxies  have  posed  obstacles  to  efforts  at  mobilising  the
expertise  necessary for  successful  legal  claims.  Academics  of  all  stripes,  of  course,  have  long
bemoaned the inevitable tensions between their professional commitments and the roles they are
asked to play in legal arenas and as expert witnesses (for stimulating discussions see R. Evans 2002;
Stacey 2004). The tensions examined here, however, are of a new and distinctive kind - explicable
by the dual crisis of the 1970s. More importantly, finally, and as illustrated below, anthropologists
and historians had begun mobilising around the Kalahari San and Herero and Nama genocide long
before  such  disputes  reached  the  courtroom.  Such  groups  have  played  an  integral  part  in  the
mobilisation and transformation of transnational movements described in the previous chapter.
These dilemmas have, by contrast, been of considerably less significance for the brands of
human rights activism focused on by the norm spiral model’s first stage. The ‘ultimate goal’ of such
activists’ information-gathering  is  not  ‘to  challenge  the  ‘truth’ of  something’,  but  is  rather  to
‘challenge whether it is good, appropriate, and deserving of praise’. This process is ‘not necessarily
or entirely in  the realm of  reason,  though facts  and information may be marshalled to  support
claims. Affect, empathy, and principled or moral beliefs may also be deeply involved’ (Finnemore
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and Sikkink 1998, 900).  Allies in the media are central to this. In order to ‘put a norm-violating
state on the international agenda’, however, norm spirals also depend upon the moral authority of
human rights organisations, researchers, and fact-finding missions (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 20; for
‘moral  authority’  Hopgood  2006,  106-7).  These  roles  are  typically  performed  by  Amnesty
International, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the International Commission of
Jurists (e.g. Schmitz 1999, 42; Jetschke 1999, 140). 
There is considerable debate about how to interpret the reports these organisations produce.
Kathryn Sikkink’s former student Hun Joon Kim (2014, 69, 79), for example, has recently stressed
how such researchers, by focusing on facts, can attain ‘objectivity’ and reveal ‘the reality of …
events’. But such claims to ‘unflinching realism’ have been attacked by critics such as Richard
Wilson  (1997,  149),  who equates  this  stripping-away of  context  with  an  elicit  ‘suppression  of
authorial voice’ (but cf. Hopgood 2006, 205-7). Critiques such as Wilson’s are lent credibility by
Kim’s (2014, 70) own observation of how reporters use events ‘as a subject and not as an object in
the sentence, suggesting it is not reporters but the facts of the … events themselves that reveal the
truth’. Stephen Hopgood (2006, 74), likewise, records Amnesty International staffers’ intentional
avoidance of ‘emotive sentences’ or even ‘adjectives and abverbs’. Indeed, even some advocates of
the norm-spiral model are willing to see the primary role of human rights organisations as providing
an ‘interpretive framework’ for new information (Schmitz 1999, 54). These organisations are adept,
notably,  at  portraying  political  violence  in  terms  of  violations  of  physical  integrity  rights  and
‘violent bodily harm’; issues which are thought to resonate particularly well with global publics
(Sikkink 2011, 255). As with the media, therefore, the key political question here is whether rights
activists have access (directly or indirectly) to researchers and organisations who are able to frame
their predicament in these apparently objective terms.
2. Framing human rights violations in Zimbabwe
Our Zimbabwean case study, unlike its Namibian and Botswanan counterparts, is reasonably
well captured by this account. Perhaps the most significant difference was that new information
communication  technology  -  including  digital  and  mobile  phone  cameras  -  allowed  farmers’
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organisations to present violations ‘objectively’ without the aid of major NGOs and human rights
organisations  (cf.  Laurie  2012).  Chapter  2  described information-gathering by JAG (Justice for
Agriculture)  and  GAPWUZ  (The  General  Agricultural  and  Plantation  Workers  Union  of
Zimbabwe).  These  efforts  relied  on  farmers’  already  well-established  organisational  and
communication structures, and were eventually published with the assistance of researchers from
the Research and Advocacy Unit (RAU), a small Harare-based NGO (Pilossof 2012, 1, 45). Whilst
documenting  losses  to  property,  these  reports’ main  ‘focus  … [was] on  violations  of  physical
integrity and political freedoms’ - particularly intimidation, assault, detention, rape, disappearance
and torture (including that of pets) (JAG and GAPWUZ 2009, 24-28; GAPWUZ, RAU and JAG
2010,  3).  Their  findings  were  illustrated  with  ‘unflinching  realism’ and  long  factual  narrative
accounts  of  violence  (JAG  and  GAPWUZ  2008;  GAPWUZ,  RAU  and  JAG  2010;  see  also
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 2007). As described in chapter 2, this information gathering
has been central to the litigation of abuses in South Africa and attracting attention to the farmers’
and farm workers’ cause.
The availability of such information has not, however, been sufficient to place Zimbabwe
‘on the international agenda’. Unusually for an African country, until the early 2000s major British
newspapers, especially, almost all had foreign correspondents based in Harare (Willems 2005, 92).
But the most revelatory of all the country’s human rights reports - a well-known 1997 investigation
by the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and the Legal Resources Foundation into the
Gukurahundi  massacres  of  the  early  1980s  -  attracted  very  little  international  media  attention
(CCRJ and LRF 1997; Willems 2005, 94-5). As described in the previous chapter, violence towards
white farmers (not black farm workers) has mobilised effectively in the West. The badly beaten
faces of Ben Freeth and his family formed the centrepieces to his 2011 book, were the key exhibits
in  the courtroom footage included in  Mugabe and the White  African (2009),  and accompanied
almost all journalistic coverage of the story (e.g.  Daily Telegraph 30th June 2008; Banya, 1st July
2008;  BBC News, 1st July 2008; Freeth 2011). Local actors could thus benefit from Zimbabwe’s
privileged position of the racial hierarchy of moral concern. During interviews with CFU and JAG
representatives in 2003, one of Willem’s (2005, 99) informants described how successful  these
organisations had been in passing on the information they had already ‘framed’ and collected: 
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we usually get contacted before they arrive in the country and the first stop is here. At the
same time, there are still quite a lot of journalists who might be here for two weeks and it’s
only the last couple of days that they hear about us and get in contact with us. Very sad and
they end up doing a lot more work in those two days than they have done in the previous
twelve days. So yah, my advice to those journalists out there is that we’re here, make contact
with us. If you are not prepared to come into the country,  we do have this database with
statistics and a lot of footage, a lot of the camera work has been done and is ready.
The  focus  in  this  chapter,  however,  will  not  be  on  physical  integrity  rights  or  on  the
Zimbabwean case study. Instead I want to illustrate how rights’ expansion into the definition of
groups has necessitated new alliances for litigants: not the press and human rights organisations but
historians and anthropologists.  These people are required to act as expert  witnesses and to add
scientific credibility to allegations of violations. Their particular disciplinary histories, however -
bound up with those same historical shifts which led to the 1970s expansion of rights in the first
place - have typically left them unwilling to provide the ‘information’ that litigants require. The
defining of groups is often simply too contentious. Even at this first stage of the ‘norm spiral’,
therefore, we can begin to observe how the ideational background to new generations of rights is
key to understanding their dysfunction.
3. Reparations histories and the ‘judicalisation of the past’
These historical shifts are particularly evident in the case of historians writing in support of
African reparations. This had begun before groups such as the Herero and Nama began claiming
reparations on their  own behalf. As indicated in the previous chapter, in the 1990s an incipient
global social movement had sought, unsuccessfully, to justify reparations for African states with the
aid of ‘dependency histories’. These histories contrasted with an older modernist historiography of
colonialism.  A key  category  in  this  had  been  ‘primary  resistance’,  which  interpreted  initial
confrontation and non-compliance with colonial powers as connected, in some sense, with much
later  demands  for  decolonisation  (for  an  overview  Walvaren  and  Abbink  2003;  for  leading
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historians’ perspectives on this period Rathbone 2000, preface; Lonsdale 2005, 390; Ranger 2013,
83). In these new ‘dependency’ histories, however, popular on the Marxian Left, ‘glorious historical
pasts for … the new political organisations that would lead African countries in to the New Era’
were de-emphasised (T. Young 2003, 1). In the more extreme formulations, African elites at the
coming of colonialism were portrayed not as icons of resistance but as mere ‘conveyor belts’ for
global economic imperatives (Amin 1972, 518). A corresponding emphasis was placed on how the
capitalist world system, and particularly the slave trade, had allowed Europe to industrialise whilst
leaving Africa  ‘underdeveloped’ - a process only intensified by formal colonial rule (cf. Rodney
1973).
In the 1970s this clearly could serve to justify political demands for a New International
Economic  Order  more  favourable  to  African  industrialisation.  But  following the  demise  of  the
NIEO, it was now unclear how any particular reparations figure could ever be justified. As early as
1979 the UN Secretary General, referencing Rodney (1975), had noted that ‘dependency’ histories
could only support the existence of a right to development in ‘ethical’,  not in legal terms (UN
Secretary General, 2nd January 1979, paragraph 54, n.25). The GEP itself, strikingly, refused to even
provide an estimate of the reparations it demanded. The Jamaican Pan-Africanist Dudley Thompson
claimed this was ‘impossible’ and would ‘trivialise’ the issue - an argument more usually made by
critics of ‘compensation cultures’ (Howard-Hassmann 2008, 28). Subsequent attempts have often
been crude. These range from a figure of $100 trillion (reached by assuming that slavery alone
accounts for the respective population sizes of Africa and Asia), to a wholly unjustified estimate of
$777 trillion (62 times the then gross domestic product of the United States) (the first estimate is
academic, the second produced by activists; Osabu-Kle 2000; Howard-Hassmann 2008, 28). 
Now, however, effective ‘information-gathering’ for reparations campaigns not only had to
help  mobilise  but  had  to  be  guaranteed  by forms  of  historical  expertise  recognisable  by legal
procedure. As shown below, the 1990s saw the rapid development of new historiographical trends
favouring  precisely  such  uses.  These  trends  can  themselves  be  located  within  wider  debates
triggered by the ideological crises of the previous decades.  These surrounded, in particular,  the
possibility of connections between mass violence and universalising ideologies;  the latter  being
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thought inherently prone to ‘othering’ those excluded from their visions of true humanity (cf. Furet
1978; Martin 2008, 88; for analysis Torpey 2001 342-3; Burbank and Cooper 2004, 457). These
new theories have come to de-emphasise structural explanations in favour of the discursive logics
behind atrocities,  focusing historians’ attention on those responsible  for such acts  (recently,  for
example,  Gott  2011).  For  Henri  Rousso  (2000,  73-80),  the  leading  French  student  of  these
developments, they have enabled a ‘judicialisation of the past’92. 
‘Black  books’  and  ‘white  books’  had,  of  course,  long  been  produced  by  parties  to
international conflicts and disputes. These were typically intended to provide seemingly objective
documentary foundations for partisan positions. In post-war Eastern and Central Europe a number
of  these  were  produced  for  traditional  purposes,  publicising  enemy  atrocities,  de-legitimising
occupations, or justifying reparations from defeated parties (e.g. Republic of Poland 1940; Jewish
Anti-Fascist Committee [1946] 1981). Although the Nuremburg Trials ostensibly placed a great
premium on ‘impartial’ information gathering, Cold War politics soon re-established the value of
more obviously partisan documentation (compare The Avalon Project [1946] 2008, 658, 665-6, 691,
with Moscow Press Group of Soviet Journalists 1968; Littell Ed. 1969; but cf. Hirsch 2013). This,
however, had begun to change by the early 1990s. Older documentation practices now began to co-
exist  alongside  ‘black  books’  produced  by  third-parties,  and  intended  to  directly  influence
transitional justice and international criminal-legal institutions (compare,  for example, Reporters
Sans  Frontieres  1993,  with  Estonian  State  Commission  on  Examination  of  the  Policies  of
Repression 2005). 
It was, however, the Black Book of Communism (Courtois et al. 1999) and the Black Book of
Colonialism (Ferro ed. 2003) which marked the (contentious) arrival of this ‘information gathering’
style in the mainstream of professional historiography. The latter was clearly produced, at least in
part,  to  bolster  the reparations demands made at  the  World Conference against  Racism, Racial
Discrimination,  Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,  held in Durban in September 2001 (Ferro
2003, 10; Vuckovic 2003; see also critical comments by Jean Fremigacci in Chrétien et al. 2003). In
line with the demands made at Durban against Western powers, no effort was made to distinguish
between historical periods, slavers and abolitionists, colonialists and anti-colonialists, or any other
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sub-category of the ‘West’. The Black Book simply recorded crimes against humanity; appealing to
a ‘new human rights ideology’ which had emerged thanks to ‘a change in mentality linked to the
dramas of the previous century’ [author’s translation] (Ferro 2003, 11). Like the  Black Book of
Communism, it  was  characterised  by  the  wholesale  adaption  of  analytical  categories  from the
Nuremburg  trials  (for  Left  critique  Badiou  2005,  11).  Most  significantly,  however,  it  did  not
constitute a polemical response to its predecessor, as with traditional ‘black books’. As Burbank and
Cooper (2004, 456) argue, this fact reflected ‘fundamental reconfigurations of intellectual thought
in the 1990s [...] there is no comparison of evils, no setting of colonialism and communism against
each other, no ritual of choice between two systems, no way out toward a different future. Instead
the focus is relentlessly on the murderous violence of the past’.
Subsequent years have seen similar such works and debates produced in conjunction with
‘limited’ reparation claims (see chapter 7). Perhaps the best-known of these in academic circles are
the controversies surrounding ‘information gathering’ for the reparations lodged claim by Kenyan
Mau-Mau veterans in the British High Court. Mau-Mau memories have proved particularly divisive
since a number of ‘loyalist’ Kenyans died aiding the British counterinsurgency. Consequently, the
first President Jomo Kenyatta sought to neutralise these divisions and render them consensual: ‘we
all fought for  uhuru [independence]’ (Lonsdale and Odhiambo 2003, 4). Under second President
Daniel Arap Moi, meanwhile, some of the state’s most radical critics laid claim to the Mau-Mau
inheritance (Clough 2003, 258-261; Pommerolle 2006, 78). After 2002, however,  the Mau-Mau
legacy was wholeheartedly endorsed by the  new democratic  government  of  Mwai  Kibaki  (e.g.
Branch 2009,  xii).  In  this  it  received support,  notably,  from some former  radical  critics  at  the
Kenyan Human Rights Commission. This was the most influential local NGO, and it now began to
prepare  the  veterans’  lawsuit  (Pommerolle  2005,  168,  193,  n.3;  Anderson  2011).  These
developments created a highly politicised context for the twin publication in 2005, on the same day,
of two new academic works on the counter-insurgency: David Anderson’s Histories of the Hanged
(2005) and Caroline Elkins’ Imperial Reckoning (2005) - published in Britain, significantly for our
purposes, as  Britain’s Gulag. Of these Elkins’ Pulitzer-Prize-winning effort has proved the most
controversial,  claiming  as  it  does  that  the  British  detention  and  torture  of  civilians  may have
constituted  an  ‘incipient  genocide’ claiming  the  lives  of  ‘perhaps  hundreds  of  thousands’ of
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Kenyans (Elkins 2005, xvi, 49). These atrocities, Elkins claims, in strikingly contemporary fashion,
were a logical corollary of Britain’s self-ascribed ‘civilising mission’ in the colony (Elkins 2003,
193; 2005, xv). 
Other historians of the period, however, have been notably critical of Imperial Reckoning.
They have accused Elkins, inter alia, of uncritically using oral testimony by members of veterans’
associations  pursuing reparations,  inflating  statistics,  stripping-away context  with  ‘prosecutorial
zeal’,  downplaying Mau-Mau atrocities (discussed by Anderson at  length),  and of allowing her
work to be used as an ‘intellectual prop’ by the notoriously corrupt Kibaki regime (Vice-President
Moody Awori spoke at the book’s Kenyan launch) (e.g. Ogot 2005 493, 502; Blacker 2007; Berman
2007, 534-5; Branch 2009, xv). Often implicit in these criticisms, moreover, has been an allegation
made by Pascal Imperato (2005, 147):  Imperial Reckoning  seeks ‘not so much to present truth
supported  by incontrovertible  evidence’ as  to ‘demands  reparations’ for  ‘Mau-Mau adherents’;
something Imperato believed was confirmed by Elkins’ participation as the first historian advising
the  legal  firm  representing  Mau-Mau  claimants.  (Elkins,  it  should  be  noted,  rejects  these
accusations.  She claims that  the absence of  ‘loyalists’ from  Imperial  Reckoning  can largely be
explained by the book’s temporal and geographical scope, and that although ‘rumours abounded
about possible reparations for years’ this had no direct effect on her work [Elkins 2011, 735-6].)
In Namibia, meanwhile, German colonial atrocities were portrayed by nationalists as crimes
against the nation they hoped to build. It was only in the 1970s that the word genocide was attached
to the death of Herero and Nama, as opposed to Namibians (McCullers 2011, 43, n.1). But SWAPO
propaganda in exile continued to understand the genocide as a crime against the latter. Its 1981 To
Be Born a Nation  drew heavily on classic Marxian accounts from the 1960s. Written, in part, as
pleas for decolonisation, these works - especially Dreschler ([1966] 1981) - explained the genocide,
at  least  in  part,  in  terms  of  Germany’s  distinctive  authoritarian-capitalist  path,  dictated  by the
imperatives  of late-imperial  ‘catch-up’ (see also the more contemporary-style  argument  in  Bley
[1968]  1996;  and  commentary  in  Gewald  2003,  294).  The  ‘uprisings’ preceding  von  Trotha’s
infamous order, meanwhile, were understood, in line with contemporary modernist orthodoxies, as
‘primary resistance’ to the colonial economic project. The still classic work from the 1980s -  A
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History  of  Resistance  in  Namibia,  written  by  SWAPO’s  London  spokesman  Peter  Katjavivi  -
described the events in largely uncontroversial terms, and in no great detail. In then situated them,
however, within a now contentious anti-colonial context; ‘a widespread war of resistance to German
rule by the Nama and Herero people,  from 1904 to 1907’ (Katjavivi  1988, 8;  for  commentary
Gewald 2004, 70).
As elsewhere, more recent approaches to the genocide have foregrounded specific atrocities
by stressing the murderous discursive ‘logic’ of the new imperialist ideologies which Lothar von
Trotha brought to South-West Africa. This is a view once specific to Hannah Arendt (1951, 196),
who saw imperialism as a ‘laboratory test’ for pan-Germanism. The genocide,  on this  account,
cannot  be  understood  as  a  simple  consequence  of  colonial  economic  imperatives.  The  highly
contested rise of ideas of racial  superiority within German politics takes centre-stage (for these
domestic debates Madley 2005, 432, 439-440; van der Heyden 2007). It was only with the dismissal
of former governor Theodor Leutwein that these radical notions - promoted by patriotic societies
since 1890 and largely shared by Kaiser Wilhelm and Bernhard von Bülow (Chancellor from 1900)
- began to supplant  previously dominant  utilitarian beliefs.  Leutwein had  endorsed widely-held
Social Darwinist ideas, saw Namibians as a labour force for economic development, and sought to
establish a kind of rural utopia for Germans in South West Africa - which some Conservatives had
identified as a haven from modernisation (Wallace 2011, 194; for the importance of Leutwein’s
replacement Dedering 1999). But Leutwein never understood ‘race war’ as an end in itself. This
new ideology,  found in  all  European colonialisms  and not  specific  to  a  German ‘special  way’
(Sonderweg), placed the colonised ‘outside humankind’ (e.g. Zimmerrer 2005, 55). It thus helped
pave  a  road  ‘from  Windhoek  to  Auschwitz’,  and  broke  the  ‘ultimate  taboo’ surrounding  the
bureaucratised massacre of whole populations (Zimmerrer 2005, 56; 2007, 59; contrast Kundrus
2005).  (Recently,  Caspar  Erichsen  and  David  Olusoga  The  Kaiser’s  Holocaust:  Germany’s
Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of  Nazism  (2010) - along with Olusoga’s  Namibia
Genocide and the Second Reich (2005), shown by the BBC and Channel 4 - has sought to bring this
narrative  to  a  broader  audience,  modelling  itself  notably  on  Adam Hochschild’s  famous  King
Leopold’s Ghost (1998)93.) 
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By seeking to explain what made specific atrocities possible, such historiographical trends
thus favour the production of empirical work useful for litigation. Erichsen’s own careful studies,
for  example,  have  done much  to  document  and  trace  the  hitherto  little  understood  episode  of
scientific experimentation on Herero and Nama skulls on Shark Island (Erichsen 2005; 2007). More
dramatically,  furthermore,  in 2003 Jeremy Sylvester and Jan-Bart  Gewald produced a scholarly
edition of the 1918 Blue Book, used by the British to persuade the League of Nations of German
‘crimes of humanity’ committed against Herero and others. This international legal category was
created by Allies in an effort to justify the dismantlement of Ottoman and German empires for
international  audiences94.  On  the  4th January  1918,  accordingly,  a  telegram was  despatched  to
British  authorities  in  Australia,  New Zealand and British  South  Africa  asking for  ‘evidence  of
anxiety of natives of (German New Guinea) (Samoa) (South-West Africa) to live under British rule’
(Gewald and Sylvester 2003, xv). One of the results was the Blue Book, or  The Report on the
Natives of South-West Africa and their Treatment by Germany (1918) (Gewald 2004, 64). Alongside
an exhaustive catalogue of abuses, and eyewitness accounts, it mobilises much of the ‘bare life’
pathos Agamben (1998) associates with human rights practice. A section entitled ‘The Outbreak of
the Herero Rising and the Humanity of the Herero’ includes the following passage:
there is something deeply pathetic in this picture of the desperate Herero warrior with his
ancient rifle and half-a-dozen cartridges deciding to rise and defend his liberties against the
might of the German Empire … Can anyone allege that these poor mild-mannered creatures
who had born the German yoke for over 14 years had no justification for the step they took? Is
there  anyone in  the civilised  world  who can assert  that  Germany was justified when she
allowed von Trotha and his soldiers mercilessly to butcher and drive to their death 60,000 or
more of these unfortunate people and to destroy every asset in the way of cattle, sheep, goats
and other possessions? (Sylvester and Gewald 2003, 103).
(The political background to this publication is clear from Zephania Kameeta’s foreword, even if
the editors argue cogently for its value as a historical source [Sylvester and Gewald 2003, xix-xxix;
contrast  Twomey 2011].)  In 2010, meanwhile,  Jeremy Sarkin himself  -  Kuiama Riruako’s legal
advisor  -  published a  very detailed historical  account  of  the genocide (Sarkin 2010).  This  was
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prefaced  by his  client  and  produced  a  number  of  facts  which  clearly  help  establish  the  legal
responsibility of the Kaiser and German state for the genocide. As with such trends generally, some
in the historical profession have reacted strongly against  such works.  Reinhardt  Kössler (2012,
234), for example, has sought to criticise Sarkin on the grounds that he ‘dons the role of attorney
out to persuade the jury’.
Jan-Bart Gewald (1996), whose pathbreaking research is the most detailed yet produced on
the genocide, has been subject to another kind of critique. He began by noting how media and
academic  coverage  of  the  reparations  campaign  has  focused  attention  on  ‘Germany’s  role  in
Namibia’ to the exclusion of ‘the role of the Herero in determining their own history’; portraying
them misleadingly ‘as a people who were and are only capable of reacting to and in copy of external
influences’ (Gewald  1996,  1).  This  stress  on  ‘African  agency’,  widespread  in  African  studies,
represented, like the focus on the violent ‘logics’ of ideology, a response to crisis of dependency
theory and dilemmas on the Marxian Left (most famously Bayart [1989] 2009; see also Lindsay
2014; for critique T. Young 1999, 150-3; Hearn 2007). Although Gewald has come to argue that the
politicisation of memories may diminish the benefits of symbolic recognition, his work has formed
an important part of the reparations case (Gewald 2003, 279; 2005). International law, notably, has
dictated  that  the  Herero  lawsuit  produce  expert  knowledge  which  presents  the  plaintiffs  as  a
‘people’ who both understand themselves as such, and whose boundaries have remained largely
fixed over time:  
the Hereros had a reasonably well-developed sense of orderly international relations and they
regulated their affairs with other tribes on the basis of treaties [citing Bridgman 1981, 20] …
The Herero tribe was and is a tribe of racial social, cultural and political distinctiveness, and
as  such  was  and  is  entitled  to  the  protection  of  international  law  (The  Herero  People’s
Reparation Corporation et al. v Deutsche Bank AG et al., paragraphs 25, 28).
Here  the  lawsuit  could  ground itself  in  the  1999 version  of  Jan-Bart  Gewald’s  thesis,  Herero
Heroes. This argues that an encompassing ‘Herero’ identity, and not merely  Otjiherero-speaking
language group, had acquired real salience by the end of the nineteenth-century (cf.  The Herero
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People’s Reparation Corporation et al. v Deutsche Bank AG et al., paragraphs 14-17). Whilst this
particular  point  has  rarely  been  contested,  other  scholars  have  alleged  that  Herero  Heroes
naturalises  it  nevertheless.  Marion  Wallace  (2001),  for  example,  has  written  that  ‘while  other
historians of Namibia are moving towards an approach that treats ethnicity as neither fixed nor
inevitable,  Gewald  hardly  pauses  to  discuss  what  he  means  by  the  term  ‘Herero’’.  These
requirements of judicialised politics have indeed often created dilemmas for scholars who endorse
contemporary liberal theories of identity’s fluidity, but must for practical reasons present groups as
facts. Whilst some have been happy to sacrifice academic commitments for the political - Gaytari
Spivak’s (1988) ‘strategic essentialism’ - the longterm prospects of such strategies are uncertain at
the very least (see also Lynch 2012).
4. Anthropologists and violations of indigenous rights
The framing of  indigenous issues  in  terms  of  ‘genocide’ has  long been unpopular  with
anthropologists. In the early 1970s, when they were still a key constituency for the early indigenous
rights movement, SI’s director, Stephen Corry, devoted considerable effort to defending the use of
terms such as ‘ethnocide’ in academic fora (Corry 1975; Mair 1975). Then, as now, however, the
profession as a whole has been largely unwilling to openly condemn states where they conduct their
fieldwork (Houtman 1985, 4; Dahl 2009, 30). There may obviously be self-interested reasons for
this. But in states such as Botswana, nevertheless - which are both jealous of their sovereignty and
sensitive  to  external  criticism  -  a  much  wider  range  of  voices  has  argued  that  confrontation
ultimately proves counter-productive (Solway 2009; Saugestad 2011).  
Dahl (2009, 31) describes the strategic dilemmas these failed collaborations created, and
suggests that SI ‘chose a different path’ than IWGIA in ‘reaction’ to them. Whilst IWGIA turned
towards capacity-building, the London-based organisation began to focus ‘primarily on the media
and the public in order to reach as many people as possible and raise public awareness’; tactics it
continues to favour today. The organisation preferred not ‘to remain forever philosophising about
first principles’ (Bentley 1976, 352). As this section will illustrate, however, it could not sever all
links with the anthropological profession. In legal settings the indigenous rights it promotes can
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only be applied with the aid of anthropological expertise. 
In  the final  pleadings  of  Sesana,  the  plaintiff’s  case focused on the  CKGR inhabitants’
‘freedom to choose’; a freedom which Judge Dow ruled as conferred by their international legal
status as indigenous peoples (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraphs
117-119). The plaintiff’s anthropological witness was George Silberbaeur, the colonial official upon
whose recommendation the CKGR was created in 1961 (see chapter 4). Silberbauer testified that
the San had chosen freely to move into the CKGR ‘many centuries’ ago. They had not been forced
into this by the movement of ‘Bantu’ groups. The San constituted a distinctive people characterised
by egalitarian social organisation and non-dominance by other groups (Tutwane,  14th July 2004;
Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 349). 
In order to contest these points the government at one stage planned to call Japanese ‘Kyoto
School’ anthropologist Masazuka Osaki to the witness stand (Tutwane, 14th July 2004). This, had it
happened, would have exposed to the courtroom to some seemingly intractable theoretical disputes
between  Japanese  and  Western  schools  of  anthropology  (Silberbauer  1982:  803;  Izumi  2006;
Barnard 2007, 62-64, 118). In the event, however, respondents’ counsel (Sidney Pilane) focused on
two issues which have proved extremely controversial within Western branches of the discipline:
the extent to which San can be defined as a distinctive group, and the nature of this difference. He
aired  these  issues  in  order  to  establish  that  the  anthropology  Silberbaeur  practised  was  not  ‘a
science’ which used ‘empirical  evidence’ as  its  ‘tool’ (Sapignoli  2009, 260).  His  strategy drew
attention  to  the  ways  in  which  anthropological  ‘information-gathering’ is  in  fact  shaped  by
interpretive  disputes  locatable  within  the  dilemmas  described in  chapter  6. Indeed,  there  is  no
reason to believe that these disputes can continue to be publicly downplayed, over the long-term, in
ways protecting anthropology’s political value for indigenous rights activism.
Perhaps most embarrassing for Silberbauer was Pilane’s questioning of his original justifica-
tions for the creation of the Reserve. A central plank of the applicants’ case was that the CKGR had
been intended as  neither  a  game  reserve  nor  as  a  place  for  ‘conserving’ so-called  ‘primitive
peoples’. It had been meant, rather, as a protected space allowing its population to choose its way of
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life. As Pilane pointed out, however, this was far from evident from contemporary documents. Sil-
berbauer had, in fact, argued at the time for the reserve to be a ‘retreat for hunters and gatherers’
who were ‘in danger of extinction’ (Sapignoli 2009, 258; Zips-Mairisch 2013, 293). In response to
this questioning, the anthropologist was obliged to explain that at the time such policies simply had
to be legitimated in terms of then dominant modernist beliefs (see chapter 4). 
The late 1960s collapse of modernist consensus relieved anthropologists of these legitima-
tion requirements, and allowed them to write in ways which subsequently proved more useful for
indigenous rights advocacy. The consequences of this shift were immediately visible in San studies.
In 1966, most famously, the young Canadian anthropologist Richard Lee co-organised the ‘Man the
Hunter’ conference in Chicago; ‘one of the most important ... in the history of the discipline’ and in-
strumental in challenging ‘the traditional Hobbesian view of hunter gatherers as having a difficult
struggle for existence’ (Barnard 2007, 67). Lee’s co-authored introduction to the 1968 conference
volume made clear the normative background to the enterprise: ‘we cannot avoid the suspicion that
many of us were led to live and work among the hunters because of a feeling that the human condi-
tion was likely to be more clearly drawn here than among other kinds of societies’ (Lee and DeVore
eds. 1968, preface). In the same year, Marshall Sahlins’ seminal essay on the ‘the original affluent
society’ - originally published, co-incidentally, in Paris - drew on Lee to suggest that poverty was
‘an invention of civilization’ (Sahlins [1968] 2006). Hunter-gatherers, on Sahlins’ account, simply
had no desire to accumulate wealth. This view resonated so strongly with new anti-productivist be-
liefs, Barnard (2007, 69) argues, that ‘it would be an exaggeration to say that our modern anthropo-
logical image of the bushman is a result of the events of 1968, but it would not be outright non-
sense’. As Irven deVore later put it, ‘we were being a bit romantic … but that was probably inevit-
able given the social and intellectual context within which we were working’ (in Lewin 1988).
A corollary of insisting upon hunter-gatherer ‘affluence’ was an assumption of autonomy.
New anthropological studies of the San by Lee and others painted pictures dramatically removed
from the early twentieth-century ones described in the previous chapter. Economic independence
and self-determination took the place of ‘slavery’ and dominance by neighbouring groups. By the
1980s, however, the collapse of the political utopias which had informed these views opened up
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considerable space for critique. The result was the so-called Kalahari Debate between ‘revisionists’
and ‘traditionalists’.  Paralleling political science debates about the economic ‘rationality’ of peas-
ants in the Third World, ‘revisionists’ pointed to archaeological evidence that demonstrated San his-
toric integration in global capital circuits and therefore political interdependence (cf. Denbow and
Wilmsen 1986; Wilmsen 1989; compare Popkin 1979; R. Bates 1981). These have seen San not as
autonomous but as an ‘underclass’ (e.g. Wilmsen 2002, 834-835, 839). Lee, now working with Jac-
queline Solway, adjusted his viewpoint. Whilst conceding many of the revisionists’ empirical find-
ings, Solway and Lee (1990, 109) accused their opponents of mistakenly ‘assuming that evidence of
trade implies the surrender of autonomy’ (compare attached responses by James Denbow, Edwin
Wilmsen, Robert Gordon and Carmel Schrire; Lee and Guenther 1991). The revisionist viewpoint
was politically useful for the government in Sesana. It seemed to suggest both that the San should
not be understood as an indigenous people endowed with effective ‘freedom to choose’, but also
(perhaps more contentiously) that they constituted a suitable object for welfarist government inter-
vention. Sidney Pilane, certainly, made reference to such revisionist ‘knowledge’ in order to assert
that Botwsanan San were simply a poor class of the population (Sapignoli 2009, 265). 
But perhaps even more awkward than this was Pilane’s identification of the problems in-
volved in defining a population whose autonomy and distinctiveness could not uncontroversially be
assessed. Several days of courtroom time, indeed, ‘were taken to try and define in an objective and
scientific way who can be considered ‘bushman’ and ‘indigenous’’ (Sapignoli 2009, 257). (These
terms were legally significant because under the Botswanan Constitution (Article 14, section 3.c)
freedom of movement is only qualified in the case of only ‘bushmen, indigenous at the Reserve’
[sic].) The plaintiffs, of course, required a definition that established continuity between themselves
and  those  peoples  which  the  CKGR was  originally  created  to  protect.  Silberbauer’s  testimony
provided evidence of this. He claimed that San ‘populations have been stable for a considerable
period many hundreds of years [sic]’, and this evidence proved central to Judge Phumaphi’s conclu-
sion that ‘Bushmen are indigenous to the CKGR’ (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement
of Phumaphi, paragraph 65; also Zips-Mairisch 2013, 331). This continuity, however, was incorpor-
ated in, rather than established by, Silberbauer’s definitions of ‘bushmen’. Speaking from memory
he defined ‘bushmen’ simply as ‘descendants of hunters and gatherers who spoke languages con-
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taining a predominance of click consonants and by implication are indigenous to Southern Africa
and her children’ (in Sapignoli 2009, 257, n.26)95. This definition focused on changing practices
rather than on seemingly immutable group traits or characteristics. As Sidney Pilane pointed out, it
thus contrasted explicitly with the definition based on race that Silberbauer had earlier provided to
justify the creation of the Reserve: ‘the Bushmen are the oldest race of Bechuanaland’s population
having inhabited all of Southern Africa for 12 or 15000 years’ (in Sapignoli 2009, 260).
Silberbauer’s difficulties illustrate the anthropologists’ dilemmas highlighted in James Clif-
ford’s classic works from the 1980s (cf. Marcus and Clifford eds. 1986). In  The Predicament of
Culture (1988, chapter 12) Clifford described an episode from 1976 when two anthropologists testi-
fied on behalf of Mashpee Indians suing for the return of lands in Cape Cod. Eager to avoid the ‘re-
ifying’ of ‘tribes’, these expert witnesses highlighted the fluidity of Mashpee identity in recent cen-
turies. As a result their claims appeared ‘fuzzy and opportunist’ and the claim was lost. The de-
mands of courtroom politics had now begun to conflict with disciplinary beliefs. Clifford’s work
certainly resonated among anthropologists in the ways that help explain current their unease with
accepting tasks like Silberbauer’s. It spoke to a widespread and decreasing confidence in the discip-
line about the authority attached to their representation of cultural ‘others’. This authority was now
seen as derived, above all, from positions of increasingly contested social privilege. As Clifford
(2012) recently speculated in a 25-year retrospective on Writing Culture (1986), this resonance may
have been partially due to the rise of post-structuralism - noticeable all across the humanities and
social sciences - but it also probably reflected existing efforts to resolve dilemmas posed by anthro-
pology’s past in a postcolonial world (cf. Asad 1973). He reported a conversation to this effect from
the early 1970s with Raymond Firth, the renowned ethnographer of the Tikopia: ‘not so long ago
we were radicals. We thought of ourselves as gadflies and reformers, advocates for the value of in-
digenous cultures, defenders of our people. Now, all of a sudden, we’re handmaidens of empire!’
(Clifford 2012, 419).
In Southern Africa, as with historians, anthropologists’ wariness of naturalising group iden-
tities has been greatly accentuated by the political demands of opposition to apartheid. Adam Kuper
(2005, 203-5), most famously, argues not only that support for indigenous rights represents a ‘re-
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turn’ to anthropology’s invention of ‘primitive’ peoples, but that it dovetails neatly with the nativist
rhetoric of Afrikaner ethnonationalism and the far Right (see also Kuper 1999). Among Survival In-
ternational’s critics, James Suzman draws identical parallels, whilst Jacqueline Solway follows Ku-
per in identifying links between Survival International and the Countryside Alliance, a British pro-
hunting lobby group (Suzman 2002, 6; Kuper 2005, 218; Solway 2009, 323, n.5). These politically-
charged moves may help explain the edge to SI’s responses. Its director Stephen Corry, for example,
has replied to Suzman in the following terms:
there are a tiny number of British and US anthropologists who, like Suzman, are trying to pro-
mulgate this idea [that indigenous rights promote ethnic inequality] within the profession. Al-
though this may sound cranky, governments have often followed bizarre anthropological the-
ories when devising schemes to cope with minorities who did not fit their own view of the
world. Perhaps the best-known example of this is the Nazi fabrication of a ‘master race’ - well
supported by German social scientists (Corry 2003, 2).
A sceptical report of the consequences of Sesana by young anthropologist Julie Taylor, meanwhile,
received the following retort:
effectively challenging vested interests ... is met with well-funded hostility. The allegations
made here that Survival made things worse originate with Ditshwanelo, an organization that
has represented Botswana at the UN. The author cites Suzman and Solway with approval.
However, Suzman does not believe indigenous rights have a place in Africa, an idea also em-
braced by his former employer, De Beers. Solway does not believe the Gana and Gwi have a
right to live in the reserve. The organization Kuru is cited, but not the fact that its principal
funder is De Beers and its patron is minister of mines (J. Taylor 2007, 5).
Their tone and immediate political context notwithstanding, such exchanges reflect deep conflicts
between indigenous rights activism and the anthropology it depends upon to guarantee its legal
tools. SI has not been able to distance itself from the discipline entirely in order to focus on media
mobilisation. It has had, rather, to frame sincere interpretive disagreements over indigeneity as the
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products of vested interests or wilfully perverse adherence to outmoded racial doctrines; supposed
deviations, in both cases, from the ‘scientific’ norms that guarantee legal respectability.
No anthropological attempts to maintain politically productive relationships with indigenous
rights in the face of these dilemmas are sustainable in the long-term. Some supporters have argued,
reasonably enough, that parallels with Afrikaner nationalism and the far Right are misleading. San
populations are simply in no position to impose ‘blood and soil’ ideologies on others (e.g. Plaice
2003, 397; Dahre 2008, 147; Minde 2008, 58). This critique fits with recent anthropological re-
definitions of the concept of indigeneity in terms of differential power; definitions referring to sys-
tematic patterns of marginalisation and exclusion from national society rather than aboriginality or
cultural traits (see Saugestad 2001, 55-58; Kenrick and Lewis 2004; Kenrick 2006; Zips 2006).
Such arguments, however, neither deny the political value of ‘essentialist’ images nor suggest that
their use should be opposed. In this respect they are fully compatible with currently orthodox resol-
utions of these dilemmas. As Lee (2006, 472) writes ‘a theme common to many of these recent
studies is an acknowledgement of the beauty and utility of strategic essentialism as a tool in the ar-
senal of indigenous peoples’ struggles’. Essentialism should be endorsed politically, that is, even if
intellectually indefensible (cf. Barnard 2006)96. Lee himself, a veteran of earlier utopian worlds, is
now almost alone in suggesting that the notion ‘indigenous peoples’ is not only a ‘powerful tool for
good’, in political terms, but is also an intellectually-meaningful term with real-world referents (Lee
2006, 458). In a passage referencing Marshall Sahlins, he makes it clear that for him, still, the ‘main
story’ is not (post)-colonial exclusion and differential power, but:
how indigenous people are connected to the land, how indigenous people are living in cultures
that are profoundly non-capitalist, and how their ongoing existence bears witness that even in
this hard-bitten age of real-politik and globalization, other ways of being, other ways of living
in the world are possible (Lee 2006, 472).
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5. Conclusion
For Lee, indigenous rights activism thus represents ‘an essential component of the coalition
of progressive forces fighting globalization’ and a weapon for the ‘Party of Humanity in its historic
struggle against the Party of Order’ (Lee 2006, 473). This is a wonderfully robust defence of an in-
creasingly dissident stance. But the Party of Order’s arguments have merits even from its oppon-
ent’s perspective. As the next chapter will illustrate, anthropologists’ (and historians’) resistance to
precise definition, and even to the enterprise of definition itself, has facilitated effective resistance
to the very parts of the international legal order upon which indigenous rights activism depends.
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Chapter 9: Institutionalisation
1. Introduction
After transnational movements have emerged, and they have gathered information about
violations, the second and third stages of the norm spiral model see activists attempt to persuade
states  to  accept  new norms for  interpreting  the information  they have  gathered.  States  initially
oppose rights with ‘allegedly more valid norms’, such as national sovereignty (the second stage).
They then make tactical  ‘concessions’,  accepting their  general validity and opposing only their
application to specific national contexts (the third stage) (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 22-28). This
persuasion became easier after 1989. As Sikkink (2011, 11-12, 83, 247) argues, if the human rights
revolution dates from the 1970s, its globalisation dates from the 1990s. Geopolitical shifts allowed
for the global spread and institutionalisation of new human rights beliefs.  ‘In most cases’ these
institutions became crucial to facilitating persuasion and (later) diffusion. Institutions do this by
‘clarifying what,  exactly,  the norm is’ and by ‘spelling out  specific procedures by which norm
leaders  coordinate  disapproval  and sanctions  for norm breaking’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998,
900). This means that states’ tactical concessions can impose reputational clear costs on other states
(particularly those in the same region) that refuse to follow suit (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 22-25;
Sikkink 2011, 94, 248). As a result, ratification is mimicked and diffuses rapidly. A ‘norm cascade
ensues’ (the spiral model’s fourth stage) and domestic activists can use clarified norms to socialise
states into ‘rule-consistent behaviour’ (the spiral model’s fifth stage) (cf. Risse and Ropp 2013, 8-
11)97.
There is one central difficulty with applying such approaches to understanding the evolution
of human rights beliefs. Their institutionalisation, typically, cannot in fact clarify their content. In
the case of individual rights this has long been the case to some extent.  The boundaries of the
individual ‘human’ can, of course, never be stabilised (e.g. Singer 1975, chapter 1; Bobbio 1996,
86). In the 1950s African states could use human rights institutions to assert their humanity and thus
de-legitimise imperial rule (for the United Nations see Reus-Smit 2013a, chapter 5; for Leopold
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Senghor and the ECHR see Simpson 2001, 739). But  the human rights revolution of the 1970s
dramatically increased the scope for such resistance. The ideological context in which new beliefs
emerged  now  ascribed  them  a  ‘maximalist’  character,  and  stretched  their  potential  area  of
application beyond individual rights and into the definition of groups and collectivities. As John
Dunn remarked in the 1980s, it became hard ‘to see how any authentically presented claim of a
right offered on behalf of a determinate human grouping can be discounted’ (J. Dunn [1988] 1990,
53)98. The Zimbabwean case, which involves (in political terms) dangerously determinate individual
rights claims, provides an exception to these rules.
The expansion of rights, therefore, must be understood in the context of changing webs of
beliefs, as well as in terms of globalisation and an increasingly diverse international society (for
latter cf. Hopgood 2006, chapter 5). Moreover, whilst 1989 and the end of geopolitical stasis may
have granted international institutions much greater formal oversight over domestic human rights
questions, it only began a process of contestation over how, and to whom, new norms were to be
applied. African states have sought here to appropriate existing discourses and institutional sites,
whilst contesting similar moves by their domestic opponents. These legal challenges, finally, have
been greatly enabled by new ‘interlegal’ forms of diffusion across international and transnational
legal regimes.  Through an analysis  of the changing beliefs of key agents in this diffusion,  this
chapter will seek to provide an interpretive complement to existing explanations for such processes.
  
2. Reparations for colonial injustice
(a) Institutionalisation
In chapter 6 I described the emergence of new reparations practices in the 1970s. These
involved compensating entities other than states for historical injustices. After 1989 these practices
have globalised and extended to colonial injustice. Parties to such cases may be ‘collectives’, such
as  survivors  of  the  British  repression  of  the  Mau-Mau  rebellion  in  Kenya  (see  chapter  8).
Alternatively, lawsuits may be brought on behalf of ‘corporate groups’, such as those represented
by the Herero People’s Reparations Corporation (see chapter 6; for this distinction P. Jones 1999).
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One key development has greatly facilitated, if not explained, the globalisation of such claims. This
is the gradual expansion, in international law, of the phenomena comprehended by ‘gross’ human
rights violations and ‘crimes against humanity’. The significance of these classifications is that they
typically override two legal objections to the litigation of colonial injustice: that such cases may
involve  the  illegitimate  retroactive  application  of  law,  and that  they may -  although again  not
always - be brought so long after the events in question as to be subject to statutes of limitations (or
periods of prescription, in civil law systems)99. 
International law has, of course, at least in theory, treated acts such as the Herero and Nama
genocide as ‘crimes against humanity’ for over six decades - ever since the first legal application of
this concept at the Nuremburg and Tokyo trials, and the subsequent definition of the international
crime of genocide in 1948 (Schiff 2008,  24-5). Contemporary arguments for retroactivity merely
repeat  those  made  at  that  time.  The  Nuremburg  Tribunal  grounded  its  decisions  in  ‘general
principles of law’, such as those embedded in humanitarian law and the 1907 Hague Regulations
(Dana 2009,  884).  Supporters  of  the  Herero  and Nama claims  have done likewise,  identifying
general principles they believe criminalised German conduct in the Hague Regulations of 1899
(Harring 2002, 406-8;  R. Anderson 2005; Sarkin 2008, chapter 2)100.  Nuremburg’s retroactivity,
however, proved fiercely controversial even amongst the most liberal of commentators (compare,
famously H. Hart 1958, 593, 615-621 with Fuller 1958, 648-657 and Shklar 1964, 144-181). Cold
War politics,  moreover,  soon ensured that even international duties to prosecute genocide were
largely neglected (see Pendas 2011).
 The failures of these post-1945 norms to permeate domestic politics in this period were
dramatically illustrated during debates at the General Assembly in 1968 over the Convention on the
Non-Applicability of  Statutes  of  Limitation  to  War  Crimes  and Crimes  against  Humanity.  The
preparation of the Convention had been triggered by a decision by the West German Bundestag to
proscribe the prosecution of serious offences after 1969, including crimes against humanity and war
crimes under international humanitarian law. The retroactive provisions in Nuremburg had never
been integrated into West German domestic law, and even its accession to the Genocide Convention
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had been qualified to avoid them (R.H. Miller 1971, 479). The socialist states of Eastern Europe
seized on this  opportunity to  publicise  West  German tolerance of  Nazi  Criminals.  The debates
which followed took place at the height of Cold War division within human rights institutions, and
saw more dissenting votes than to any previously adopted UN human rights instrument (R.H. Miller
1971,  478,  n.7;  more  generally  Moyn  2010,  126-7).  Western  states  argued  especially,  and
unsuccessfully,  against  retroactivity.  And  they  sought  to  counter  definitions  of  crimes  against
humanity which referred only to the practices of the enemies of the Eastern bloc; South African
apartheid, Israeli occupation and alleged West German indifference to Nazi crimes. They did this by
proposing more limited (but still vague) reference to ‘grave’ violations (R.H. Miller 1971 487-8,
490, n. 79, 498-501).
The most interesting features of these debates, for our purposes, are the positions of African
states.  These  illustrate  Moyn’s  (2010,  chapter  3)  argument  that,  prior  to  the  late  1970s,  anti-
colonialists deployed human rights only to further demands for decolonisation. Arab states thus
sought to aid Palestine by adding ‘eviction by armed attack or occupation’ to the definition of
crimes  against  humanity in  Article  I  (Miller  1971,  490).  African  states,  meanwhile,  sought  to
publicise the iniquities of apartheid, and  not colonialism or the slave trade  (see explanations of
votes by Tanzania and Dahomey (Benin) in Third Committee of the General Assembly,  11-13 th
December 1967, paragraphs 68-9).  The Democratic Republic of the Congo - for obvious reasons,
linked to the Katanganese succession - did propose to insert ‘and from the exercise of mercenary
activities’ after  ‘apartheid’ (Third Committee to the General Assembly [Report],  15th December
1967, paragraph 26). But it, too, failed to mention colonialism as a possible crime against humanity.
African  states’ silence  on  this  issue  strikingly illustrates  the  dominance  of  confident,  forward-
looking theories  of  African  history (see  chapters  6,  8).  Such theories  paralleled  the  modernist
beliefs to which some states (such as Tanzania) were sincerely committed, and to which others used
to legitimate their rule (e.g. T. Young 2005, 159). Somalia did insist that apartheid and colonialism
were ‘equally as serious crimes as nazism’ (in R.H. Miller 1971, 491). But this exception merely
proves the rule. Somalia was the only independent African state under majority rule that continued
to insist on the illegitimacy of colonial borders (see Kornprobst 2002, 376, 381).
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The contrast between these debates and those of more recent decades is a marked one. The
rapid globalisation of international criminal justice has created new incentives for expanding the
category of ‘gross’ violations - thus reducing the scope for prescription, and enabling retroactivity.
Such  arguments  could  be  made  with  special  force  in  new transitional  justice  domains,  where
successor states risked inheriting legal systems of dubious status from their predecessors (Teitel
1997, 2022-2026). And such arguments can be extended to colonial situations where citizens had no
effective recourse to the law (Sarkin 2008, chapter 2). Between 1997-8 negotiations around the
creation of the International Criminal Court saw statutes of limitations excluded from the final
Statute (Article 29). A number of Western and liberal states also argued for broad definitions of
‘crimes  of  humanity’ which  would  allow  for  a  progressive  development  of  international  law
(Arsanjani 1999, 36). A number of liberalising states, although none from Western Europe or North
America, even ratified the  Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutes of Limitation to War
Crimes and Crimes against Humanity; the preserve, before 1989, of non-aligned and Soviet-allied
states101. The United States was now almost alone among such states in fearing that such provisions
might endanger its foreign policy; an imperial outlier (see generally Ikenberry 2011).
The institutionalisation of this new consensus, however, did nothing to clarify new norms.
In the United States, as we have already noted, the Alien Tort Claims Act has established some
degree  of  effective  universal  civil  jurisdiction  over  cases  like  these,  without  any  formal
international institutionalisation process (for similar legislation elsewhere Stephens 2002)102. At the
United Nations, however, efforts to institutionalise new reparations beliefs began as soon as the
Cold War ended (van Boven 2010, 1). These made almost no progress towards defining rights-
holders.  Particularly intractable debates centered around the legal identification of ‘groups’ and
‘victims’.  The  reports  of  distinguished  UN legal  experts  appointed  to  deal  with  this  question
provided  only  vague  guidance. In  addition  to  direct  victims,  their  immediate  families  and
dependants, those ‘connected with’, ‘closely connected with’, or ‘beneficiaries’ of victims (both
individuals and collectivities) were, at various stages, proposed as entitled to reparation (United
Nations Commission on Human Rights, 24th May 1996, 3; 22nd December 1997, 11; 8th February
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1999, 13). Whilst the first of these reports warned, finally, that definitions should not be stretched
‘so far that no generally applicable conclusions in terms of rights and responsibilities could be
drawn’, it failed to provide any conceptual tools by which such stretching might be prevented; a
problem which the subsequent documents did nothing to resolve (United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, 2nd July 1993, 7).   
This lack of clarity was singled out for criticism by a number of states during consultations.
But there was little consensus about what might replace it. Sweden and Japan argued that only
individuals could be victims, Germany wanted the category to extend to immediate families, France
favoured  the  inclusion  of  institutions  and  organisations,  Canada  and  Portugal  criticised  broad
definitions of ‘collectivities’, and the UK and Spain asked for an ‘objective test’ to be included in
the document (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 27th December 2002, paragraphs 65-
72).  States  from the  old  Third  World,  meanwhile,  demanded  more  emphasis  on  collectivities.
Ecuador wanted a greater focus on ethnic cleansing, whilst Cuba and Egypt continued to stress
apartheid and Israeli occupation (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 27th December
2002, paragraphs 73-74). The legal experts ignored these latter moves but nonetheless defended
references to ‘collectivities’ against Western objections. In doing so, however, they conceded that
domestic legal provisions for group representation were so varied that international law could not
yet effectively regulate this area (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 27th December
2002, paragraphs 77-78; 10th November 2003, 28). The Basic Principles and Guidelines eventually
adopted by the General Assembly were, in one commentator’s words, ‘less than clear’ (Zwanenburg
2006,  663).  Their  definition  included  ‘groups  of  persons  who  are  targeted  collectively’;  an
ambiguous formulation that allowed compromise precisely because of its failure to clarify. None of
this was surprising ‘given the fact that States have not been able to agree on this point for many
years in other fora’ - notably, I would add, those pertaining to indigenous rights (Zwanenburg 2006,
663).
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(b) States’ responses
Pace the norm spiral model, as described in chapter 7, intellectuals affiliated with the OAU
did not initially use the idea of sovereignty to oppose the payment of reparations to groups. Instead
they supported new norms enthusiastically, hoping to exploit their indeterminacy by continuing to
apply them to states. During the 1990s African states also made ‘offensive’ use of new rights (for
this term Bob 2014). Their efforts culminated, famously, in the World Conference Against Racism,
Racial  Discrimination,  Xenophobia and Related Intolerance,  held in Durban in early September
2001..As described by the Brazilian diplomat who formally proposed the event, the Conference was
largely intended to demand reparations. For ‘the States of the African Group’ this meant ‘compensa-
tion to be effected by inter-state donations, pardon the foreign-debt, or increased economic assist-
ance’ (Lindgren  Alves  2003,  369).  Following their  intellectuals’ lead  African  states  legitimated
these claims, indistinguishable from those once associated with the NIEO, in terms of new repara-
tions practices. The hypocrisy of paying reparations to Jewish groups but not to Africans was identi-
fied by both Jakaya Kikwete (future Tanzanian President and then Minister of Foreign Affairs) and
Theo-Ben Gurirab (the Namibian Minister of Foreign Affairs) (Melber 2006;  Howard-Hassmann
2008, 44). The Zimbabwean Minister for Justice Patrick Chinamasa asked ‘a poignant question,
why reparations to Jews, American Japanese, and not to African Americans and Africans? Why the
double standards’ (Howard-Hassmann 2008, 44)103. 
Faced with these criticisms, Western states made a series of ‘tactical concessions’ (Risse and
Sikkink 1999, 24). Like the German government confronted with Namibian demands, they sought
to  appease  critics  with  gestures  falling  short  of  legally-consequential  apologies.  The  Dutch
representative at Durban, for example, expressed ‘deep remorse about enslavement and the slave
trade’. The British Minister for Africa, meanwhile, declared that ‘the British Government and the
European Union profoundly deplore the human suffering, both individual and collective, caused by
slavery and slave trade’ (for both positions Howard-Hassmann 2008, 37). As anticipated by the
norm spiral model, moreover, these concessions then provided domestic critics with standards by
which governments could be held account. Although British Labour Party figures were reportedly
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concerned most by the threat of litigation by African states, the Anglo-Caribbean social movement
identified  in  chapter  7  exploited  official  rhetoric  most  effectively  (e.g.  Bright  and Jasper,  25 th
November 2001; BBC News, 27th November 2006). Domestic mobilisation around the bicentenary
of abolition in 1807, for example, saw Nelson Mandela drop a planned visit to the former slave-port
of Bristol  from his UK itinerary (Sengupta,  25th March 2007).  Prime Minister  Tony Blair  now
apologised for the trade on a visit to slave-holding castles in Ghana (BBC News 14th March 2007;
25th March  2007).  And  this,  in  turn,  facilitated  the  demands  for  reparations  for  slavery  from
Caribbean states, which had promoted the bicentenary at the United Nations ‘in the spirit’ of the
Durban Conference (Caribbean Net News, 14th November 2006; chapter 8).
As with claims relating to colonial atrocity, however, disputes within Caribbean politics now
revolve around whether states alone are representative enough to receive and distribute any sums
they obtain (e.g.  The Gleaner,  15th July 2013).  As the norm spiral  model fails  to anticipate,  no
determinate standards for behaviour (whether legal or socially-constructed) can be produced to help
resolve these disputes. Questions of representation are inherently political. It remains unclear which
‘collectivities’ can represent past victims.  A priori there is no means of excluding groups like the
Herero and Nama, or states like Zimbabwe, from the canon of deserving beneficaries104. The upshot,
as described by Chief  Riruako’s legal  advisor,  is  the suggestion that  these questions be left  to
judicial discretion: ‘when examining historical reparations cases, it is thus vital to carefully consider
the current  political,  economic,  and social  conditions of  the party claiming them to discern its
motivations for and stake in the award of restitution’ (Sarkin 2008, 184).
3. Indigenous rights
(a) Institutionalisation
Global  indigenous  activism,  like  reparations  advocacy,  changed  in  scope  after  1989.
Previously  it  had  focused  on  peoples  perceived  as  needing  protection  from  the  excesses  of
productivist  civilization.  The  most  obvious  candidates  for  assistance  were,  therefore,  the
populations of Western states, most especially European Sami populations and direct descendants of
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those peoples  who had inhabited settler  colonies of the New World before European conquest.
There was some interest in those African groups which had previously identified as ‘primitive’, but
lack of resources and the hostility of African states prevented any significant mobilisation. Only
those such as the East African Maasai, who had longstanding connections with state structures, were
able to benefit (Crawhall 2004, 46; Igoe 2006; Dahl 2009, 66). The end of the Cold War, however,
saw a dramatic increase in the financial and institutional opportunities available to NGOs and civil
society organisations worldwide, but in Africa in particular (for an overview Igoe and Kelsall eds.
2005). Some of these organisations now sought to apply indigenous rights to African populations.
As in the 1950s,  the institutionalisation of these rights ensured that shared tacit  understandings
hostile to such new applications provided only limited resources for those elites seeking to prevent
this. 
The first of these institutional developments in the post-1989 period was the adoption of
ILO Convention 169. In 1988 the Organisation’s Meeting of Experts unanimously concluded that
‘integrationist language of Convention 107’ was ‘outdated’ and ‘destructive in the modern world’.
‘In 1956 and 1957’ by contrast, it declared, ‘it was felt that integration into the dominant national
society offered the best chance for these groups to be a part of the development process of the coun-
tries in which they live […] In practice it had become a concept which meant the extinction of ways
of life which are different from that of the dominant society’ (in Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 43). But
NGOs and indigenous organisations had little input into this process, and the document says next to
nothing about to whom it applied (Dahl 2009, 70-71). To date, despite a number of ratifications by
Latin American states, the Central African Republic (in 2010) has been the only African state to do
so105. The United Nations, by contrast, has been the central focus of indigenous activism (Niezen
2010, 117, 217). In 1993 the Working Group on Indigenous Populations produced a final draft of a
proposed UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). The drafting process was
characterised by greater involvement of indigenous organisations, and the text placed much greater
stress on ‘self-determination’ than on mere ‘consultation’ and ‘participation’ (e.g. D. Sanders 1997,
107-8).
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Defining indigeneity, however, was to prove elusive. Western democracies like Canada and
Australia  had  long  distinguished  ‘the  rights  of  old  homeland  minorities  from  those  of  new
immigrant minorities’ (Kymlicka 2008, 8). Whilst each category was internally heterogeneous, and
almost  infinite  potential  complexities  involved  in  arbitrating  their  precise  application,  their
distinctions had been very largely underpinned by a set of tacit cultural understandings shared by
Western elites106.  In Saugestad’s (2008, 159) words, ‘an emphasis on first  come was  natural in
contexts where it was unambiguous who was there first and who arrived later’ (emphasis added).
UN  machineries  now  effectively  replicate  these  countries’  bipartite  schema.  Their  (largely
redundant)  systems  for  guaranteeing  the  rights  of  ‘national  minorities’ are  inherited  from  the
League of Nations’ more ambitious schemes for protecting minorities in Eastern Europe (for the
older system Mazower 2004). And their concepts of indigeneity were originally derived from the
1970s focus on the ‘victims of the ‘blue-water’ colonialism that began with Columbus in 1492’
(Saugestad 2008, 159). Tacit elite understandings from these earlier periods, however, have now
been eroded by institutionalisation.
In Africa various groups’ self-identifications have posed particular definitional difficulties.
An emphasis on aboriginality would appear to allow claims from a variety of groups not imagined
in the West as existing outside of productivist civilisation. As Kuper (2005, 203-5) points out, both
Afrikaners and even English nationalists in Europe have in fact made precisely such claims. Some
pastoralist peoples, meanwhile, who are imagined as indigenous in the West, might thereby also be
excluded107.  Anthropologists’ ‘strategic  essentialist’ solution  to  this  problem,  discussed  in  the
previous chapter, has been well summarised by Barnard (2006, 9):
supposing one’s definition of ‘indigenous people’ accidentally leads one to the conclusion,
which Kuper raises, that the English might qualify as ‘indigenous people’, or that Maasai
might not qualify? As a sceptic, Kuper would see this as an argument for getting rid of the
concept of ‘indigenous people’. The dogmatists in the indigenous peoples’ lobby, however,
would see it as a problem to be solved by redefinition. Each case becomes a special case, and
the refinement of definition becomes endless. The third solution is the recognition that we do
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know an ‘indigenous people’ when we see one; and the English are not one! It is the idea of
definition itself that is the problem. [...] The logical solution then, is ... redefine ‘indigeneity’
according to local requirements for the achievement of legitimate political goals108.
Legal  and  anthropological  experts  on  the  UN  Working  Group  have  deployed  this
anthropological ‘knowledge’. They too have substituted assessments of politically-relevant goals
and aspirations for an emphasis  on legally-relevant  characteristics.  In 1996, for example,  Erica
Irene-Daes stated that:
attachment to a homeland is  ...  definitive of the identity and integrity of the [indigenous]
group,  socially  and  culturally.  This  may suggest  a  very narrow but  precise  definition  of
‘indigenous’,  sufficient  to  be  applied  to  any  situation  where  the  problem  is  one  of
distinguishing an  indigenous  people  [from]  the  larger  class  of  minorities  (United  Nations
Commission on Human Rights, 6th July 1996, paragraph 39).  
Yet by 2000, this emphasis of ‘precise definition’ had disappeared. In a statement co-authored with
the chairman of the UN working group, Daes now asserted ‘that indigenous peoples and minorities
organize themselves separately and tend to assert different objectives, even in those countries where
they  appear  to  differ  very  little  in  ‘objective’ characteristics’ (United  Nations  Commission  on
Human Rights, 19th July 2000, paragraph 41). Whilst minorities were assumed to want to ‘integrate
themselves freely into national life to the degree they choose’, indigenous groups were assumed to
‘desire to remain collectively distinct’. This document frankly admitted the political reasons for this
shift,
the  usefulness  of  a  clearcut  distinction  between  minorities  and  indigenous  peoples  is
debatable. The Sub-Commission, including the two authors of this paper, have played a major
role in separating the two tracks. The time may have come for the Sub-Commission to review
the issue again … The distinction is probably much less useful for standard setting concerning
group accommodation in Asia and Africa (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 19th
July 2000, paragraph 25).
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Conceptually speaking, the problem with this approach is that it forges axioms from highly
implausible empirical assertions. As Will Kymlicka (2008, 17) - a pioneer of indigenous rights in
Canada  -  argues,  a  number  of  ‘national  minorities’ do  in  fact  also  appear  to  desire  to  remain
‘culturally  distinct’,  and  base  their  arguments  on  historical  vulnerability  vis-à-vis national
majorities.  And  recent  changes,  as  Kymlicka  bemoans,  have  seen  ‘any  number’ of  national
minorities  seek  to  change  their  self-definition.  No  conceivable  conceptual  innovation  could,
seemingly,  contain this contestation: ‘once we start down the road of extending the category of
indigenous peoples beyond the core case of New World settler states, there is no obvious stopping
point’ (Kymlicka 2008, 14). Politically speaking, meanwhile, the late 1990s saw some determined
opposition  to  this  conceptual  expansion  from  both  African  and  Asian  states  and  some
anthropologists. All these claimed that the concept should be reserved for victims of ‘blue-water’
colonialism (Béteille 1998; Kingsbury 1998, 416-8). 
The  most  significant  confrontation  over  this  issue,  however,  came  from within  the  UN
system itself. In 1999 Alfonso Martinez, the UN Working Group rapporteur, claimed there was a
need ‘to  re-establish a clear  cut  distinction between indigenous people and national  and ethnic
minorities’ (United Nations Commission on Human Rights, 22nd June 1999, paragraph 68). This
would be achieved, in effect, by re-asserting old shared understandings. For Martinez, the efforts of
some African groups to appropriate the indigenous label needed to be guarded against, particularly
the  claim  that:  ‘all  Africans  on  the  African  continent  are  ‘autochthonous’’  (United  Nations
Commission on Human Rights, 22nd June 1999, paragraph 91). Martinez’s, however, was a quixotic
attempt. It was rejected by the Working Group for the same reasons that it had been conceived: it
threatened to exclude African groups and put an end to incipient indigenous mobilisation of the
continent. In one observer’s words, ‘his report has, on the whole, not been treated as a significant
document’ (Saugestad 2008, 163).
Over the last decade, therefore, indigenous rights institutions have not generally sought to
counter  controversial  self-definitions  by  re-defining  the  concept.  Instead,  the  ‘relational’  or
‘processual’ concepts of indigeneity discussed in the previous chapter have been used to justify
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taking  decisions  on  a  case-by-case  basis.  This  move  has  in  fact  threatened  to  re-anchor  the
application of indigeneity in new tacit cultural understandings; not those of the Western publics
which dominated prior to institutionalisation, but those of the anthropologists, legal experts, and
indigenous activists who regularly participate in global political fora - Irène Bellier’s (2006, 112)
‘new indigenous elite’. As Barnard (2006, 9) puts it, ‘we do know an ‘indigenous people’ when we
see one’. Jens Dahl (2009, 153-4), for instance, has described how the IWGIA has used ‘processual’
concepts to justify drawing distinctions between groups. Dahl’s discussion is a revealing one and
worthy of extended treatment.  He first takes the example of Griqua populations in South Africa,
who ‘are accepted as being indigenous by most indigenous peoples participating in international
meetings and by organisations like IWGIA’. He then compares them with the Rehoboth Basters
from Namibia, ‘to whom they are historically related’, but who are not so recognised. This contrast
is ‘interesting for IWGIA because IWGIA has supported the Griqua while similar support would
never have been given to the Rehoboth Basters. But it is even more interesting because it reveals -
and confirms - the need to take a relational view on being indigenous (beyond the self-definitional
issue)’. Dahl  attaches  a  brief  history of  the  two groups  to  this  discussion.  This  is  intended to
demonstrate how relational (non)-definitions can be used to justify the tacit understandings shared
by  ‘most  indigenous  peoples  participating  in  international  meetings  and  by  organisations  like
IWGIA’. Dahl’s history explains how the two groups were originally one,  before the Reheboth
Basters crossed the Orange River into modern-day Namibia. Here ‘the Rehoboth Basters developed
into a settled community with its own identity. During colonial times, they allied themselves first
with the Germans and, after World War I, the South Africans’. In South Africa, by contrast, ‘the
Griqua  were  dispersed  and,  during  the  Apartheid  regime,  grouped  as  Coloured  peoples.  As
Coloured, the Griqua were discriminated against and were in general not in opposition to the Black
majority’. All this is intended to show how: 
history made it different for those Basters who moved north and those who remained south of
the  Orange  River.  The  two  groups  reacted  differently  to  the  colonisers  and  the  Black
majorities and, without a relational perspective, we are unable to understand why today the
Griqua  have  received  a  positive  response  to  their  indigenous  claim  while  the  Rehoboth
Basters have not. 
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For Dahl this approach serves as a model for how indigenous rights organisations can combat the
subversion of their agendas: 
groups from all continents have tried to use the indigenous UN platform […] Groups like the
Rehoboth Basters may feel that they have no other place to go. These cases always give rise to
discussions  and considerations but  there are  few cases in  which the indigenous course is
abused. It must be borne in mind that, when new groups of indigenous peoples enter the UN,
the indigenous movement itself is faced with new challenges, which may cause some tension.
[…]  These are the realities that have moulded IWGIA’s way of dealing with the issue of
definition and the reason why it often distances itself from the academic debate around the
issue of indigenousness. IWGIA’s point of departure has been from a social,  political  and
cultural position and not from a theoretical discussion.
As this discussion should by now have made clear, however, read alongside that in chapter
8, NGOs such as IWGIA have in fact operated at anything but a distance from academic discussion.
‘History’, moreover, does not, of course, simply consist of objective ‘processes’ awaiting discovery.
Many Reheboth Basters, indeed, as well as a number of Namibian historians might strongly contest
not  only Dahl’s facts  but  also the moral  weight  he attaches  to their  interpretations.  Alternative
histories would point to brutal South African repression of Reheboth Rebellion in the 1920s, which
led to their petitioning the League of Nations for decades (Dedering 2009). And these accounts, like
some orthodox treatments of Namibian politics today, would understand SWAPO and other ‘black
majorities’ as capable of marginalising populations rather like colonial  powers did (e.g.  Melber
2009a; 2010). Relational understandings of Dahl’s breadth clearly lack anything approaching the
forensic  qualities  traditionally  associated  with  legal  concepts  (even on ‘activist’ understandings
such  as  Dworkin  1982,  194-6).  Simple  references  to  processes  of  marginalisation  are  simply
incapable of uncontroversially parsing real-world situations of serious complexity. In Dahl’s own
words, they are far more likely to merely reflect ‘social, political and cultural position[s]’.
As  Saugestad  (2001,  50)  describes,  the  concept  of  indigenous  peoples  is  ‘perceived  by
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bureaucrats all over the world as a concept that is inconvenient, diffuse and difficult to handle’.
‘Relational’ approaches only intensify such difficulties. They provide law and bureaucracy with
nothing  in  the  way  of  predictability;  their  capacity  to  help  routinise  such  domains  being
proportionate  only  to  the  sociological  density  of  global  indigenous  rights  milieux,  and  its
corresponding  capacity  to  exclude  candidate  peoples  on  the  basis  of  shared  understandings.
Institutionalisation, in short, has not served to ‘clarify’ indigenous rights norms, as constructivist
approaches would lead us to expect. Instead, it has opened up spaces for resistance by allowing
African and other groups to expand the area of application for these rights. Whilst human rights
have always had such indeterminate qualities, only an analysis of their 1970s transformation helps
us  understand  how such  resistance  was  able  to  expand  beyond  the  domain  of  citizenship  and
individual rights (contrast Reus-Smit 2013). 
(b) States’ responses
On 13th November 2007, in a development that surprised many observers, African states
abandoned  traditional  public  postures,  and  voted  in  favour  of  adapting  the  United  Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP - General Assembly Resolution 61/295).
Only the CANZUS states - Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States - voted against.
African states’ change of position can be understood as a move from the second to the third stage of
contructivists’ ‘norm spiral’ model (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 24-5; Risse and Ropp 2013, 8-11). On
this account, as we have seen, after norms emerge states initially deny their universal validity. This
accurately characterises the behaviour of African states in the 1990s and until  mid-2007. These
same  states  then  make  ‘tactical  concessions’ to  avoid  international  isolation.  Once  again,  this
accurately captures the reasons for African states vote in favour of the Declaration. The failure,
however, to clarify norms via institutionalisation meant they could not be made universally valid.
Tactical concessions were, inevitably, made to norms with obviously indeterminate implications for
state behaviour - a development that would complicate later efforts to seek compliance and ‘rule-
consistent behaviour’ from Botswana (see chapter 4). 
237
One African state has long provided an exception to such rules. After  apartheid, President
Mandela and the ANC identified South Africa’s San population as the least divisive symbol around
which to build the post-apartheid nation (see Fauvelle-Aymar 1999). In the 1990s and early 2000s
South Africa was effectively the only African state to promote indigenous rights in pan-African fora
(Crawhall  2004;  Crawhall  2011,  20).  The  single  most  important  figure  in  this  effort  is  often
identified as Barney Pityana,  Chairperson of the South African  Human Rights Commission and
member of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Crawhall 2004, 41; Crawhall
2011, 24). In the 1970s Pityana had been an important and radical figure in Black Consciousness
and  World  Council  of  Churches  circles  (Magaziner  2010,  23-36; for  conscientisation  before
indigenous rights see chapter 6). Now, from the IWGIA’s perspective at least, he was ‘probably the
only member of the African  Commission interested in indigenous issues’ (Dahl 2009, 96). From
1999 he began a slow but ultimately successful attempt to persuade other commissioners to embrace
indigenous rights questions.
Other African states, however, were hostile to this language. They consistently argued that
all (black) African populations were colonised and none are therefore any more indigenous than any
other;  a denial  of  the new norm’s  universal  validity (e.g.  Kymlicka 2008, 13,  n.22). Important
explanations for these attitudes include memories of ‘balkanisation’, associated in particular with
some international support for Katanganese succession in newly independent Congo, and, on the
part  of  Southern  African  states  such  as  Botswana,  memories  of  ‘separate  development’ under
apartheid (e.g. Heraclides 1991, chapter 5; Southall 2013, 5-6; chapter 4). Indeed, Botswana and
Namibia,  who like South Africa are famous for having significant San populations, led African
opposition to UNDRIP (Crawhall 2011, 19-22). This opposition began to mobilise at a late stage in
response to mounting pressures from African civil society, co-ordinated by the African Commission
on  Human  and  Peoples'  Rights  (ACHPR) and  with  support  in  particular  from  Danish  donor
assistance (Crawhall 2011, 24; for the Danish aid Dahl 2009, 100-101). These efforts eventually
elicited support from some African states in other regions, ‘Congo Republic, Gabon, Cameroon, DR
Congo and to some degree Morocco and Algeria’ (Crawhall  2011, 20). A compromise text was
agreed by the Working Group, and then adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in June 2006. 
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But at the General Assembly in December 2006, Namibia, operating on the behalf of the
African Group, tabled a proposal to postpone consideration of the Declaration (Oldham and Frank
2008, 6). Botswana had become the ‘leading actor’ in co-coordinating this opposition, catalysed by
the unfavourable outcome in the  Sesana case (Saugestad 2006, 1). In October the President had
written to other African states outlining his concerns, and on the very same day that the  Sesana
judgement was read Charles Tiboni, Minister of Minerals, Energy and Water Resources, announced
that UNDRIP ‘in its current form ... would not see the light of day’ (Saugestad 2006, 3; Botswana
Press  Agency,  13th December  2006). The  African  Group’s  ‘Draft  Aide  Mémoire’ expressed  a
number  of  concerns  about  sovereignty  and  balkanisation  (African  Group,  9 th November  2006,
paragraphs 5,7 and 8). Significantly for our purposes, moreover, it objected that the ‘absence of a
definition of indigenous peoples in the text creates legal problems for the implementation of the
Declaration’, and asked for a ‘jurisdictional clause defining the rights holder’ to be included in the
text  (African Group, 9th November 2006, paragraph 2.1).  In January,  at  the African Union, the
Botswanan Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that:
the Declaration, as currently drafted, shows that, far from correcting past wrongs, it instead
poses a serious threat not only to our sovereignty and territorial integrity, but to peace and
stability of our respective countries and the continent at large ... [and] provides an opportunity
for Non-Governmental Organisations to meddle in the internal affairs of sovereign states in
the guise of promoting human rights. A number of countries, including my own, are already
facing this challenge (in Saugestad 2006, 3). 
In May 2007, finally, an African amendment was proposed stipulating that ‘every country or region
shall have the prerogative to define who constitutes indigenous people in their respective countries
or regions taking into account its national or regional peculiarities’ (Oldham and Frank 2008, 6-7).
As constructivists would expect, a number of other groups quickly sought to re-assert the
universal validity of indigenous rights (e.g. Indigenous Peoples’ Caucus, June 2007; Kamel Rezag
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Bara of the ACHPR in Assembly of First Nations, May 17th 2007, annex, paragraph 23). In late May
2007, however, the ACHPR produced an Advisory Opinion rejecting the Group’s arguments on the
grounds of local politics, not universal principles - something constructivists do not expect. The
Opinion  observed  that  ‘trans-national  identification’ in  Africa  posed  no  danger  to  ‘territorial
integrity’ and wholly discounted the Group’s concerns about legal definitions (ACHPR, May 2007,
paragraph  30).  It  claimed  that  since  ‘no  single  definition  can  capture  the  characteristics  of
indigenous populations’ it was ‘not necessary or useful’ to have one. A ‘much more relevant and
constructive’ approach would seek to bring out their ‘main characteristics’ (ACHPR, May 2007,
paragraph 10).  These characteristics  were,  in  turn,  then defined according the latest  ‘relational’
anthropological ideas: ‘self-identification; a special attachment to and use of their traditional land
[ ... and] a state of subjugation, marginalisation, dispossession, exclusion, or discrimination because
these  peoples  have  different  cultures,  ways  of  life  or  mode  of  production  than  the  national
hegemonic and dominant model’ (ACHPR, May 2007, paragraph 12). ‘In Africa’, the Commission
noted, the
term indigenous populations does not mean ‘first inhabitants’ in reference to aboriginality as
opposed to non-African communities or those having come from elsewhere. This peculiarity
distinguishes Africa from the other Continents where native communities have been almost
annihilated by non-native populations. Therefore, the ACHPR considers that any African can
legitimately  consider  him/herself  as  an  indigene  on  the  Continent  (ACHPR,  May  2007,
paragraph 13). 
Following  closed-door  negotiations  between  Namibia  and  Mexico  (representing  the  co-
sponsors  of  the  Declaration),  between  May  and  August  2007,  the  African  bloc  abandoned  its
opposition.  After  the  vote  the  central  importance  of  ‘provisions  on  sovereignty  and  territorial
integrity in providing ‘comfort language’ were highlighted by 15 mainly developing countries’. But
no more substantive tactical concessions were obtained (Oldham and Frank 2008, 6).  The final
Declaration  contained  no  precise  definition  of  ‘indigenous  peoples’,  and  did  nothing  more  to
assuage the CANZUS states’ concerns that provisions concerning land rights and natural resources
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might threaten their extractive industries (for these states’ subsequent attitudes Smits and Winter
2013). Accounts of these events by NGO participants provide nothing approaching an explanation
for this rather extraordinary volte face (cf. Oldham and Frank 2008, 7; Crawhall 2011, 29). And the
opacity of  the  relevant  diplomatic  proceedings  prevents  us  drawing any more  than  speculative
conclusions.  The general  phenomenon is  however  assessed by Saugestad (2008, 171),  a former
employee  of  the  Norwegian  development  agency  in  Botswana  and  one  of  the  closest
anthropological observers of indigenous rights politics:
what exactly is the driving force behind such changes? With the possible exception of South
Africa, we can probably not attribute these changes to strong national organisations that have
succeeded in persuading their governments. Rather, we can increasingly observe the effect of
the indigenous discourse being taken up by actors on a level that controls financial capital
(World Bank, IMF) or moral capital (the African Commission). Put even more bluntly, some
countries  in search of loans  may come up with a  policy on their  indigenous populations,
because World Bank directive 4.20 requires it.
 
African  states  tactical  concessions  certainly  did  not  extend  to  tacit  approval  of  the
universality validity of new norms. A number of public statements made by African governments
after voting for the Declaration made it clear that they continued to reject both the principles behind
it  and  those  behind  indigenous  rights  policies  more  generally  (e.g.  Hitchcock,  Sapignoli  and
Babchuk 2011, 63). As outlined above, moreover, African states in fact insisted upon retaining their
rhetorical framing of issues (‘comfort language’), and made concessions only on political specifics
(especially  legal  implementation);  a  reversal  of  the  constructivist  account.  Their  opponents’
framings were in any case structurally indeterminate. They were promoted as reflecting universally
valid principles (the ACHPR letter), but also placed great stress on local ‘peculiarities’ (the ACHPR
advisory opinion). This ambiguity was unavoidable. As their promoters concede, indigenous rights
cannot be turned into universally valid norms or determine desirable behaviours with any degree of
precision.
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(c) ‘Interlegal’ diffusion
As described in chapter 2, however, even if Botswana was to initiate ‘backlash’ against the
evolving international regime, this would not necessarily insulate it from international law’s effects
in  the  long-term.  Like  judges  in  ATCA cases,  Botswanan  judges  could  make  use  of  new
international legal principles governing indigenous rights. They could do so, moreover,  without
having to  ground their  decisions  in  formally agreed international  instruments,  and without  the
formal ‘embedding’ of international law in the Botswanan Constitution (for the latter’s significance
Alter 2014, 159-60). Of course, laws have never circulated only between national and international
systems. The ‘horizontal’ diffusion of laws between national systems has long been studied by
comparative lawyers (famously Watson 1974; Kahn Freund 1978). William Twining (2004, 1-2)
remembers teaching the subject in colonial Sudan with the aid of a world map coloured according
to  national  legal  ‘families’;  civil  law,  common law,  Roman-Dutch  law and so on.  And it  was
through the common-law family channel - specifically the  Australian High Court in  Mabo and
Others v The State of Queensland (1992) - that Judge Phumaphi was able to ‘sneak’ Aboriginal title
into Botswanan law ‘through the side door’ (Ng’ong’ola 2007; chapter 4). But as Twining (2004, 2)
points out, the assumptions behind his Sudanese map were ‘dubious even then’. As described in
chapter  6,  for  example,  the  class-action  lawsuit  has  globalised  dramatically  in  recent  decades,
despite civil lawyers’ predicting its certain incompatibility with their legal systems109. For Twining
(2005, 239) these ‘processes by which legal orders and traditions are influenced by other legal
orders and traditions’ now constitute ‘a pervasive aspect of  interlegality at all levels of law and
legal ordering’ (emphasis added).
Judge  Dow’s  judgement  in  Sesana  exemplified  the  shift  which  Twining  describes.  Her
crucial conclusions that ‘the Applicants belong to a class of peoples that have now come to be
recognized as ‘indigenous peoples’’, and have a ‘special relationship to their land’, were justified
by reference to a leading UN expert, and not the laws of Botswana or any international conventions
to which it was a party (Sesana v The Attorney General 2006, judgement of Dow, paragraph 117).
Dow’s willingness to do this would have been unsurprising to Botswana jurists. As summarised by
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Duma Boko, a Harvard-educated attorney whose firm represented the Sesana applicants, she was a
judge ‘who was willing to listen to arguments that to some conservative judges would seem to be
outrageous. In the CKGR case, I think she brought it home in the plainest manner’ (in Segwai, 14 th
November  2008). Dow defended these  ‘activist’ interpretations  by citing  theories  of  ‘generous
construction’ and the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court that ‘liberty is a broad and majestic term
... subject  to  change  in  a  society  that  is  not  stagnant’ (Sesana v  The Attorney  General  2006,
judgement of Dow, paragraphs 118-9).
 Dow  took  both  these  citations  from  Dow  v  the  Attorney  General  (1991).  This  was
previously the best-known case in the recent judicial history of Botswana, and one in which Dow
herself had been the litigant (see Dow 1995). Although she herself was a Motswana, the 1982 and
1984 amendments to the Citizenship Act effectively denied her children citizenship rights on the
grounds that her husband was American. Her lawsuit - which she saw as a ‘test case’ with crucial
implications for ‘implementing change’ for African women - received support from the Swedish
International  Development  Agency  and  various  Southern  African  and  American  NGOs
(Pfotenhauer and Dow 1991, 104-5; Dow 1995, preface). It was the first civil action to allege that
parliament had violated human rights and exceeded its constitutional powers (Pfotenhauer and Dow
1991,  101).  Its  success  coincided  with  a  comparative  explosion  in  Botswanan  constitutional
litigation  (see  Fombad  2011,  18).  Although  a  Bill  of  Rights  had  existed  since  independence,
arguments  based  upon  it  had  been  ‘largely  unheard  of’ (A.J.G.M.  Sanders  1983,  351).  The
Ghanaian Charles Hayfron-Benjamin, Chief Justice from 1978 to 1981, had briefly sought to use
the law of Britain and the United States to bring an ‘activist’ style to the country’s conservative
judiciary (A.J.G.M. Sanders 1983). But he was consistently frustrated by the conservativism of a
Court of Appeal bench dominated by white liberal judges from South Africa, all appointed on short-
term contracts (A.J.G.M. Sanders 1984)110. The only politically acceptable means for these men to
oppose apartheid was by a strict ‘positivist’ adherence to the letter of the law (see Forsyth 1985;
Chanock 1999, 397-8). 
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As Brake and Katzenstein (2013, 727, 728, n.14) write, ‘interlegal’ movements of law ‘oc-
cur around nodes of power and prestige’. Where once ‘at the turn of the last century, states looked
to German law for an institutional catalyst to speed development from agrarian to an industrialized
society’, African judges are now more likely to import concepts from international law or the law of
the United States (Brake and Katzenstein 2013, 727;  for European law and the transformation of
Meiji Japan, Ataturk’s Turkey, late nineteenth-century Egypt, and 1960s Ethiopia see Beckstrom
1973; Wilner 1975; Örücü 1992; Hirowatari 2000). ‘Neo-functionalist’ explanations for diffusion
conceal these unequal relationships by referencing global ‘communities’ or ‘networks’ of law (see
Helfer and Slaughter 1997; for critique Dezalay and Garth 2002; Buxbaum 2004; for functionalism
generally see chapter 6). In the Botswanan case conditions for such diffusion have included the
globalisation  of  American-style  litigation  ‘support  structures’ after  1989,  and  the  existence  of
agents, such as Unity Dow, who reject the beliefs in parliamentary sovereignty and  judicial ‘posit-
ivism’ which had previously dominated liberal jurisprudential thought in the region (for ‘support
structures’ Epp 1998, 197). 
In Namibia, notably, there have been no such agents and no such diffusion processes. The
appointment of acting judges continues to be necessary for the Supreme Court to attain quorum, and
these (politically-dependent) appointments continue to be made from amongst the ranks of those
same  (largely)  liberal-positivist  expatriates  who  once  dominated  Botswana’s  Court  of  Appeal
(Hemed Bukurura 2006; Tjombe 2008; 229, 234; Southall 2013, 152)111. One result is that Nami-
bia’s judges have worked, pragmatically, ‘to develop and maintain amicable relations with the exec-
utive’ whilst not seeking to not compromise their independence (VonDoepp 2009, 149). For Jeremy
Sarkin (2008, 174), indeed, they are so ‘sympathetic to the ruling party’ that he does not consider
them likely, in the short-term, to accept the transplantation of international reparations norms into
Namibian law. Legal rights can thus diffuse across the boundaries of legal-systems, and in the ab-
sence of clarification by institutionalisation. Their adoption is determined not merely by desires for
conformity and reputational costs, but also by the beliefs and social positions of local diffusion
agents (for social positions Dezelay and Garth eds. 2011).
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4. Supranational human rights courts
(a) Institutionalisation
In chapter 2 I described how, in Zimbabwe, the government has sought to prevent ‘interleg-
al’ diffusion by replacing judges in the higher courts, and seeking to remove ‘international law’
from the constitution’s interpretive sources. Litigants, however, have still been able to make use of
the ‘embedding’ of international law in the South African constitution, as well  as supranational
courts  associated with regional and continental  organisations.  Africa,  indeed, has more of these
‘new-style’ courts - with compulsory jurisdiction where non-state actors initiate litigation - than any
other continent (Alter 2014, 82-4; chapter 6). In this  section,  taking the example of the SADC
Tribunal, I argue that the norm spiral is incapable of explaining this remarkable institutionalisation
process. African states ratified new courts without internalising or even making tactical concessions
to new norms. In the SADC case ‘backlash’ against the Tribunal only began when it was clear that
potentially determinate  rights provisions could be used to undermine ‘patriotic-historical’ norms
embedded in legitimate regional statehood. (This contrast with the two previous cases explains why
I have treated it last, departing from my usual practice.)
Before the end of the Cold War sub-Saharan Africa had only one ‘new-style’ court:  the
inoperative  Court  of  Justice  of  the  ECCAS (Economic  Community  of  Central  African  States)
(1983). By 2004 it had nine (excluding war crimes courts), including the  Court of Justice of the
African  Economic  Community  (1991),  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  WAEMU  (West  African
Economic  and  Monetary  Union) (1996),  the  Common Court  of  Justice  and  Arbitration  of  the
OHADA (L’Organisation pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires) (1997), the Court
of Justice of the COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) (1998), the Court of
Justice of the CEMAC (La Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Central) (2000),
the  East  African  Community  Court  of  Justice  (2001),  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  ECOWAS
(Economic  Community Of  West  African  States)  (2001),  and the  African  Court  on  Human and
People’s  Rights  (2004)  (Romano,  Alter,  and Shany 2014,  fold-out  chart). The  SADC Tribunal
(2000),  for  its  part,  was  created  as  part  of  SADC’s  replacement  of  the  Southern  African
Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) in the early 1990s. The 1992 Windhoek Treaty
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committed the new organisation,  inter alia, to ‘human rights, democracy and the rule of law’, the
‘free  movement  of  capital  and labour’,  and  the  establishment  of  a  supranational  tribunal  with
compulsory  jurisdiction  (with  specific  competences  to  be  established  via  a  separate  protocol)
(SADC, August 1992, articles 4-5, 16). This was a dramatic volte face. SADCC institutions had not
been  devoted  to  human  rights.  Although  rhetorically  committed  to  ‘economic  liberation’,  the
organisation had in fact functioned primarily to divert trade from areas affected by South African
‘de-stabilisation’ during apartheid (cf. Gleave 1992). 
This striking lack of interest is not surprising in the context of African political history. As
described in chapter 6, during decolonisation African states had largely used rights as tools (see
generally Moyn 2010, chapter 3). In the years around 1960, like Irish republicans and Cypriot na-
tionalists at the ECtHR, they had sought to expand the application of individual rights to colonial
subjects in order to de-legitimise Empire (Simpson 2001, 1053-1102; Reus-Smit 2013). ‘The fight
against apartheid’, in particular, which was rooted in rights discourse, ‘gave form to the political
project known as the Third World’ (Irwin 2012, 5, 104). After independence, however, rights were
typically abandoned domestically. They became bourgeois luxuries which developing states could
ill-afford. Every African state which had inherited or advocated for a Bill of Rights at independence
significantly restricted its scope in the post-independence period (Rubner 2011, 123, 125-147). Only
President Nyerere of Tanzania adopted a less obviously instrumental attitude. In his opening address
to the Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa Conference in September 1959
he asked: 
are we going to turn round to them, tomorrow after we have achieved Independence and say,
‘To hell with all this nonsense about human rights; we are only using that as a tactic to har-
ness the sympathy of the naïve? (in Eckert 2011, 298). 
And in 1967 he was almost alone in criticising Nigerian conduct during the Biafran War, arguing
that ‘the OAU is not a trade union of African Heads of State’ (Rubner 2011, 117-8)112. In Tanzania
itself, meanwhile, and again very unusually, Nyerere had opposed British attempts to impose a Bill
of Rights at independence. This was on the grounds that Tanzania’s poverty meant that the UDHR
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‘represents our goal rather than something we have already achieved’ (in Eckert 2011, 299; see also
Moyn 2010, 111; Rubner 2011, 133). Other leaders would only discover this argument after inde-
pendence.
In the later 1970s, as outlined earlier, African states began to use the ‘human rights revolu-
tion’ to re-legitimise the New International Economic Order. They applied new ‘maximalist’, inde-
terminate right ideas to groups and ‘collectivities’. The most significant product of this period was
the continent’s  first  human rights  document:  the 1981 African Charter  of  Human and People’s
Rights (ACrHPR). Here African states enshrined the ‘right to development’ and sought to establish
idiosyncratic new concepts such as ‘peoples’ rights’ and even duties towards the ‘national commu-
nity’ and ‘the family … the  custodian of morals and traditional values recognized by the com-
munity’ (OAU, 27th June 1981, articles 18, 27, 29; for analysis Rubner 2011, 245-302). Such applic-
ations were so novel, and their implications so far reaching, that Theo Van Boven, Director of the
United Nations Division of Human Rights, was forced to concede that it was ‘a pertinent question ...
whether the Universal Declaration is still a valid and pertinent international instrument’ (in Rubner
2011, 180). The overall result, in Peter Takirambudde’s words, was ‘a comparatively weak declarat-
ory regime exacerbated by potential or actual normative incoherence’ (Takirambudde 1991, 48, in
Widner 2001, 167). 
Once more, Nyeyere represented a partial exception to these rules. Hailing the Charter, he
welcomed the opportunity to ‘attack [human rights abuse] … when it is committed by Black Gov-
ernments against their own people’. But this was largely a post-hoc justification of his invasion of
Uganda and deposition of Idi Amin in 1979 (Widner 2001, 168). Whilst a number of states had be-
gun to condemn Amin, even Nyerere studiously avoided justifying intervention on human rights
and humanitarian grounds, and such concerns were of no importance for the creation of the ACrH-
PR (Wheeler 2001, 118; Rubner, 2011; 257, 259; contrast Welch Jr. 1981, 405-6). President Sen-
ghor of Senegal did, it is true, promote the adoption of something more like the UDHR. But for
Rubner (2011, 258) ‘the evidence, such that it is’ suggests only ‘that it appealed to his vanity’ at a
time when he was hoping to win the Nobel Prize in Literature and promote his ‘Civilization of the
Universal’ on the international stage (for more evidence of this see Villey 1983, 16). 
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In short, during the Cold War few if any African leaders believed in human rights law, let
alone courts. Superficially, this only makes their subsequent enthusiasm for them more of a puzzle.
Unlike during the drafting of the ACrHPR, moreover, after 1989 they did not even try to contest the
scope of the rights these new courts would adjudicate. There was no extended period of internation-
al and domestic pressure followed by ‘tactical concessions’, as constructivists would anticipate. In-
stead, the end of the Cold War saw large-scale diffusion of ECJ and (especially) ECtHR models,
emulating the forms these institutions had adopted by the later 1970s (see chapter 6). The SADC,
like so many other organisations of its sort, was clearly modeled on European Union templates (see
Börzel and Risse 2012). The SADCC’s Consultative Conference in preparation for the Windhoek
Treaty simply announced, without justification, that such regional communities required ‘mechan-
isms of mediation and arbitration, to which all agents of integration - governments, business, civil
associations and individuals - can seek justice’ (in Lenz 2012, 165). Strikingly, therefore, as Lenz
(2012, 165) notes, ‘when the decision was taken to establish a Tribunal with the Windhoek Treaty,
no real discussion on the costs and benefits of different options had taken place at the regional
level’. And no such discussions would take place until Campbell had come to court. Tanzanian Pres-
ident Kikwete later bemoaned how he and his fellow Heads of State had ‘created a monster’ (e.g.
Hulse 2012). But SADC states had allowed 21 direct and indirect references to human and individu-
al  rights  to  be  inserted  into  the  Community’s  Protocols  (Cowell  2013,  155).  (As  described  in
chapter 2, Zimbabwe had both defended itself before, and even sent a judge to this Court which it
would later claim was illegally constituted.)
Given this, it is difficult to understand how Nathan (2013, 884) can explain the Tribunal’s
dissolution by referencing ‘predominant norms’ in the SADC of ‘respect for sovereignty … regime
solidarity and anti-imperialism’.  In the 1990s even Zimbabwean official  rhetoric  regularly pro-
claimed alternative standards for state conduct. Following the Liberian crisis of 1990, for example,
President Mugabe was so keen to qualify sovereignty that he suggested that the ‘‘domestic affairs’
of a country’ must be re-defined to ‘mean affairs within a peaceful environment’ (in Wippman 1993,
182). Some regional leaders have, of course, justified their apparent change of heart on these mat-
ters by citing new Western pressures, and some analysts have been tempted to explain it likewise
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(e.g. Nathan 2013, 882-4). But despite the Tribunal and other SADC organs being almost wholly
dependent on European Union and other donor funding, Lenz’s (2012, 163) detailed study in fact
‘found little evidence to suggest that active EU diffusion efforts were causal for this decision [to
emulate EU models]’. He places much greater stress on SADC leaders’ pro-active efforts to seek
out  European funding by emulating  European institutions,  as  illustrated  by the  Summit’s  1991
observation that ‘the existing patterns of net resource flows are likely to, at best, stay the same in
real terms, in the face of keen competition for aid and investment from the other parts of the world,
notably Eastern Europe’ (in Lenz 2012, 165).
Theoretically, I maintain, such findings are instances of what one leading Africanist,  Jean-
Francois Bayart (2000), calls ‘extraversion’ (see Brett and Gissel 2013). Dependence, for Bayart,
can be a ‘form of action’, geared towards extracting rents from the international system. It need not
be simply equivalent to ‘external structural conditions’, as maintained by dependency theorists in
earlier decades (cf. Bayart 2000, 218). In simple terms, African states reacted to harsh new geopolit-
ical conditions by simulating compliance with new Western demands; Chabal and Daloz’s (1999,
117) ‘politics of the mirror’.  The most radical exponents of  this  ‘technique of self-preservation’
were ‘various  anciens régimes’ including Zimbabwe (Bayart  2000, 225).  After 1989  such tech-
niques replaced the efforts to stretch and re-appropriate human rights ideas which had characterised
the previous period113. So although African states were still to internalise human rights ‘norms’, they
studiously avoided the kind of contentious ‘dialogue’ over their content which endanger aid flows
and regime stability (contrast Risse and Sikkink 1999, 17; Risse and Ropp 2013, 8). As explained
by Judge Ariranga Pillay, who headed the SADC Tribunal when it was dissolved, the court was in-
tended ‘to get funds from the European Union and others’ by giving-off ‘all the right buzz words,
you know, ‘democracy, rule of law, human rights’’ (in Nathan 2013, 883). This extraversion, mean-
while, was reflected in the ‘poor drafting’ of the SADC Treaty (Matyszak 2011, 3, n.22). And it is
betrayed by the vagueness of references to human rights in SADC instruments. In Cowell’s (2013,
156) words, these only reflect ‘a commitment to what is sometimes termed the ‘global script’ of hu-
man rights among Member States’114. They certainly did not result from an institutionalisation pro-
cess which had helped to clarify the relevant norms. 
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(b) States’ responses
In the aftermath of Campbell, however, this lack of clarity was not itself, per se, responsible
for backlash. Unlike in the Botswanan and Namibian cases examined here, rights had not expanded
into the inherently political realms of group definition. The Tribunal’s decision to rule on racial dis-
crimination was certainly an ‘activist’ one.  As described by  Tazorora Musarurwa (2010, 11), the
court’s international legal assistant,  ‘conservative positivists may thus have problems with the ap-
proach taken by the Tribunal’. But the Tribunal had merely expanded the scope of application for
individual rights, as was commonplace before the human rights revolution of the 1970s (see chapter
6). Nor was regional backlash caused by threats to fundamental political order, even if the Camp-
bell judgement clearly posed this risk (see chapter 2). Regional backlash resulted, rather, from the
threat these particular individual rights posed to the predominant norms governing legitimate state-
hood in the region (for legitimate statehood Bull 1977; Wendt 1999; Reus-Smit 1999). These norms
were not Nathan’s trio (2013, 884) of ‘respect for sovereignty … regime solidarity and anti-imperi-
alism’. All of these had been at least rhetorically violated to serve extraversion in the 1990s. They
related, instead, to ex-liberation movements’ legitimations as overthrowers of settler colonialism.
The Tribunal would only violate these norms when it ruled on the legality of Fast Track Land Re-
form in 2008.
As outlined above, the SADCC had been conceived to combat the ‘de-stabalisation’ and re-
gional designs of the apartheid regime: identified by African states as the last vestige of settler colo-
nial rule on the continent (Price 1984, 14-16; Gibb 2007, 424). The pre-existing areas of co-opera-
tion it built upon, moreover - notably the Dar-Es-Salaam Transport Corridor - had been designed to
safeguard Zambian trade following the advent white minority rule in Rhodesia (Gleave 1992; Taki-
rambudde 1999, 153).  Negotiations to end apartheid (1990-1994), however, meant that such activi-
ties could no longer provide the explicit rationale for post Cold-War regionalism. This history re-
mained central, however, to the domestic legitimation of former liberation movements governing
ex-settler colonial states. As Southall (2013, 5), citing Johnson (2001), has claimed, the ANC in
South Africa, SWAPO in Namibia and ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe all share a ‘common theology’ of
‘national liberation’; ‘the just and historically necessary conclusion of the struggle between the peo-
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ple and the forces of racism and colonialism’. This theology has three corresponding demands, ‘a
conception of the colonially oppressed ‘people’ or ‘nation’ as one’, as exemplified by SWAPO’s re-
action to Herero and Nama demands for reparations; that ‘their leaders be ‘imbued with a particular
legitimacy’ as illustrated by ZANU-PF’s reaction to the emergence of the MDC; and ‘the construc-
tion of ‘patriotic history’’, which insists that ‘the seizure of African land by white settlers was a mo-
tivating force driving the armed struggle’ (Southall 2013, 6, 231; chapter 2)115. 
These norms also have their ‘norm entrepreneurs’. ‘Agentic constructivists’ have tended to
identify human rights activists as the only kind of agents motivated by ‘empathy, altruism and ideo-
logical commitment’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 898). For these scholars ‘counter-discourses’,
where they exist, are ‘regime-based’; centered around the defence of state interests and typically
propagated by state agents and ideologues (Risse and Ropp 2013, 15-21; Kim 2014, 64, 99, 136).
Following FTLR, however, Southern African activists unconnected with ZANU-PF have, in fact,
done much to propagate the ‘patriotic history’ of land (or ‘liberation narrative’) in the wider region.
By lobbying regional meetings - and the Namibian and South African governments, which are al-
ready at  least  rhetorically committed to  these norms -  these activists  have been able to  ensure
norms’ wider diffusion (Alden and Anseew 2009, 107-8, 140, 143, 173-4; 2010, 265, 273).
A powerful indicator of the growing power of norms relating to land and patriotic history
has been regional leaders’ increasing unwillingness to publicly express private concerns. Pragmatic
concerns about the planning and consequences of any FTLR-like ‘process’ are, indeed, almost ubi-
quitous among regional elites. The ANC, for example, although increasingly eager to promote sym-
bolic initiatives,  has consistently undermined the efforts of its  land reform bureaucracy via un-
der-financing and contradictory policy-making (Zenker 2013). In 2000 President Thabo Mbeki -
who, like many urban and once exiled party intellectuals, had never personally engaged much with
the land question - initially expressed private concerns about FTLR (Alden and Anseeuw 2010, 276,
n.5; for ANC attitudes Klug 2000, 125; Walker 2008, 53). He consistently, however, refused any
forthright condemnation of Mugabe’s efforts to redress the ‘enduring legacies of colonialism’ - be-
moaning, in 2003, how the land issue had ‘disappeared from public view’, its place ‘taken by the is-
sue of human rights’ (Alden and Anseew 2009,  110-112; Nathan 2013, 885). More recently Land
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Reform Minister Gugile Nkwinti, to cheers from ANC parliamentarians, has declared it an ‘honour’
to have his work compared with that of Robert Mugabe - despite the relative pragmatism of his own
actual approach (South African Press Association, 31st May 2013; for Nkwinti see Jacobs 2012, 174;
Southall 2013, 224). In Namibia, similarly, SWAPO’s commitment to land reform has been almost
entirely  rhetorical  (see  chapter  3).  President  Nujoma,  however,  was  personally  sympathetic  to
Mugabe and FTLR, and Zimbabwean developments  triggered a  wave of domestic  mobilisation
around the issue in 2004-5 (Melber 2005; Alden and Anseeuw 2009, 139-140, 143). The result, in
both cases, has been that:
Southern states came to ignore the pressure of international actors when it contradicted the
sources of regional legitimacy and the regional norm on solidarity. Domestic audience costs
of taking a harsh public stance on the Zimbabwe question were deemed by governing author-
ities in Pretoria and Windhoek too high, given the reverberations it would hold for their own
domestic land question. Moreover, the residual impulse of regional solidarity ... came to play
a far greater role in situating these transitional states in relation to their self-ascribed identity
as independent, post-settler states (Alden and Anseeuw 2009, 178).
Namibia was later particularly forthright in its opposition to the Tribunal’s human rights jurisdic-
tion, with its Minister of Justice, Pendukeni Iivula-Ithana, claiming that member states were entitled
to ‘fine-tune regional bodies’ and that the Tribunal existed to ‘serve us’ (Melber, 17 th August 2011;
Cowell 2013, 163).
Leaders of many states with differing historical legacies have followed suit. In 2000 Presid-
ent  Chissano of  Mozambique,  like President  Mbeki,  had privately voiced concerns  with FTLR
(Alden and Anseeuw 2010, 276, n.5). Subsequently he even ‘quietly sought to encourage white Zi-
mbabweans  to  take  up  farming  in  the  underutilised  agricultural  areas  of  the  country’s  central
provinces’ (Alden and Anseeuw 2009, 116; see generally Hammar 2010). His FRELIMO govern-
ment, however - despite officials’ private concerns - has consistently ‘spoke[n] publicly in support
of Mugabe’s dilemma, emphasising their shared colonial legacy of land dispossession’ (Alden and
Anseeuw 2009, 168). In 2004 the Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa and Mauritian Prime Min-
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ister Paul Berenger praised FTLR at the SADC Summit, even if these countries later justified their
stance on the Tribunal’s suspension on technical grounds (Alden and Anseeuw 2009, 174; Mike
Campbell Foundation, 4th March 2014). Botswanan elites alone have consistently criticised FTLR
(e.g. BBC News, 11th November 2001; Kahiya, 11st October 2002; for a response typical of ZANU-
PF Maodza, 7th August 2013). This would be difficult to understand if ‘respect for sovereignty …
regime solidarity and anti-imperialism’ genuinely constituted norms of legitimate statehood in the
region, but becomes less puzzling once that country’s historical lack of anti-colonialism and land
dispossession is taken into account (see chapter 4; contrast Nathan 2013, 884). Even here, however,
‘though forthright in its criticism of the Zimbabwean government internally, by end 2005, the Pres-
ident [Mogae] had changed his tone dramatically at an international level’, praising Zimbabwean
agriculture (Alden and Anseeuw 2009, 169). The regional salience of the ‘patriotic history’ of land
was hammered home, finally, by the justifications for the Tribunal’s suspension offered by SADC
Deputy Secretary General, Joao Caholo - an SADCC veteran and former deputy minister in the An-
golan government. An interview conducted by the Zimbabwean journalist Edson Gutu (17 th March,
2011) began with the following exchange:
QUESTION: About the SADC tribunal’s alleged suspending after a ruling made in favour of
Zimbabwe’s aggrieved farmers…
Now. Let me first underscore the fact that the land issue is a very sensitive issue. It has to do
with ownership,  it  has  to  do with the  past;  It  has  to  do with the  process  that  led to  the
liberation of Zimbabwe. It has to do with, probably the future of Zimbabwe in particular. But
let me also state that the land issue is not only particular to Zimbabwe or Southern Africa. It is
probably, or it can probably be applied to all African countries.
And Caholo concluded that,
the issue of land in Zimbabwe is not legal only, it is also political ... and that is not the man-
date of the tribunal to judge [...]  Even in the country that I come from - in Angola, the issue
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of land has not been addressed properly, and it is political. You cannot disown me, a native of
that piece of land in the name of justice; You cannot!.
At the level of individual states a number of country-specific factors must, of course, have
exerted some influence. President Kabila of the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, may
have continued to feel obligated towards Nujoma and Mugabe for their 1998 military intervention
on behalf of his father’s embattled regime (see Prunier 2009, 258). For Merran Hulse (2012) it is
unsurprising if ‘autocratic’ Heads of State such as  King Mswati of Swaziland decided to suspend
the court. Jeremy Gauntlett (2012, 36), meanwhile, speculates, plausibly, that ‘it must have been ex-
plained to a country such as Botswana (or perhaps the other shoe dropped) that its manner of treat -
ment of the San people ... would be set to be challenged, soon, before the Tribunal’; a view shared
by Hulse (2012). And Gauntlett’s suggestion that Malawi may have had similar worries about its
criminal law ‘provisions and discrimination enforced, often brutally, against gay people’ was also
echoed by various (anonymous) interviewees. Some of these alleged that Mugabe had waited until
South African President Zuma absented himself from the 2011 Summit before persuading other at-
tendees of this risk. 
The  political  culture  of  liberation  movements  may  also  have  come  into  play.  Michelo
Hansungele (2013, 138) of the International Commission of Jurists, for instance, has reported that a
senior GOZ official declared at an earlier workshop that its nominated judge (Antonina Guvava)
was ‘too junior to ‘overrule’ the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe while sitting at the SADC Tribunal’,
despite  her  actual  seniority  in  the  rational-legal  hierarchy.  A number  of  influential  culturalist
scholars believe that decoding these familial and paternal metaphors is the key to understanding
political legitimacy in Africa (Schatzberg 2001; Bayart [1989] 2009, 174; Chabal 2009, 40). Such
language is particularly common amongst former liberation movements, who continue to regard
each other as ‘brothers in war’ and now ‘fathers of the nation’ (e.g. Alao 1994; Melber 2009b, 456-
8). At SADC Summits Heads of State thus ‘accord President Robert Mugabe with elevated status
first as an elder statesman and second as the most educated among them’, some even being ‘said to
queue for advice’ from the Zimbabwean leader (Hansungele 2013, 145). For Chabal (2009, 40) this
treatment of Mugabe ‘speaks to the attributes of the politics of age’ in the region. Nonetheless, these
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specific cultural inheritances and more local political concerns are clearly themselves insufficient to
explain how similar patriotic-historical justifications for suspension were invoked by a wider range
of states. To do this we must make reference to intensifying regional norms of legitimate statehood.
5. Conclusion
In every case examined here, therefore, institutionalisation failed to clarify emerging norms
and render them more determinate. This runs counter to the constructivist account of ‘norm spirals’.
In  the  case  of  reparations  and  indigenous  rights  a  condition  for  this  indeterminacy  was  the
‘maximalist’ expansion of rights that followed the ‘revolution’ of the 1970s. When new reparations
norms were institutionalised after 1989 states were no longer the only legitimate rights-holders. But
nor could they be excluded as such. This has prevented liberal actors from stopping Namibia and
other African states contesting and even deriving positive advantages from new reparations ideas.
Similarly,  in the case of indigenous rights,  institutionalisation after  1989 undermined tacit  elite
assumptions which had previously restricted their scope to cases of ‘blue-water’ colonialism. This
expansion  meant  that  liberal  actors  were  unable  to  assuage  African  states’ concerns  that  no
determinate definition of rights-holders could be devised. These states’ ‘tactical concessions’ are
likely to have been elicited by more straightforward coercive means. By contrast,  the failure of
institutionalisation to clarify the mandates of new supranational courts owed little to the events of
the  1970s.  Initially,  in  fact,  Southern  African  states  eagerly  promoted  these  processes  when
deploying techniques of ‘extraversion’. They only sought to contest these norms when the courts
they had established began adjudicating individual rights that violated ‘patriotic history’; now a key
component of legitimate statehood in the region.
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Chapter 10: Conclusion.
1. New dysfunction in the liberal project
The editor of a student textbook has recently written that the future of human rights is best
learnt about from ‘science fiction’. Promoting them is not a matter of adhering to specific beliefs. It
involves, instead, ‘taking sides’ for or against an ‘inherently revolutionary’ challenge to ‘traditional
cultures and philosophies’ (Goodhart 2009, 2, 4-5). Constructivists, as we have seen, take a similar
view. They understand rights activism as the socialisation of political actors into complying with
new  behavioural  norms  constructed  by  ‘norm  entrepreneurs’.  As  argued  in  chapter  5,  finally,
sophisticated Foucauldian studies  of liberalism echo this  position.  These scholars downplay the
significance of proclaimed differences between specific  liberal  ideas,  and highlight their  shared
political effects. For Young and Williams (1994, 93, n.61), for example, who draw on Ian Shapiro
(1986), there is ‘much in common’ between even utilitarianism and rights-based philosophies. In
Christianity, similarly, fierce theological controversies such as those following the Spanish conquest
of  the  Americas  ultimately  distract  the  analyst  from  the  fixed  core  of  its  civilising  mission.
Apparently irreconcilable positions shared ‘premises of singularity and universality [which] press
against ... cultural pluralism ... If innocent, these others must be converted; if hopelessly corrupted
they must be conquered or eliminated so that the corruption will not spread’ (Connolly 1991, 42-3
in Young and Williams 1994, 100). These positions were united not by overarching epistème, but by
shared relentless desires to re-shape non-Christian or non- liberal others (see chapter 5; contrast
Foucault 1970, 181). Differences can always be ‘resolved in practice’ (Young and Williams 1994,
96).  
In this study, however, I have argued that human rights discourse now has other functions. I
have  sought  to  demonstrate  ways  in  which  it  has  expanded  beyond  the  realm  of  individual
subjectivities,  and  into  domains  of  fundamental  political  order;  a  domain  it  has  proved
fundamentally incapable of regulating. An explanation for this is that liberalism’s adoption of rights
language has entailed a new dependence on legal establishments. Liberal ideas have increasingly
been applied by lawyers,  the ‘clergy of liberalism’,  and not  by ‘the foot-soldiers of the liberal
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project’ (chapter 5). This has meant that the inherent indeterminacy of these ideas has become a
political problem of greatly increased significance. Traditional liberal concepts (such as autonomy
and utility) have long been understood as ultimately ‘unadministerable’ and lacking the ‘relational
specification’ necessary to help resolve real-world disputes (I. Shapiro 1989, 58, 60). But where
such  concepts  have  served  to  license  new kinds  of  social  transformation  by the  liberal  ‘foot-
soldiers’ their  ‘theoretical  implausibility’ has  not,  historically,  been  of  central  importance  (see
Young  and  Williams  1994,  100).  Now,  however,  lawyers  apply  indeterminate  rights  ideas  to
regulate concrete legal orders where the consequences of the specific decisions could hardly be
more far-reaching. Differences between interpretations cannot be simply ‘resolved in practice’ via
socialisation. In the long-term, of course, the ‘liberal project’ depends on containing opposition to
realistic  efforts  to  consolidate  legal  order.  The  expansion  of  rights,  in  this  narrow  sense,  is
dysfunctional for it. Liberals, therefore, have reasons to be sceptical of rights116. Opposition to it
need not be limited to adherents of ‘traditional cultures and philosophies’.
As Duncan Ivison (1998, 144) describes, Michel Foucault himself recognised this problem
but steadfastly refused to engage with it:
something then has to create the conditions for social order, for the possibility of some kind of
identity. For Hobbes it was a civil peace backed by the power of a Leviathan. For Locke, it an
almost self-regulating civil society. For Foucault, perhaps all we can say is that the clamour
for Right only ever muffles the sound of war continuing on around us.
Bernard  Williams,  by contrast,  himself  a  convinced  liberal,  took  a  less  sanguine  view of  this
muffling. His brand of liberal ‘realism’ was intended as a corrective to recent ‘moralist’ theories,
such as those of John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin. These assume that the existence of social order
can first be established ‘at the level of state-of-nature theory’, and then rights and responsibilities
assigned (Hawthorn 2005, xiv;  Williams 2005, 62). For Williams whilst it was ‘easy to think of the
political in those terms’ in ‘settled’ societies, such views could be damagingly misleading when
applied to other contexts (Williams 2005, 62). He thus sought to provide an alternative ‘Hobbesian’
solution to the question of order’s priority. This did not start from the ‘state-of-nature’, but from the
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real-world; it was ‘inherent in there being such a thing as politics’ (Williams 2005, 5). For Williams,
Hobbes had correctly identified  ‘the first  political  question’:  ‘the securing  of  order,  protection,
safety, trust, and the conditions of co-operation’ (Williams 2005, 3, 62). This question was logically
‘first’ because ‘solving it is the condition of solving, indeed posing, any others’. There is simply no
point in reflecting upon how to promote ‘justice’ and human rights if no political order exists to
deliver them. It makes no sense to say, in short, as Article 28 of the UDHR does, that ‘everyone is
entitled to  a  social  and  international  order  in  which  the  rights  and  freedoms  set  forth  in  this
Declaration can be fully realised’ (my emphasis). Such an order is simply a condition for their
realisation.
For  Hobbes, of course, the monopoly of violence had been key to this. For Williams, by
contrast  - who follows Weber at  this  point - some element of legitimacy is  also essential.  Any
durable order must fulfil a ‘basic legitimation demand’ (BLD) (unless, like some slave societies, it
is to be experienced as simply coercive by a large number of its inhabitants) (Williams 2005, 4-5).
This legitimacy can be secured in a number of ways, including those which do not respect human
rights. History, indeed, provides a variety of answers for ‘why, when and by whom’ basic political
arrangements have been ‘accepted or rejected’ (Williams 2005, 9). In Africa, notably, as we have
seen, the process of building new orders in land ‘must engage broad citizenries,  and ...  require
consensus  building  over  basic  questions  of  political  order  and community’ (Boone 2007,  586;
chapter 1). They cannot merely be imposed by a court or Leviathan. These attempts to resolve basic
constitutional conflicts are canonical examples of Williams’ ‘first’ questions. They are ‘central to
state-formation’,  ‘logically  prior  to  policy  choices’,  and,  I  would  add,  morally  prior  to  the
guaranteeing of rights (Boone 2007, 586; Lund and Boone 2013, 1). But as Raymond Geuss (2008,
22) has written, drawing on Williams, basic political order is ‘always a social achievement, and it is
something  attained  and  preserved,  and  generally  achieved  only  at  a  certain  price’.  As  my
Zimbabwean case illustrates, even a new, broad consensus around these questions may have to be
brought at the cost of rights violations and injustice. 
The boundaries of basic political order can, therefore, be identified in specific cases, and
claim a moral priority over the abstract ascription of rights, freedoms and obligations. Such a task
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will  always,  however,  in  Foucault’s  (1977b,  139)  words,  ‘be  grey,  meticulous,  and  patiently
documentary’. On close examination, for example, the CKGR case in Botswana has turned out to be
one that courts might just, at least in theory, have been able to use to help satisfy Williams’ BLD;
legitimating new entitlements to land and resources by promoting political inclusion of San via the
language of rights. (In reality, of course, this has not been the result.) The Zimbabwean commercial
land and Namibian reparations cases, by contrast, are not of this kind. They are ferociously complex
struggles  over  fundamental  political  order.  Neither  abstract  moral  reasoning  nor  the  social
construction of new norms for conduct can resolve them. 
One obvious corollary of this, finally, is that some kinds of rights-based resistance really do
present fundamental challenges to liberalism. They do not all expand the boundaries of ‘the human’
and individual subjectivity, and thus enable new and more powerful forms of discipline (see chapter
5). A ‘logic of appropriation’ does not always threaten ‘to make rights, as positive legislation and
disciplinary apparatus,  complicit  in  the ‘etatization’ of  our  social  lives’ (Rajagopal  2003,  191).
Louiza Odysseous (2011, 452) may be right to argue, in Foucauldian mode, that in the CKGR, at
least  to date,  ‘invoking rights does not resist the processes of ‘power that conducts’’. This, she
claims,  is  because  ‘it  still  animates  the  art  of  government’s  guiding  of  the  conduct  of  the
population ... by leaving the value of development unproblematized’. In Zimbabwe and Namibia,
however,  resistance  to  state-formation  trends  post-FTLR,  like  resistance  to  the  framework  of
bilateral relations, cannot be appropriated by power and turned into new norms for conduct. Here
power must oppose them in the name of order. 
2. Prospects
Geuss (2005, 65) believes that it may be too late for political considerations such as these to
generate any backlash against rights in the West:  ‘settling back into our cosy world of cultivating
the tiny garden of our own welfare and our ‘human rights’ and those of other members of the global
village, incoherent as the concept of a ‘human rights’ is, may well turn out in fact to be the last word
for  us’.  In  Southern  Africa,  however,  much  of  the  Left  is  turning  against  this  language  (for
Zimbabwe  Raftopolous  2013,  973,  984;  Ncube  2013,  99;  Lewanika  2014;  for  South  Africa
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Neocosmos  2006;  2011;  Cousins  and  Hall  2011;  contrast  Madlingozi  2012;  Tissington  2012).
Elsewhere some leading promoters of indigenous rights have denounced the ‘liberal consensus’ that
has emerged since the 1970s and the ‘rights fetishism’ that has accompanied it (respectively Sutton
2009,  11,  19-20;  McHugh  2014;  see  also  Lowe  2010,  221).  They  now  endorse  more  openly
paternalist approaches that stress trusteeship and ‘capacity-building’ (Sutton 2009, 9, 1; Edwards
2010, 23; McHugh 2014; see also Roger Chennels in chapter 4). Even reparations advocates make
similar  arguments.  Reflecting  on  the  2011  Rawagede  case,  where  payments  were  made  to
Indonesian victims of Dutch mass executions, Larissa van der Herik (2012, 704), for example, has
argued, like many Namibian analysts, that ‘comprehensive political settlements regulated by the
legislator may well be preferable over casuistic and individual court cases’ (compare chapter 3). 
Backlash  from states,  even liberal  ones,  is  of  course also likely. Such efforts,  however,
operate within as yet under-analysed constraints (compare Helfer 2002). Goodhart (2009, 374) is on
to something significant when he writes that ‘it is not as if some decision - by scholars, diplomats,
lawyers, or government officials  -  could draw a line or fix a limit  to human rights claims and
aspirations’.  This  does  not  mean that  there  is  nothing states  can do about  their  expansion.  By
concentrating their attention, and expending significant diplomatic resources, African states, may,
for example, perhaps soon be able to limit the powers of the International Criminal Court - rather as
they have the SADC Tribunal. At the grandest and most dramatic level, therefore - when dealing
those  institutions  which  most  obviously  restrict  state  sovereignty,  and  which  are  only  weakly
enmeshed with other  legal  regimes -  backlash may be a possibility in  the short-term.  We may
perhaps see  the  ‘endtimes’ for  totemic  ‘Human Rights’ institutions  such as  the  ICC (Hopgood
2013).
One of my core concerns in this study, however, has been to illustrate just how far lesser-
known international courts and legal regimes have proliferated, and just how enmeshed in them
even some Southern African states have become. As described in the previous chapter, Twining
(2005, 239) has identified ‘a pervasive aspect of interlegality at all levels of law and legal ordering’.
To the extent that rights have diffused ‘interlegally’ they will be difficult to dislodge. To do so
would require degrees of co-ordinated thought and concentrated bureaucratic attention that is now
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untypical of elites anywhere,  let  alone in the more dependent  states of sub-Saharan Africa (cf.
Kelsall 2002). In the words of my Zimbabwean informant, ‘as one door closes another one will
open’ (see chapter 2). Students of the (highly interdependent) European Union have already noted
how  overlapping,  ‘pluralist’  human  rights  architectures  can  assist  with  the  ‘construction  of
postnational authority’ and prevent backlash (see Krisch 2008). The significance of this, however,
has not always been so obvious to students of other regions.
Courts  themselves,  moreover,  are  unlikely  over  the  long-term to  be  able  to organise  a
sufficiently deft jurisprudential retreat from some of the politically dangerous positions they now
occupy.  International investment regimes, for example - including the International Convention on
the Settlement of Investment Disputes, which arbitrated in Funnekotter v Republic of Zimbabwe -
are  beginning,  slowly,  to  accommodate  pressure  from  states  eager  to  retain  their  regulatory
privileges (Waibel  et  al.  eds.  2010;  Alvarez  2011;  Wouters,  Duquet  and  Hachez  2012,  20-21;
Trakman 2012). But arbitrators’ new ‘strategies of self-limitation’ have been too ‘hesistant’ and ‘ad
hoc’ to deter states from wanting to intervene further in the system (Schneiderman 2011, 1, 5, 18;
compare  Roberts  2014). In  South Africa,  similarly,  courts  have begun,  belatedly,  to  attempt  to
reconcile  rights  to  property  with  social  pressures,  particularly  for  housing.  In  2008  the
Constitutional  Court  (CC)  created  a  new  (quasi-legal)  concept  of  ‘meaningful  engagement’,
obliging all parties to squatting and eviction disputes to engage with one other ‘in good faith and
with a willingness to listen to the concerns of the other’ (cf. Muller 2011, 261; for its significance
Budlender 2011). In other area of property rights more generally, however, the courts have been
unable to prevent  government  from adopting ever  more antagonistic  positions  (e.g.  Chaskalson
2012; Mostert 2014; contrast Jacobs 2012). 
Rights  theorists  may thus  be  mistaken  in  believing  that  courts  will  be  able  to  restrain
themselves so that the liberal project as a whole is not endangered. James Griffin (2010, 355), for
example, believes that the law, ‘as it often does’, will ‘restrict its own activity in its service’. The
case of the SADC Tribunal also illustrate why such assumptions may be misplaced. Human rights
beliefs  have  acquired  some  utopian  qualities  from  the  ideational  dynamics  explaining  their
emergence. There is no guarantee that those applying them will end up assisting liberals performing
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their various tightrope acts. None of this is to suggest, as systems theorists sometimes do, that law
and lawyers are not cognisant of, or influenced by politics (e.g. Luhmann 1986; for commentary
Cotterrell 1995, chapter 6). ‘At its own rhythm’, the law must indeed, ultimately, reflect ‘the forces
that  at  bottom shape  social  relations’ (Dezelay  and  Garth  1996,  98).  These  different  rhythms,
however, have themselves been enough to introduce dysfunction into the liberal project. 
3. Explanatory implications
The dysfunction already caused by new rights beliefs is, however, difficult to understand if
we seek to understand liberalism by looking only for a historically invariant or ‘intensifying’ core
(for ‘intensification’ Foucault 1979b, 228; 2007, 229. 231). The views I engage with in this study
have  sought  to  derive  such  a  core  from  some  blend  of  Christian,  Western,  Renaissance  and
Enlightenment  elements  (Meyer,  Boli  and  Thomas  1987;  Sikkink  2011,  255,  Foucault  2007,
chapters  8-10;  Young  and  Williams  1994,  100).  In  every  case  these  theories  downplay  the
explanatory significance of dilemmas posed by more specific instances of ideological competition,
such  as  the  socialist  and  modernist  crises  of  1970s  (and  associated  rise  of  human  rights).  As
described  in  chapter  5  these  theories  typically  accomplish  this  by  assuming  irrational  belief
formation. On sophisticated Foucauldian views, in particular, new beliefs are only adopted when
functional  for  relentless  desires  for  social  transformation.  As  Donald  Davidson’s  work  shows,
however, the dominance of such irrationality in the ‘matrix of decision’ cannot simply be assumed.
Rational belief formation helps account for the recent arrival and tenacity of new kinds of beliefs in
rights. The beliefs are indeterminate in new and specific ways (relating to the definition of groups),
and yet have been clung onto despite the difficulties they pose for wider liberal projects. 
International relations constructivists have already established the need to understand norms
in relation to other principles governing the international system (e.g. Reus-Smit 2001; Finnemore
2003). In this study, however, I have used the theoretical considerations outlined above to produce a
relational account of norm emergence. It is implausible, I have suggested, to ascribe this solely to
the creative agency of ‘norm entrepreneurs’, who extract them from a stable set of cultural sources,
each  ‘nested’ within  another.  It  makes  more  sense  to  understand  normative  shifts,  and  norm
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entrepreneurship,  as  products  of  new  beliefs.  These  beliefs,  in  turn,  should  be  understood  as
mutable products of ideological competition. Norms derived from them continue to bear the traces
of their contested origins. The recent history of human rights in Southern Africa bears witness to the
dramatic consequences of this fact.  
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1 John Rawls (1971, 5-6) - an author Williams and (especially) Geuss attack on this score - did, it is true, acknowledge
that moralist theories such as his could only apply in ‘well-ordered societies’ where ‘everyone accepts, and knows
that everyone else accepts, the very same principles of justice’, and where ‘basic social institutions satisfy and are
generally known to satisfy these principles’. Williams’ Weberian, internalist notion of legitimacy, however, helps us
see how political order can in fact be established in the radical absence of any such agreement about justice or just
institutions - current disputes in the United States between liberals and (extreme) libertarians being a case a point
(for discussion of legitimacy in Williams see Hall 2013, 4, 10).
2 Rights advocates may, of course, be sceptical of such arguments, since ‘unitary states’ tend for obvious reasons to be
the most reliable implementers of international legal obligations (Risse and Ropp 2013, 18-19).
3 This is not to adopt a naïve legal pluralism, where (modern) law is wholly absent from (African) customary norms
(for critique Chanock 1992; Zips and Weilenmann eds. 2011). Lund and Boone’s emphasis on the local effects of
national  constitutional  orders  illustrates  why this  is  mistaken.  Such  observations,  however,  do  not  entail  that
between distinctions between ‘negotiated’ social orders and those governed by more rational-legal forms legitimacy
become impossible to draw in particular cases (see Roberts 2005; 16). 
4 For  the  Namibian  case  some  journalistic  sources,  public  statements,  and  press  releases  are  now  at
http://www.africavenir.org/en/project-cooperations/german-genocide-in-namibia/press-clipping-links.html [accessed
5th June 2014].
5 As my interviews revealed, both counterfactuals are still keenly debated. 
6 Mugabe has a  degree in  law and administration from the University of  London.  An honorary law degree was
revoked in 2008 (Svep, 12th July 2008).
7 Acquisitions also continued to violate the amended Land Acquisition Act (Marongwe 2008, 197).
8 This is quoted from the famous ‘Utete Report’. For a recent overview of Zimbabwe’s complex tenure arrangements
see Rukuni (2012-3a).
9 JAG’s allegations of a ‘Matabeleland faction’ echo the CFU’s earlier history; a central topic of Selby (2006).
10 For a list of only the decisions reached see http://www.sadc-tribunal.org/?page_id=1872 [accessed 25th May 2014].
11 For a legal opinion by Jeremy Gauntlett, Jeffrey Jowell and Frank Pelser see Ex Parte: Commercial Farmers Union
(3rd September, 2009). For other legal challenges by the CFU, still with somewhat more limited objectives than those
pursued  by  Freeth  and  his  team,  see  CFU  (September  30 th,  2010)  and  Bell  (3rd June  2011).  For  gradual
rapprochement between the two positions see JAG Open Letter Forum (7th October 2011). 
12 Madagascar, the organisation’s fifteenth member, was then suspended. 
13 Tembani  and  Freeth  met  at  the  Tribunal  in  Windhoek  (Ben  Freeth,  interview,  5th April  2012).  In  2000  the
Agricultural Bank of Zimbabwe had auctioned-off the indebted Tembani’s farm without a court order. The execution
of sale was upheld by the Supreme Court in Zimbabwe but ruled illegal by the SADC Tribunal in 2009.
14 The  details  of  ratifications  are  available  at:  http://www.african-court.org/en/images/documents/Court/Statute
%20ACJHR/Statuts%20of%20the%20Ratification%20Process%20of%20the%20Protocol%20Establishing%20the
%20African%20Court.pdf [accessed 1st June 2014].
15 GOZ officials have often occupied important roles in the Commission, which has frequently ‘stressed the colonial
element of the Zimbabwe situation’ (Murray 2011, 188).
16  This text is taken from Section 4(3) of the Implementation of the Rome Statute Act 27 of 2002.
17 Summaries  of  the  case  and  heads  of  argument  are  available  at:  http://www.osisa.org/law/zimbabwe/sa-must-
investigate-zimbabwean-officials  , http://www.osisa.org/law/blog/applying-universal-jurisdiction-sa-law  , and
http://www.Southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2000/02/13/salc-and-another-v-ndpp-and-others-3/ [all  accessed  3rd
June 2014].
18 The court order is available at:  http://cfuzim.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=375:louis-fick-
v-government-of-zimbabwe-in-pretoria-high-court-77812009-&catid=44:legal-cases&Itemid=91 [accessed 4th June
2014].
19 Some lawyers and commercial farmers claimed that these valuations were extremely low, and inferior to what could
be obtained on the basis of SADC judgements (JAG Open Letter Forum, 2nd March 2010; JAG Open Letter Forum,
22nd June 2011).
20 See http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/our_work.html [accessed 12th June 2014].
21 See  comments  by  Tomaso  Ferando,  Jarrod  Hepburn,  Luke  Eric  Petersen  and  Christian  Schliemann  at
http://www.ecchr.de/index.php/worldbank.html [accessed 12th June 2014].
22 For these statistics see http://www.tradingeconomics.com/zimbabwe/current-account [accessed June 12th 2014]. The
intervening  period  has  seen  deficits  increase,  but  stabilise  at  around  $2000  million  (see
http://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects/data?region=SST [accessed June 12th 2014]).
23  For Zimbabwean GDP http://data.worldbank.org/inrdicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?page=2 [accessed 12th June 2014].
24  Unlike JAG and Freeth, Ben Purcell-Gulpin and Marc Carrie-White of the CFU also believe that some form of
'affirmative action' may in principle have been appropriate for Zimbabwe before FTLR. They do not see property as
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'God's Law' (Ben Purcell-Gilpin and Marc Carrie-Wilson, interview, 5th April 2012).
25 ZLHR was now the leading such organisation in Zimbabwe (compare Dorman 2001, 160-162). It  enjoyed close
links with some MDC figures and international human rights organisations - notably the International Commission
of Jurists, of which it was the Zimbabwean affiliate (cf. Tsunga 2009). Amendment 17 linked urban civil society
with commercial farmers’ campaigns for the first time (for the distance between these constituencies see Pilossof
2012, 204-5). ZLHR appealed against the ouster clause to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the
Judges and Lawyers, and - alongside the SADC Lawyers Association and other groups - launched litigation against
it in the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (Zimbabwe Lawyers For Human Rights, September 6th
2005; N.d., 4; JAG, 9th September 2005). But it studiously avoided the questions of racial discrimination and future
political order raised by the Amendment.
26 In 2005 the party split. Unless otherwise indicated I refer here, post-2005, to the larger of two parties that resulted:
the MDC-T, led by Morgan Tsvangirai. 
27 For constitutional drafts and commentary http://www.sokwanele.com/zimbabweconstitution/sections/2552 [accessed
15th June 2014].
28 Compared to Zimbabwe, agricultural  land in Namibia is  generally arid  and unproductive.  Before independence
commercial farming survived largely because of South African subsidies (Werner and Odendaal 2010).
29 In an interview with me on the 27th August 2011 Riruako stated that he had devised the campaign. Morgan (2010,
285) claims that a quotation from one informant (whom I believe to be Mburumba Kerina) shows that the campaign
originated in the 1950s. This may be a conflation with efforts at that time to link the genocide with opposition at the
United Nations to South Africa’s ‘incorporation’ of South-West Africa (Gewald 2003, 289-291; Yates and Chester
2006, 193).
30  I thank Joachim Zeller for providing me with a copy of his interview with Phil Musolino. For more on the 'political
question' doctrine see chapter 6, section 2(c).
31  Hinz's proposal was first presented at a high-profile conference on August 17th. The conference had a telling title:
'1904-2004 Decontaminating the Namibian Past’.
32 Riruako had, however, pointedly invited King Kauluma of Ndonga from Northern Namibia - chairperson of the
Council of Traditional Leaders - to the 2004 centenary commemorations, illustrating the unusual degree of unity at
the time (Zuern 2012, 502). 
33 More recently remains of survivors from Shark Island have been buried in a ‘rather inclusive’ manner as ‘martyrs of 
the liberation struggle’ (Förster 2013). 
34 For recent shifts in some Nama political circles away from commemorating anti-colonial resistance (see  Kössler
2007).  In  the  1970s  the  Nama Chiefs’ Council,  for  its  part,  like  the  Herero’s  Chiefs’ Council,  had  deployed
resistance narratives to contest SWAPO’s anti-apartheid credentials (du Pisani 1986, 255-7). 
35 One speculative explanation for  this is  the better  relationship that  Riruako enjoyed with President  Hifikepunye
Pohamba than with his predecessor (Kuiama Riruako, interview, 27th August 2011).
36 Some have suggested that the reparations campaign has radicalised Herero youth to the point that they hope seize
land from German-speakers (Esther Muinjangue, interview, August 23rd 2011; also Förster 2013). At Red Flag Day
Commemorations in 2011 I certainly observed that radical demands were greeted with more enthusiasm by youth
than by political leaders.
37 I side-step controversies surrounding the normative status of institutions’ technical capacity to preserve objects. 
38 This same source believes that major European museums now co-ordinate their public positions on such matters in
order to continue treating claims on a case-by-case basis.
39  For the ‘colonisation of Tswana consciousness’ see Comaroff and Comaroff (1991, 4).
40  The CKGR's population density was 4,000 times less than Austria's (R. Hitchcock 2002, 804; Zips-Mairitsch 2013, 
303).
41 See http://www.ditshwanelo.org.bw/about.html [accessed 10th June 2014].
42 As Russell (1976) argues, seeing the (typically impoverished) Ghanzi settlers as vehicles of apartheid is in fact
rather absurd.
43 Unfortunately time constraints meant I could not investigate these.
44 For how the late John Hardbattle could play this role in the early days of FPK see Saugestad (2001, 176-7).
45 Such  consent  is  much  harder  to  achieve  amongst  class-action  litigants  in  Western  societies  (for  fascinating
discussion Rubenstein 1997). For ‘bands’ in San society see Barnard (2007, 62-64).
46  Not all Kantians, it should be noted, endorse all aspects of human rights (e.g. O’Neill 2005).
47 For the 'countless ways' in which human interests can in fact be classified see Feinberg (1984, 55).
48 For arguments that at least some liberals’ beliefs were tenaciously anti-imperialist even in the late nineteenth-century
(Claeys 2010). For 'self-interested' liberal anti-imperialism in this period, motivated by desires to protect domestic
liberties see A. Fitzmaurice (2012, 138).
49 For how a new managerialist ‘vulgate’ has ‘apparently risen from nowhere’ see Bourdieu and Wacquant (May 2000),
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and contrast Bevir's (2010a) analysis of its historical origins. Bourdieuan 'fields' may justify themselves in terms of
beliefs, but the two are very far from equivalent (for an introduction Bourdieu 1981). 
50 Contrast the more functionalist explanation for ideas about bodily integrity in Elias ([1939] 2000).
51 This paragraph draws on Brett (2012).
52 As John Dewey (1935, 3) observed, 'liberalism has meant in practice things so different as to be opposed to one
another' (in Bell 2014, 21). Something similar, arguably, has been the case with Christianity (a theme of MacCulloch
2009).  Sikkink may have granted causal influence to what ‘world polity’ sociologists call the ‘Western cultural
account’ thanks to agentic constructivist engagement with their work (Thomas et al. 1987; Finnemore 1996). These
scholars see human rights as simply the latest incarnation of the Western ‘cult of the individual’. They can only deny
their obvious expansion into ‘collective and corporate entities’ on the grounds that such rights remain a statistical
minority (see Elliott 2007, 356, 359).
53 For twentieth-century convergence between rights and humanitarianism see Schiff (2008, 15-20), Sikkink (2011,
106-8) and W. Hitchcock (2012). 
54 When asked to help draft the UDHR the great liberal idealist Benedetto Croce could reportedly only pronounce
himself ‘inept’ (Villey 1983, 10-11).
55 Catastrophe  avoidance,  previously a  liberal  preserve,  has  become a  Left  theme  -  something  reflected  by new
arguments about the dangerous nature of truth (compare Shklar 1989 with Harcourt 2011; for critique Badiou 1993;
2005). Moyn (2010, 47, 81-3) dates Holocaust awareness to the early human rights revolution. Cohen (2012) dates it
somewhat earlier.
56 Geuss (2005, 37, n.18) notes that ‘a general characteristic of much of the history of ideas’ is that the prominence of
particular views can be understood by analysing ‘the spectrum of what were thought to be possible alternatives’. He
associates this approach, which I endorse, with Weber and Nietzsche.
57 For the significance of the 'particular character' of the 'intellectual strata' propagating religious beliefs see Weber
([1922] 1978, 501).
58 Here I gloss over a distinction between ‘normation’ and ‘normalisation’ which Foucault introduced from 1976 (see
D. Taylor 2009, 49-52). Briefly put, biopolitical power,  unlike disciplinary power, derived the normal not from
abstract ‘humanity’ but from the scientific and technical studies of ‘populations’ (normation). Normalisation could
then proceed according to the variety of normals these studies produced. 
59 Lauterpracht and Cassin both had their extended families massacred during the Holocaust. A recurring theme in
Simpson  (2001)  is  how  British  elites  failed  to  understand  the  importance  of  this  experience  for  European
construction  (see also P. Anderson 2009, 18-19).
60 Compare Jean Monnet’s ‘indifference’ but not ‘insensibility’ towards ideological debates (P. Anderson 2009, 15). 
61 Britain had acceded to the Court in 1966, accepting individual petition for a test period. France would only accept it
after Mitterand's election in 1981. Madsen (2011a, 72) explains accession in terms of 'safe distance from the war in
Algeria'. 
62 Whilst pensions, for example, had long been nationally guaranteed for certain classes of the population - such as
soldiers, miners and civil servants - these reforms were only extended to all after 1945 (Conrad 1991, 177). For
state-led reforms and the New Deal see Skocpol and Amenta (1985). 
63 Denning's views on the common law in ex-British colonies also contrasted with those of 'law and development'
modernists (Harrington and Manji 2003, 395-7).
64 The  Chicago  neo-liberals  were  so  disinterested  in  law at  this  time  that  they  appear  to  have  attracted  Michel
Foucault's qualified admiration (Harcourt, Becker and Ewald 2012).
65 Fitzmaurice sought, especially, to identify peremptory norms of international law, or international norms form which
no derogation could be allowed, see G. Fitzmaurice (1973, 323). 
66 This is not to say, of course, that the judgement was therefore a beacon of humanitarianism (for powerful critique C. 
Campbell 2005, 336-7).
67 These victims were not, strictly speaking, forgotten. Rather, they were 'deliberately excluded' by the limited but
nevertheless striking legislative precedents of the 1950s (Pross 1998, 52; Goschler 2009, 105).
68 Jurisprudential milestones included Tel Oren v Libyan Arab Republic (1984), which reached a different conclusion
on justiciability from that in Filártiga. Siderman de Blake v Republic of Argentina (1992) saw the Court of Appeals
overule district courts, and decided that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act also meant ATCA claims were not
justiciable. I thank Chandra Lekha Sriram for guidance here.
69 In North America and Australasia there were long histories of courts arbitrating disputes over treaties signed with
still  'independent' nations,  and sometimes of  appeals made to the British Crown by peoples formally under its
protection. There was however no standardised international legal approach to such questions (cf. McHugh 2005,
chapters 3-5). 
70 The ‘purism’ of J.C. de Wet was one notable exception to this rule (see Fagan 1996, 62-64).
71 Similar, and almost equally notorious was Rossouw v Sachs (1964) (see Dyzenhaus 1998, 69). 
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72 For a discussion of 'constitutional morality', particularly important for British jurists, see Stapleton (1995). 
73 Some of the government's more radical  political opponents sought to exploit the Afrikaner 'formalistic sense of
justice' in similar ways (see remarks by the current Deputy Chief Justice Dikgang Moseneke in Broun 2000, 117).
74 For the genesis of Ford’s work in the 1970s collapse of Latin American socialism (Y. Dezalay and Garth 2006, 237-
242; Moyn 2010, 140-141; S. Dezalay 2011, 11). For the important Legal Resources Centre see Dubow (2012, 84).
75 Compare comments on judicial ‘prejudice’ by Minister of Human Settlements Tokyo Sexwale (2013) with those in
Gauntlett (1972, 207). For another ANC response to Gauntlett see Radebe (26th June 2012). 
76 For FUL's membership see http://www.freedomunderlaw.org/ [accessed 4th April 2014].
77 William Wade and, more recently, Christopher Forsyth - encountered in chapter 4 - have been some of the most
significant inheritors of Denning’s legacies (e.g. Forsyth 1999; Wade and Forsyth 2000, preface).
78 See also biographical information at http://www.blackstonechambers.com/people/barristers/jeffrey_jowell_qc.html 
[accessed 4th April 2014].
79 On 22nd March 2008 Pilossof  (2012, 147, n.78) performed google searches for “farm workers” AND Zimbabwe,
“land reform” AND Zimbabwe, and “white farmers” AND Zimbabwe, receiving 5,700, 21,000, and 827,000 hits
respectively.
80 From a search on www.bbc.com/news/ for 'Ben Freeth' conducted on June 1st 2014.
81 Alongside a number of smaller awards, the film was nominated for an Emmy and BAFTA, and shortlisted for an
Oscar  (see  http://www.mugabeandthewhiteafrican.com/news/ and  http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1437235/awards?
ref_=tt_ql_4 [both accessed 18th June 2014]).
82 But see Mazrui (1977) for disagreements with some aspects of dependency theory. 
83 For details see Revitalizing the Reparations Movement, an important conference held in Chicago on April 19 th 2014,
addressed  by  Louis  Farrakhan  and  Ralph  Gonsalves,  chairman  of  CARICOM  (see  http://ibw21.org/press-
2/revitalizing-the-reparations-movement-a-nationalinternational-forum/ and  https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=r2NYDwFlO0k .  
84 An older generation of Caribbean scholar-politicians had highlighted the damage caused by slavery in order to
legitimate decolonisation rather than to demand reparations (see C.L.R. James 1938; E. Williams 1944.)
85 For the Mau-Mau campaigning of Jeremy Corbyn MP and Liberation (formerly Fenner Brockaway's Movement for
Colonial Freedom), which Corbyn chairs, see Olende (5th October 2012) and Shah (2012).
86 See  http://www.africavenir.org/about-africavenir/about-berlin/our-activities.html [accessed  4th April  2014].  Berlin
Postkolonial is another very important group in the NGO alliance, and advocates notably for changed streetnames
(Nicolai  Röschert,  personal  communication,  29th July  2014). It  was  founded  in  2007,  and  stresses  the  120th
anniversary of the Berlin Africa Conference as the catalyst for increased mobilisation in 2004 - unlike Melber (2014,
157)  who,  likes  me,  stresses  the  centenary  of  1904  (see  https://www.betterplace.org/en/organisations/berlin-
postkolonial [accessed 4th April 2014]). 
87 See http://www.goethe.de/kue/lit/prj/com/cgp/cgse/enindex.htm and 
https://www.goethe.de/ins/za/prj/sua/gen/rue/wer/her/enindex.htm [accessed 4th April 2014].
88 See http://www.africavenir.org/about-africavenir/about-berlin.html [accessed 14th April 2014].
89 The launch of the Namibian Coalition for Transitional Justice (NCTJ) was spearheaded by Breaking the Wall of
Silence (BWS; a group representing ex-SWAPO detainees), and the Legal Assistance Centre. It was supported by
former TRC commissioner Yasmin Sooka who argued that a ‘good reparation’ policy was essential for entrenching
the rule of law and human rights in society. An LRC report published to accompany the launch blamed the Namibian
government for a failure to resolve ‘issues of accountability, truth-telling, memory and compensation’ relating to the
genocide of 1904-07 (Sasman, 27th October 2009). BWS spokeswoman, Pauline Dempers, believes that SWAPO
fears that ‘another chapter will immediately be opened’ if reparations are paid (interview,  August 30th 2011;  for
similar speculations see Buford and van der Merwe 2004, 298). In 2001 Namrights, another NGO engaged around
these issues, even threatened to sue the Tanzanian and Zambian governments - allegedly complicit in torture of
dissidents - if such a reconciliation commission was not created (Namrights, 22nd February 2001). For a comparison
of Namrights and BWS' strategies see Höhn (2010).
90 Van der Post (1986, 74) also attacked sanctions against apartheid as 'morally obscene’, even if he had long criticised
apartheid itself (Wilmsen 1995, 207, n.47). For the 1987 Kalahari visit see Butcher, 30th August 2002.
91 Saugestad (2011, 61, n.73) thus queries Resnick's (2009) claim that 'frame resonance disputes' such as these can be
beneficial for transnational movements. 
92 This  should  be  distinguished  from  a  linked  but  separate  development:  the  dramatic  increase  in  the  legal
responsibility of historian themselves for the content of their work, especially that denying historical crimes (see Le
Crom 1998; Chauvy And Others v. France 2004).
93 For King Leopold Ghosts' role in recent legal battles around Belgian colonial atrocities see Ewans (2003). And for
Hoschild's contribution (Buettner 2014).
94 Ultimately,  however,  this  legal  category only become accepted  after  1945.  The strategic  calculations  of  Great
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Powers clearly prevented such forms of oversight extending into inter-war colonial administration after Germany’s
loss of her colonies (compare Schiff 2008, 22). The pressure applied to ‘little’ Belgium to curb abuses in the Congo
constituting the exception proving this rule (see Koskenniemi 2001, 155-165). In 1919 Germany prepared its own
'White Book' documenting British colonial atrocities. And in 1923 after South African independence, the German
settler  bloc in Windhoek's  new all-white  legislative assembly forcefully demanded the Blue Book's  destruction
(Gewald 2004, 65).  British and South African officials acquiesced 'in the interests of chessboard politics of imperial
consolidation' (Sylvester and Gewald 2003, xxviii). 
95 Silberbauer conceded this definition might also apply to non-San groups in the CKGR such as the Bakalagadi
96 But for how gender differences might be obscured see Sylvain (2004; 2006; 2011).
97 This most recent version of the norm spiral model stresses 'bottlenecks' between norm cascades and compliance,
notably those caused by low state-capacity. It aligns itself with the Chayes' (1995) managerialism and downplays the
importance of rules (Risse and Ropp 2013, 15).
98 It should be noted that he bureaucratic 'gatekeeping' which Bob (2009) shows can efficiently exclude new rights, is
not necessarily so less effective at preventing new applications of existing rights.
99  For an argument that neither statutes of limitations nor retroactivity should in fact prevent Namibian reparations see
Sarkin (2008, chapter 2). For arguments that limitations should have excluded recent Indonesian reparations claims
against the Dutch government see van den Herik (2012, 698, n.23). And for reasons why the British High Court was
able to use its discretion to decide otherwise in the Kenyan case Engelhart (2012, 101).
100 Jeremy Sarkin (2008, 64) has also argued that 'the international system of rights protection, even outside of the laws
of war,  was not only present in the nineteenth century,  but  developing rapidly'.  (The intervening period had, it
should be noted, seen significant efforts by international lawyers to connect humanitarian and human rights law
'streams' - as reflected in the 2005 UN principles on reparations (Zwanenburg 2006, 655-660; Schiff 2008, 15-20;
Sikkink 2011, 106-8).
101 See  http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-6&chapter=4&lang=en [accessed
14th April 2014].
102 The domestic law of the United States possesses some  de facto  international enforcement capacities - capacities
mirrored on a sub-regional scale by the domestic law of South Africa (see chapter 2) - since almost all states have
commercial  interests  of  some sort  in  that  country.  Space precludes  analysis  of  some new, similar  liabilities  of
corporations.
103 The African leaders who most openly opposed the principles behind these demands were Senegalese President
Abdoulaye Wade and Ghanaian President J.A. Kufour. Wade declared that he himself might be liable for the slaves
owned by his ancestors, whilst Kufour - a figure whose political opponents frequently accused of inheriting traits
from slave-owning forebears - later claimed that African elites involvement in slavery undermined the legitimacy of
any reparations payments (Hasty 2002, 66; Hassmann 2008, 86; Asare 2008, 34; see also MacCaskie 2007, 176).). 
104 Space precludes extended discussion, but the most common means of denying states’ claims is to brand them as
‘criminal’.  This  certainly followed Zimbabwean demands at  Durban and Haitian demands for  reparations from
France in 2003 (Charles, 18th December 2003; compare also Dupuy 2007 with Hallward 2007; Howard-Hassmann
2008, 135-6). As Skinner (2010, 46) argues, however, inherited state obligations such as public debts are necessarily
integral to the international system. This means only some states can be ever labelled as unrepresentative at any one
time. This informal, negotiated division of the world into 'civilised and barbarous nations' is what Reus-Smit (2013b,
181-4) calls ‘Millian sovereignty’.  
105 See  http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314
[accessed 3rd June 2014].
106 Even in these countries, however, there have always been concerns that legal definitions in terms of 'aboriginality'
impose overly demanding and even perverse evidential requirements on potential litigants (e.g. Thuen 2004, 270;
Ulbricht  2014). This has served to render self-definitional approaches more attractive.  Such approaches in turn,
however, have been criticised on the grounds that membership lists - produced, for instance, in order to share casino
revenue or allocate scholarships - reflect the vested interests of the indigenous elites who draft them (see Pfefferle
2007; McHugh 2014).
107 Saugestad (2008, 165, n.4), for example, notes how contemporary United Nations definitions of indigeneity retain
an emphasis of 'priority of occupation' despite the fact that peoples such as the Maasai may only have occupied their
territories 'for about two centuries'
108 The terms  'sceptics' and 'dogmatists' refer to an analogy Barnard draws with a debate in the history of mathematics.
109  ‘Horizontal’ here does not imply uncoercive (see Buxbaum's 2004, 184-5 critique of Slaughter 2003).
110 The last two decades have seen a significant indigenisation of the Botswana judiciary, even if expatriate judges still
regularly sit on the Court of Appeal. I thank Rachel Ellett for sharing her database of these judges.
111 Once again I thank Rachel Ellett for sharing her database of expatriate judges’ career paths.
112 Gabon, Côte d’Ivoire and Zambia were the only other states to recognise Biafra - which had justified succession in
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terms of the risk of genocide. President Kaunda of Zambia often followed his friend Nyerere’s lead in foreign
affairs, whilst, for a long time at least, the Francophone states were considered to have been acting as French proxies
(see Heraclides 1991, 93-98; Saideman 2001, chapter 4).
113 For Bayart (2000) extraversion is not merely a technique but part of African states' 'historicity' and 'grammar of
action'. Such claims are advanced from within a Foucauldian theoretical framework ultimately incompatible with
that proposed in this study (cf. Bayart [1989] 2009). And despite my indebtedness to Bayart's work, I agree with
Young (1999, 151) that such perspectives are, strictly speaking, ahistorical.
114 These  scripts,  importantly,  do  not  operate  automatically  -  as  in  Boli,  Meyer  and  Thomas  (1987)  -  but  are
consequences of extraversion. For the case of ECOWAS see Ebobrah (2010).
115 This 'theology' is largely common also to FRELIMO in Mozambique (Saunders 2013, 163).
116 Liberal theorists have, of course, argued against some of their other features. Some have alleged, for example, that
rights are corrosive of social capital and republican virtue, and tend to over-bureaucratise public service delivery
(Glendon 1991; Dagger 1997; O'Neill 2005, 425).
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